Institutions and Organizations
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Ambassador Eliasson sets out the current status of Europe-US relations and acknowledges the wide range of daunting problems the world must face today. He emphasizes the need for an enhancement of the transatlantic relationship, as well as the need for multilateral cooperation. Mr. Eliasson also reinforces the importance of a continued awarenesss of the economy, the environment, and ethics.

Synopsis

Although unsure whether there will in fact be a new transatlantic agenda, Ambassador Eliasson repeatedly highlights that it is crucial that it does happen if we are to challenge the ‘huge’ issues of today. Mr. Eliasson notes the current financial climate and its possible effects on the social and political spheres as worrying. He also expresses particular concern at what he calls ‘fortress building,’ which involves protectionism and intolerance. Mr. Eliasson goes on to explain that as it stands, current US-Europe relations are dominated by mutual interest on security and the economy. However, to Mr. Eliasson, this relationship is marred by several issues. Inside the EU, democracy is in a predicament with politicians being accountable nationally while the issues are international. Moreover, Mr. Eliasson feels that the nature of the US and Europe relationship is not representative of the responsibility it should carry by being the most prosperous regions of the world.

How is this transatlantic relationship to move forward? If we are to arrive at what Mr. Eliasson describes as ‘scenario 1,’ which involves long term thinking, regulation, an emphasis on ethics, and a realization of interdependence in an internationally cooperative system, then Mr. Eliasson argues this requires reform. Mr. Eliasson argues it is urgent not to separate politics and economics. In dealing with a financial crisis, we must employ a multilateral approach and learn lessons for the future, particularly not fearing international regulation in a globalized economy. Mr. Eliasson also explains we can avoid this protectionist ‘fortress building’ by embracing ‘multipolarity.’ Mr. Eliasson underscores the importance of tolerance and good governance as central to progress. In addition, Mr. Eliasson reinforces that the problems of today are on such a massive scale that they must be dealt with internationally, as well as regionally and in the private sector.

Dealing with such issues, which involve collective engagement in Afghanistan and a cooperative approach in Africa, is what Mr. Eliasson believes must be added as a ‘third pillar’ to the US and Europe’s relationship. Mr. Eliasson also stresses concrete action on poverty by the US and Europe as central to this effort. In particular, he places emphasis a program for education of women and the establishment of clean water access. Mr. Eliasson believes that such efforts, which would add a pivotal ethical dimension to the transatlantic agenda, would enhance the reputation of democracy across the globe through concrete action.

In engaging with the audience in a question-and-answer session, one of the most emphasized subjects was diplomatic standards for international relations. Mr. Eliasson strongly reinforced the notion that the transatlantic agenda should stand with clear ethical standards. Other issues addressed included Iran's nuclear capabilities, religion, and the role of Russia.

About the Speaker

Ambassador Jan Eliasson was until July 1, 2008 Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Darfur. Previously, Jan Eliasson was President of the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly 2005-2006. He was Sweden’s Ambassador to the United States, 2000-2005. Mr. Eliasson was Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in 2006.

Mr. Eliasson served from 1994 to 2000 as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a key position in formulating and implementing Swedish foreign policy. Earlier, 1988-1992, he was Sweden’s Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. During this period, he also served as the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative for Iran/Iraq.

In 1992, Mr. Eliasson was appointed the first United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and was involved in operations in Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique and the Balkans. He also took initiatives on landmines, conflict prevention and humanitarian action.

1980-1986, Mr. Eliasson was part of the UN mediation missions in the war between Iran and Iraq, headed by former Prime Minister Olof Palme. In 1993-94 Mr. Eliasson served as mediator in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). He has been Visiting Professor at Uppsala University and Göteborg University in Sweden, lecturing on mediation, conflict resolution and UN reform.

During his diplomatic career, Mr. Eliasson has been posted to New York (twice) Paris, Bonn, Washington (twice) and Harare, where he opened the first Swedish Embassy in 1980. He served as Diplomatic Adviser to the Swedish Prime Minister 1982-1983, and as Director General for Political Affairs in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1983-1987.

Mr. Eliasson has authored and co-authored numerous articles and books and is a frequent lecturer on foreign policy and diplomacy. He is recipient of honorary doctorate degrees from i. a. American University, Washington, D.C., Uppsala University and Göteborg University, Sweden. He has been decorated by a number of Governments.

He is the Chairman of the Anna Lindh Memorial Fund of Sweden and is Member of the Advisory Group to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva.

Born in Göteborg, Sweden, in 1940, Mr. Eliasson was an exchange student in the United States 1957-1958. He graduated from the Swedish Naval Academy in 1962 and earned a Master’s degree in Economics and Business Administration in 1965.

Oksenberg Conference Room

Jan Eliasson Former Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Darfur; Former President of the United Nations General Assembly; Former Minister for Foreign Affairs for Sweden Speaker
Lectures
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Why do community-based education and social persuasion programs for promoting healthy lifestyle and preventing chronic disease sometimes fall short of our expectations? Why are population effects so difficult to engineer and why are they so ephemeral? This research carried out at USC, the Claremont Graduate University, and collaborating institutions in China integrates across social, behavioral, and neurocognitive sciences to address those questions.

We conclude tentatively that the answer to each of the questions may lie in individual and context variability relative to program response, and that in order to more fully address the question of prevention program response variability requires engagement and integration across several levels of science to consider the roles of social groupings, environmental selection and design, social influence processes, and brain biology. What works in one social, cultural or organizational setting may not be so effective in another. What works for persons with certain genetic and experiential backgrounds may be totally ineffective for persons with different dispositional or personality characteristics. In a series of community/school based prevention trials carried out in markedly different southern California and central China settings, we have uncovered domains of consistent response, and other domains of substantial environment- and disposition-based response variability. A social influences based smoking prevention program framed in collectivist values and objectives worked to prevent smoking in one cultural setting but not another. And an individualist framed social influences program worked in the setting where the collectivist program did not. But the characteristics of the particular settings which defined program success or failure were different from what conventional (e.g., cultural psychology) wisdom would have led us to expect. Furthermore, both within and across cultural settings, the same individual dispositional characteristics moderated or determined program effectiveness, again in ways not predicted by the common cultural and behavioral science wisdom. In recent studies carried out both in China and the U.S. we have found affective decision deficits, with known neural underpinnings, to account for rapid progression to regular smoking and binge drinking. These deficits are akin to the dispositional characteristics found earlier to moderate prevention program effects. Subsequent brain imaging studies confirm the hypothesized regions of neural involvement. Together these findings hold promise for more effective – situation and phenotype specific – approaches to engendering and sustaining more optimal individual and population health behavior.

Philippines Conference Room

Carl Anderson Johnson Dean & Professor Speaker School of Community & Global Health, Claremont Graduate School
Seminars
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Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a promising technology that might allow for significant reductions in CO2 emissions. But at present CCS is very expensive and its performance is highly uncertain at the scale of commercial power plants. Such challenges to deployment, though, are not new to students of technological change. Several successful technologies, including energy technologies, have faced similar challenges as CCS faces now. In this paper we draw lessons for the CCS industry from the history of other energy technologies that, as with CCS today, were risky and expensive early in their commercial development. Specifically, we analyze the development of the US nuclear-power industry, the US SO2-scrubber industry, and the global LNG industry.

We focus on three major questions in the development of these analogous industries. First, we consider the creation of the initial market to prove the technology: how and by whom was the initial niche market for these industries created? Second, we look at how risk-reduction strategies for path-breaking projects allowed the technology to evolve into a form so that it could capture a wider market and diffuse broadly into service. Third, we explore the "learning curves" that describe the cost reduction as these technologies started to capture significant market share.

Our findings suggest that directly applying to CCS the conventional wisdom that is prevalent regarding the deployment and diffusion of technologies can be very misleading. The conventional wisdom may be summarized as: "Technologies are best deployed if left in the hands of private players"; "Don't pick technology winners" or "Technology forcing is wrong"; and "Technology costs reduce as its cumulative installed capacity increases". We find that none of these readily applies when thinking about deployment of CCS.

Through analyzing the development the analogous industries, we arrive at three principal observations:  

  • First, government played a decisive role in the development of all of these analogous technologies. Much of the early government role was to provide direct backing for R&D work and demonstration projects that validated the technological concepts. For example, the US government directly supported for over two decades most of the basic science and engineering research in both SO2 scrubbers and nuclear power. Most of the demonstration projects were significantly underwritten by government as well; the Japanese government was the principal backer of LNG technology through its promises to buy most of the world's LNG output over many years. Direct government support created the niche opportunities for these technologies.
  • Second, diffusion of these technologies beyond the early demonstration and niche projects hinged on the credibility of incentives for industry to invest in commercial-scale projects. In each of the historical cases, government made a shift in its support strategy as the technology diffused more widely. In the early phase (when commercial uncertainties were so high that businesses found it extremely risky to participate in more than small, isolated projects) success in achieving technology diffusion required a direct role for government. But as uncertainties about the technology's performance reduced and operational experience accumulated, direct financial support became less important, and indirect instruments to lower commercial risk rose in prominence. Those instruments included tax breaks, portfolio/performance standards, purchase guarantees, and low-interest-rate loans linked to specific commercial-scale investments. It is conceivable that such incentives could have been supplied by non-governmental institutions, such as large firms or industry associations, but the three analogs point strongly to a governmental role-perhaps because only government action was viewed as credible. (In the United States, many of the key decisions to support new technologies were crafted at the state level, such as through rate base decisions to allow utilities to purchase nuclear plants.)
  • Third, the conventional wisdom that experience with technologies inevitably reduces costs does not necessarily hold. Risky and capital-intensive technologies may be particularly vulnerable to diffusion without accompanying reductions in cost. In fact, we find the opposite of the conventional wisdom to be true for nuclear power in the US (1960-1980) and global LNG (1960-1995). Costs increased as cumulative installed capacity increased. A very rapid expansion of nuclear power plants in the US around 1970 led to spiraling costs, as the industry had no chance to pass lessons from one generation of investment to the next-a fact evident, for example, in the failure to standardize design and regulation that would allow firms to exploit economies of scale. For natural gas liquefaction plants, costs stayed high for decades due to a market structure marked by little competition among technology suppliers and the presence of a single dominant customer (Japanese firms organized by the Japanese government) willing to pay a premium for safety and security of supply. The same attributes that allowed LNG to expand rapidly-namely, promises of assured demand made credible by the singular backing of the Japanese state-were also a special liability as the technology struggled to compete in other markets. The experience with SO2 scrubbers was more encouraging-costs declined fairly promptly once industrial-scale investment was under way. But that happened only after sufficient clarity on technological performance and capability of FGD systems had been established. What followed was a strict performance standard-in the form of a government mandate, imposed by environmental regulators-that effectively picked FGD as a technology winner. The guaranteed market for FGD led to serious investment, innovations, and learning-by-doing cost reductions. We do not argue that this technology-forcing approach was economically efficient but merely underscore that rates of diffusion of FGD technology akin to what is imagined for CCS technology today were possible only under this technology-forcing regulatory regime.

As CCS commercialization proceeds, policymakers must remain mindful that cost reduction is not automatic-it can be derailed especially by non-competitive markets, unanticipated shifts in regulation, and unexpected technological challenges. At the same time, there may be some inevitable tradeoffs, at least for a period, between providing credible mechanisms to reduce commercial risk, such as promises of assured demand for early technology providers, and stimulating market competition that can lead to lower costs. History suggests that government-backed assurances are essential to creating the market for capital-intensive technologies; yet those very assurances can also create the context that makes it difficult for investors to feel the pressure of competition that, over successive generations of technology, leads to learning and lower costs.

We are also mindful that our history here-drawn on the experience of three technologies that have been successful in obtaining a substantial market share-is a biased one. By looking at successes we are perhaps overly prone to derive lessons for success when, in fact, most visions for substantial technological change actually fail to get traction.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working Paper #81
Authors
Varun Rai
David G. Victor
Mark C. Thurber
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In 2006, public reports began to circulate that North Korea was constructing a large new rocket testing and launching center in a rural North-western coastal valley. A Jane's article by Bermudez nicknamed the complex Pongdong-ni and reported on some of the individual facilities. Coming in the aftermath of the 2006 Taepo-dong II launch failure from the existing Musadun-ri launch center on North Korea's East coast, there has been world-wide  speculation and ‘expert' analysis, much of it based on Google Earth images which have not been updated since 2003 (Musadun-ri) and 2006 (Pongdong-ni).  A recent government report that a rocket engine test occured during the summer of 2008 ratcheted up the media rhetoric: meanwhile little has been admitted by North Korea. In our presentation, we will examine the growth of the DPRK's rocket programs using commercial tools and satellite visible and multispectral data previously available only the government intelligence and military analysts.  In our presentation:

  1. We will assess and compare the capabilities and completion schedules of Pongdong- ni and  Musadun-ri,
  2. Present important new policy issues that are presented by these major facility investments,
  3. Show examples of how Open Source Technical Intelligence can provide an improved public understanding of foreign WMD activities independently of government and partisan policy centers.  
  4. Comment on last weeks Iranian satellite launch using North Korean developed rockets. 

Lew Franklin is a long-time CISAC Affiliate, joining CISAC in 1992 as a Visiting Scholar after retiring as a TRW vice president, and previously vice president and co-founder of ESL, a defense intelligence company.  Upon retirement he was awarded the CIA's Gold Medal for career-long contributions to foreign weapons assessment and national technical means capabilities.  At CISAC his work focused on technical intelligence related problems, including wmd proliferation, export controls, defense conversion, and especially conversion of retired ICBMs for low-cost space launches.  In 1993, he headed the launch campaign that mated the Stanford Quakesat satellite onto a retired Russian SS-19 Rokot launcher for a successful launch to orbit.  His current research into Open Source Technical Intelligence is in support of the upcoming visit to North Korea led by Lewis and Hecker.

Nick Hansen graduated with a BA in Geography from Syracuse University in 1964.  His career in national intelligence spans 43 years first as an Army imagery analyst, and then in industry with GTE-EDL, ESL/TRW, Tera Research as a cofounder Vice Pres. and then again at ESL (now TRW/Northrop-Grumman) as a Director. Currently he is in an SES position at the Navy's NIOC-Suitland, MD, as an image technology expert associated with Pennsylvania State University.  He has been twice nominated for the NRO's Pioneer award for innovative imagery uses and techniques development and is an expert in foreign weapons systems and test ranges. Currently Nick is supporting John Lewis' North Korea project.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Lewis Franklin CISAC Affiliate Speaker
Nick Hansen Retired Expert on Imagery Technology, Electronic Systems Laboratory; Senior Engineer, Penn State University Speaker
Seminars
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On March 17 the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies will host a book launch for a pathbreaking new book, Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats, co-authored by Stephen Stedman, Senior Fellow, FSI and Director of the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies, Bruce Jones, Co-Director of the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, and Carlos Pascual, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution. Power and Responsibility has been produced by the Managing Global Insecurity Project, a multi-year, multi-continent collaboration between the Brookings Institution, NYU's Center on International Cooperation, and Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute, seeking to coalesce the best thinking on international security affairs today.

As the authors note, the post-World War II fabric of global security, designed and maintained by the United States, has dangerously frayed. Built for a different age, current international institutions are ill-equipped to address today's pressing transnational security challenges-- such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, civil strife, and terrorism, which are beyond the power of any one state to address.

Revitalizing the institutions of cooperation will require a new conceptual foundation for global security. The "national sovereignty" of the twentieth century must give way to "responsible sovereignty" - a principle requiring nations not only to protect their own people, but also to cooperate across borders to safeguard common resources and tackle common threats. Achieving this will require American leadership and commitment to a rule-based international order.

With timely and hard-hitting recomendations, Power and Responsibility seeks to galvanize more effective global action against transnational threats and to build the political support networks needed to reform and revitalize international institutions.

Following an introduction by Coit D. Blacker, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies and Director, the Freeman Spogli Institute, all three authors will comment on key ways that revitalized institutions and commitments could address issues topping the foreign policy agendas of the U.S. and its global partners.

A book signing and reception will follow the authors' commentary.

Bechtel Conference Center

Bruce Jones Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University Speaker
Carlos Pascual Vice President, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution Speaker

CDDRL
Encina Hall, C152
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2705 (650) 724-2996
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
Stedman_Steve.jpg PhD

Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, and will be faculty director of the Program on International Relations in the School of Humanities and Sciences effective Fall 2025.

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance.

In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.

His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Director, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law
Director, Program in International Relations
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Date Label
Stephen J. Stedman Senior Fellow, FSI, and Director, Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies Speaker
Conferences
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This event is presented in conjunction with the Japan Society of Northern California.

About the talk

Orthodox economic theory views cognition as taking place inside the skull and skin of individuals. For example, the contract theory of the firm is based on such premise. However, one of essential features of corporate firms can be seen as systems of group-level, distributed cognition.

From this perspective, Aoki identifies five generic types of organizational architecture in terms of three-way relationships between management's and employees' cognitive assets and physical tools of group-level cognition (e.g., computers, file, machines, etc.). He will discuss a variety of governance structures complementary to each of them. It is hoped that in this way, an essential aspect of a competitive form of architectural-governance evolving in global markets beyond national characteristics may be identified.

Aoki will conclude with a suggestion of information roles of equity markets subtly different from what the orthodox finance-property rights theory indicates.

About the speaker

Masahiko Aoki is the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies in the Economics Department, and senior fellow of Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. He is a theoretical and applied economist with a strong interest in institutional and comparative issues. His preferred field covers the theory of institution, corporate governance, the Japanese and Chinese economies, and modularity.

Aoki's most recent book, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, was published in 2001 by MIT Press. This work develops a conceptual and analytical framework for integrating comparative studies of institutions in economics and other social sciences based on game-theoretic apparatus. His research has been also published in the leading journals in economics, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Literature, and Industrial and Corporate Change.

Aoki is president of the International Economic Association (2005-2008) and a former president of the Japanese Economic Association. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the founding editor of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies, as well as an associate editor and member of the scientific advisory committees for various professional journals. He was awarded the Japan Academy Prize in 1990, and in 1998 he took the 6th International Schumpeter Prize. Between 2001 and 2004, Aoki served as the President and Chief Research Officer (CRO) of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), an independent administrative institution specializing in public policy research in Japan.

Aoki graduated from the University of Tokyo with a BA and an MA in economics and earned a PhD in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1967. He was formerly an assistant professor at Stanford University and Harvard University and served as both an associate and full professor at the University of Kyoto before re-joining the Stanford faculty in 1984 after sixteen years of absence. He became professor emeritus in 2004 to concentrate on research as well as be engaged in various international activities.

Philippines Conference Room

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Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor of Japanese Studies, Department of Economics, Emeritus
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Senior Fellow at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
2011_MasaAoki2_Web.jpg PhD

Masahiko Aoki was the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies in the Department of Economics, and a senior fellow of the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Aoki was a theoretical and applied economist with a strong interest in institutional and comparative issues. He specialized in the theory of institutions, corporate architecture and governance, and the Japanese and Chinese economies.

His most recent book, Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutions, based on his 2008 Clarendon Lectures, was published in 2010 by Oxford University Press. It identifies a variety of corporate architecture as diverse associational cognitive systems, and discusses their implications to corporate governance, as well their modes of interactions with society, polity, and financial markets within a unified game-theoretic perspective. His previous book, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, was published in 2001 by MIT Press. This work developed a conceptual and analytical framework for integrating comparative studies of institutions in economics and other social science disciplines using game-theoretic language. Aoki's research has been also published in the leading journals in economics, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Literature, Industrial and Corporate Change, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations.

Aoki was the president of the International Economic Association from 2008 to 2011, and is also a former president of the Japanese Economic Association. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the founding editor of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies. He was awarded the Japan Academy Prize in 1990, and the sixth International Schumpeter Prize in 1998. Between 2001 and 2004, Aoki served as the president and chief research officer of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry, an independent administrative institution specializing in public policy research in Japan.

Aoki graduated from the University of Tokyo with a B.A. and an M.A. in economics, and earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1967. He was formerly an assistant professor at Stanford University and Harvard University and served as both an associate and full professor at the University of Kyoto before rejoining the Stanford faculty in 1984.

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Masahiko Aoki Speaker
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