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Why do community-based education and social persuasion programs for promoting healthy lifestyle and preventing chronic disease sometimes fall short of our expectations? Why are population effects so difficult to engineer and why are they so ephemeral? This research carried out at USC, the Claremont Graduate University, and collaborating institutions in China integrates across social, behavioral, and neurocognitive sciences to address those questions.

We conclude tentatively that the answer to each of the questions may lie in individual and context variability relative to program response, and that in order to more fully address the question of prevention program response variability requires engagement and integration across several levels of science to consider the roles of social groupings, environmental selection and design, social influence processes, and brain biology. What works in one social, cultural or organizational setting may not be so effective in another. What works for persons with certain genetic and experiential backgrounds may be totally ineffective for persons with different dispositional or personality characteristics. In a series of community/school based prevention trials carried out in markedly different southern California and central China settings, we have uncovered domains of consistent response, and other domains of substantial environment- and disposition-based response variability. A social influences based smoking prevention program framed in collectivist values and objectives worked to prevent smoking in one cultural setting but not another. And an individualist framed social influences program worked in the setting where the collectivist program did not. But the characteristics of the particular settings which defined program success or failure were different from what conventional (e.g., cultural psychology) wisdom would have led us to expect. Furthermore, both within and across cultural settings, the same individual dispositional characteristics moderated or determined program effectiveness, again in ways not predicted by the common cultural and behavioral science wisdom. In recent studies carried out both in China and the U.S. we have found affective decision deficits, with known neural underpinnings, to account for rapid progression to regular smoking and binge drinking. These deficits are akin to the dispositional characteristics found earlier to moderate prevention program effects. Subsequent brain imaging studies confirm the hypothesized regions of neural involvement. Together these findings hold promise for more effective – situation and phenotype specific – approaches to engendering and sustaining more optimal individual and population health behavior.

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Carl Anderson Johnson Dean & Professor Speaker School of Community & Global Health, Claremont Graduate School
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Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a promising technology that might allow for significant reductions in CO2 emissions. But at present CCS is very expensive and its performance is highly uncertain at the scale of commercial power plants. Such challenges to deployment, though, are not new to students of technological change. Several successful technologies, including energy technologies, have faced similar challenges as CCS faces now. In this paper we draw lessons for the CCS industry from the history of other energy technologies that, as with CCS today, were risky and expensive early in their commercial development. Specifically, we analyze the development of the US nuclear-power industry, the US SO2-scrubber industry, and the global LNG industry.

We focus on three major questions in the development of these analogous industries. First, we consider the creation of the initial market to prove the technology: how and by whom was the initial niche market for these industries created? Second, we look at how risk-reduction strategies for path-breaking projects allowed the technology to evolve into a form so that it could capture a wider market and diffuse broadly into service. Third, we explore the "learning curves" that describe the cost reduction as these technologies started to capture significant market share.

Our findings suggest that directly applying to CCS the conventional wisdom that is prevalent regarding the deployment and diffusion of technologies can be very misleading. The conventional wisdom may be summarized as: "Technologies are best deployed if left in the hands of private players"; "Don't pick technology winners" or "Technology forcing is wrong"; and "Technology costs reduce as its cumulative installed capacity increases". We find that none of these readily applies when thinking about deployment of CCS.

Through analyzing the development the analogous industries, we arrive at three principal observations:  

  • First, government played a decisive role in the development of all of these analogous technologies. Much of the early government role was to provide direct backing for R&D work and demonstration projects that validated the technological concepts. For example, the US government directly supported for over two decades most of the basic science and engineering research in both SO2 scrubbers and nuclear power. Most of the demonstration projects were significantly underwritten by government as well; the Japanese government was the principal backer of LNG technology through its promises to buy most of the world's LNG output over many years. Direct government support created the niche opportunities for these technologies.
  • Second, diffusion of these technologies beyond the early demonstration and niche projects hinged on the credibility of incentives for industry to invest in commercial-scale projects. In each of the historical cases, government made a shift in its support strategy as the technology diffused more widely. In the early phase (when commercial uncertainties were so high that businesses found it extremely risky to participate in more than small, isolated projects) success in achieving technology diffusion required a direct role for government. But as uncertainties about the technology's performance reduced and operational experience accumulated, direct financial support became less important, and indirect instruments to lower commercial risk rose in prominence. Those instruments included tax breaks, portfolio/performance standards, purchase guarantees, and low-interest-rate loans linked to specific commercial-scale investments. It is conceivable that such incentives could have been supplied by non-governmental institutions, such as large firms or industry associations, but the three analogs point strongly to a governmental role-perhaps because only government action was viewed as credible. (In the United States, many of the key decisions to support new technologies were crafted at the state level, such as through rate base decisions to allow utilities to purchase nuclear plants.)
  • Third, the conventional wisdom that experience with technologies inevitably reduces costs does not necessarily hold. Risky and capital-intensive technologies may be particularly vulnerable to diffusion without accompanying reductions in cost. In fact, we find the opposite of the conventional wisdom to be true for nuclear power in the US (1960-1980) and global LNG (1960-1995). Costs increased as cumulative installed capacity increased. A very rapid expansion of nuclear power plants in the US around 1970 led to spiraling costs, as the industry had no chance to pass lessons from one generation of investment to the next-a fact evident, for example, in the failure to standardize design and regulation that would allow firms to exploit economies of scale. For natural gas liquefaction plants, costs stayed high for decades due to a market structure marked by little competition among technology suppliers and the presence of a single dominant customer (Japanese firms organized by the Japanese government) willing to pay a premium for safety and security of supply. The same attributes that allowed LNG to expand rapidly-namely, promises of assured demand made credible by the singular backing of the Japanese state-were also a special liability as the technology struggled to compete in other markets. The experience with SO2 scrubbers was more encouraging-costs declined fairly promptly once industrial-scale investment was under way. But that happened only after sufficient clarity on technological performance and capability of FGD systems had been established. What followed was a strict performance standard-in the form of a government mandate, imposed by environmental regulators-that effectively picked FGD as a technology winner. The guaranteed market for FGD led to serious investment, innovations, and learning-by-doing cost reductions. We do not argue that this technology-forcing approach was economically efficient but merely underscore that rates of diffusion of FGD technology akin to what is imagined for CCS technology today were possible only under this technology-forcing regulatory regime.

As CCS commercialization proceeds, policymakers must remain mindful that cost reduction is not automatic-it can be derailed especially by non-competitive markets, unanticipated shifts in regulation, and unexpected technological challenges. At the same time, there may be some inevitable tradeoffs, at least for a period, between providing credible mechanisms to reduce commercial risk, such as promises of assured demand for early technology providers, and stimulating market competition that can lead to lower costs. History suggests that government-backed assurances are essential to creating the market for capital-intensive technologies; yet those very assurances can also create the context that makes it difficult for investors to feel the pressure of competition that, over successive generations of technology, leads to learning and lower costs.

We are also mindful that our history here-drawn on the experience of three technologies that have been successful in obtaining a substantial market share-is a biased one. By looking at successes we are perhaps overly prone to derive lessons for success when, in fact, most visions for substantial technological change actually fail to get traction.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working Paper #81
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Varun Rai
David G. Victor
Mark C. Thurber
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In 2006, public reports began to circulate that North Korea was constructing a large new rocket testing and launching center in a rural North-western coastal valley. A Jane's article by Bermudez nicknamed the complex Pongdong-ni and reported on some of the individual facilities. Coming in the aftermath of the 2006 Taepo-dong II launch failure from the existing Musadun-ri launch center on North Korea's East coast, there has been world-wide  speculation and ‘expert' analysis, much of it based on Google Earth images which have not been updated since 2003 (Musadun-ri) and 2006 (Pongdong-ni).  A recent government report that a rocket engine test occured during the summer of 2008 ratcheted up the media rhetoric: meanwhile little has been admitted by North Korea. In our presentation, we will examine the growth of the DPRK's rocket programs using commercial tools and satellite visible and multispectral data previously available only the government intelligence and military analysts.  In our presentation:

  1. We will assess and compare the capabilities and completion schedules of Pongdong- ni and  Musadun-ri,
  2. Present important new policy issues that are presented by these major facility investments,
  3. Show examples of how Open Source Technical Intelligence can provide an improved public understanding of foreign WMD activities independently of government and partisan policy centers.  
  4. Comment on last weeks Iranian satellite launch using North Korean developed rockets. 

Lew Franklin is a long-time CISAC Affiliate, joining CISAC in 1992 as a Visiting Scholar after retiring as a TRW vice president, and previously vice president and co-founder of ESL, a defense intelligence company.  Upon retirement he was awarded the CIA's Gold Medal for career-long contributions to foreign weapons assessment and national technical means capabilities.  At CISAC his work focused on technical intelligence related problems, including wmd proliferation, export controls, defense conversion, and especially conversion of retired ICBMs for low-cost space launches.  In 1993, he headed the launch campaign that mated the Stanford Quakesat satellite onto a retired Russian SS-19 Rokot launcher for a successful launch to orbit.  His current research into Open Source Technical Intelligence is in support of the upcoming visit to North Korea led by Lewis and Hecker.

Nick Hansen graduated with a BA in Geography from Syracuse University in 1964.  His career in national intelligence spans 43 years first as an Army imagery analyst, and then in industry with GTE-EDL, ESL/TRW, Tera Research as a cofounder Vice Pres. and then again at ESL (now TRW/Northrop-Grumman) as a Director. Currently he is in an SES position at the Navy's NIOC-Suitland, MD, as an image technology expert associated with Pennsylvania State University.  He has been twice nominated for the NRO's Pioneer award for innovative imagery uses and techniques development and is an expert in foreign weapons systems and test ranges. Currently Nick is supporting John Lewis' North Korea project.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Lewis Franklin CISAC Affiliate Speaker
Nick Hansen Retired Expert on Imagery Technology, Electronic Systems Laboratory; Senior Engineer, Penn State University Speaker
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On March 17 the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies will host a book launch for a pathbreaking new book, Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats, co-authored by Stephen Stedman, Senior Fellow, FSI and Director of the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies, Bruce Jones, Co-Director of the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, and Carlos Pascual, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution. Power and Responsibility has been produced by the Managing Global Insecurity Project, a multi-year, multi-continent collaboration between the Brookings Institution, NYU's Center on International Cooperation, and Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute, seeking to coalesce the best thinking on international security affairs today.

As the authors note, the post-World War II fabric of global security, designed and maintained by the United States, has dangerously frayed. Built for a different age, current international institutions are ill-equipped to address today's pressing transnational security challenges-- such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, civil strife, and terrorism, which are beyond the power of any one state to address.

Revitalizing the institutions of cooperation will require a new conceptual foundation for global security. The "national sovereignty" of the twentieth century must give way to "responsible sovereignty" - a principle requiring nations not only to protect their own people, but also to cooperate across borders to safeguard common resources and tackle common threats. Achieving this will require American leadership and commitment to a rule-based international order.

With timely and hard-hitting recomendations, Power and Responsibility seeks to galvanize more effective global action against transnational threats and to build the political support networks needed to reform and revitalize international institutions.

Following an introduction by Coit D. Blacker, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies and Director, the Freeman Spogli Institute, all three authors will comment on key ways that revitalized institutions and commitments could address issues topping the foreign policy agendas of the U.S. and its global partners.

A book signing and reception will follow the authors' commentary.

Bechtel Conference Center

Bruce Jones Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University Speaker
Carlos Pascual Vice President, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution Speaker

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Encina Hall, C152
616 Jane Stanford Way
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(650) 725-2705 (650) 724-2996
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
Stedman_Steve.jpg PhD

Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, and will be faculty director of the Program on International Relations in the School of Humanities and Sciences effective Fall 2025.

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance.

In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.

His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Director, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law
Director, Program in International Relations
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Stephen J. Stedman Senior Fellow, FSI, and Director, Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies Speaker
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This event is presented in conjunction with the Japan Society of Northern California.

About the talk

Orthodox economic theory views cognition as taking place inside the skull and skin of individuals. For example, the contract theory of the firm is based on such premise. However, one of essential features of corporate firms can be seen as systems of group-level, distributed cognition.

From this perspective, Aoki identifies five generic types of organizational architecture in terms of three-way relationships between management's and employees' cognitive assets and physical tools of group-level cognition (e.g., computers, file, machines, etc.). He will discuss a variety of governance structures complementary to each of them. It is hoped that in this way, an essential aspect of a competitive form of architectural-governance evolving in global markets beyond national characteristics may be identified.

Aoki will conclude with a suggestion of information roles of equity markets subtly different from what the orthodox finance-property rights theory indicates.

About the speaker

Masahiko Aoki is the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies in the Economics Department, and senior fellow of Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. He is a theoretical and applied economist with a strong interest in institutional and comparative issues. His preferred field covers the theory of institution, corporate governance, the Japanese and Chinese economies, and modularity.

Aoki's most recent book, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, was published in 2001 by MIT Press. This work develops a conceptual and analytical framework for integrating comparative studies of institutions in economics and other social sciences based on game-theoretic apparatus. His research has been also published in the leading journals in economics, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Literature, and Industrial and Corporate Change.

Aoki is president of the International Economic Association (2005-2008) and a former president of the Japanese Economic Association. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the founding editor of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies, as well as an associate editor and member of the scientific advisory committees for various professional journals. He was awarded the Japan Academy Prize in 1990, and in 1998 he took the 6th International Schumpeter Prize. Between 2001 and 2004, Aoki served as the President and Chief Research Officer (CRO) of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), an independent administrative institution specializing in public policy research in Japan.

Aoki graduated from the University of Tokyo with a BA and an MA in economics and earned a PhD in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1967. He was formerly an assistant professor at Stanford University and Harvard University and served as both an associate and full professor at the University of Kyoto before re-joining the Stanford faculty in 1984 after sixteen years of absence. He became professor emeritus in 2004 to concentrate on research as well as be engaged in various international activities.

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Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor of Japanese Studies, Department of Economics, Emeritus
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Senior Fellow at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
2011_MasaAoki2_Web.jpg PhD

Masahiko Aoki was the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies in the Department of Economics, and a senior fellow of the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Aoki was a theoretical and applied economist with a strong interest in institutional and comparative issues. He specialized in the theory of institutions, corporate architecture and governance, and the Japanese and Chinese economies.

His most recent book, Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutions, based on his 2008 Clarendon Lectures, was published in 2010 by Oxford University Press. It identifies a variety of corporate architecture as diverse associational cognitive systems, and discusses their implications to corporate governance, as well their modes of interactions with society, polity, and financial markets within a unified game-theoretic perspective. His previous book, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, was published in 2001 by MIT Press. This work developed a conceptual and analytical framework for integrating comparative studies of institutions in economics and other social science disciplines using game-theoretic language. Aoki's research has been also published in the leading journals in economics, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Literature, Industrial and Corporate Change, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations.

Aoki was the president of the International Economic Association from 2008 to 2011, and is also a former president of the Japanese Economic Association. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the founding editor of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies. He was awarded the Japan Academy Prize in 1990, and the sixth International Schumpeter Prize in 1998. Between 2001 and 2004, Aoki served as the president and chief research officer of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry, an independent administrative institution specializing in public policy research in Japan.

Aoki graduated from the University of Tokyo with a B.A. and an M.A. in economics, and earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1967. He was formerly an assistant professor at Stanford University and Harvard University and served as both an associate and full professor at the University of Kyoto before rejoining the Stanford faculty in 1984.

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Masahiko Aoki Speaker
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Effective strategies for managing the dangers of global climate change are proving very difficult to design and implement.  They require governments to undertake a portfolio of costly efforts that yield uncertain benefits far in the future.  That portfolio includes tasks such as putting a price on carbon and devising complementary regulations to encourage firms and individuals to reduce their carbon footprint.  It includes correcting for the tendency for firms to under-invest in the public good of new technologies and knowledge that will be needed for achieving cost-effective and deep cuts in emissions.  And it also includes investments to help societies prepare for a changing climate by adapting to new climates and also readying "geoengineering" systems in case they are needed.  Many of those efforts require international coordination that has proven especially difficult to mobilize and sustain because international institutions are usually weak and thus unable to force collective action.  All these dimensions of climate diplomacy are the subject of my larger book project and a host of complementary research here at the Program on Energy & Sustainable Development.  

By far, the most important yet challenging aspect of international climate policy has been to encourage developing countries to contribute to this portfolio of efforts.  Those nations, so far, have been nearly universal in their refusal to make credible commitments to reduce growth in their emissions of greenhouse gases for two reasons.  First, most put a higher priority on economic growth-even at the expense of distant, global environmental goods.  That's why the developing country governments that have signaled their intention to slow the rise in their emissions have offered policies that differ little from what they would have done anyway to promote economic growth.  Second, the governments of the largest and most rapidly developing countries-such as China and India-actually have little administrative ability to control emissions in many sectors of their economy.  Even if they adopted policies to control emissions it is not clear that firms and local governments would actually follow.  

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #82
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David G. Victor
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Syed Ibne Abbas joined the Consulate General of Pakistan, Los Angeles on August 3, 2006. Prior to his present assignment, he served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad as Director General (2004-2006).

He joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1983 and held various diplomatic assignments at the Pakistan Missions abroad: Berne (1989-1992), Geneva (1992-1994), Canberra (1998-2001) and New Delhi (2001-2004). He also worked at the Headquarters as Director and Desk Officer, and served as Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister's Secretariat (1995-1997).

He has represented Pakistan and led delegations on several occasions on bilateral and multilateral fora. He attended the 1997 and 2006 UN General Assembly sessions as a Pakistan delegate. He represented Pakistan at the Conference on Disarmament and attended meetings of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

He has delivered talks at the Pakistan's premier civil and military training institutions. He holds masters degrees in Political Science and International Relations.

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Syed Ibne Abbas Consul General of Pakistan Speaker
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The change of Russian foreign policy under President Putin, the war in Georgia, and the recent disputes over Russian gas exports cannot but affect Moscow's relations with the European Union. Looking back at the history of these relations in the 1960s and 1970s will provide the analyst with valuable insights and with recommendations for future European policy.

Dr. Mueller focuses not only on Russia's current relations with the EU but also the historical buildup to the current state of play. He examines the most recent issues straining the EU-Russia relationship and the dependence of the two powers on each other. Dr. Mueller also leads the audience from World War II to the USSR's eventual recognition of the EEC in 1988. 

Synopsis

Dr. Mueller begins by introducing the current status of both the EU and Russia. As it stands, Russia’s population of 142m people is outweighed significantly by the EU’s 500m. In addition, Dr. Mueller reminds the audience that the EU’s economy is 10 times the size of Russia’s. However, the two are important trade partners. To Russia, the EU represents more than 50% of its trade. To the EU, Russia represents its 3rd largest trading partner. However, the EU’s dependence on Russia for energy is crucial. Dr. Mueller explains how various integration efforts have come to very little. The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has not been renewed, and the four common spaces approach the EU took to Russia has borne little fruit. Dr. Mueller reveals how relations are further strained by a variety of current issues such as debates over disarmament, democracy in Russia, and Kosovo.

In order to properly understand this, Dr. Mueller returns to the post-World War II period and the formation of the EEC in 1957. While Western European countries saw the EEC as an opportunity to unite and help each other in economic recovery after the war, the USSR perceived it as an economic base for NATO and an organization standing in the way of the USSR becoming Europe’s supreme power. Dr. Mueller describes how the Soviet Union was forced to change such an attitude because of the success of the EEC in raising wages in member states as well as Eastern European countries’ increasing dependence on it as an export partner. In 1962, Khrushchev took a new approach to all-European integration but his offer of formal relations fell through when de Gaulle vetoed the UK’s membership application into the EEC. Such efforts on the part of the USSR fell through once again in 1972 when the EEC was not interested in dealing with Comecon. Under Gorbachev, the USSR finally recognized the EEC in 1988. Dr. Mueller concludes by saying that while it was obvious that USSR did not really endorse Western European integration, it is surprising that the USSR did not see it as an opportunity to counter U.S. influence during the Cold War.

About the Speaker

Dr Wolfgang Mueller is a research fellow at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and a lecturer in Russian history and politics at the University of Vienna. His book on Soviet policy in Austria, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945-1955 (Böhlau 2005), was awarded the R.G. Plaschka Prize. Dr Mueller was a visiting scholar at the Freeman Spogli Institute's Forum on Contemporary Europe during the 2008-2009 academic year.

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Research Scholar, Austrian Academy of Sciences
Visiting Scholar, Forum on Contemporary Europe
PhD

Dr Wolfgang Mueller, PhD in contemporary history and Russian studies (University of Vienna), is a research associate at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Former professional affiliations include the Montreal Holocaust Memorial Centre, Canada, and the Institute of East European History, University of Vienna. Wolfgang Mueller was a visiting fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of OSCE missions to the CIS area. He teaches Russian history and politics at the University of Vienna.

Research interests: Russian and Soviet foreign policy, international relations, the Cold War, European integration. Current research projects: continuities in Russian foreign policy behavior, the USSR/Russia and European integration; the revolutions of 1989.

Wolfgang Mueller’s book on postwar Soviet policy in Austria Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945-1955 (2005) was awarded the Richard G. Plaschka Prize. Further publications include Sovetskaia politika v Avstrii: Dokumenty iz Rossiiskikh arkhivov (with N. Naimark, A. Suppan, G. Bordiugov eds. 2005); The Austrian State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (with G. Stourzh, A. Suppan eds. 2005); “Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War,” Cold War History 6 (2006) 1; Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (with M. Portmann eds. 2007); “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” in From the Common Market to European Union Building (M. Gehler ed. 2009); Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe 1955-1989 (Forthcoming).

Dr. Mueller was a visiting scholar with the Forum on Contemporary Europe from October 2008 through March 2009.

Wolfgang Mueller Research Scholar, Austrian Academy of Sciences; Visiting Scholar, Forum on Contemporary Europe Speaker
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Daishiro Nomiya
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In activist communities worldwide, globalization has had an enormous impact, both in the composition of activist groups and the content of their messages. At the same time, regional concerns are playing a significant role in the ways protests are organized, managed, and deployed.

Regardless of their location or their target, it is clear that protest campaigns have, on the one hand, become increasingly globalized. The protests that took place during the July 2008 G8 Toyako Summit in Japan offer a case in point. Approximately one hundred transnational activists flew into Sapporo, a city located near the summit site, and joined various civil and protest activities. Over a loudspeaker, they broadcast statements denouncing the summit meeting as “antidemocratic” and “discriminatory against the poor.” These activists were drawn from East, Southeast, and Central Asia, as well as Europe and North America, and they voiced correspondingly global concerns—for human rights, global peace, and democracy, and against inequality and poverty. These themes echoed those of other major global protests, including demonstrations that took place against the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, the latter most notably in 1999 in Seattle. Indeed, protests of this kind represent what might be called an antiglobalization movement

On the other hand, global movements of this kind also appear to be organized on an increasingly regional basis. Though the activists who protested the Toyako Summit came from all over the world, and addressed topics of global importance, most of the participants came mainly from South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Given this apparent dichotomy, the question arises: Will global social movements become regional?

One could argue that global social movements are and will remain regional, at least for the time being, for two practical reasons. First, the costs associated with flight to activist hubs near protest sites can be expensive. Second, the amount of time spent in transition to the protest site becomes a burden. The time doubles when taking into consideration the time spent to return to the originating country. These factors can be prohibitive especially to those based far away, but are less burdensome to regional activists, thus making it easier for nearby protesters to participate.

While time and cost are no doubt a concern, they may not be as important when compared with the other factors. Language is among these factors. Cooperative activities beyond the national borders are on the rise, yet many foreign activists do not speak the languages spoken in the countries where they protest. They invariably rely on English, widely accepted as the “global” language. Yet the levels of English fluency differ among participating activists, and this is a key factor. With their English ability, activists from Europe and North America tend to communicate with others on an individual basis, while those from nearby countries often rely on interpreters, especially when discussions delve into the details of the planned activity and necessary arrangements associated with it. Typically, interpreters are group leaders, well educated and knowledgeable about regional and global issues—and these individuals facilitate most intergroup communication.

Preestablished ties and preexisting communication can influence negotiation and cooperation processes among activists. Global social movements tend to enhance crossnational cooperation among participating activists—that is, activists who come together from different countries often regroup elsewhere, building on their previous cooperative activities. In the case of the 2008 G8 summit protests, regionalization was very much at work. Several months prior to the summit, Japanese media activists planned a temporary umbrella organization called the G8 Media Network, which helped to accommodate incoming foreign media activists and arranged international cooperative activities during the summit. As it happened, the foreign activists and groups that interacted with the G8 Media Network were actually regional, originating mainly from South Korea and Hong Kong. Under the auspices of the G8 Media Network, these groups of activists arrived prior to the summit and stayed until it concluded. Afterward, the same media groups discussed the continuation of crossnational cooperation. Though technically foreign, the dominant actors and groups who sought to continue cooperative activities were, in fact, only from neighboring countries.

Looking more closely at participants in the global protest activities provides further insight into contemporary global protest movements. At the 2008 G8 Summit protests, two different types of foreign participants were on display—those who had prior ties to host activist groups in Japan, and those who did not. The former group could be described as professional activists, whose preestablished ties ensure that they have good knowledge of a given protest’s scheduled activities. The professional group also organizes its own plans of action, precoordinated with domestic groups. The latter group tends to be traveling activists, a more or less independent and unorganized collection of individuals who enjoy traveling the globe and joining the activities offered at protest sites worldwide. The professional activist group is often drawn largely from neighboring countries in the region.

Most global social movements feature participants from around the world. At the same time, signs of regionalization also exist, making most protests both global and regional in nature. One could claim that the future of global social movements is regional. But whether global or regional, it is vital that we continue to study the composition of global protest movements and their abiding impact on civil society.

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