After the 51-48 defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the Senate, General John Shalikashvili (Former Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff) commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to examine the following technical issues,* which will be summarized:

•  US capacity to maintain safety/reliability and design/evaluation of its nuclear stockpile without testing.
• International/US capability to monitor a nuclear test ban, including evasion scenarios.
• Ability of nations to increase nuclear capability with/without cheating and the potential effect of cheating on US security.

* Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy Press, 2003. D. Hafemeister, Physics of Societal Issues, Springer and AIP Press, 2005; Physics and Society 33, 4-7, July 2004; and VERTIC Verification Yearbook 2004.

David Hafemeister is an emeritus professor of physics at California Polytechnic State University.  He spent a dozen years in Washington as Professional Staff Member on the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs (1990-93 on arms control treaties at the end of the Cold War), Science Advisor to Senator John Glenn (1975-77), Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Nye (1977-78), Visiting Scientist in the State Department Office of Nuclear Proliferation Policy (1979) and Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy (1987), Foster Fellow in the ACDA Strategic Negotiations Division (1997-98), and Study Director at the National Academy of Sciences (2000-02).  He has led technical staffs on nuclear-testing with the State Department (1987), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1900-02) and the National Academy of Sciences (2000-02).

The presentation examines the practical problems of reducing the danger of accidental launch and suggests that the current approach to the problem should be reconsidered. First, the U.S. launch-on-warning posture may represent a bigger problem than that of Russia. Second, the efforts to repair or augment the Russian early-warning system should not be pursued as part of the de-alerting agenda, since they probably increase risk of an accidental launch. Finally, the notion of transparency in de-alerting should be reconsidered, for verification prevents de-alerting from being effective. (A short summary of the presentation can be found at russian forces).

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He spent several years as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years. At the Center for Arms Control Studies, he worked on various technical and political issues of missile defense; U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations, and structure and history of the Russian strategic forces. During that time he was a principal investigator of a Russian Nuclear Forces research project, which produced a book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Ariel (Eli) Levite is the Principal Deputy Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). Dr. Levite has extensive experience dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation as both a scholar and practitioner. Before that, Dr. Levite was a visiting fellow at CISAC, where he also served as co-leader of the CISAC Discriminate Force Project. His previous jobs include Deputy National Security Advisor (Defense Policy) and Head of the Bureau of International Security at the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

Dr. Levite has written and published extensively on issues of international security, strategy, and Middle East politics. His two most recent publications include "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited" in International Security, Winter 2002-03, and, co-authored with Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "The Case for Discriminate Force" in Survival, Winter 2002-03. He holds a bachelor's degree from Tel-Aviv University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Cornell University.