What is the problem?
Progress towards reducing nuclear dangers is currently hampered by entrenched divisions between Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty members and non-members, and between Western and non-aligned states. Longstanding differences between Australia and India typify this problem.

What should be done?
New partnerships and platforms for dialogue would expand the space for agreement and new thinking. An unconventional diplomatic partnership between India and Australia could be a test bed for the larger challenge of how to bridge old divides on nuclear and security issues.

Early steps in such a partnership would include a leaders' statement identifying common aims in reducing nuclear dangers. Nonproliferation export controls could be a primary area of cooperation. Canberra should promote Indian involvement in the so-called Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons export controls, including to raise comfort levels between New Delhi and other nonproliferation arrangements.

A new bilateral nuclear dialogue could consider the prevention of illicit nuclear transfers at sea, the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the security of nuclear energy growth in Southeast Asia, the reduced role of nuclear arms in defence postures, and recommendations from the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament sponsored by Australia and Japan.

(Excerpt) According to climate scientists, averting the worst consequences of climate change requires that the increase in global temperature should be limited to 2°C (or 3.6°F). to achieve that objective, global emissions of green house gases (GHGs)—the main human cause of global warming—must be reduced to 50 percent of 1990 levels by 2050.

The key to successful climate change abatement at those scales lies in leveraging the collective actions of developed and developing countries. Cumulatively, developed countries have been responsible for most human emissions of GHGs. that picture will be quite different in the future as emissions from the developing world take over the top mantle. Given this dynamic, there is a general agreement internationally that developed countries will lead emissions reductions efforts and that developing countries will follow with “nationally ap- propriate mitigation actions.” turning that agreement into environmentally beneficial action requires close international coordination between the developed and developing countries in allocating the responsibility for the necessary reductions and following up with credible actions. However, the instruments employed so far to promote the necessary collective action have proved to be insufficient, unscalable, and questionable in terms of environmental benefit and economic efficiency.

Currently, the most important and visible link be- tween developed and developing countries’ efforts on climate change is the Clean development Mechanism (CdM). the CdM uses market mechanisms—the “carbon markets”—to direct funding from developed countries to those projects in developing countries that lead to reductions in emissions of warming gases. In reality, the experience with the CdM has been mixed at best since its inception in 2006. while the CdM has successfully channeled funding to many worthy projects that reduce emissions of warming gasses, it has also spawned myriad projects with little environmental benefits. overall, the CdM has led to a significant overpayment by developed countries for largely dubious emissions reductions in developing countries.

Israel has had an arsenal of nuclear weapons since the late 1960s, and its current inventory is estimated at between 100 and 200 warheads. Some of these weapons will eventually be, or have already been, placed on Israel's missile-carrying submarines, making them virtually impervious to preemptive military attack. They are or soon will be Israel's invulnerable nuclear deterrent.

Yet, hardly a day goes by without some Israeli official, journalist or lobbyist expressing apocalyptic warnings about Iran's nuclear program. Iran, a state party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), is in technical violation of some of its treaty obligations, but its program is still under international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Israel never signed the NPT and thus is not under any international inspection regime.

The tacit assumption behind the apocalyptic pronouncements is that Iran will not only make nuclear weapons, but will use them to destroy Israel shortly thereafter. This amounts to assuming that Iran's leaders are insane. That is, Israel's deterrent notwithstanding, the Iranian clerics' hatred of Israel is so intense that in order to destroy it they would launch a nuclear attack that would kill not only Jews but also up to 1.5 million Muslims living in Israel, as well as triggering an Israeli nuclear counterattack. An Israeli nuclear counterattack, which Iran could not prevent, would turn back the clock on Iran's development for many decades and reduce its leaders to radioactive dust. There is no evidence to suggest that the ruling clerics are so disposed. Some have speculated that Iran might make nuclear weapons and transfer some of them to third parties, e.g. terrorist organizations, for use against Israel. But no country that provides nuclear weapons to a third party can be sure that the transfer will be perfectly secure from discovery or that the weapons will be used as intended. A nuclear attack on Israel using a weapon originating in Iran would undoubtedly be treated as if it came from Tehran, again resulting in Iran's utter destruction.

Many countries around the world are taking a fresh look at nuclear power. An important cause of what has come to be called the global nuclear renaissance is the prospect of severe disruptions to the earth's climate brought about by continued increases in greenhouse gas emissions, primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels. Nuclear power occupies a unique position in the debate over global climate change as the only carbon-free energy source that is already contributing to world energy supplies on a large scale and that is also expandable with few inherent limits. These attributes are regularly highlighted by nuclear energy advocates and now, increasingly, by some formerly anti-nuclear activists, even as other environmentalists remain strongly opposed to this technology.

The traditional approach to demand response of paying for a customer's electricity consumption reductions relative to an administratively set baseline is currently being advocated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as a way to foster the participation of final consumers in formal wholesale markets. Although these efforts may lead to greater participation of final consumers in traditional demand response programs, they are likely to work against the ultimate goal of increasing the benefits that electricity consumers realize from formal wholesale electricity markets, because traditional demand response programs are likely to provide a less reliable product than generation resources. The moral hazard and adverse selection problems that reduce the reliability of the product provided by traditional demand response resources can be addressed by treating consumers and producers of electricity symmetrically in the wholesale market. Several suggestions are made for how this would be accomplished in both the energy and ancillary services markets. A specific application of this general approach to the California wholesale electricity market is also provided.

Programs to distribute improved biomass stoves have traditionally been unsuccessful, despite enormous potential health and climate benefits. This research note helps explain the reasons for this by considering three main prerequisites for technology adoption by the poor. The first success factor is motivation on the part of customers to adopt the new product. When motivation does not exist initially, it must be created through education, social marketing, or improved design. The second essential component is that the product be affordable, be it through disposable income, financing, or subsidies. Finally, the success of a product is dependent on the level of user engagement necessary to take advantage of it.

Improved cookstoves rank poorly on all three dimensions: their benefits are rarely valued highly by customers at the outset, they are expensive, and they require a significant change in lifestyle to be put into use.

These three potential barriers to adoption are relevant to any product aimed at consumers at the "bottom of the pyramid" in income. They help explain why some products (for example, Coca-Cola and cell phones) have penetrated markets rapidly while others such as cookstoves have achieved very limited penetration.

Prevention of pressure ulcers is fundamental to safe care of nursing home residents yet the role of hydration in pressure ulcer prevention has not been systematically examined. This randomized clinical trial was undertaken to determine whether administration of supplemental fluid to nursing home residents at risk for pressure ulcers would enhance collagen deposition, increase estimated total body water, augment subcutaneous tissue oxygenation, and was safe. After a baseline period, 64 subjects were randomized to receive the fluid volume prescribed or additional fluid (prescribed plus 10 mL/kg) for 5 days. Participants' potential to heal as measured with hydroxyproline was low at baseline and did not increase significantly during treatment when additional fluid was systematically provided. Fluid intake increased significantly during treatment. Estimates of total body water and subcutaneous oxygen did not increase, indicating hydration was not improved. Supplemental fluid did not result in overhydration as measured by clinical parameters. Further work is needed to examine the relationship between fluid intake and hydration in nursing home residents as well as the role of hydration in pressure ulcer prevention.

Interest in nuclear disarmament has grown rapidly in recent years. Starting with the 2007 Wall Street Journal article by four former U.S. statesmen-George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn-and followed by endorsements from similar sets of former leaders from the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Australia, and Italy, the support for global nuclear disarmament has spread. The Japanese and Australian governments announced the creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in June 2008. Both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama explicitly supported the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons during the 2008 election campaign. In April 2009, at the London Summit, President Barack Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev called for pragmatic U.S. and Russian steps toward nuclear disarmament, and President Obama then dramatically reaffirmed "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" in his speech in Prague.

There is a simple explanation for these statements supporting nuclear disarmament: all states that have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are committed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." In the United States, moreover, under Clause 2 of Article 6 of the Constitution, a treaty commitment is "the supreme Law of the Land." To af1/2rm the U.S. commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons is therefore simply promising that the U.S. government will follow U.S. law.

A closer reading of these various declarations, however, reveals both the complexity of motives and the multiplicity of fears behind the current surge in support of nuclear disarmament. Some declarations emphasize concerns that the current behavior of nuclear-weapons states (NWS) signals to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) that they, too, will need nuclear weapons in the future to meet their national security requirements. Other disarmament advocates stress the growth of global terrorism and the need to reduce the number of weapons and the amount of fissile material that could be stolen or sold to terrorist groups. Some argue that the risk of nuclear weapons accidents or launching nuclear missiles on false warning cannot be entirely eliminated, despite sustained efforts to do so, and thus believe that nuclear deterrence will inevitably fail over time, especially if large arsenals are maintained and new nuclear states, with weak command-and- control systems, emerge.

Perhaps the most widespread motivation for disarmament is the belief that future progress by the NWS to disarm will strongly influence the future willingness of the NNWS to stay within the NPT. If this is true, then the choice we face for the future is not between the current nuclear order of eight or nine NWS and a nuclear-weapons- free world. Rather, the choice we face is between moving toward a nuclear- weapons-free world or, to borrow Henry Rowen's phrase, "moving toward life in a nuclear armed crowd."

There are, of course, many critics of the nuclear disarmament vision. Some critics focus on the problems of how to prevent nuclear weapons "breakout" scenarios in a future world in which many more countries are "latent" NWS because of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities to meet the global demand for fuel for nuclear power reactors. Others have expressed fears that deep nuclear arms reductions will inadvertently lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging U.S. allies currently living under "the U.S. nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence to pursue their own nuclear weapons for national security reasons. Other critics worry about the "instability of small numbers" problem, fearing that conventional wars would break out in a nuclear disarmed world, and that this risks a rapid nuclear rearmament race by former NWS that would lead to nuclear first use and victory by the more prepared government.

Some critics of disarmament falsely complain about nonexistent proposals for U.S. unilateral disarmament. Frank Gaffney, for example, asserts that there has been "a 17 year-long unilateral U.S. nuclear freeze" and claims that President Obama "stands to transform the ‘world's only superpower' into a nuclear impotent." More serious critics focus on those problems-the growth and potential breakout of latent NWS, the future of extended deterrence, the enforcement of disarmament, and the potential instability of small numbers-that concern mutual nuclear disarmament. These legitimate concerns must be addressed in a credible manner if significant progress is to be made toward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

To address these problems adequately, the current nuclear disarmament effort must be transformed from a debate among leaders in the NWS to a coordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS. This essay outlines a new conceptual framework that is needed to encourage NWS and NNWS to share responsibilities for designing a future nuclear-fuel-cycle regime, rethinking extended deterrence, and addressing nuclear breakout dangers while simultaneously contributing to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.