International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Gi-Wook Shin
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This essay first appeared in The Diplomat.



For decades, South Korean strategy rested on a stable hierarchy within the international order. The alliance with the United States provided security; Seoul then managed relations with Japan, Europe, China, and regional institutions around that anchor. The alliance remains indispensable, but Seoul can no longer assume that this foundation will stay stable.

The evidence is visible in the way Washington now deals with allies. In 2025, the United States initially announced sharply differentiated “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Negotiations later produced a 15 percent baseline framework for all three, but the process mattered as much as the final rate. Trade access, industrial investment, defense procurement, and alliance politics were increasingly handled as one bargaining package. Allies were not exempt from economic pressure because they were allies.

At the same time, Europe and Asia have been building connections that would have seemed highly ambitious a decade ago. The European Union signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November 2024. This year, the EU and Japan launched a defense-industry dialogue, while the EU and South Korea signed a digital trade agreement and began implementing cooperation on maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation, space, and the defense industry. The strategic map is becoming more networked. 

The network, however, remains uneven. Japan already has a mature economic partnership with the EU and rapidly expanding defense-industry ties. EU-South Korea relations are deepening, but they still lack the density and regular strategic consultation found in EU-Japan ties. A trilateral format would therefore do more than add another meeting: it would reduce asymmetry among three partners whose capabilities are increasingly complementary.


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The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.
Gi-Wook Shin

South Korea, Japan, and the EU now face four converging challenges and pressures.

The first is demographic. South Korea is aging faster than any other OECD society; Japan’s working-age population has been shrinking for decades; and the EU’s fertility rate reached a new low in 2024. Demography is not a social-policy sidebar. It affects defense recruitment, industrial capacity, fiscal room, technological adoption, and the ability to sustain long-term commitments. Each actor is experimenting with immigration, automation, workforce policy, and welfare reform, but the security implications remain largely compartmentalized.

The second is concentrated economic dependence. None of the three can or should decouple from China. Yet South Korea’s experience after the THAAD deployment, Europe’s debates over economic coercion, and China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and other strategic inputs have shown that interdependence can be converted into leverage. De-risking therefore requires more than national stockpiles. It requires shared risk maps, compatible certification, co-investment in alternative suppliers, and advance consultation before export controls or industrial subsidies create collateral damage among partners.

The third challenge is U.S. volatility. The United States is still the only actor capable of providing extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and NATO remains central to European defense. But dependence on U.S. power now coexists with uncertainty about U.S. policy. The classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment are no longer opposite ends of a spectrum. Today, U.S. allies fear both being left out and being drawn into bargains or contingencies they did not shape.

The fourth pressure is the collapse of the old geographic separation between European and Asian security. North Korean munitions, missiles, and troops have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow, in turn, has provided Pyongyang with political cover, economic support, and the prospect of military know-how. What happens on a European battlefield is changing the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. A regional response to a cross-regional threat is structurally inadequate.

This is the case for an EU-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue. This framework should not be described as strategic autonomy, equidistance, or a hedge against the United States. A better term would be institutionalized hedging: risk diversification through standing, rule-based consultation among allies and partners that remain anchored in the broader U.S.-led system.

The proposal is more feasible than ever before. Japan-South Korea relations have improved significantly in recent years. The January 2026 summit in Nara and the reciprocal summit in South Korea in May demonstrated continuity across leadership changes in both countries since June 2025. The EU already has free-trade, digital, green, and security frameworks with both countries. The task is not to invent three new bilateral relationships; it is to connect existing ones.

The dialogue should begin modestly, through a Track 1.5 process involving officials, experts, and industry. Its early agenda must be concrete and specific: a joint critical minerals and supply chain risk assessment; consultation on export controls and investment screening; cooperation on AI, cyber resilience, and digital standards; exchanges on demographic and defense workforce adaptation; and shared monitoring of North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Successful projects could then be elevated to ministerial working groups.

Two design choices are essential. First, the initiative must remain function-driven. It is not NATO, not the Quad, and not an anti-China coalition. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability without demanding economic separation. Second, it should be complementary to relations with Washington and transparent about that purpose. Horizontal networks strengthen alliances when they help allies absorb shocks, coordinate positions, and arrive at consultations with greater capacity.

For South Korea, the need is particularly acute. Japan already has the G7, a mature economic partnership with the EU, and expanding European defense ties. Seoul’s international weight has grown faster than its institutional depth. An EU-Japan-South Korea dialogue would help close that gap.

Horizontalizing alliances is not a vote of no confidence in the United States. It is insurance for the moments when the United States wavers, overreaches, or changes course. The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.

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The trilateral is more feasible – and more important – than ever before.

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Drawing on the alliance and identity politics literature, we argue that as the U.S.-China tensions intensify, citizens of U.S. allies tend to hold more negative views against China. This is because the strategic competition between the two powers reinforces the perceptual foundation of shared identity, amplifying perceived threats to national security and economic interests as well as values shared between the U.S. and its allies. For the same reason, we further expect public views toward China and the U.S. to be conversely related among citizens of U.S. allies as the bilateral competition grows. We test our propositions in the Asia-Pacific region, where the U.S. has several allies and its tensions with China are most acute. By analyzing the Gallup World Poll (2006–2022) and Asian Barometer Survey (Wave 3-5), we show that as the U.S.-China tensions intensify, citizens of U.S. allies tend to exhibit less favorability toward China as well as contrasting attitudes toward the two powers. However, such patterns are less likely to appear among those living in non-allies. This study provides not only theoretical implications for the study of foreign public opinion but also important policy suggestions.

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Australian Journal of International Affairs
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Gidong Kim
Gi-Wook Shin
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This memo examines how pro-war Russian-language Telegram channels framed the war in Ukraine and Western actors during peace negotiations over six months after the Anchorage summit of August 2025. Drawing on a corpus of over 500,000 posts from 117 channels, the study moves beyond treating pro-war Telegram as a single propagandistic bloc and instead examines how framing varies across distinct categories of channels. We find that the Telegram ecosystem is stratified along multiple dimensions that do not always align. The channels that produced the strongest political framing of Western actors were not the channels that reached the largest audiences, and different categories favored different rhetoric. Mass-audience news outlets frequently engaged in consistent delegitimization of the West, while independent commentators advanced moral and conspiratorial framing, and military bloggers often used enemy-based language. Across the corpus, the United States and President Trump emerged as central objects of attention, invoked more frequently than either Russian or Ukrainian leadership. The study adds an account of how pro-Western hostility is distributed across forms and categories of propagandistic Telegram messages. We argue that this internal structure has direct implications for how Western governments might contest the Russian information space.

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This paper asks whether the United States and the European Union, despite divergent economic exposure and institutional design, can sustain a coherent sanctions strategy toward Russia, and how that divergence shapes the regime's effectiveness. It proceeds through a structured comparison across three policy domains — energy, finance, and immobilized sovereign assets — drawing on the literatures on economic statecraft, energy security, and financial-network theory, and on transaction-level, macroeconomic, and legal evidence from 2022 to early 2026. The analysis finds, first, that the United States' position as a net energy exporter enabled rapid embargoes, whereas the EU's import dependence produced a slower, phased decoupling. Second, US financial measures operated extraterritorially through dollar centrality and centralized OFAC enforcement, while the EU relied on regulatory jurisdiction over SWIFT but enforced through fragmented national authorities; a Gazprombank carve-out preserved the energy-export inflows that offset the intended balance-of-payments shock. Third, in the dispute over frozen assets, EU custodial institutions bear the legal and retaliatory exposure that the United States advocates from a position of relative insulation. The findings indicate that the regime's effectiveness is constrained less by the design of individual measures than by uneven enforcement and an asymmetric distribution of risk; absent institutionalized burden-sharing, its durability and credibility are likely to weaken.

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Transnational repression, understood as the extraterritorial repressive actions by states against members of their national community abroad, has become a global phenomenon.

Transnational Repression book cover

Several trends and developments, including cross-border migration, technological advances, and democratic backsliding, suggest that acts of transnational repression are likely to increase further in the future. Importantly, transnational repression is not exclusively driven by autocracies: Liberal states also contribute to those challenges when they question the legitimacy of international institutions or when they engage in outright acts of transnational repression themselves. Covering more than a dozen countries from both the Global North and the Global South, this volume explores transnational repression along three dimensions. First, what are the motives for states to engage in transnational repression (the 'why')? Second, what instruments and tactics do states employ when engaging in acts of transnational repression (the 'how')? Third, what are the implications and consequences of transnational repression (the 'so what')?

Edited by Klaus Brummer, Catholic University of Eichstatt-Ingolstadt, Šumit Ganguly, Stanford University, California.

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A Comparative Perspective Across Autocracies and Democracies

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Šumit Ganguly
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Escalating threats to undersea cable networks, stemming from gray-zone sabotage at vulnerable chokepoints, are receiving long-overdue attention from policymakers and the public. Recent incidents highlight the strategic vulnerability of this infrastructure, due to a lack of redundancy, limited repair capacity, and gaps in international maritime law. Despite attempts at multilateral cooperation through the G7 and the Quad, concrete actions are lagging. The US administration has not directly addressed this issue. To strengthen resilience, democracies must collaborate and invest in hardened cable designs, real-time monitoring and data sharing, routing diversity, regional repair hubs, and enhanced legal frameworks. They must work together to secure their lifeline for economic and national security and future digital-technology advancement.

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Nicole is a B.A. candidate in International Relations in the Class of 2029. Her academic interests focus on the Middle East and North Africa, with particular interests in governance, social movements, and political change in the region. She studied Arabic in Morocco for a year through a scholarship program funded by the U.S. Department of State. In her free time, Nicole enjoys language learning and speaks Arabic, Greek, and Spanish.

Research Assistant to Professor Hesham Sallam, Summer 2026
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Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to welcome a new cohort of fellows joining us starting in summer 2026.

APARC offers multiple prestigious fellowship opportunities for Stanford doctoral students, emerging scholars of exceptional promise, and accomplished faculty and mid-career experts researching contemporary Asia topics. Supported by these fellowships, our incoming fellows will complete dissertation research, work on book manuscripts, undertake new research projects, and engage with the center's scholarly community.


Meet the Fellows

Herbert Chang

Herbert Chang

Stanford Next Asia Policy Visiting Fellow, 2026-2027

Herbert Chang is an assistant professor of quantitative social science at Dartmouth College and a Forbes 30 Under 30 honoree in Science for his work on network science and offshore finance. His research examines how emerging technologies reshape democratic behavior, including recent work on AI and misinformation in the 2024 Taiwan and U.S. presidential elections. His work has been featured in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Scientific American, and has informed both academic and policy debates.

Chang will use his time at APARC to write a monograph on the interdependence of AI infrastructure and information ecosystems, with Taiwan and the United States as central empirical sites. He will also collaborate with SNAPL to quantify its talent-portfolio theory and empirically model how Asian Pacific nations cultivate and retain scientific expertise. 

Alicia R. Chen

Alicia Chen

APARC Predoctoral Fellow, 2026-2027

Alicia R. Chen is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She studies international relations and political economy, with a focus on China. Her dissertation examines the domestic political economy of China's international aid and finance, revealing how domestic politics and institutions shape its overseas economic activities.

Her research is published in the British Journal of Political Science and has been generously supported by Stanford’s King Center on Global Development, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, among others.

Before her doctoral studies, Chen was a research specialist with the Empirical Studies of Conflict project at Princeton University. She holds a master's degree in international policy from Stanford University and a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Southern California. 

Sheikh Jamal Hossain

Sheikh Jamal Hossain

Asia Health Policy Program Postdoctoral Fellow, 2026-2027

Dr. Sheikh Jamal Hossain is a researcher and academic specializing in child development, maternal mental health, health promotion, and health economics. His professional interests center on advancing evidence-based interventions through rigorous research, teaching, and capacity strengthening, with a commitment to translating scientific evidence into policies and programs that improve the lives of women and children globally.

With over two decades of experience spanning academia, public health research, and international development, Dr. Hossain has led and contributed to large-scale randomized controlled trials, implementation research, and economic evaluations addressing early childhood development, nutrition, maternal mental health, and health system strengthening. He has successfully secured and managed research grants from international donors, including Grand Challenges Canada, UNICEF, FCDO, and Sida.

Dr. Hossain has authored more than 30 peer-reviewed scientific publications, including 13 as first author, in leading international journals such as The Lancet Regional Health, Pediatrics, Social Science & Medicine, The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, and BMJ Global Health. He currently mentors multidisciplinary research teams and supervises early-career researchers and graduate students.

He earned his doctorate in women’s and children’s health from Uppsala University, with research focused on the effects of parenting interventions integrated with social protection programs on child development and maternal well-being in Bangladesh. He also holds master's degrees in public health and in health economics from the University of Dhaka.  

Angela Ju

Angela Ju

Taiwan Program Visiting Fellow, 2026-2027

Angela Ju is an associate professor of international affairs and political science at St. Edward's University in Austin, Texas. She uses mixed-methods approaches to study race/ethnicity, gender, international migration, social determinants of health, the nonprofit sector, and urban politics in North America, Latin America, Europe, and East Asia. Her first book, Identities Matter: The Politics of Immigration and Incorporation (Oxford University Press), was published last year. 

While at APARC, Angela will be working on her second monograph, Taiwan's Migration Diplomacy Towards Mainland Chinese Migrants and Refugees. In this book, she will examine why Taiwan has not formed consistent immigration policies for migrants from Mainland China.

Using textual analysis of Taiwanese government legislation and publications, the book's primary argument is that Taiwan uses its migration policies to manage its foreign relations with Mainland China. It also argues that one way in which Taiwan pursues international participation, despite lacking international recognition as a state, is through its migration diplomacy.

Headshot of SNAPL postdoctoral fellow Siyu Liang

Siyu Liang

Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab Postdoctoral Fellow, 2026-2028

Siyu Liang is a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Her research lies at the intersection of political communication, public opinion, and computational social science, focusing on how media and information environments shape political attitudes in both democratic and authoritarian contexts.

Her dissertation examines the role of media in shaping perceptions of China in contemporary U.S.-China relations. In particular, she studies foreign influencer propaganda and the downstream effects of U.S.-China competition on public opinion and intergroup relations. As a computational social scientist, she develops and applies natural language processing and machine learning methods to study political communication and international politics, with particular interests in stance detection, transfer learning, and soft-label modeling.

At the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, she will expand this research agenda by examining how digital media and geopolitical conflict shape public opinion and social exclusion, with a particular focus on U.S.-Asia relations. She will also pursue projects on nationalism and racism in East Asia. Together, these projects seek to advance a more global understanding of how international politics shapes social inclusion and group relations across the Asia-Pacific region.

Siyu received master's degrees in statistics and political science from UCLA and holds bachelor's degrees in political science and statistics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Deepika Padmanabhan

Deepika Padmanabhan

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow on Contemporary Asia, 2026-2027

Deepika Padmanabhan is a political scientist whose research examines nationalism, language politics, and self-determination, with a regional focus on South Asia. 

Her book project explores how nation-building unfolds not only through grand policies and formal institutions, but also from the ground up, in everyday life. It examines how states promote national languages through routine, informal interactions with citizens, a process she terms the Everyday Imposition of language.

More broadly, her research explores how everyday practices shape political identities and collective belonging. In related projects, she examines the politics of language, food, film, and symbolic rituals as sites through which nationalism is cultivated, contested, and reproduced in daily life.

At APARC, Deepika will revise her book manuscript and develop additional projects on nationalism and political behavior. 

She received her doctorate in political science from Yale University in 2025. She holds a bachelor's degree in political science from St. Xavier’s College, Mumbai, and master’s degrees from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the Department of Politics at New York University.

Grace Zeng

Grace Zeng

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow on Contemporary Asia, 2026-2027

Grace Zeng is a political scientist specializing in international political economy, with a focus on China's use of trade and investment to influence global regulatory governance. Her research examines how states leverage economic tools to shape international rules and institutions. Her work on China's trade practices shows how China uses seemingly technical health and safety regulations to exert pressure on other nations, systematically increasing import restrictions in response to political tensions.

At APARC, she will pursue projects that extend this research agenda by examining China's growing influence in global governance. One project investigates whether China strategically uses infrastructure investment and foreign subsidiaries to shape international environmental standards. Another examines China’s information control system through the lens of its WTO commitments and the global governance of cyberspace.

Before joining Stanford, Grace was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. She received her doctorate in politics from Princeton University. She also holds a master's degree in the social sciences (MAPSS) from the University of Chicago and a bachelor's degree in mathematics from the University of Hong Kong.

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Seven scholars researching diverse topics across contemporary Asian studies will join the APARC community starting this summer.

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2025 Incoming Fellows
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The United States cannot match China's scale alone and pretending otherwise is a strategic mistake. That was the central message Rush Doshi delivered as keynote speaker at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions' 2026 annual China Conference, where he called on the U.S. to reimagine its alliance system as a platform for building shared capacity across military, economic, and technological domains.

Rush Doshi, the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and an assistant professor at Georgetown's Walsh School of Foreign Service, previously served as Deputy Senior Director for China and Taiwan on the National Security Council (2021-24), where, for a portion of his tenure, he was the U.S. government’s lead action officer coordinating the negotiations that launched AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership for the Indo-Pacific region between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He is also the author of The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Doshi grounded his address in a historical argument: scale, which Doshi defined as “the ability to generate efficiency and productivity and thereby outcompete rivals,” has been the decisive factor in the rise and fall of great powers. Great Britain's eclipse by larger industrializing rivals in the late nineteenth century, he argued, offers a cautionary parallel for the U.S. today. "Today, that sense of daunting scale belongs to China," Doshi said, "and the United States appears to be in the position that Great Britain was in a century ago."

China's Scale Is Not Abstract
China's economy, measured in purchasing power, is now roughly 30 percent larger than that of the United States, and its share of global manufacturing quintupled in the two decades after joining the WTO, while the U.S. share fell by half. China has two to three times U.S. industrial capacity, 13 times U.S. steel production, and roughly 500 times U.S. shipbuilding capacity. It produces two-thirds of the world's electric vehicles, three-quarters of its batteries, and 90 percent of its solar panels and refined rare earths, and is at the leading edge of six of the ten industries expected to define the next industrial revolution.
That industrial strength is now translating into direct geopolitical leverage. Doshi pointed to China's weaponization of its rare earths dominance in 2025, which effectively forced the U.S. to walk back elements of its own trade and export control policies. "That marked the first time that an export control was used to force open market access," he said. "That's a massive moment in the history of trade.

The Case for Allied Scale
The answer, Doshi argued, is not to retreat into fortress America, a sphere-of-influence arrangement, or a China-led order, but to build what he calls "allied scale." A coalition of the U.S. and its key allies and partners would represent three times China's nominal GDP, twice its defense spending, and one and a half times its share of global manufacturing.

That advantage is entirely theoretical, unlocking its potential, though, is the central task of American statecraft in this century."
Rush Doshi

"That advantage is entirely theoretical," Doshi conceded. "Unlocking its potential, though, is the central task of American statecraft in this century." In practice, that might mean Japan and South Korea investing in American shipbuilding; Taiwan building semiconductor plants in the U.S.; allies co-producing advanced weapons systems; and all parties maintaining a shared tariff or regulatory wall against China's excess industrial capacity. On the economic side, Doshi called for common investment screening, coordinated industrial policy, and an "economic Article 5" ensuring that when China uses economic coercion against one ally, all respond together.

Addressing the Skeptics
Doshi acknowledged "the new pessimism," the view that Trump-era damage to U.S. alliances has made allied scale impossible. The strain is real, he said, but not terminal, for three reasons:

  1. The alternatives are worse. Spheres of influence, unrestrained multipolarity, and a China-led order all leave the U.S. and its partners poorer and less secure. 
  2. Alliances have absorbed serious shocks before and survived. For example, France's withdrawal from NATO's unified command, Nixon's opening to China, the Plaza Accord. 
  3. The underlying logic of interdependence persists. Allied economies are growing more dependent on U.S. markets as China buys less from them, allies are purchasing record numbers of American weapons, and even the Trump administration has not escaped the pull of allied scale, with Vice President Vance publicly calling for a trading bloc among allies to break China's chokehold on critical minerals.
Allied scale can't just be about balancing China, it has to be about building the kind of world that we want to see and live in.
Rush Doshi

Eight Principles to Achieve Allied Scale
Doshi closed with a practical blueprint — eight principles for building allied scale.

  1. Turn the page on the Trump era. Persuade allies that the most damaging recent policies were products of individual leadership rather than durable features of the American political system.

  2. Begin with humility. Start with small, achievable projects: a joint shipbuilding effort, a critical minerals offtake agreement, a co-production line. Build from there.

  3. Build mutually beneficial bargains. Allies invest in America; America invests in allies. All extend each other more preferential terms than they do to non-market economies like China.

  4. Pay attention to domestic politics. “The danger of the ‘Trump Approach’ is alienation and polarization of allied politics that makes diplomacy impossible.” Any allied scale strategy must be first grounded in domestic politics.

  5. Build ad hoc coalitions. Allied scale does not mean doing everything with everyone. It means assembling the right groupings for specific challenges and opportunities.

  6. Bolster credibility through congressional legislation. Executive orders are too easily reversed. Durable commitments to allies require legislative backing that is harder to undo with a change in administration.

  7. Build on existing platforms. Frameworks like the Quad, AUKUS, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral, and the G7 already exist. Allied scale should strengthen what works, not start from scratch.

  8. Articulate an affirmative vision. "Allied scale can't just be about balancing China," Doshi said. "It has to be about building the kind of world that we want to see and live in."


“That work is hard,” Doshi concluded, but “it's not impossible. And the alternatives are far more concerning than the future that I’m outlining.” Doshi ended his address on a note of optimism: a call to action for the U.S. to reforge our alliances and rebalance the world order to create a better world for not just the U.S., but for nations across the globe.



A full recording of Dr. Rush Doshi’s talk is available on YouTube and below.


This article was supported by research using Claude. All outputs were reviewed by humans and the final expression was produced by the author.

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Rush Doshi, keynote speaker at the 2026 SCCEI China Conference, laid out an eight-point blueprint for transforming U.S. alliances into an engine of shared economic and industrial capacity.

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Oren Samet, the Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, has received the 2026 Outstanding Dissertation Award from the International Collaboration Section of the American Political Science Association for his dissertation, “Challenging Autocrats Abroad: Opposition Parties on the International Stage.” The award recognizes outstanding doctoral research on international cooperation, transnational politics, and global governance.

Samet's dissertation examines how opposition parties engage foreign governments and international organizations to build pressure against authoritarian incumbents. Drawing on original cross-national data on opposition lobbying and transnational party networks, as well as interview-based fieldwork and case studies from Southeast Asia, the project explores when opposition movements seek support abroad, the benefits and risks of doing so, and why international backing sometimes helps topple autocrats but often falls short.

Before entering academia, Samet was based in Bangkok, Thailand, where he served as the Research and Advocacy Director of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, working with politicians and civil society leaders across Southeast Asia. He previously worked as a Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and a B.A. from Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs.

Samet's research focuses on the international dimensions of authoritarian politics and democratization, particularly opposition movements in Southeast Asia. His work has appeared in leading journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, and Political Communication.

Following his year at CDDRL, Samet will join Rice University as an Assistant Professor of Political Science, where he will continue his research on authoritarian politics, opposition movements, and democratization.

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Oren Samet presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on October 30, 2025.
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Oren Samet presented his research in September 2025 at the Global Development Postdoctoral Fellows Conference co-hosted by CDDRL and the King Center on Global Development.
Oren Samet presented his research in September 2025 at the Global Development Postdoctoral Fellows Conference co-hosted by CDDRL and the King Center on Global Development.
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The award recognizes Samet's research on the opportunities and risks of foreign support for opposition movements.

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