The central premise underlying Bussell's discussion this week is the reality that public service provision is often flawed in the developing world. Reforming public services entails significant efforts to increase the quality of public service, and there have been two important recent trends in this space: privatization and public-private partnerships and increased use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The one-stop services model (which has been adopted globally in various forms, from Singapore's eCitizen Centre to Germany's Buergerbuero or "Citizen's Bureau"), exemplifies current trends.

In her research, which focuses primarily on the case of India, Bussell asks the following questions: why do or don't governments reform public service delivery? And when governments decide to implement reforms, why do they or don't they employ ICTs in these reforms?

The Indian strategy to public service reform has been to create stand-alone, one-stop citizen service centers. These centers are computerized and frequently have private-sector participation. Aside from these typical characteristics, there is significant state-level variation on several points, including timing of policy adoption, quantity and type of services, degree of automation, and ownership and management models.

Bussell discusses a variety of hypotheses that offer insight into the potential factors influencing the character of Indian reforms. First, she notes that politicians faced mixed electoral incentives for and against reforms. After all, there is evidence that eServices can improve service characteristics and reduce corruption. On the other hand, reforms may also reduce politicians' opportunities to amass funds to run for re-election. After all, bureaucratic discretion and opaque processes enable the siphoning of funds and bribe taking in service delivery. Politicians use "transfer authority" over bureaucrats to access bribes. More transparent services, due the implementation of reforms, threaten this access to bribes. At the same time, reform may also offer new opportunity for rents. Private partnerships to run centers entail new contracting processes. Larger-scale bribes may be available from ownership and management negotiation.

Based on these mixed direct and indirect incentives, Bussell predicts that reform will require expected net benefits to ruling politicians. States with higher petty corruption should implement policy reforms later. Meanwhile, states with higher grand corruption might lead to more partnerships with private sector.

So what factors actually explain variation in when different Indian states adopted reform? According to Bussell's research, the level of corruption was the most statistically significant variable affecting the timing of reform adoption. However, whether or not there was a coalition government in power was also significant. This means that an increase of 1 point out of 10 in the state's corruption level led to a 63% decrease in the chance of a reform being adopted in a given year. The quantity of services covered varied widely in the sample of states from less than 10 to more than 40 services. On average, moving from a state with below average corruption to a state with above average corruption causes a drop of 14 in the number of services covered.

In addition to examining the variation in reform adoption across Indian states, Bussell also looks at the consequences of reform. Despite reforms in the state of Karnataka, to give one example, demand for services continues to outstrip supply. Visitors to Nemmadi (privately-run computerized centers) were able to access services faster, while paying less money, making less visits, spending less time waiting at each visit, and seeing a reduction (on average) in the number of days before receiving the service. Despite quantitative improvements in average efficiency, however, perceived efficiency actually declined. Now, there is a 7-day minimum for service delivery and a 21-day maximum. Although average has declined as a consequence of these new requirements, it is now impossible to bribe officials in order to achieve service delivery in one day.

According to Bussell, these results bring up some interesting policy implications. First, it is important to consider the institutional incentives underlying the established model in order to ensure that reforms are effective. The incentives faced by both top politicians and street level officials must be taken into account. Second, it may be best to design policies that establish a strong, if narrow, initial model. After all, growing citizen demand affects electoral benefits and the calculations of politicians. Third, more research must be done regarding the various factors that influence policy outcomes. According to cases in South Africa and Brazil, there is some evidence that differences in electoral competition can affect policy outcomes. In South Africa, for instance, less electoral competition has led to less incentive to reform. More research will help to clarify the factors of importance in public service reform implementation.

In today's networked information economy, Yochai Benkler suggests, the most important inputs into the core economic activities of the most advanced economies are, for the first time, widely distributed in the population. Examples of decentralized or peer production are increasingly common, with Wikipedia just one among the list of notable examples. In contrast to the old model, in which all parties needed large-scale capital investment to influence the public space, Benkler suggests that today's networked public sphere has fewer barriers to entry. The groups that have traditionally influenced the public sphere include commercial interests (representing the power of money), government (which influences through funding, access, and threats, representing the power of power), parties, citizens, and a final group of civil society actors (i.e. professional values, journalism and universities). In Benkler's view, these categories of power have been destabilized by the spread of new means of social sharing and exchange. Today, authority, quality and accreditation are separate to capital due the addition of many new groups and platforms, including examples such as the following:

• Pro Publica, American Independent Media
• New highly visible blogs
• Sunlight Foundation
• Wikileaks
• Large-scale participatory platforms for politically active participants
• Citizen journalism, camera phones, and footage

Benkler notes that many critiques have arisen to the argument that the Internet democratizes. For example, some claim that new parties can talk on the Internet, but no one will necessarily hear them. Not only is very little attention actually paid to politics online, but links between sources are also very concentrated. Additionally, there is the question of whether the blogosphere simply offers a new version of elitism, in which the top bloggers come from similar backgrounds to those who formerly dominated the public sphere.

However, Benkler argues that the Internet does make the public sphere more democratic after all. The structured web offers more visibility to more people, in accreditation and filtration clusters. Speakers on the periphery can be identified by major sites and broadcast iteratively to higher-level visibility. On Daily Kos, for example, people are able to bring posts of interest forward onto the home page. All of this occurs with relatively little financing.

In their 2010 paper, Benkler and Shaw explored patterns among the top 155 political blogs, applying link analysis and other methods to explore differences between bloggers on the political left and on the political right. They found that the left adopts enhanced platforms much more quickly and has more flexible content boundaries--a measure of how easy it is for bloggers on the periphery to have their content taken up. While the right has more sole-author blogs, the left has more user blogs available and more large-scale collaboration (exemplified by blogs with more than 20 writers). The authors found that there was no single effect of "Liberation Technology" in this case, in that the left and right showed divergent practices. While Benkler concedes that a link analysis is only so useful without full content analysis, he also notes that the results are consistent with social cognition literature on the differences between people on the left and the right. Another explanation, however, comes from the theory that there was more need for the left to embrace the blogosphere in 2002; when technology first became available, the right dominated the government, news, and already had a platform for discussion in churches. Seeking a new forum for discussion and debate, the left seized on the blogosphere as a solution.