Scholars at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies assess the strategic situation in East Asia to be unsettled, unstable, and drifting in ways unfavorable for American interests. These developments are worrisome to countries in the region, most of which want the United States to reduce uncertainty about American intentions by taking early and effective steps to clarify and solidify U.S. engagement. In the absence of such steps, they will seek to reduce uncertainty and protect their own interests in ways that reduce U.S. influence and ability to shape regional institutions. The recommendations summarized below, and elaborated in a 23-page report entitled “President Trump’s Asia Inbox,” suggest specific steps to achieve American economic and security interests.

» Key Recommendations

» Full Report with Preface from Director Gi-Wook Shin and Introduction by Amb. Michael H. Armacost

» About the Contributors

» Information for Press

» Press Coverage

Key Recommendations. 

Trade and Economic Relations

The dynamic economies of East Asian countries are increasingly integrated and interdependent. The United States is an important market and source of investment and technology, but this is no longer sufficient to ensure that future arrangements and rules will protect American interests. The region is moving toward more formal, rule-based arrangements and the United States must be an active shaper of those institutions.

Most in the region want the United States to play a leading role in the establishment and enforcement of free and fair international economic transactions, and want the rules and mechanisms governing trade to be multilateral ones. If we do not play such a role, China, and possibly others, will seek arrangements that disadvantage American firms.

• The replacement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should build on what was achieved in those negotiations, especially those that would assure market access for U.S. firms and protect intellectual property rights, enforce labor standards, and ensure environmental protection. A single multilateral agreement would be best, but much could be achieved through interlocking and consistent bilateral agreements.
• The administration should adopt policy measures to increase employability and create jobs for the Americans who have been disadvantaged by globalization.

Defense and Security

China’s military buildup and North Korea’s growing arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons have fueled concerns about U.S. will and ability to honor its security commitments in the region. No one wants a regional arms race or tit-for-tat moves that increase the danger of accidental conflict or escalation, but many believe concrete steps are needed to check perceptions that the United States is becoming less willing to maintain the peace and stability that undergirds regional prosperity.

• While reaffirming the need for a forward presence in the region, reconfigure it along the lines of an “active denial” strategy. “Active denial” means maintaining a forward presence in East Asia that is designed to deny an opponent the benefits of military aggression, especially the prospect of a quick victory. The first component of such a strategy is a resilient force posture, which can be achieved by exploiting the size and depth of the region to distribute units in more locations. The second component is an emphasis on planning to conduct military operations against an adversary’s offensive strike or maneuver forces, not targets deep inside an adversary’s homeland territory and not by carrying out preemptive strikes.
• Strengthen U.S. military capabilities by developing and fielding stealthier air and maritime platforms, increase submarine and anti-submarine assets, and provide forward deployed forces with better active defenses, such as rail guns and lasers. At the same time, the United States should assist those neighbors of the PRC who feel threatened by Chinese assertiveness to develop asymmetric coercive capabilities that can put at risk forward-deployed PLA forces. The United States can use elements of such assistance programs as points of negotiating leverage in our attempts to limit militarization on both sides.
• Continue to promote U.S.-China military relations, emphasizing accident avoidance and crisis management, sustained dialogues on national strategies and doctrines, and cooperative endeavors, such as training exercises and combined operations, where and when feasible and mutually beneficial.

China

People in the region worry about China’s actions and intentions but they worry more about the prospect of confrontation and conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic. They look to the United States as a counterbalance to China but fear that Washington will overreact or underreact to actions by Beijing, or take provocative actions that jeopardize their own interests. The U.S. should:

• Respond to Chinese actions inimical to American interests in ways that protect our interests, achieve U.S. goals shared by others in the region, and avoid both the reality and the appearance of being “anti-China.”
• Reaffirm American commitments to allies and partners including China and Taiwan.
• Tighten enforcement of import restrictions on products produced by firms that have stolen intellectual property from U.S. companies.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea is threatening an ICBM test in 2017, possibly in the next few weeks or months. There is a political vacuum in South Korea, and Seoul is being pressured and punished by Beijing to reverse its decision to accept the deployment of a U.S. THAAD missile defense in South Korea. Under these circumstances, these are our priority recommendations for the administration

• It should work to dissuade North Korea from an ICBM test. Publicly, the new administration should reaffirm that the U.S. would use military means against an ICBM that appeared to threaten the U.S. or one of our allies. Regular spring ROK-U.S. joint military exercises should be held, but calibrated and conducted to avoid giving Pyongyang extra pretext for a test. The Trump administration should appoint a senior envoy empowered to go to Pyongyang to convey openness to renewed diplomacy, while at the same time being clear about the consequences of an ICBM test. China will share this goal, and the new Trump administration should establish a dialogue with China on North Korea based on this shared interest rather than linked to other issues in the U.S.-China relationship, such as bilateral trade. The Trump administration should not negotiate the THAAD issue with Beijing but rather stick to the principle that this is a Seoul-Washington issue.
• The U.S.-ROK relationship will need early and special attention in 2017. Secretary of Defense Mattis’ early visit to the ROK was a wise move. With names already announced for Beijing and Tokyo, a new American ambassador for Seoul should be nominated soon. Despite the political leadership vacuum in Seoul, the Trump administration should strive for the closest possible diplomatic, political, and military coordination on North Korea with our South Korean allies. Trade and burden-sharing issues should not be front-burner issues during South Korea’s political transition. U.S. neutrality in the South Korean election, along with demonstrated respect for South Korea’s democracy, will be carefully monitored, and is essential, as is strengthening U.S. contacts and outreach across the political spectrum in South Korea.

Japan

The Abe administration is the most stable government Japan has had for many years. The prime minister wants to work with Washington, is prepared to deepen defense cooperation with the United States and others in the region, and is eager to lock in the commitments and arrangements negotiated in the TPP. There is a real opportunity to secure access for U.S. firms greater than achieved by any previous administration.

• Build upon arrangements negotiated in TPP to secure a U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement (FTA) that increases access for U.S. firms and locks in economic reforms initiated by the Abe government.
• Propose annual head of state level trilateral cooperation summits with Japan and South Korea and seek greater trilateral cooperation, particularly in the area of security cooperation. Caution Tokyo against steps backward on historical reconciliation.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Southeast Asia is most vulnerable to and concerned about China’s actions and intentions. Countries in the region want the United States to counterbalance and constrain China but worry equally that the United States is unreliable and unequal to the challenge of protecting their interests while preserving American interests vis-à-vis China. Unless given a better option, they will lean toward China for economic and security reasons.

• The United States should anchor U.S. policy on the South China Sea (SCS) to an explicit commitment that no single country—not the US, not China, nor anyone else—should seek or enjoy a monopoly of ownership and control over that body of water. To underscore that commitment, the United States should execute freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in waters between and around the Spratly islands. These and other operations in the SCS should be conducted in conformity with the authoritative ruling on the status of its waters and land features issued in 2016 by the arbitral court convened for that purpose under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• The United States should also try, in concert with its allies and partners, to bring the SCS under international protection and management by a combination of claimant and user states, including the United States and China, based on international law. The Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative should be enlarged and upgraded to serve this purpose. If China declines to join, a chair at the table should remain empty should Beijing change its mind.

The U.S. should remain engaged with the process of regional and trans-Pacific institution building, including but not limited to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) annual meetings, the East Asian Summit, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which will be hosted by Vietnam in 2017.

Full Report with Preface from Gi-Wook Shin and Introduction by Amb. Michael H. Armacost.

The policy recommendations published above are a summary included in the beginning of a 23-page report entitled “President Trump’s Asia Inbox.” You may view the full report here.

About the Contributors

Michael H. Armacost is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Karl Eikenberry is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC; director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative; former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. Army.

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus at FSI; director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC; and affiliated with FSI’s Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow and has served as former first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and chairman of the National Intelligence Council, among other positions.

Takeo Hoshi is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies and director of the Japan Program.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; director of the Korea Program; and the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies, all at Stanford.

Daniel C. Sneider is the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, co-director of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project and a former foreign correspondent.

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Fellow in the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

Information for Press.

The contributors are open to comment, interview and provide background information on the contents of the report, “President Trump’s Asia Inbox.” To inquire about availability, please contact Lisa Griswold, Shorenstein APARC Communications and Outreach Coordinator, at lisagris@stanford.edu or (650) 736-0656.

Related Press Coverage

Stanford report offers policy insights for the Trump administration, Caixin Media (in Chinese), Feb. 13, 2017

"Trump, do not bring up KORUS FTA and US forces cost-sharing until S. Korea's next presidential election," Yonhap News and various other outlets (in Korean), Feb. 13, 2017

China looks to US to resolve N. Korea nuclear issue, The Straits Times (in English), Feb. 15, 2017

Stanford experts offer policy proposals, insights on US-Asia relations, Stanford News Service (in English), Feb. 15, 2017

Unsettled, unstable and drifting: Today's US-East Asia relationship, Medium (in English), Feb. 16, 2017

Why Japan will also be "convenient" for the Trump administration, Tokyo Business Today (in Japanese), Feb. 18, 2017

Study: Managing China relationship most consequential to US, China Daily USA (in English), Feb. 21, 2017

How the Trump administration should address China, Tokyo Business Today (in Japanese), Feb. 23, 2017

Fears of Trump giving China free reign in Asia misplaced, Asia Times (in English), Feb. 24, 2017

Stanford University has expressed its views on the recent executive order on immigration, and is offering resources for students who could be affected. News accounts indicate that as many as 17,000 students across the country fall into this category. On Jan. 27, President Trump signed an executive order restricting travel to the United States of people from seven largely Muslim countries -- Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

Amy Zegart, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, said CISAC's "mission is generating knowledge to build a safer world. We bring scholars, ideas from everywhere. And always will."

Looking ahead, Stanford is planning campus events and initiatives on this issue. Some information already to note: 

• Stanford launched a new website on immigration issues for students and scholars. This includes centralized campus information about international travel guidance and other information. Stanford will continue to add content to this site.

• A letter to the campus community from Stanford president Marc Tessier-Lavigne, provost John Etchemendy, and incoming provost Persis Drell affirming the university's support for international students. "As events unfold, the university intends to continue vigorously advocating before Congress, the Executive Branch, and beyond for policies consistent with its commitment to members of our community who are international, undocumented and those who are impacted by the recent executive order."

Syria's civil war has taken a devastating toll on children.

Stanford freshman Emma Abdullah puts a young human face on that tragedy with her book, The Blue Box, which details the plights of Syrian children during the country’s six-year civil war. Published in 2014, the work is a collection of short stories and poems, and all proceeds go to charity. Abdullah estimates she’s raised $80,000 for the cause. Abdullah, who was raised in Kuwait, has relatives and friends from her father’s side of the family in Syria who have died or gone missing.

As many as 470,000 people and 10,000 children have been killed in the war, according to published accounts and the United Nations.

“My goal is to raise awareness about what these children are going through,” said Abdullah, who spoke at a recent staff meeting at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. “It’s important for me to bring this situation to light.”

She’s found receptive minds among her fellow classmates, though many of them were not aware of the scope of horror in Syria. “Other students have been good, and people are willing to listen once you talk to them about it. It’s been very positive at Stanford, and there is a lot to do on campus.”

Her 86-page book includes a child who writes stories about people in Syria. “She feeds the box with her thoughts; she puts in everything she has. She doesn't know it but her box becomes powerful. It takes up every word, every smile and every heartbeat and slowly, quietly, it grows. It grows into something so much bigger and more profound than she is. She’s just a child. She’s just a child who promised she’d save another but who doesn't know how. But one day, she looks at her box and she understands,” writes Abdullah, who will major in political science.

'It's a sad picture'

The Syrian civil war began in March 2011; the politics involved were not understandable to Abdullah. Would things return to normal? They did not, and have not since. She soon began losing friends – she estimates at least 20 people -- as thousands of children were tortured and killed.  She wanted to do something and make a difference, and not just be a bystander staying silent. So Abdullah began expressing her thoughts and feelings in story form.

Regarding the book’s front cover, Abdullah recalled that when she told the child who drew it how beautiful it was, the child replied, “Don’t lie, it’s a sad picture.” Despite the bright colors, one sees children in that drawing crying and a military airplane flying overhead dropping bombs. And, one of the girls pictured, Nour, is lost forever, likely dead, noted Abdullah. 

Image

In one story, “Call of the Jasmine,” a little boy named Karim writes an early letter to Santa Claus, worried that he may not be alive come December. “I know where I live is not very pretty and I know there’s not much in it for you, but mama says we’re beautiful where it counts.”

In another account, a child is given an injection of lethal poison. “Everything subsequently goes dark but I close my eyes anyway. The darkness will protect me.”

Some quotes from the book include, “When you write something down, it stays forever. It's like a little part of you that you're giving to the universe.” Abdullah also writes, “We live in a world where some people have already lost the game before having begun.”

As she describes the experience of war on children, “There is no Richter scale to measure pain; it leaves you vulnerable. It's not pain you can get used to, not sorrow that you can tame. It leaves you broken, broken but alive.”

Ultimately, one of her characters said, “Maybe life just wants to be noticed, like a sulking toddler, so it will keep throwing things our way until we finally give it the attention it deserves.”

Disconnected world

Abdullah says literature and art allow us to connect with each other in ways that any other medium would really struggle to match.

“We tend to think of refugees as statistics; death tolls in faraway lands we will never live in. We see children of war and never picture our own for we assume that we will never find ourselves packing up our lives and everything we know only to cross oceans for new homes that do not want us,” she said.

That disconnect is the greatest part of the problem. “We allow ourselves to feel distanced from these events and these people. I wonder how many people stop to think ‘this could be me,’” she said.

Abdullah said that when people read a story or watch a play, they are able to think beyond their own lives and feel what another’s pain is like.

“If stories and theater allow us all to live the harrowing life of a refugee, if only for just an hour, maybe we could all carry a little part of them inside of us and maybe then we’d want to push for change,” she added.

‘Community and unity’

President Trump’s recent travel ban for Muslims from seven different Middle Eastern countries has focused attention on Syrian refugees, Abdullah said. Now, media outlets are interviewing refugees and doing in-depth stories on them. She believes the protests and activism around the country and on campus reflects the desire by many to take a closer look at the victims of the Syrian war.

“We see a greater sense of community and unity, and people who might not have cared about these issues are starting to do so now. People are saying, ‘this is not right’ There is a sense of hope,” she said.

She said that living in constant fear of being hurt by others for what you believe in and in fear of being told you can no longer enter a country like the U.S. is something no one should have to experience.

“Nobody chooses where they are born,” Abdullah said.

“My friends in the Middle East are afraid that all the years they have spent working hard will amount to nothing if their education is interrupted. Those studying in the U.S. wonder whether they will be able to visit their families for the holidays and those in other countries are afraid that maybe the ban will spread to where they are, too.”

Power of writing

Abdullah said she’s always enjoyed writing; she started publishing when she was 13, and has written for student newspapers and magazines in her home country. “I saw that people were being touched, and thought it could have an effect.”

Emma Abdullah

Abdullah went to high school at the New English School in Kuwait. Her book has been adapted as a play by Alison Shan Price. Titled, “The Blue Box: The Memories of Children of War,” it premiered in Kuwait in 2015 and then internationally at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in Scotland last year. 

For those seeking to help, Abdullah suggests making donations to the Syrian American Medical Society, which has helped with evacuations and humanitarian relief for children and others caught up in the crisis.

“The most important thing is not to forget them and not to allow anyone else to either. It is too easy to become indifferent, she said.

The Syrian war has dragged on for six years now, Abdullah said, and children continue to suffer and die every day.

“On a very small scale, the best thing you can do is talk about them and make sure your friends do, too. Learn more about the war and the refugee crisis so that you can spread the word,” she said.

People can donate to charities and NGOs that work with refugees, volunteer at charities, or even start their own fundraisers.

“Advocacy is crucial,” Abdullah said. “Protest, email or call your representatives and urge your government to increase their assistance to Syrian refugees, and encourage your friends to do the same.”

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC.

MEDIA CONTACTS

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

Russia’s desire to be a great power, nuclear deterrence and naval strategies are the reasons behind its rapid Arctic military build-up, a Stanford expert says.

The issue is complicated. “There are three basic drivers: military-strategic calculations, economic development, and domestic objectives,” said Katarzyna Zysk, a visiting scholar at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Zysk has a forthcoming paper on this topic to be published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Last year, she presented her findings at the conference, "The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective," held by the American Foreign Policy Council. She also discussed her research at the Hoover Institution's Arctic Security Initiative meeting in November 2016. 

Putin’s foreign policy

Despite claims it would not do so, Russia since 2012 in particular has embarked on a large-scale military modernization in the Arctic across basically all defense branches, with a special focus on the air and maritime domain, Zysk said.

“The military ambitions have expanded with the more nationalist and isolationist turn in Russian policies after (Vladimir) Putin’s return as president in May 2012,” said Zysk, an associate professor at the Norwegian Defence University College who specializes in Russia’s security and defense policies.

In 2014, Russia decided to deploy military forces along the entire Russian Arctic coast, from Murmansk to Chukotka, and on permanent basis. A modernization effort is underway, too.

This trend has deepened the asymmetry of power between Russia’s forces and those of other countries in the region, such as the United States, Zysk said.

“The Arctic contributes to maintaining Russia’s great power status, which has been one of the main driving forces behind Putin’s foreign policy in recent years,” she said.

‘Startling’ military build-up

The Arctic appears as one of the most stable Russian border regions, which makes the rapid defense build-up by a Russian government with a slowing economy quite perplexing to many observers, noted Zysk.

Apart from the economy, she explains the military strategies involved:

“Russia has revived the Cold War ‘Bastion’ concept in the Barents Sea: In case of conflict, the Northern Fleet’s task is to form maritime areas closed to penetration for enemy naval forces, where Russia would deploy strategic submarines and maintain control. In the areas further south, Russia would seek to deny control for potential adversaries. It also gives Russia a possibility to attack an enemy’s sea lines of communication,” she said.

On top of this, Russia’s modernization efforts are focused on modernizing its nuclear deterrent, including building fourth-generation strategic submarines of the Borei class: three are completed, and five are under different stages of construction, according to Zysk.

Russia is also building new attack submarines, as well as new frigates and corvettes, though the shipbuilding industry is struggling with delivering these on time, she added.

Also, the Artic provides Russia a strategic gateway to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Zysk said, which is important given that Russia’s naval forces are separated between four theaters of operations – the Pacific, the Arctic-Atlantic, the Baltic and the Black Sea.

As a result of climate change, Russia may be able to more freely move its warships between its main bases along the Northern Sea Route, she added.

“Importantly, the forces in the Arctic are not going to stay only in the Arctic. With the increased mobility, the military units can be transferred rapidly to support Russia military operations in other regions, as we have observed in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has used a brigade deployed in the High North. The trend is likely to continue, also because Russia’s military capabilities remain limited, despite the ongoing modernization,” she said.

Perceived threats

Russia considers that if it engaged in conflict with other great powers, such as the United States, the Arctic would be a major target, Zysk said. Russia has also rehearsed scenarios when the biggest part of the Russian Navy based in the Arctic, the Northern Fleet, would be activated during conflicts escalating in other regions. That’s a reason for the strengthening of its defenses in the region.

“In the Russian assessment, an aerial attack from the Arctic region may pose military threats to the entire Russian territory. In particular, however, Russia is concerned about the sea-based nuclear deterrent deployed in the Arctic. As a result, Russia has devoted a strong focus to increasing air defense and air control across the Arctic,” she said.

Apart from threats from state actors, environmental accidents, trafficking, terrorist attacks on industrial infrastructure or increased foreign intelligence also make the Arctic, in Russia’s view, a vulnerable territory. Finally, the issue of Russia’s vast energy reserves and other rich natural resources in the Arctic are another factor. The development of the Arctic is seen as one of the solutions to what ails the Russian economy.

Zysk said, “Since the early 2000s, the Russian political and military leadership has systematically argued that there will be an acute shortage of energy resources worldwide, which may lead to a conflict, and that the West, led by the United States, may attempt to seize Russia’s oil and gas.”

While this assessment is controversial, Zysk points to statements by the top Russian political and military leadership, including Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, that suggests the Russian leadership believes such scenario may occur by 2030.

“It may also explain some of the military investments in the region, such as reactivating 13 military airfields across the Arctic, paratroopers’ exercises and amphibious landing operations along the Northern Sea Route,” she said.

In addition, the Arctic holds a symbolically important place in Russia’s history and national identity, according to Zysk.

“Displays of military strength, accompanied by rhetoric that portrays Russia as the Arctic superpower, resonate well with the Russian public, especially in communities where feelings of nationalism and isolationism run deep,” she said.

As a result of the military modernization, she added, Russia is today better prepared to participate in complex military operations than a decade ago, especially in joint operations, strategic mobility and rapid deployments.

“Russia’s ability to limit or deny access and control various parts of the Arctic has increased accordingly,” Zysk said.

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MEDIA CONTACTS

Katarzyna Zysk, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 723-6840, kzysk@ifs.mil.no

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu