Shapiro presents research he conducted with David A. Siegel, a student in Stanford's Graduate School of Business:

A review of international terrorist activity reveals a recurring pattern of financially strapped operatives working for terrorist organizations that seem to have plenty of money. This observation is hard to square with traditional accounts of terrorist financial and logistical systems, accounts that stress the efficiency with which terrorist financial networks distribute funds while operating through a variety of covert channels. In order to explain the observed inefficiencies, we present a hierarchical model of terror organizations in which leaders must delegate financial and logistical tasks to middlemen for security reasons; however, these middlemen do not always share their leaders' interests. In particular, the temptation always exists to skim funds from any financial transaction. To counteract this problem, leaders can threaten to punish the middlemen. Because logisticians in international terrorist organizations are often geographically separated from leaders, and because they can defect to the government if threatened, violence is rarely the effective threat it is for localized groups such as the IRA. Therefore leaders must rely on more prosaic strategies to solve this agency problem; we focus on leaders' ability to remove middlemen from the network, denying them the rewards of future participation. We find that when the middlemen are sufficiently greedy, and when the organization suffers from a sufficiently strong budget constraint, that leaders will choose not to fund attacks in equilibrium because the costs of skimming are too great. Further, we show there can be important non-linearities in terrorists' response to government counter-terrorism. Specifically, we find that given constrained funding for terrorists, government efforts will yield few results until they reach a certain threshold, at which point cooperation between leaders and middlemen in terrorist groups breaks down leading to a dramatic drop in the probability of terrorist success.

Robert O. Keohane (PhD., Harvard University), James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, has taught at Swarthmore College, Stanford University, Brandeis University, and Harvard University where he was Stanfield Professor of International Peace.

He is the author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984), for which he was awarded the second annual Grawemeyer Award in 1989 for Ideas Improving World Order. He is editor or co-editor of, and contributor to, eleven other books, most recently, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge 2003), with J.L. Holzgrefe. Between 1974 and 1980 he was editor of the journal, International Organization. He was president of the International Studies Association, 1988-89, and of the American Political Science Association, 1999-2000. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has held a Guggenheim Fellowship and fellowships at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and the National Humanities Center. He is on leave from Duke this year, conducting research at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Waishengren (or mainlanders) make up about 12% of the current population in Taiwan. This is an artificial category referring to the Chinese people and their descendants who were originally from mainland China and who have been settling in Taiwan since 1945. The term can be literally translated to mean people from outside the (Taiwan) province.

Despite the diversity of social and economic backgrounds, the Waishengren have shown a strong and almost uniform tendency in opposing Taiwanese nationalism or Taiwan independence. They have shown a strong inclination in supporting a unified and strong China, though the Republic of China, not the People's Republic, is still the country that embodies their collective identity.

Dr. Chang will address the following questions: (1) why do the Waishengren act, or are perceived to act, as one "ethnic group" in Taiwan, given the differences?; (2) what were the main historical reasons for their nationalistic feelings?; (3) what are the features of Chinese diaspora nationalism in Taiwan?; (4) how does Waishengren nationalism differ from the Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism that is found in Southeast Asia?; (5) what is the general and theoretical meaning of diaspora nationalism?

Agricultural production in North Korea collapsed between 1990 and 1996, leaving the country dependent on massive international food assistance. The causes of this agricultural decline are primarily found in the policy decisions which guided the development of DPRK farming, and which have not been adequately addressed either by the government or by international aid organizations. It is, however, feasible for the DPRK to produce enough food to satisfy basic domestic needs. A scenario is proposed in which the DPRK could increase food production, using sustainable farming methods. The cost of international assistance to facilitate such a restructuring would be similar to the current cost of food aid, and such assistance would strongly encourage increased technical and economic cooperation between DPRK organizations and their international counterparts.

Randall Ireson coordinates the American Friends Service Committee agriculture assistance program in North Korea. Over the last seven years he has made numerous trips to the DPRK, and accompanied nine agricultural study delegations from the DPRK to the US and other countries. Dr. Ireson has managed or evaluated many rural development projects, mostly in Southeast Asia. He has written extensively on social and development issues in Laos, and also taught sociology at Willamette University. He holds a Ph.D. in Development Sociology from Cornell University.