Ambassador James E. Goodby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a research affiliate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has held several senior government positions dedicated to arms control and nonproliferation, including deputy to the special adviser to the president and secretary of state on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 2000-2001; special representative of President Clinton for the security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, 1995-1996; chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction agreements, 1993-1994, and vice chair of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks, 1982-1983. He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in 1980-1981.

Bart Bernstein is a Professor of American history at Stanford University. He has written very widely on post-World War II American history, including the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, economic policy, diplomacy, nuclear history, and scientific discovery.

Matthew Kroenig is a doctoral candidate in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, the Herbert York Fellow at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. His dissertation explains the strategic incentives that drive states to provide nuclear weapons technology to nonnuclear-weapon states. His other research focuses on international security, nuclear weapons proliferation, homeland security, terrorism, and civil war. His writings have appeared in such publications as Democratization, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Newsday, and Security Studies.

Kroenig has also served as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was a principal author of key national security strategy and defense review documents and where he led the development of a U.S. government-wide strategy for deterring terrorist networks. For his work, Kroenig received the Department of Defense's Award for Outstanding Achievement.

The Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science has assembled a panel of experts to examine the technical aspects of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. The speaker will discuss the preliminary findings of this panel.

Benn Tannenbaum is Project Director at the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. Tannenbaum works on a variety of projects for CSTSP, including drafting policy briefs, tracking legislation, serving as liaison with MacArthur-funded centers and the security policy community, organizing workshops and other meetings, attending Congressional hearings and conducting topical research. He testified before the House Homeland Security Committee on radiation portal monitors. Tannenbaum also serves on the American Physical Society's Panel on Public Affairs and on the Program Committee for the Forum on Physics and Society. Prior to joining AAAS, Tannenbaum worked as a senior research analyst for the Federation of American Scientists. He worked extensively on the FAS paper "Flying Blind"; this paper explores ways to increase the quality and consistency of science advising to the federal government. Before joining FAS, Tannenbaum served as the 2002-2003 American Physical Society Congressional Science Fellow. During his fellowship, Tannenbaum worked for Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA) on nonproliferation issues. Before his fellowship, Tannenbaum worked as a postdoctoral rellow at the University of California, Los Angeles. At UCLA, he was involved in the Compact Muon Solenoid experiment at CERN, in Geneva, Switzerland, and the Collider Detector Facility at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory outside Chicago. He received his PhD in particle physics from the University of New Mexico in 1997. His dissertation involved a search for evidence of supersymmetry. None was found.

A key pillar and unmet need in the defense against threats to health is the ability to recognize the etiological factor(s) and predict the course of disease, at early points in the timeline of the process. This ability would enable early intervention in the disease process when there is the greatest likelihood of benefit, as well as triaging of hosts, based on individual need. Genomic tools and approaches have enabled a more detailed description of host-microbe encounters, and shed light on fundamentally important processes, including the cellular responses associated with infection. Genome-wide transcript-abundance profiles, like other comprehensive molecular readouts of host physiological state, provide a detailed blueprint of the host-pathogen dialogue during microbial disease. Studies of cancer based on genome-wide transcript-abundance profiles have led to novel signatures that predict disease outcome and serve as useful clinical classifiers. The highly dynamic and compartmentalized aspects of the host response to pathogens complicate efforts to identify predictive signatures for infectious diseases. Yet, studies of systemic infectious diseases so far suggest the possibility of successfully discriminating between different types (classes) of infection and predicting clinical outcome. In addition, host gene expression analysis could lead to the identification of early signatures associated with a protective immune response, both to natural infection and to vaccination. Early explorations in some of these areas indicate the potential feasibility of this approach but also point to important unmet challenges.

David Relman is associate professor of medicine, and of microbiology and immunology at Stanford University. He is also chief, infectious diseases section, at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California.

A native of Boston, Massachusetts, Relman holds an SB degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and received his MD degree, magna cum laude, from Harvard Medical School in 1982. Following postdoctoral clinical training at Massachusetts General Hospital in internal medicine and in infectious diseases, Relman served as a postdoctoral research fellow in microbiology at Stanford University in the laboratory of Stanley Falkow from 1986 until 1992. He joined the Stanford University faculty in 1992 and was appointed associate professor (with tenure) in 2001. His research is directed towards the characterization of the human indigenous microbial communities of the mouth and gut, with emphasis on understanding variation in diversity, succession, the effects of disturbance, and the role of these communities in oral and intestinal disease.

Experimental approaches include molecular phylogenetics, ecological statistics, single cell genomics, and community-wide metagenomics. A second area of research concerns the classification structure of humans and non-human primates with systemic infectious diseases, based on patterns of genome-wide gene transcript abundance in blood and other tissues. The goals of this work are to recognize classes of pathogen and predict clinical outcome at early time points in the disease process, as well as gain further insights into virulence (e.g., of variola and monkeypox viruses). Past achievements include the description of a novel approach for identifying previously-unknown pathogens (selected as one of the 50 most important papers of the last century by the American Society for Microbiology), the identification of a number of new human microbial pathogens, including the agent of Whipple's disease, and the most extensive descriptions to date of the human indigenous microbial community. See http://relman.stanford.edu. Relman received the Squibb Award from the Infectious Diseases Society of America (2001), the Senior Scholar Award in Global Infectious Diseases from the Ellison Medical Foundation (2002), and is a recipient of an NIH Director's Pioneer Award (2006). He is a member of the American Society for Clinical Investigation and was named a Fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology in 2003.

Relman currently serves on the Board of Scientific Counselors of the National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research and was a member of the Board of Directors of the Infectious Diseases Society of America (2003-2006), and co-chair of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare (2004-2006). He is a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Microbial Threats, and advises several U.S. Government departments and agencies on matters related to microbial pathogen detection and future biological threats.

Nuclear fuel supply assurance is a long-term issue that has been studied in various venues since the beginning of the nuclear area. This topic has recently gained greater urgency with various countries now embarking on their own nuclear power programs and considering construction of their own fuel cycle facilities, including enrichment plants, to provide for their own fuel. Some of these fuel facilities could however be diverted for weapons material production within clandestine military programs. In this context the assured provision of internationally supplied nuclear fuel and fuel supply guarantees are meant to discourage new nuclear countries from developing domestic sensitive fuel cycle facilities. An IAEA initiative on this topic has culminated in a September 2006 IAEA Special Event Seminar held in conjunction with the 50th General Conference. Eleven different proposals for instituting fuel supply assurance arrangements were presented (some prior to and some during) the meeting. Noted among them was the NTI proposal that included a commitment from Warren Buffet to contribute 50 Million Dollars towards the purchase of a Uranium stockpile that would form the basis of a Nuclear Fuel Bank to be managed by the IAEA.

In this presentation I will review and comment on the recent supply assurance proposals made. I will discuss technical and institutional issues I have raised in reviewing these proposals, and I will rank all the proposals based on their ease of implementation and contribution to nonproliferation.

Chaim Braun is a CISAC science fellow working on issues of nuclear power and nonproliferation. Prior to his Stanford position, Braun worked in various technical and management positions in Altos Management Partners, Bechtel Power Corporation, United Engineers and Constructors, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). While at CISAC Chaim authored papers with Chris Chyba on "Proliferation Rings" and with Mike May on "International Regime for Fresh Fuel Supply and Spent Fuel Disposal." He also co-authored two chapters in the CISAC book , U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Threats, made numerous technical presentations, and was instrumental in bringing to CISAC the research project on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540.

The speaker will present European views on current nuclar issues (deterrence, proliferation) and their implications for U.S. policy.

Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), as well as an associate researcher at the Centres d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI). He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and contributing editor to Survival. His latest book is War Without End (New York: The New Press, 2005).

The prospect of civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India has stirred controversy for its potential impact on nuclear proliferation. I will discuss the origins or the U.S.-India nuclear deal, its current political prospects in the United States and India, and evaluate its impact on the nonproliferation regime. My talk will be based on part on the report U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward.

Michael Levi is a fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He was previously a science and technology fellow at the Brookings Institution. Levi is the author of two books, The Future of Arms Control (Brookings, 2005, with Michael O'Hanlon), and Rethinking Nuclear Terrorism (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

The siting and construction of high-level biocontainment facilities involves a complex review process with environmental impact documents, legally mandated reviews, and public involvement in decision making about associated risks. In some cases, serious public opposition and legal challenges may arise during the review and approval stages of a project. The recent proposed construction of NIH-NIAID regional and national biocontainment labs provided an opportunity for a real-time study of the review and approval processes associated with labs in many different locations. By analyzing environmental impact documents, mass media coverage, internet communications, and detailed timelines at the various labs, it was possible to identify common issues and features associated with labs in general, as well as specific concerns associated with those where public controversies and opposition arose. The study focused on both good and bad experiences at various recently proposed lab sites and compared them with other past case examples to identify 'lessons learned' that are relevant to both current and future biocontainment projects. Overall, the study documented the continuing importance of trust, transparency, and due process in public decision making and highlighted the importance of developing and implementing a comprehensive pro-active risk communication strategy at the earliest stages of project planning. The study also documented indications of public insecurity associated with biodefense research, which may translate into future problems for public health researchers.

Margaret Race is an ecologist working with NASA through the SETI Institute in Mountain View, Calif. She recently completed a study on public decision making and risk communication associated with the construction of BSL-3 and BSL-4 biocontainment labs nationwide. The study, which was begun during a fellowship at Stanford University and CISAC, reflects her longstanding interest in risk perceptions, legal and societal issues, public communication and education associated with controversial science and technological proposals. In her work with NASA, she focuses on planetary protection and the search for extraterrestrial life--which will someday involve construction of a BSL-4 biocontainment lab for handling and testing scientific samples returned from Mars and other solar system locaitons. During the past decade, she has been a lead member of an international team of researchers that helped NASA develop a protocol for the quarantine, handling, and testing of extraterrestrial samples from Mars. She has served on numerous National Resource Council studies analyzing risk communication and societal issues associated environmental protection on Earth and in space. Dr. Race received her BA degree in Biology and MS degree in Energy Management and Policy from the University of Pennsylvania, and her Ph.D. in Ecology/Zoology from the University of California at Berkeley. Her teaching and research work has included positions at Stanford University (Human Biology Program), UC Berkeley (Assistant Dean, College of Natural Resources), and Office of the President, University of California (Senior Science Policy Analyst and Director of Planning). She was also a Postdoctoral Fellow in Marine Policy and Ocean Management at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

After considering trends in the role of nuclear weapons and some lessons from history, this presentation examines nuclear signaling in the context of the evolving role of nuclear weapons (for deterrence and dissuasion, among other purposes) and likely developments of U.S. nuclear forces and their concepts of operation for regional crises. Following the development of a 2015 regional crisis scenario, the utility of potential signaling options are examined in light of current U.S. nuclear force development trends. Options for future U.S. nuclear force and concepts development for signaling as part of overall tailored deterrence are identified and examined.

Owen Price is a consulting visiting fellow in the Center for Strategic and International Studies International Security Program, on sabbatical until March 2007 from the U.K. Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), where he has worked for 12 years. Most recently, he led a team of systems engineers working on AWE capability programs, work designed to ensure that AWE continues to be able to design and field new warheads of tasked to do so by the British government. From 2000 to 2003, he led the AWE Verification Research Program, was a technical adviser to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and was a member of the U.K. delegation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meetings in 2003 and 2004. Price holds an MA in engineering from the University of Cambridge, England, and an MBA in engineering management from the University of Bradford, England. He is currently reading (part time) for an MSc in systems engineering at the U.K. Defense Academy, Cranfield University, Shrivenham, England. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and is a British national.

Satellites are absolutely essential and extremely vulnerable for national and economic security. How do we deal with this dilemma?

Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of eleven books and over 350 articles. Prior to co-founding the Stimson Center, Krepon worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the U.S. House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks. He receive an MA from the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt.

Krepon divides his time between Stimson's South Asia and space security projects. The South Asia project concentrates on escalation control, nuclear risk reduction, confidence building, and peace making between India and Pakistan. This project entails field work, publications, and Washington-based programming, including a visiting fellowship program. The space security project seeks to promote a code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations and works toward stronger international norms for the peaceful uses of outer space.