Ambivalent nuclear technologies use or have a potential to produce nuclear weapon relevant materials like highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, tritium and U233. It is important to assess the proliferation potential and measures to strengthen the proliferation resistance of these technologies as early as possible (preventively) to find alternative more proliferation resistant designs or at least to identify sensitive parameters or even critical parts that should trigger international safeguards and export controls.
The conclusions of different case studies investigating the proliferation resistance of nuclear technologies such as spallation neutron sources, tokamak fusion reactors and plutonium fuels will be briefly presented. The main part of the talk will focus on the minimization or elimination of civil HEU usage and the role of research reactor conversion to the use of low enriched uranium, which is intrinsically more proliferation resistant. The conversion of the German high flux research reactor FRM-II will serve as an example for the complex political and technological challenges and problems one has to face, especially, if proliferation concerns are not taken seriously in the research and design phase. These case studies of relatively disparate nuclear technologies have in common that they are neutron producing technologies and some questions regarding their proliferation potential can be addressed using neutronic codes.
Finally, the talk will briefly outline the future research of the next year addressing centrifuge technology as another case study to explicate on exemplary basis general criteria for the proliferation resistant use of nuclear technologies.
Matthias Englert is a
postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. Before joining CISAC in 2009, Matthias was a
researcher at the Interdisciplinary Research Group Science Technology and
Security (IANUS) and a PhD student at the department of physics at Darmstadt
University of Technology in Germany.
His major research
interests include nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, nuclear postures
and warheads, fissile material and production technologies, the civil use of
nuclear power and its role in future energy scenarios and the possibility of
nuclear terrorism. His research during his stay at CISAC focuses
primarily on the technology of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, the
implications of its use for the nonproliferation regime and on technical and
political measures to manage the proliferation risks.
Matthias has been
participating in projects investigating technical aspects of the concept of
proliferation resistance with topics spanning from conversion
of research reactors, uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges, reducing
plutonium stockpiles with reactor based options, spallation neutron
sources and fusion power plants. Further research topics included fissile material stockpiles, fuel-cycles and
accelerator driven systems. Although a substantial part of his
professional work of the last years was quite technical he is equally
interested in and actively studies the historical, social and political aspects
of the use of nuclear technologies. Research interests include the dispute
about Article IV of the NPT, the future development of the NPT regime, possibilities
for a nuclear weapon free world, preventive arms control, and history and
development of proliferation relevant programs. By studying contemporary
theory in philosophy of the interaction of science, technology and society,
Matthias acquired analytical tools to reflect on approaches describing or
addressing the problem of ambivalent technology.
Matthias is a vice speaker
of the working group Physics and Disarmament of the German Physical Society
(DPG) and a board member of the German Research Association for Science,
Disarmament and Security (FONAS).
Michael May is
Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering
and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director
of Stanford University's Center for International
Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through
January 2000. May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away
from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development
positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was a
technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member
of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various
times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory
Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND
Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and
Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, and a
Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. May received the Distinguished Public Service and
Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the
Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as
other awards. His current research interests are in the area of nuclear and
terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear
weapons and foreign policy.
