In recent years, natural gas prices in the United States have gone from historic highs of over $12 per mmBtu in the summer of 2008, to under $2.50/mmBtu in 2012. While demand side factors – such as the crisis in global financial markets – were partially to blame, many would argue that the real story is on the supply side, where increased production of shale gas – a form of unconventional natural gas trapped in leafy shale rock – drove gas prices down across the continent. The impact of low gas prices was felt in the form of cheap electricity, heating, and feedstocks to consumers and industry, which in turn bolstered the economic recovery. As an added bonus, cheap gas displaced dirty coal in power generation, reducing carbon emissions and pollution.

It is no wonder then, that when a recent U.S. Energy Information Administration publication on world wide reserves of shale gas crowned China as the holder of the world’s largest shale gas reserves, many inside and outside the Middle Kingdom were intrigued and enthralled by the possibilities of what shale gas could mean for China – in terms of climate, pollution, quality of life – and what it could mean for the broader international gas trade.

In this upcoming EWG talk, we will highlight some of the current activities and future plans for unconventional gas development in China. We will focus on the political, institutional, and commercial forces at play, and discuss some of the potential upsides and pitfalls that China will encounter on the road to realizing its unconventional gas potential.

The Modern European History Lecture Series presents “Everyday Empire: Habsburg Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century” a talk by Pieter M. Judson, the Isaac H. Clothier Professor of History and International Relations at Swarthmore College.

Sponsored by the Department of History, the Europe Center and Introduction to the Humanities

The Stuxnet computer worm is perhaps the most complicated piece of malicious software ever built - roughly 50 times the size of the typical computer virus. This threat leveraged a huge array of new techniques to spread itself, conceal itself and to attack Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. This talk will provide a detailed dissection of the Stuxnet worm, answering such questions as how it spread, how it evaded detection, what it did once it found its target, and ultimately, how successful it was.

About the speaker: Carey Nachenberg is a Fellow and Chief Architect at Symantec corporation, the world's largest computer security provider. As Chief Architect, Mr. Nachenberg drives the technical strategy for all of Symantec’s core security technologies and security content, which in total protect hundreds of millions of customers around the world. During his time at Symantec, Mr. Nachenberg has led the design and development of Symantec’s core antivirus, intrusion prevention and reputation-based security technologies; his work in these areas have garnered over fifty United States patents.

He holds BS and MS degrees in Computer Science and Engineering from University of California at Los Angeles, where he continues to serve as an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Computer Science and a member of UCLA’s Computer Science Alumni Advisory Board.

There are currently 60 nuclear reactors under construction worldwide with nearly half of these projects being built in China. There is no doubt that East Asia is emerging as a leader in the international nuclear community where China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are playing major roles as a result of their aggressive new plant build programs. Both China and South Korea present very interesting case studies where the former is rapidly building up domestic expertise in nuclear construction while the latter has gone one step further in capitalizing successfully on a nuclear export business. Both countries have relied heavily on external commercial support in building up this expertise. In the case of South Korea, the “Koreanization” of nuclear power took place in the 1980’s and 1990’s, first with a large number of Western builds and ultimately a complete indigenization of pressurized water reactor technology through a technology transfer with Combustion Engineering. The Chinese domestic nuclear program has been largely influenced by Western vendors as well; however, there has been significantly less emphasis on exporting the technology up to now as they master the imported technologies for their domestic program. The recent AP1000 technology transfer between Westinghouse Electric Company and China has opened up unique transnational learning opportunities between the United States and China where the lessons learned building the first AP1000 plants in China will be shared with the two U.S. utilities now embarking on new plant construction at the Vogtle and V.C. Summer sites, in Georgia and South Carolina, respectively. This talk will review both the historical experiences of exporting nuclear technology to the ROK and China, as well as the progress being made by these countries in absorbing the technology. Further, the AP1000 passive plant technology will be summarized as an example of the general trend for future designs in response to the reactor accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi in March 2011. Finally, the advanced construction techniques being used to build AP1000 plants in both the U.S. and China will be highlighted along with their benefits in delivering new plants on schedule.

About the speaker: Dr Matzie is the former Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer for Westinghouse Electric Company and was responsible for all Westinghouse research and development undertakings and advanced nuclear plant development. He is also on the Board of PBMR Pty Ltd. and Chairman of the Board Technical Committee. In that role, he assures proper oversight of the design, safety, licensing, research and development, and quality aspects of the PBMR enterprise.

Previously, Dr Matzie was responsible for the development, licensing, detailed engineering, project management, and component manufacturing of new Westinghouse light water reactors and was also the Executive in charge of Westinghouse replacement steam generator projects and dry spent-fuel-canister fabrication projects. He became a Senior Vice President in 2000, when Westinghouse purchased the nuclear businesses of ABB. His career has been devoted primarily to the development of advanced nuclear systems and advanced fuel cycles, and he is the author of more than 120 technical papers and reports on these subjects.

The collision between the Iridium 33 and the Cosmos 2251 shows space debris is becoming a significant threat to satellites. Concerns of the threat led to the IADC space debris mitigation guidelines. However, there is no way to compel or enforce compliance with the guidelines, and since implementing some guidelines can be expensive, they are
frequently not followed. Moreover, the current legal framework is unable to determine who is liable for losses in an on-orbital collision. A space surveillance data sharing committee is proposed to solve the liability problem. Under the proposed liability rules, satellite operators would be liable for the debris they created. Insurance companies will step in to cover such risk. Therefore, there would be a financial incentive for them to adopt the debris mitigation
guidelines.

About the speaker: Ting Wang is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. His research concerns on space debris problems, and ASAT weapons. Before coming to CISAC in 2011, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. He received a PhD at the Beihang University in China. His PhD dissertation was titled "Orbital Debris Evolution and Threat to Spacecraft."

He also holds a B.A. in aerospace engineering from Beihang University and has worked at the Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering. He was a visiting scholar at the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2003, where he began to be interested in security issues.

The book The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History by Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas is scheduled to be published on May 14, 2012 by Harvard University Press. This book describes and analyzes in detail the Soviet biological warfare (BW) program, from its inception in 1928 to likely termination in 1992. The two most vexing questions that the authors attempt to answer are; in the final analysis, what were the Soviet BW program’s accomplishments? Second, might Soviet accomplishments related to enhancing biological weaponry be made available to future national or terrorist BW programs? This presentation will explain why these questions are difficult to answer but nevertheless will propose answers to them. The authors have a basis for doing so because they have been able to collect and analyze information from primary resources in archives and special collections, as well as in the course of hundreds of hours spent on interviewing scientists who operated the Soviet BW program. During his presentation, Zilinskas will discuss tentative findings that encompass subjects such as whether the application of genetic engineering, which resulted in among other accomplishments the development of multiantibiotic resistant Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, and Yersinia pestis, actually resulted in improved weaponry and whether genetically engineered strains remain in Russian cell culture collections and from there might escape or be made available to those who seek to acquire biological weapons.

About the speaker: Raymond A. Zilinskas, formerly a clinical microbiologist, is the director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the editor of Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Lynne Rienner, 1999) and co-editor of the Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense (Wiley, 2005). He received a PhD from the University of Southern California and a BA in Biology from the University of Stockholm.

Diego García-Sayán was elected President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the 2010-11 and reelected for the term 2012-2013. He was the first Peruvian to be elected President of the Court. He has  served as a judge on the court since 2004. During his distinguished career, Judge García-Sayán has served as Minister of Justice of Perú, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Perú and as a member of the Peruvian Congress.  He founded the Andean Commission of Jurists and was the Chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.  Judge García-Sayán is a university professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and author of many publications on international law and human rights.

The Cost of Inaction (COI) is an approach to the economic evaluation of interventions that draws attention to the consequences of a failure to take an action. It is not the cost of doing nothing but the cost of not doing some particular thing and it highlights the negative impacts that result when an appropriate action is not taken.

While working as research coordinator at the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard School of Public Health, Nadejda Marques was responsible for researching and analyzing the cost of inaction of public programs and actions that help reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS on children in Angola from 2009 to 2011. Nadejda will present the results for Angola and contrast these with the results for Rwanda.

Currently, Nadejda Marques manages the Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy, Development and The Rule of Law at Stanford University.