In 1990, hypertext was a utopian conjecture. Since then, a hypertext system called the World Wide Web not only become the predominant medium of human communication, but also one of the primary methods for distributing software. Obviously, this transition has had implications for subjects of geopolitical interest including software security, political discourse, and the ability of states to surveil their citizens' communications and reading habits.

Because it was hard enough to build a global hypertext system in the first place, security was generally an afterthought in the design of the World Wide Web. One necessary component of a secure website is HTTPS encryption, but it is still only used correctly by a tiny fraction of websites. Any website that allows http:// as well as https:// is inherently vulnerable to network surveillance, account hijacking, and other forms of insecurity. To make matters worse, HTTPS itself has been plagued by numerous security problems and design flaws.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been engaged in a series of projects to encrypt the entire Web, retiring the insecure HTTP protocol, and ensuring that "HTTPS" actually delivers what it promises. These projects include HTTPS Everywhere, the SSL Observatory, Sovereign Keys, and efforts to persuade major sites to deploy HTTPS. In this talk Peter will give an overview of these projects, the significant progress they have made to date, and the work that remains to be done.

About the speaker: Peter Eckersley is Technology Projects Director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. He keeps his eyes peeled for technologies that, by accident or design, pose a risk to computer users' freedoms—and then looks for ways to fix them. He explains gadgets to lawyers, and lawyers to gadgets. Peter's work at EFF has included privacy and security projects such as Panopticlick, HTTPS Everywhere, SSDI, and the SSL Observatory; helping to launch a movement for open wireless networks; fighting to keep modern computing platforms open; and running the first controlled tests to confirm that Comcast was using forged reset packets to interfere with P2P protocols.

Peter holds a PhD in computer science and law from the University of Melbourne; his research focused on the practicality and desirability of using alternative compensation systems to legalize P2P file sharing and similar distribution tools while still paying authors and artists for their work.

Peter will discuss work at SRI and the University of Cambridge under two projects currently funded by DARPA, relating to clean-slate architectures for hardware, software, networking, and clouds, aimed at higher-assurance security, resilience, evolvability, and other critical requirements.

Two papers provide some early views of the ongoing work:

http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/law10.pdf 
http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/2012resolve-cheri.pdf

Peter G. Neumann (Neumann@CSL.sri.com) has doctorates from Harvard and Darmstadt. After 10 years at Bell Labs in Murray Hill, New Jersey, in the 1960s, during which he was heavily involved in the Multics development jointly with MIT and Honeywell, he has been in SRI's Computer Science Lab since September 1971. He is concerned with computer systems and networks, trustworthiness/dependability, high assurance, security, reliability, survivability, safety, and many risks-related issues such as election-system integrity, crypto applications and policies, health care, social implications, and human needs -- especially those including privacy. He is currently PI on two DARPA projects: clean-slate trustworthy hosts for the CRASH program with new hardware and new software, and clean-slate networking for the Mission-oriented Resilient Clouds program. He moderates the ACM Risks Forum, has been responsible for CACM's Inside Risks columns monthly from 1990 to 2007, tri-annually since then, chairs the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, and chairs the National Committee for Voting Integrity (http://www.votingintegrity.org). He created ACM SIGSOFT's Software Engineering Notes in 1976, was its editor for 19 years, and still contributes the RISKS section. He is on the editorial board of IEEE Security and Privacy. He has participated in four studies for the National Academies of Science: Multilevel Data Management Security (1982), Computers at Risk (1991), Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society (1996), and Improving Cybersecurity for the 21st Century: Rationalizing the Agenda (2007). His 1995 book, Computer-Related Risks, is still timely. He is a Fellow of the ACM, IEEE, and AAAS, and is also an SRI Fellow. He received the National Computer System Security Award in 2002 and the ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Contributions Award in 2005. He is a member of the U.S. Government Accountability Office Executive Council on Information Management and Technology, and the California Office of Privacy Protection advisory council. In 2012, he was elected to the newly created National Cybersecurity Hall of Fame as one of the first set of inductees. He co-founded People For Internet Responsibility. He has taught courses at Darmstadt, Stanford, U.C. Berkeley, and the University of Maryland. See his website (http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann) for testimonies for the U.S. Senate and House and California state Senate and Legislature, papers, bibliography, further background, etc.

About the Speaker: Mickey Edwards is the director of the Aspen Institute-Rodel Fellowships in Public Leadership and lecturer at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.  He represented the state of Oklahoma as a  Republican member of Congress 16 years (1977-92).  He was a member of the House Republican leadership and served on the House Budget and Appropriations committees.  Since leaving Congress, he has taught at Harvard, Georgetown, and Princeton universities, and has chaired various task forces for the Constitution Project, the Brookings Institution, and the Council on Foreign Relations.  Edwards is the author of The Parties Versus the People: How to Turn Republicans and Democrats into Americans (Yale University Press, August 2012) and Reclaiming Conservatism: How a Great American Political Movement Got Lost--And How It Can Find Its Way Back (Oxford University Press, March 2008).

Officials, scholars, and activists have long believed in improving environmental policy in developing countries by fostering desirable values and practices through networks of experts. Tim Forsyth will question this faith by arguing that all too often such networks ignore the limitations of global environmental assessments and the politics involved in producing and using expert opinion. Using preliminary evidence from Indonesia and Thailand, he will show how Procrustean advice and local agendas affect efforts to mitigate climate change, and what that can mean for the generation of greenhouse gas (through energy use) and its absorption in sinks (through forest conservation). Forsyth argues that more deliberative institutions of environmental information, judgment, and decision can better accommodate local knowledge and vulnerabilities, strike productive balances between mitigation and adaptation, and thereby address climate change in Southeast Asia in more timely and effective ways.

Tim Forsyth is Reader in Environment and Development in the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has published widely on matters of politics of environmental science and policy in Southeast Asia including Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science (Routledge, 2003); Forest Guardians, Forest Destroyers: The Politics of Environmental Knowledge in Northern Thailand (with A. Walker, Washington University Press, 2008); and International Investment and Climate Change: Energy Technologies for Developing Countries (Earthscan, 1999). He was a co-author of the chapter on climate change in the international Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).

Abstract:

In light of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) electoral resurgence in Taiwan, it is well worth reconsidering the election that initiated its time out of power. In this talk, I draw on comparative evidence to challenge two narratives about the 2000 presidential election: one emphasizing the KMT’s declining resource advantages as the primary cause of its defeat, and the other placing the blame on personality conflicts within the party or on other idiosyncratic factors unique to Taiwanese politics. Instead, the KMT’s defeat had much to do with the simple fact that presidential elections are higher-variance than parliamentary ones. Thus, we should not be surprised either that the KMT lost or that it has subsequently returned to a position nearly as dominant as it was in prior to 2000.

Speaker Bio:

Kharis Templeman received a BA (2002) from the University of Rochester and a Ph.D. in political science (2012) from the University of Michigan. For the 2012-13 academic year he is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan’s International Institute. A fluent Mandarin speaker, he has lived, worked, and traveled extensively in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. His dissertation is a comparative study of the origins and decline of dominant party systems, in which incumbent parties hold power for an extraordinary period of time despite facing regularly, contested elections. 

Current interests include democratization, party system development in newly-contested regimes, and political institutions, with a regional focus on the new and transitioning democracies of Pacific Asia. He is also engaged in collaborative research on constitutional design for divided societies, on the effects of regime change on how client states manage the arms-allies trade-off, and as a regional manager for the Varieties of Democracy project.

In addition, he has taught a wide array of courses while at Michigan, ranging from an introduction to college writing to a senior seminar in the International and Comparative Studies program; in 2010, he won the political science department’s Kingdon teaching award for outstanding graduate student instructor.   

How do we historicize recurring aesthetic forms? In his talk, which addresses themes from his recent book Realism after Modernism, Fore explores the return to figuration in European art of the 1920s, asking if it is possible that the reappearance of aesthetic strategies from the 19^th century during the interwar period did not mark a regression to an older set of artistic practices, but, to the contrary, may have heralded a new aesthetic paradigm.

Co-sponsored by the Department of German Studies and the Department of Comparative Literature.