Abstract:

What explains the decline of clientelism in advanced democracies? This paper examines the United States and Britain from 1880-1920, a period in which political parties shifted from clientelistic to programmatic competition. I theorize that business pressures incentivize parties to change clientelistic strategies. Using archival and quantitative evidence, I find that the rise of managerial capitalism, the establishment of national business organizations, and the increasing costs of clientelism to economic development led businesses to push for programmatic reforms.

Speaker Bio:

Didi Kuo is a fellow with the Project on American Democracy at CDDRL. Her research interests include clientelism, democracy, and corruption. Her book project investigates clientelism in historical and comparative perspective using archival resources and new measures of electoral fraud. She received her PhD in political science from Harvard University in 2013.

Abstract:

Prior work on colonialism has shown that colonial institutions can influence modern developments outcomes, but has not examined the distributional effect of colonialism within societies. This chapter examines how the strategic goals of the colonial state altered the distribution of wealth across Indian caste groups, and how these differences have persisted into the post-independence period. Colonial administrators were only likely to transfer formal or informal power to the precolonial elite if they were secure militarily. This theory is tested using an empirical strategy that uses European wars as an exogenous determinate of colonial military stress. In areas annexed at times of European war, precolonial elites have low levels of wealth today relative to other groups, while in areas annexed at times of peace in Europe precolonial elites retain a more substantial economic advantage. The results highlight the variable impact of colonialism within societies, the strategic nature of colonial policy choices, and the long term consequences of colonial conquest. 

Speaker bio:

Alexander Lee's research focuses on the historical factors governing the success or failure of political institutions, particularly in South Asia and other areas of the developing world. His dissertation examined the ways in which colonialism changed the distribution of wealth in Indian society, and the ways in which these changes affected the development of caste identities. Additional research areas include the study of colonialism and European expansion in a cross- national perspective, and the causes of political violence, especially terrorism. His work has been published in World Politics and the Quarterly Journal of Political Science. Alex earned his PhD from Stanford in 2013. More information on his work can be found on his website: https://people.stanford.edu/amlee/

This seminar is part of the "Europe and the Global Economy" series.

With the creation of the euro, the European Union embarked on a grand experiment. From the beginning, member countries had widely different degrees of budget, or fiscal, transparency. Early warnings about the potential of moral hazard in public finances as a consequence of asymmetric information about fiscal decisions were largely disregarded. In this paper, we analyze the political origins of differences in adherence to the fiscal framework of the euro. We identify in detail how manipulation of subcomponents of Stock-Flow Adjustments in national accounts is used to produce electoral cycles under the radar of the budget surveillance system of the EU. We show how these domestic incentives to use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and respond to fiscal rules at the supranational level interacted with limited budget transparency at the level of national fiscal authorities to produce a systematic undermining of the Economic and Monetary Union through employment of fiscal gimmicks or creative accounting.

David Dreyer Lassen (PhD 2002, Copenhagen) is Professor of Economics at the University of Copenhagen. His research is in empirical political economy and public economics, and includes work on fiscal transparency, political budget cycles, the politics of budgeting, and quasi-experiments in political behavior and political attitudes. His publications includes articles in American Economic Journal-Economic Policy, American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Journal of Public Economics and the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. He has been a visiting scholar at IQSS, Harvard University, and currently holds a Starting Grant from the European Research Council.

Abstract
We know poor governance when we see it, and we also have models of effective, responsive, and accountable governments across the globe. But the truth is that we know much less about how change happens. The limits of legal reforms and institutional forms imported from the outside are apparent, and additional resources are rarely a solution on their own.  Scholars increasingly agree on the need to develop reforms with greater consideration of local context and capacity.  New technologies create opportunities for institutional design, yet many widely touted interventions fail to attract government and citizen users.

Against this backdrop, Associate Professor of Political Science Jeremy Weinstein and I partnered over the 2012-2013 academic year to design the Governance Collaboratory. Our goal is to use the methods of human centered design to help civil society actors and government reformers develop innovations with the potential to disrupt the status quo. We conceived and tested five prototypes for our program, which involved applying the process of design thinking to various governance challenges around the world. I will discuss the key insights we uncovered relating to the substantive problems we addressed, as well as our findings on the utility of design thinking to support governance innovation.

Jenny Stefanotti is currently a fellow at the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design at Stanford, where she applies design thinking to her work at the intersection of technology and international development. She is co-founder of the Governance Collaboratory, a Stanford-based program which supports civil society activists and government reformers to develop innovations that make government more efficient, empower people to have a say in how they are governed, and hold those in power accountable for what they deliver.

Prior to her post at the d.school, Jenny spent over ten years addressing strategic challenges across private, public, and non-profit sectors. She holds a Master’s in Public Administration and International Development from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

This seminar is part of the "Europe and the Global Economy" series.

How do political institutions shape the costs of responding to financial crises? Previous research contends that policy-makers in democracies choose policies less costly to taxpayers than politicians in autocracies. In this research note we re-evaluate Keefer's (2007) contribution to this body of research using an updated theoretical model as well as updated fiscal costs data, which is his dependent variable. We argue that political institutions shapes when politicians spend, rather than how much they spend, in response to financial crises.  In the updated theoretical model we include the possibility that politicians can shift crisis response costs into the future by using policies that create contingent liabilities. Politicians facing removal pressures--such as elections--have incentives to create contingent, rather than immediately realized liabilities. Empirically we illustrate this dynamic by first updating Keefer (2007) using new data on the fiscal costs of financial crises. We further substantiate our argument with Eurostat's detailed yearly, cross-country comparable data from the late 2000s financial crisis to show that politicians in democracies tend to increase contingent liabilities,  while also decreasing realized liabilities, before elections.

*PLEASE NOTE:  The room for this seminar has been changed to the Reuben Hills Conference Room, Encina Hall East, 2nd floor.

Bjørn Høyland will present his joint work with Sara B. Hobolt and Simon Hix titled "Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions".  In multi-level political systems politicians are faced with several possible career paths, as they can advance their careers at either the lower (state) or higher (federal) level.  Career ambitions lead representatives to carefully adapt their behavior to maximize their chances of being re-elected and promoted to higher office at their preferred level of government.  Høyland, Hobolt and Hix argue that the design of the electoral institutions influences how politicians respond to these incentives.  Analyzing a unique dataset of both ‘stated’ and ‘realized’ career ambitions of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) they find that politicians seeking high political office in their home state reduce their legislative participation in the European Parliament, whereas politicians who seek to further their careers at the European level increase their legislative engagement.  In addition, they find that this latter effect is strongest for politicians elected in party-centered electoral systems.  This finding has implications for the literature on electoral institutions and legislative behavior.

This seminar is part of TEC's "European Governance" program seminar series.

Bjørn Høyland (PhD, London School of Economics, 2005) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. He is currently visiting Professor and Anna Lindh Fellow at the Europe Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford. The focus of his research is European Union politics and comparative legislative politics. Professor Høyland’s list of journal publications includes the American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, and European Union Politics. His textbook (with Simon Hix) The Political System of the European Union (3^rd ed) is the standard text for advanced courses on the European Union. 

Professor Yu Keping will systematically survey the dominant processes and key issues of China’s governance changes over the last 30 years since reform. His talk will summarize the major achievements and the ongoing problems of this 30 year long process. It will offer a brief analysis of the underlying reasons for these reforms and the main characteristics of China’s governance model. After enumerating an array of factual evidence, Yu will show that the drive behind China’s governance reforms stems from unitary governance to pluralist governance, centralization to decentralization, rule of man to rule of law, regulatory government to service oriented government, and from internal party democracy to the people’s democracy.

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Dr. YU Keping is the Deputy President of the Central Compilation & Translation Bureau (CCTB), and the founding Director of the China Center for Global Governance and Development (CCGGD). He also serves as Prof. and Director of the Center for Chinese Government Innovations at Peking University, and Prof. and Director of the Institute of Political Development at Tsinghua University. He was a visiting professor or senior fellow at many top universities, including Harvard University, Duke University in the US and Free University in Berlin. His fields of expertise include political philosophy, comparative politics, globalization, civil society, governance and politics in China. Among his many books are Governance and Rule of Law in China (ed., Brill, 2012) and Democracy Is A Good Thing (Brookings, 2010).  As a leading intellectual in China, Professor Yu was selected as one of the “30 most influential figures in the past 30 years since the reform in China” in 2008 and ranked 19 in “2011 Global Top 100 Thinkers” by Foreign Policy in the US.

This event is now full. We cannot accept any more RSVP's, but you can e-mail Zhila Emadi (zemadi@stanford.edu), if you would like to be placed on a waitlist.

About the Speaker:

General C. Robert Kehler is the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. He provides the President and Secretary of Defense with a broad range of strategic capabilities and options. He is responsible for the plans and operations for all U.S. forces conducting strategic nuclear and conventional deterrence and Department of Defense space and cyberspace operations.

General Kehler entered the Air Force in 1975 as a distinguished graduate of the Pennsylvania State University Air Force ROTC program. He has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and major command levels, and has a broad range of operational tours in ICBM, space launch, space control, space and missile warning operations.

General Kehler's staff assignments include tours with the Air Staff and Strategic Air Command headquarters. He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force's Office of Legislative Liaison, where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President's ICBM Modernization Program. As director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of space organizations on behalf of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. He has also served as deputy director of operations, Air Force Space Command, and as deputy commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

About the Topic: What do the National Security Agency’s bulk surveillance programs reveal about Americans?  This talk presents ongoing studies of Internet and telephone metadata.  Preliminary results suggest that technical restrictions are far less effective than many observers have assumed. 

If you would like to read about the topic before the seminar, Jonathan’s work on the subject is available at http://bit.ly/1iMdkkM and http://stanford.io/1iMdjNM.

Speaker bio:

Jonathan Mayer is a Ph.D student in Computer Science and a J.D. student in Law at Stanford University. He joined CISAC as a predoctoral cybersecurity fellow in 2012, and continued as a cybersecurity fellow at CISAC for 2013-2014.

His research aims to advance difficult problems in technology policy. His recent work has focused on how to protect consumer privacy while promoting online innovation. In one line of studies, Jonathan has used web measurement to shed light on the information collected about consumers online. Another project aims to develop third-party web services that deliver functionality without tracking users.

Jonathan completed his undergraduate degree at Princeton University in 2009, with a concentration in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 

Abstract: 

The recent events in Chelyabinsk serve as a reminder that while rare, encounters with near-Earth objects (NEOs) can have significant consequences for humanity. Understanding and mitigating the risks posed by asteroids is important to the scientific and policy-making communities as observation and mitigation missions are considered. Qualitative and quantitative studies have been done to assess such risks, and some reasonable point estimates have been proposed. However, due to the low probability/high consequence nature of asteroid risks, these measures provide limited actionable insights and may even lead to false confidence when interpreted inappropriately. Project Fox aims to provide a probabilistic model that evaluates the collective threat from asteroids events by evaluating the full distributions over consequences. Results of initial modeling efforts show that the catastrophic risks from asteroid impacts are significant, and that the majority of risk for global effects resulting from NEO impacts is attributable to a range of diameters smaller (and more frequent) than previously known. 

Speaker bio:

Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.