Stanford University

After the Inevitable: Response and Recovery from Catastrophic Cyber Attacks on US Critical Infrastructure

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About the Topic: U.S. government leaders are making extraordinary efforts to prevent and protect against cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.  Plans for responding to and recovering from such attacks receive far less attention and are deeply flawed -- especially for catastrophic events when effective plans will be most vital.  Given the rapid growth of cyber threats to the power grid and other critical infrastructure, we should not only continue to strengthen prevention and protection measures, but also assume that a catastrophic cyber-attack will occur and ramp up U.S. response plans and capabilities accordingly. I will argue that the Interim National Cyber Incident Response Plan (which governs the U.S. cyber response system) should be replaced by a plan that is better aligned with industry needs and with “traditional” U.S. disaster response plans, especially the National Response Framework. I will also propose how to structure cyber response planning to maximize “deterrence by denial” and reduce the potential attractiveness of attacking U.S. critical infrastructure for state and non-state adversaries. 

 

About the Speaker: Paul N. Stockton is Managing Director of Sonecon, LLC. Before joining Sonecon, Dr. Stockton served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs from June, 2009 until January, 2013.  In that position, helped lead the Department’s response to Superstorm Sandy and other disasters, guided the Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection program, and oversaw policies and programs to secure DOD’s domestic installations and personnel against terrorism. In September, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appointed Dr. Stockton to co-chair the Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shootings, which recommended major changes to the Department’s security clearance system that are now being implemented.  Dr. Stockton’s recent publications include articles on cyber security in the Yale Law and Policy Review and other journals. Dr. Stockton holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA Summa Cum Laude from Dartmouth College.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Paul Stockton Managing Director Speaker Sonecon, LLC
Seminars

Emerging Institutions in Cybersecurity: Zero-Day Exploits and the Controversy around Software Vulnerability Markets

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Abstract: Zero-day exploits (ZDEs) are programs that make use of newly-discovered software vulnerabilities to allow attackers to break into and manipulate information systems. A market for software vulnerabilities and exploits has developed, with military and intelligence agencies sometimes paying over $100,000 for exploits and software vendors offering bounties for their disclosure. Labeled a ‘digital arms race’ by some, it is generating a transnational debate about control and regulation of cyber capabilities, the role of secrecy and disclosure in cybersecurity, the ethics of exploit production and use, and the implications of trading software vulnerabilities for a secure and reliable Internet.

This research uses concepts and methods of science and technology studies (STS) and institutionalism to the debate over the production, sale and regulation of ZDEs. The goal of this research is to advance understanding of the way discourses are related to the emergence of governance institutions. The work also sheds light on the socio-technical and economic consequences of efforts to control software vulnerabilities and exploits, and make more transparent applications of ZDEs and cyber capabilities.

This talk will report on the ongoing dissertation work and explore how the discourse on software vulnerabilities and exploits is co-produced along with new institutions and practices in cybersecurity.

 

About the Speaker: Andreas Kuehn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Science and Technology and a Fulbright Scholar at Syracuse University. He joined CISAC as a Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow in October 2014. Before joining Stanford, he was a visiting graduate student at Cornell University’s Department of Science & Technology Studies.

In his dissertation research, Andreas examines the discourse and the emerging institutions in cybersecurity with a particular focus on software vulnerability and exploit markets. The trade with exploitable security flaws in software and their use in cyber attacks has sparked a controversy about the control and regulation of information technology, and the role of secrecy and disclosure in achieving cybersecurity. While at CISAC, Andreas is conducting qualitative, empirical research on cybersecurity institutions.

His broader research agenda is informed by Science and Technology Studies and Internet Governance to study emerging technology and its relation to privacy, security, and surveillance. Previous research included an NSF-funded project on deep packet inspection technology (DPI) and its implications on Internet governance (www.deeppacket.info), and the use of information technology in the public administration (e.g., enterprise architecture, standardization, interoperability).

Andreas worked in various research positions for the Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Swiss E-Government Institute, the Swiss Federal Office of Communications, and the Malaysian National Advanced IPv6 Centre of Excellence. The Austrian Computer Society awarded him an eGovernment Innovation Award for his research on multidisciplinary actor coordination and collaboration in large scale public ICT efforts. Andreas holds a M.Sc. in Information Systems from the University of Zurich, Switzerland, and an M.Phil. in Information Science and Technology from the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University. He is originally from Zurich, Switzerland.

Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Andreas Kuehn Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars

Risk in Cybersecurity

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Abstract: Organizations face a range of cyber threats including spammers, lone hackers, and advanced nation states. Significant uncertainty surrounds how to best secure organizations, and the relative value of different safeguards such as intrusion detection, two-factor authentication, and full disk encryption is unknown. In this talk, I will summarize results from a data analysis performed on a data set from a Research and Development Center and present stochastic models to assess risk in organizations. 

About the Speaker: Marshall is a predoctoral science fellow at CISAC. He is a PhD candidate in Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University, concentrating in Risk Analysis. Marshall studies quantitative models for cyber security in organizations. He is interested in developing probabilistic modeling techniques to improve decision making regarding defense against cyber threats. 

Marshall has a diverse background spanning many fields, that includes modeling cyber security for the Jet Propulsion Lab, developing trading algorithms with a high frequency trading company, researching superconducting materials at UIUC, and modeling economic and healthcare systems with the Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems (CASoS) engineering group at Sandia National Labs. Marshall is also the Co-President of the Stanford Complexity Group.
 
Marshall holds a B.S. in Engineering Physics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Marshall Kuypers Predoctoral Science Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars

The Soviet Economic Decline and the Cold War

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Abstract: It is often said that economists in general, and CIA analysts in particular, failed to understand until very late in the game just how serious the USSR's economic problems were.  That failure, it was widely claimed, was the root cause of a more general failure on the part of the U.S. policy community to understand what was going on in the Soviet Union during the later Cold War period.  It turns out, however, that the Soviet economic problem was understood from the mid-1960s on;  in intellectual terms, the analysis was quite impressive.  The Soviets themselves, moreover, understood the problem in much the same way as Western economists did.   All this provides us with a key--perhaps the key--to understanding great power politics during the latter part of the Cold War.

 

About the Speaker: Marc Trachtenberg is Professor of Political Science at the University of California - Los Angeles. He studies national security strategy, diplomatic history, and international relations. He has been Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and the SSRC/MacArthur Foundation. His award-winning book, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton University Press, 1999), explores the profound impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of international relations during the Cold War, making extensive use of newly opened documentary archives in Europe and the United States. History and Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1991) studies seminal events like the onset of World War I and the Cuban Missile Crisis to shed light on the role of force in international affairs. Professor Trachtenberg teaches courses on the history of international relations, international security, and historical research methods. 

 


The Soviet Economic Decline and Great Power Politics
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Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: A Failure of Intelligence?
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Marc Trachtenberg Professor of Political Science Speaker University of California - Los Angeles
Seminars

Is the sky falling or is everything going swimmingly well? Probably neither - Observations and recommendations about uncertainties from a risk analyst's perspective

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Abstract: When evaluating or reporting a risk, there is a tendency to ignore or underestimate uncertainties and to take catastrophist or exceedingly optimistic positions. Media amplification can spread fears that exceed the actual risks and group interests can obscure real ones. Further, in retrospect, a common excuse for inaction is to call a bad surprise a “black swan” that could not have been anticipated when there was ample information to the contrary. From a risk analyst perspective, I will discuss the logic of quantifying uncertainty rather than using classic adjectives and adverbs (“likely”, “unlikely”, “pretty certain”, etc.). I will present some basic, elementary properties and observations, for example, more information does not mean less uncertainty, taking the most likely hypothesis and presenting it as certain is logically wrong, so is letting the last screaming headline obscure the value of prior information. For each, I will present and discuss some examples.  

About the Speaker: Dr. M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell is the Burt and Deedee McMurtry Professor of Engineering, Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University and Chair (Emerita) of Management Science and Engineering. She is a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) of the Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and joined CISAC as an affiliated faculty member in September 2011. 

She is a world leader in engineering risk analysis and management and more generally, the use of Bayesian probability to process incomplete information. Her research and that of her Engineering Risk Research Group at Stanford have focused on the inclusion of technical and management factors in probabilistic risk analysis models with applications to the NASA shuttle tiles, offshore oil platforms and medical systems. Since 2001, she has combined risk analysis and game analysis to assess intelligence information and risks of terrorist attacks.

She is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, the French Academie des Technologies and of several boards including Aerospace, Draper Laboratory and InQtel. Dr. Paté-Cornell was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from December 2001 to 2008. She holds and Engineering degree (Applied Math/CS) from the Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble (France), an MS in Operations Research and a PhD in Engineering-Economic Systems, both from Stanford University.

 

Is the sky falling? Or is everything going swimmingly well? Probably neither
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Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Elisabeth Paté-Cornell

475 Via Ortega Room 336
Huang Engineering Building
Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 723-3823
0
Burt and Deedee McMurtry Professor of Engineering
Professor of Management Science and Engineering
CISAC Affiliated Faculty Member
Chair (Emerita) of Management Science and Engineering
FSI Senior Fellow by courtesy
mep.png PhD

Dr. M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell was born in Dakar, Senegal. Her academic degrees are in mathematics and physics (BS, Marseilles, France, 1968), applied mathematics and computer science (MS and Engineer Degree, Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble, France, 1970; 1971), operations research (MS, Stanford, 1972), and engineering-economic systems (Stanford, PhD, 1978). She was an Assistant Professor of Civil Engineering at MIT (1978 to 1981). In 1981, she joined the Stanford Department of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, where she became Professor (1991), then Chair (1997). In 1999, she was named the Burt and Deedee McMurtry Professor in the Stanford School of Engineering. She oversaw from 1999, the merger of two Stanford departments to form a new department of Management Science and Engineering, which she chaired from January 2000 to June 2011. She is a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) of the Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. She joined CISAC as an affiliated faculty member in September 2011.

She was elected to the National Academy of Engineering in 1995, to its Council (2001-2007), and to the French Académie des Technologies (2003). She was a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (2001-2004; 2006-2008). Her current memberships include the Boards of Trustees of the Aerospace Corp. (2004-), of InQtel (2006-) and of Draper Corporation (2009-). She is a member of the Board of Advisors of the Naval Postgraduate School, which she chaired from 2004 to 2006.

She is a world leader in engineering risk analysis and management and more generally, the use of Bayesian probability to process incomplete information. Her research and that of her Engineering Risk Research Group at Stanford have focused on the inclusion of technical and management factors in probabilistic risk analysis models with applications to the NASA shuttle tiles, offshore oil platforms and medical systems. Since 2001, she has combined risk analysis and game analysis to assess intelligence information and risks of terrorist attacks.

She is past president (1995)/fellow of the Society for Risk Analysis, and fellow of the Institute for Operations Research and Management Science. She has been a consultant to many industrial firms and government organizations. She has authored or co-authored more than a hundred papers in refereed journals and conference proceedings. She has received several best-paper awards from professional organizations and peer-reviewed journals.

See profile here.

Elisabeth Paté-Cornell Burt and Deedee McMurtry Professor of Engineering; Professor of Management Science and Engineering; CISAC Affiliated Faculty Member; Chair (Emerita) of Management Science and Engineering; FSI Senior Fellow by courtesy Speaker Stanford University
Seminars

Radioactive waste disposal in European clay formations: science, safety and society

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About the Topic: Large scientific and technological advances in many European countries and the establishment of the European technology platform IGD-TP have increased our understanding of how to construct, exploit, and close a future geological repository and how to reduce uncertainties in demonstrating its long term safety.  Essentially all major safety analyses have demonstrated that the risk of disposal will be of little consequence. Particularly durable confinement is assured in clay formations as is foreseen for disposal in France, Switzerland and Belgium, but strong confinement can also be realized in more water permeable granite formation by very effective engineered barrier system like those foreseen in Sweden and Finland. Still, there is not yet an operating geologic repository for highly radioactive waste worldwide. The first geological European repositories are expected to accept spent fuel, high-level waste in 2025. Yet there remains substantial public concern.  

Professor Grambow will lay out the current state of the art safety case, focusing mainly on the scientific programs, the ongoing planning of repository construction and the public debate in France, a country with one of the largest nuclear energy programs worldwide.  

About the Speaker: Bernd Grambow is a Professor of excellence at the Ecole des Mines de Nantes, France. He graduated at the Frei Universität Berlin, worked for one year at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Washington State), followed by research positions in Hahn Meitner Institute Berlin and Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe. He currently holds the Chair on nuclear waste disposal in Nantes and is head of the Subatech laboratory on high energy nuclear physics and radiochemistry, a mixed research unit between the CNRS-IN2P3, the Ecole des Mines of Nantes and the University of Nantes. Coordinator of various European projects and former director of the national CNRS-academic/industrial research network NEEDS “nuclear: environment, energy, waste, society”, his areas of scientific expertise are radiochemistry, nuclear waste disposal science, geochemical modeling, radionuclide migration in the environment, chemical thermodynamics, and dynamics of solid/liquid interfaces. He has published 143 peer-reviewed research papers. In 2008 he received the Grand Prix Ivan Pechès of the French Academie of Science and in 2014 he became Chevalier of the Ordre des Palmes Académiques. 

 

 

 

Radioactive waste disposal in European clay formations: science, safety and society
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Nuclear waste disposal: I. Laboratory simulation of repository properties
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Geological disposal of nuclear waste: II. From laboratory data to the safety analysis – Addressing societal concerns
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Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Bernd Grambow Professor at Ecole des Mines de Nantes, France, Chair on Nuclear Waste Management and Director of SUBATECH laboratory Speaker

Rodney C. Ewing

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E203
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-8641
0
1946-2024
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security
Professor of Geological Sciences
rodewingheadshot2014.jpg MS, PhD

      Rod Ewing was the Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor in the Department of Geological Sciences in the School of Earth, Energy and Environmental Sciences at Stanford University. He was also the Edward H. Kraus Distinguished University Professor Emeritus at the University of Michigan, where he had faculty appointments in the Departments of Earth & Environmental Sciences, Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences and Materials Science & Engineering.  He was a Regents' Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico, where he was a member of the faculty from 1974 to 1997. Ewing received a B.S. degree in geology from Texas Christian University (1968, summa cum laude) and M.S. (l972) and Ph.D. (l974, with distinction) degrees from Stanford University where he held an NSF Fellowship.    His graduate studies focused on an esoteric group of minerals, metamict Nb-Ta-Ti oxides, which are unusual because they have become amorphous due to radiation damage caused by the presence of radioactive elements. Over the past thirty years, the early study of these unusual minerals has blossomed into a broadly-based research program on radiation effects in complex ceramic materials.  In 2001, the work on radiation-resistant ceramics was recognized by the DOE, Office of Science – Decades of Discovery as one of the top 101 innovations during the previous 25 years. This has led to the development of techniques to predict the long-term behavior of materials, such as those used in radioactive waste disposal.

      He was the author or co-author of over 750 research publications and the editor or co-editor of 18 monographs, proceedings volumes or special issues of journals. He had published widely in mineralogy, geochemistry, materials science, nuclear materials, physics and chemistry in over 100 different ISI journals. He was granted a patent for the development of a highly durable material for the immobilization of excess weapons plutonium.  He was a Founding Editor of the magazine, Elements, which is now supported by 17 earth science societies. He was a Principal Editor for Nano LIFE, an interdisciplinary journal focused on collaboration between physical and medical scientists. In 2014, he was named a Founding Executive Editor of Geochemical Perspective Letters and appointed to the Editorial Advisory Board of Applied Physics Reviews.

      Ewing had received the Hawley Medal of the Mineralogical Association of Canada in 1997 and 2002, a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2002, the Dana Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America in 2006, the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2006, a Honorary Doctorate from the Université Pierre et Marie Curie in 2007, the Roebling Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America in 2015, Ian Campbell Medal of the American Geoscience Institute, 2015, the Medal of Excellence in Mineralogical Sciences from the International Mineralogical Association in 2015, the Distinguished Public Service Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America in 2019, and was a foreign Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He was also a fellow of the Geological Society of America, Mineralogical Society of America, Mineralogical Society of Great Britain and Ireland, American Geophysical Union, Geochemical Society, American Ceramic Society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Materials Research Society. He was elected a Fellow of the National Academy of Engineering in 2017.

      He was president of the Mineralogical Society of America (2002) and the International Union of Materials Research Societies (1997-1998). He was the President of the American Geoscience Institute (2018). Ewing had served on the Board of Directors of the Geochemical Society, the Board of Governors of the Gemological Institute of America and the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

      He was co-editor of and a contributing author of Radioactive Waste Forms for the Future (North-Holland Physics, Amsterdam, 1988) and Uncertainty Underground – Yucca Mountain and the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste (MIT Press, 2006).  Professor Ewing had served on thirteen National Research Council committees and board for the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine that have reviewed issues related to nuclear waste and nuclear weapons. In 2012, he was appointed by President Obama to serve as the Chair of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which is responsible for ongoing and integrated technical review of DOE activities related to transporting, packaging, storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste; he stepped down from the Board in 2017.

https://profiles.stanford.edu/rodney-ewing

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Senior Fellow at FSI; Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security Chair Stanford University
Seminars

Beyond Emboldenment: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy

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Abstract: What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its critical importance, this question has been understudied. This paper offers a new typology of the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy, and hypothesizes the circumstances in which these effects might be observed. I distinguish between five conceptually distinct foreign policy behaviors—aggression, expansion, independence,bolstering and steadfastness—-and show theoretically how nuclear acquisition may facilitate each of these behaviors. The typology therefore allows scholars to move beyond simple claims of "nuclear emboldenment," and allows for more nuanced predictions and empirical examinations of the ways in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of current and future nuclear states. I demonstrate the utility of this typology using a "hard" case: the United Kingdom. I show that the acquisition of a deliverable nuclear capability in 1955 significantly affected British foreign policy. Britain did not use its nuclear weapons for aggression or expansion, instead seeking to use its nuclear weapons to maintain its forward conventional posture at lower cost and thus postpone retrenchment. However, Britain did use its nuclear weapons to bolster its junior allies in the Middle East, Far East and Europe, and to exhibit greater independence from the United States and greater steadfastness in responding to challenges to its position-—most dramatically during the 1956 Suez crisis.

About the Speaker: Mark Bell is a PhD candidate in Political Science at MIT and a research fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His research examines issues relating to the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, U.S. and British foreign policy, and international relations theory, and has been funded by organizations including the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Tobin Project. He holds a Masters in Public Policy from Harvard Kennedy School, where he was a Frank Knox Memorial Fellow, and a B.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from St. Anne's College, Oxford University.

 


Beyond Emboldenment: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy
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Beyond Emboldenment: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy
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Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Mark Bell research fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Speaker Harvard University
Seminars

Armageddon Insurance: Cold War Civil Defense in the United States and Soviet Union, 1945-1991

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Abstract: This book project is the first historical study of the postwar Soviet civil defense program, and an innovative comparative account of American and Soviet civil defense. It offers a comparative institutional history of the superpowers’ civil defense drawing on previously unexamined Soviet and American archival sources. It offers findings that challenge common assumptions about the logic driving the two nations’ potentially apocalyptic nuclear flirtation, such as that that a mutual recognition that nuclear war would be suicidal prevented the leaders of the two superpowers from embracing civil defense. In actuality, Moscow and Washington developed their civil defense policies in accordance with domestic political concerns, sometimes in direct contradiction to their declared strategic doctrines or military planning. The strange history of Cold War civil defense shows that the superpowers made their nuclear weapons policies as the result of power struggles between different institutions pursuing their own narrow self-interests, with results that imperiled the survival of civilization itself.

About the Speaker: Edward Geist received his Ph.D. in history from the University of North Carolina in May 2013. Previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation in Washington DC, he is a native of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. His research interests include emergency management in nuclear disasters, Soviet politics and culture, and the history of nuclear power and weapons. His dissertation, a comparative study of Soviet and U.S. civil defense during the Cold War, draws upon previously unexamined archival sources to examine the similarities and differences in how the two superpowers faced the dilemmas of the nuclear age. Edward is also interested in the potential uses of simulation and modelling for historians and is developing a piece using these techniques to explore the potential historical implications of the the U.S. and Soviet Union's use of qualitatively different technical assumptions to model strategic nuclear exchanges. A previous recipient of fellowships from Fulbright-Hays and American Councils to conduct research in Moscow and Kyiv, he has published articles in the Journal of Cold War Studies, Russian Review, and the Bulletin of the History of Medicine.

Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Edward Geist MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow PhD CISAC
Seminars

Predicting Chinese Foreign Policy: Signals and Outcomes, 1949-2010

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Abstract: This dissertation chapter examines signaling credibility in Chinese foreign policy over 1949-2010.  The analysis is based on two new datasets: all 2,000 diplomatic interactions between the United States and China over 1949-2010 and sentiment trends in all 50,000 People's Daily articles on the United States over 1949-2010.  I find that China's bellicosity toward the United States is a reliable predictor of conflict initiation the following month.  I also find that Chinese foreign policy is responsive to urban unemployment.  I find no evidence that China's signaling credibility is affected by its military capabilities.

About the Speaker: Erin Baggott is a Zukerman predoctoral fellow at CISAC for 2014-2015.  She is completing her PhD in international relations at the Harvard University Department of Government.  She studies Chinese foreign policy with techniques from computational social science and machine learning.  Her dissertation examines the sources of trust, distrust, cooperation, and conflict in US-China relations over 1949-2012, using day-level datasets of actions and perceptions on both sides.

Previously, she completed a MSc in Modern Chinese Studies at the University of Oxford and a BA in Government and Economics at Harvard College.  She speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and has conducted several summers of field research in Beijing.

 


Predication Chapter, Erin Baggott
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Encina Hall (2nd Floor)

Erin Baggott Zukerman Predoctoral Fellow CISAC
Seminars

Tackling China's Non-Communicable Diseases

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This symposium will highlight the public health threat posed by China’s non-­‐ communicable disease (NCD) epidemic, and focus on the role of research in developing an effective response. Prevalent NCDs (stroke, diabetes, heart disease, and cancer) share common origins linked to lifestyle changes and increasing disease risk factors spurred in part by successful economic development. These conditions and their complications, however, place a high burden on health care resources and reduce social capital growth. An effective response is possible, but will require a novel approach focusing on maintaining human function and wellness, strategies that impact multiple NCDs, new models of health care delivery, and greater integration of public health and clinical care.

Featured speakers include Prof. Linhong WANG (China Center for Disease Control), Prof. Lixin JIANG (National Centre for Cardiovascular Diseases), Prof. Yangfeng WU (Peking University Clinical Research Institute) Prof. Randall S. STAFFORD (Stanford Prevention Research Center), Prof. Sanjay BASU (Stanford Prevention Research Center).

Stanford Center at Peking University

Randall S. STAFFORD Professor Moderator Stanford Prevention Research Center
Seminars
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