Abstract: President Trump may talk about the Middle East differently than Obama did. But the two seem to share the view that the United States is too involved in the region and should devote fewer resources and less time to it. The reduced appetite for U.S. engagement in the region reflects, not an ideological predilection or an idiosyncrasy of these two presidents, but a deeper change in both regional dynamics and broader U.S. interests. Despite this, the United States exists in a kind of Middle Eastern purgatory—too distracted by regional crises to pivot to other global priorities but not invested enough to move the region in a better direction. This worst-of-both-worlds approach exacts a heavy price. It sows uncertainty among Washington’s Middle Eastern partners, which encourages them to act in risky and aggressive ways. It deepens the American public’s frustration with the region’s endless turmoil, as well as with U.S. efforts to address it. It diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to confronting a rising China and a revanchist Russia. And all the while, by remaining unclear about the limits of its commitments, the United States risks getting dragged into yet another Middle Eastern conflict. 

Wittes is a co-host of Rational Security, a weekly podcast on foreign policy and national security issues. She writes on U.S. Middle East policy, regional conflict and conflict resolution, the challenges of global democracy, and the future of Arab governance. Her current research is for a forthcoming book, Our SOBs, on the tangled history of America’s ties to autocratic allies.

Wittes joined Brookings in December of 2003. Previously, she served as a Middle East specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace and director of programs at the Middle East Institute in Washington. She has also taught courses in international relations and security studies at Georgetown University. Wittes was one of the first recipients of the Rabin-Peres Peace Award, established by President Bill Clinton in 1997.

Wittes is the author of "Freedom’s Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy" (Brookings Institution Press, 2008) and the editor of "How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process" (USIP, 2005). She holds a bachelor's in Judaic and Near Eastern studies from Oberlin College, and a master's and doctorate in government from Georgetown University. She serves on the board of the National Democratic Institute, as well as the advisory board of the Israel Institute, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and Women in International Security.

Mara Karlin's Biography: Mara Karlin, PhD, is Director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She is also an Associate Professor at SAIS and a nonresident senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. Karlin has served in national security roles for five U.S. secretaries of defense, advising on policies spanning strategic planning, defense budgeting, future wars and the evolving security environment, and regional affairs involving the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Most recently, she served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development.  Karlin has been awarded Department of Defense Medals for Meritorious and Outstanding Public Service, among others. She is the author of Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (University of Pennsylvania Press; 2018).

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Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University. From 1984 to 1985, he served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Sagan has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his pioneering work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons accidents and the causes of nuclear proliferation.     

Abstract:

Efforts are underway in South Africa to turn around a decade of governance reversal. But progress in addressing an underlying cause of  the reversals remains very limited – extreme, racially-tinged inequality, with missing ladders of opportunity into the middle class. In this seminar, Brian Levy will explore some interactions between shortfalls in inclusion and institutional pressures, including an in-depth focus on one key challenge – improving the learning outcomes of South Africa’s poorly performing system of basic education.   The findings from his recent co-authored book, The Politics and Governance of Basic Education: A Tale of Two South African Provinces  suggest that a narrow focus on  ‘fixing the bureaucracy’ can only go so far. Re-balancing focus away from narrowly top-down approaches towards the evocation of agency  offers a variety of  added possibilities for creative and constructive action. 

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RSVP

On April 16, Solomon Hsiang, the Chancellor's Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Center's Noosheen Hashemi Visiting Scholar, will lead a discussion on data for adaption to climate change, moderated by Marshall Burke. A reception will be held from 4:30 - 5:00 pm. The main event begins at 5:00 pm.

Abstract:

How do memory and forgetting shape politics in autocracies? We combine the logic of collective action with a theory of informational politics, in which autocrats have three instruments: propaganda, threats of violence embedded within propaganda, and censorship. For citizens, we argue that historical memory drives the calendar of protest. In turn, the likelihood of historical forgetting drives the informational strategy of repressive governments. We test our theory in the context of China. The most powerful focal points for protest, we find, are anniversaries of the regime's crimes against citizens. Those most likely to be forgotten -- those that occurred decades ago -- are subject to censorship, while those too fresh to be forgotten are subject to propaganda as well. Explicit threats of violence are reserved for China's ethnic minorities, and coincide with anniversaries of failed separatist movements. We conclude with evidence that propaganda-based threats of violence generate a short-term reduction in protest.

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Abstract:

Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a rising wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self rule. In the United States, the election of Donald Trump marked a decisive turning point for many. What kind of president calls the news media the “enemy of the American people,” or sees a moral equivalence between violent neo-Nazi protesters in paramilitary formation and residents of a college town defending the racial and ethnic diversity of their homes? Yet, whatever our concerns about the current president, we can be assured that the Constitution offers safeguards to protect against lasting damage—or can we?  How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent. Constitutional rules can either hinder or hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights—such as those enshrined in the First Amendment—do not necessarily succeed as bulwarks against democratic decline. Rather, the sobering reality for the United States is that, to a much greater extent than is commonly realized, the Constitution’s design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. But we—and the rest of the world—can do better. The authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk of democratic decline.

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Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of Law, University of Chicago, and a professor of political science.  He is also director of the Comparative Constitutions Project   He focuses on comparative and international law from an interdisciplinary perspective. He holds BA, JD, and PhD degrees from the University of California at Berkeley. His books include Judicial Review in New Democracies (2003), which won the C. Herman Pritchett Award from the American Political Science Association; The Endurance of National Constitutions (2009), which also won a best book prize from APSA; Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (2014); and Law and Development in Middle-Income Countries (2014)..

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Abstract: In efforts to halt the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons (CW) in that country’s civil war the United States and other outside powers applied coercive strategies, in both a deterrent and compellent mode. Outcomes varied: compellence achieved a partial success in getting Syria to give up much of its chemical stockpile, but there were multiple deterrence failures. This paper examines this record to draw lessons about factors associated with the effectiveness of coercion. Its analysis points to the interplay of three factors: credibility, motivation, and assurance. Regarding credibility, the case demonstrates that threats fulfilling many of the traditional criteria for establishing credibility can still fail. In Syria, this is partly because there were ambiguities in the scope of what was covered by deterrent warnings and partly because other factors also affect coercive outcomes. In the Syria case two additional factors were especially important. First, the domestic political motivations of the target affect whether external threats provide coercive leverage. In this case Syrian President Assad’s concern with regime survival led him to perceive the value of CW use as outweighing the likely costs even if outside powers followed through on retaliatory threats. Second, where regime survival is a concern, it is vital to pair coercive threats with appropriate assurances. Here, the case suggests that it is possible not only to provide too little assurance, but also too much. Whereas the Obama administration found it hard to offer credible assurances to Assad, the Trump administration initially conveyed assurances that were too robust, creating a sense that Syria could use CW with impunity. This analysis suggests there may have been a potentially viable path to effective coercion of the Assad regime, but the path would have involved intense tradeoffs that largely prevented decision makers from embracing it. Decision makers and outside commentators alike turned instead to a familiar schema that implies credibility is established by demonstrating a willingness to impose costs using airpower – a script that can be labeled the “resolve plus bombs” formula. Despite the frequent tendency to equate coercion with the threat or limited use of air strikes, this approach was not sufficient to change Syria’s calculations regarding chemical arms.

Speaker's Biography: Jeff Knopf is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California, where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies and a senior research associate with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). He is on sabbatical for the 2018-19 academic year and is spending the year as a visiting scholar at CISAC. This is his second stint at CISAC. Dr. Knopf received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford and was previously a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC in the days when it was still located in the old Galvez House. His most recently completed project is a forthcoming book volume he co-edited on Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons. While at CISAC, Dr. Knopf will primarily be working on a project titled “Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons.” This project examines efforts by the United States and other countries to apply deterrent and compellent strategies in attempts to stop the Syrian government from using chemical weapons and to dismantle its chemical arsenal. Dr. Knopf will also be working on a paper that explores cognitive aspects of the nuclear taboo.

Abstract: To drastically reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and expand energy access, nuclear energy may play a significant role in decarbonizing electrical grids. To the extent that this expansion involves developing new and advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies, concerns about nonproliferation concurrently grow. To address at least one nonproliferation concern, a safeguards assessment was conducted on a conceptual nuclear waste processing technology, called pyroprocessing, using a traditional safeguards technique, called the neutron balance method. The safeguards assessment revealed that the fundamental requirements needed for the neutron balance method to work were not always observed. The diversion scenario modeled resulted in the undetected diversion of several kilograms of plutonium. The assessment found that traditional safeguards assumptions and techniques might not be adequate to meet nuclear material accountancy requirements. New approaches developed from fundamental research are needed to ensure new facilities are only being used for peaceful purposes.

Speaker's Biography: Chantell Murphy is a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. Chantell Murphy earned her PhD in nuclear engineering from the University of New Mexico in 2018 and holds a MS in health physics from Georgetown University and a BS in physics from Florida State University.

Chantell Murphy worked as a graduate research assistant at Los Alamos National Laboratory supporting the nuclear engineering and nonproliferation division (NEN-5) and worked in the national security office (NSO). During her time at LANL Ms. Murphy investigated safeguards approaches for pyroprocessing facilities and helped develop an acquisition path analysis software tool called APAT for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ms. Murphy worked on safeguards approaches for advanced reactor designs like thorium fueled reactors, worked on knowledge retention issues for future warhead verification campaigns, and participated in and gave talks at several international safeguards and nuclear policy related workshops around the US and in Europe. Ms. Murphy also worked as a visiting scientist at the Forschungszentrum Jülich in Germany for three months developing the IAEA’s state level approach and acquisition path analysis with the Nuclear Waste Management and Reactor Safety group in the Institute of Energy and Climate Research.

Chantell Murphy’s previous experience also includes an internship at the Managing the Atom project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and work for the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.