The new U.S. President will face more than one
kind of global recession. In addition to the economic downturn, the
world is suffering a democratic contraction. In Russia, awash with oil
money, Vladimir Putin and his KGB cronies have sharply restricted
freedom. In Latin America, authoritarian (and anti-American) populism
is on the rise. In Nigeria, the Philippines and once again in Pakistan,
democracy is foundering amid massive corruption, weak government and a
loss of public faith. In Thailand, the government is paralyzed by mass
protests. In Africa, more than a dozen fragile democracies must face
the economic storm unprepared. And in the Middle East—the Bush
administration's great democratic showcase—the push for freedom lies in
ruins.
In the past decade, the breathtaking democratic wave that
swept the world during the final quarter of the 20th century reversed
course. Making democracy work proved harder than bringing down
authoritarian rule. And receptive peoples everywhere were alienated by
the arrogance and unilateralism of President George W. Bush's approach,
which associated "democracy promotion" with the use of force and
squandered America's soft power. Advancing democracy abroad remains
vital to the U.S. national interest. But the next president will have
to craft a more modest, realistic and sustainable strategy.
It's
easy today to forget how far freedom has advanced in the past 30 years.
When the wave of liberation began in 1974 in Portugal, barely a quarter
of the world's states met the minimal test of democracy: a place where
the people are able, through universal suffrage, to choose and replace
their leaders in regular, free and fair elections. Over the course of
the next two decades, dictatorships gave way to freely elected
governments first in Southern Europe, then in Latin America, then in
East Asia. Finally, an explosion of freedom in the early '90s liberated
Eastern Europe and spread democracy from Moscow to Pretoria. Old
assumptions—that democracy required Western values, high levels of
education and a large middle class—crumbled. Half of sub-Saharan
Africa's 48 states became democracies, and of the world's poorest
countries, about two in every five are democracies today.
This
great shift coincided with an unprecedented moment of U.S. military,
economic and cultural dominance. Not only was America the world's last
remaining superpower, but U.S. values—individual freedom, popular
sovereignty, limited government and the rule of law—were embraced by
progressive leaders around the world. Opinion surveys showed democracy
to be the ideal of most people as well.
In recent years, however,
this mighty tide has receded. This democratic recession has coincided
with Bush's presidency, and can be traced in no small measure to his
administration's imperial overreach. But it actually started in 1999,
with the military coup in Pakistan, an upheaval welcomed by a public
weary of endemic corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic and
political violence. Pakistan's woes exposed more than the growing
frailty of a nuclear-weapon state. They were also the harbinger of a
more widespread malaise. Many emerging democracies were experiencing
similar crises. In Latin America and the post-communist world, and in
parts of Asia and Africa, trust in political parties and parliaments
was sinking dramatically, as scandals mounted and elected governments
defaulted on their vows to control corruption and improve the welfare
of ordinary people.
Thanks to bad governance and popular
disaffection, democracy has lost ground. Since the start of the
democratic wave, 24 states have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two
thirds of these reversals have occurred in the past nine years—and
included some big and important states such as Russia, Venezuela,
Bangladesh, Thailand and (if one takes seriously the definition of
democracy) Nigeria and the Philippines as well. Pakistan and Thailand
have recently returned to rule by elected civilians, and Bangladesh is
about to do so, but ongoing crises keep public confidence low.
Democracy is also threatened in Bolivia and Ecuador, which confront
rising levels of political polarization. And other strategically
important democracies once thought to be doing well—Turkey, South
Africa and Ukraine—face serious strains.
This isn't to say there
haven't been a few heartening successes in recent years. Indonesia, the
world's most populous Muslim country, has become a robust democracy
nearly a decade after its turbulent transition from authoritarian rule.
Brazil, under the left-leaning Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has also
strengthened its democratic institutions while maintaining fiscal
discipline and a market orientation and reducing poverty. In Africa,
Ghana has maintained a quite liberal democracy while generating
significant economic growth, and several smaller African countries have
moved in this direction.
But the combination of tough economic
times, diminished U.S. power and the renewed energy of major
authoritarian states will pose a stiff challenge to some 60 insecure
democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc.
If they don't strengthen their political institutions, reduce
corruption and figure out how to govern more effectively, many of these
democracies could fail in the coming years.
Part of the tragedy
is that Washington has made things worse, not better. The Bush
administration was right that spreading democracy would advance the
U.S. national interest—that truly democratic states would be more
responsible, peaceful and law-abiding and so become better contributors
to international security. But the administration's unilateral and
self-righteous approach led it to overestimate U.S. power and rush the
dynamics of change, while exposing itself to charges of hypocrisy with
its use of torture and the abuse of due process in the war on terror.
Instead of advancing freedom and democracy in the Middle East, 2005 and
2006 witnessed a series of embarrassing shocks: Hamas winning in the
Palestinian territories and Islamist parties winning in Iraq; Hizbullah
surging in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood surging in Egypt. After a
brief moment of optimism, the United States backed away and Middle
Eastern democrats grew embittered.
The new American
administration will have to fashion a fresh approach—and fast. That
will mean setting clear priorities and bringing objectives into
alignment with means. The United States does not have the power,
resources or moral standing to quickly transform the world's entrenched
dictatorships. Besides, isolating and confronting them never seems to
work: in Cuba, for example, this policy has been a total failure. This
does not mean that the United States should not support democratic
change in places like Cuba, Burma, Iran and Syria. But it needs a more
subtle and sophisticated approach.
The best strategy would be to
open up such places to the freer flow of people, goods, ideas and
information. The next administration should therefore start by
immediately lifting the self-defeating embargo on Cuba. It should offer
to establish full diplomatic ties with Havana and free flows of trade
and investment in exchange for a Cuban commitment to improve human
rights. Washington should also work with Tehran to hammer out a
comprehensive deal that would lift economic sanctions, renounce the use
of force to effect regime change and incorporate Iran into the WTO, in
exchange for a verifiable halt to nuclear-weapons development, more
responsible behavior on Iraq and terrorism, and improved human-rights
protection and monitoring. Critics will charge that talking to such
odious governments only legitimizes them. In fact, engaging closed
societies is the best way to foster democratic change.
At the
same time, the United States should continue to support diaspora groups
that seek peaceful democratic change back home, and should expand
international radio broadcasting, through the Voice of America and more
specialized efforts, that transmits independent news and information as
well as democratic values and ideas.
In the near term, however,
Washington must focus on shoring up existing democracies. Fragile
states need assistance to help them adjust to the shocks of the current
economic crisis. But they also need deep reforms to strengthen their
democratic institutions and improve governance. This will require
coordinated help from America and its Western allies to do three things.
First,
they must ramp up technical assistance and training programs to help
the machinery of government—parliaments, local authorities, courts,
executive agencies and regulatory institutions—work more transparently
and deliver what people want: the rule of law, less corruption, fair
elections and a government that responds to their economic and social
needs. This also means strengthening democratic oversight.
Second,
we know from experience that these kinds of assistance don't work
unless the political leaders on the receiving end are willing to let
them. So we need to generate strong incentives for rulers to opt for a
different logic of governance, one that defines success as delivering
development and reducing poverty rather than skimming public resources
and buying support or rigging elections. This will mean setting clear
conditions that will have to be met before economic and political aid
is doled out to governments.
The third priority is to expand
assistance to independent organizations, mass media and think tanks in
these fragile states that will increase public demand for better
governance and monitor what governments do. This means aiding
democratic professional associations, trade unions, chambers of
commerce, student groups and organizations devoted to human rights,
women's rights, transparency, civic education, election monitoring and
countless other democratic activities. Ordinary people must be educated
to know their rights and responsibilities as citizens—and be ready to
defend them.
While Western countries have provided this kind of
aid for more than two decades, economic assistance handed out at the
same time has often undermined democracy efforts by subsidizing
corrupt, abusive governments. Aid donors should thus strike a new
bargain with recipients, telling them: if you get serious about
containing corruption, building a rule of law and improving people's
lives, we will get serious about helping you. Those that show a real
commitment should get significant new rewards of aid and freer trade.
Those unwilling to reform should get little, though the West should
continue to fight disease and directly help people in dire need
wherever they are.
Finally, the new president should keep in mind
the power of example. Washington can't promote democracy abroad if it
erodes it at home. The contradictions between the rhetoric of Bush's
"freedom agenda" and the realities of Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, torture,
warrantless surveillance and boundless executive privilege have led
even many of the United States' natural allies to dismiss U.S. efforts
as hypocritical. Thus the new president must immediately shut down
Guantánamo and unequivocally renounce the use of torture; few gestures
would restore American credibility more quickly. The United States
should also reduce the power of lobbyists, enhance executive and
legislative transparency and reform campaign-finance rules—both for its
own good and for the message it would send.
Make no mistake:
thanks to the global economic crisis and antidemocratic trends, things
may get worse before they get better. But supporting democracy abroad
advances U.S. national interests and engages universal human
aspirations. A more consistent, realistic and multilateral approach
will help to secure at-risk democracies and plant the seeds of freedom
in oppressed countries. Patience, persistence and savvy diplomacy will
serve the next president far better than moralistic rhetoric that
divides the world into good and evil. We've seen where that got us.
