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The Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU), the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and the APARC China Program jointly hosted a workshop on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in early March. The workshop, held on March 2 and 3, welcomed researchers from around the world with expertise in the Initiative. Unfortunately, because of the rapidly developing health emergency related to the coronavirus, participants from not only China, but also Japan, were prevented from attending. As described by Professor Jean Oi, founding director of SCPKU and the China Program, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, director of CDDRL and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, who co-chaired the workshop, the meeting aimed to provide a global perspective on the BRI, consolidate knowledge on this opaque topic, and determine the best method and resources for future research.  

The workshop began with presentations from several of the invited guests. Dr. Atif Ansar from the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School kicked off the first day by describing not only the tremendous opportunity that the BRI presents to developing economies, but also the serious pitfalls that often accompany colossal infrastructure projects. Pointing out the poor returns on investment of mega infrastructure projects, Ansar examined the frequest cost and schedule overruns, random disasters, and environmental degradation that outweigh the minimal benefits that they generally yield. China’s own track record from domestic infrastructure projects does little to mitigate fear of these risks, Ansar claimed. In response, he urged professional management of BRI investments, institutional reforms, and intensified deployment of technology in BRI projects. Dr. Ansar was followed by Dr. Xue Gong of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Gong’s analysis centered on the extent to which China’s geopolitical motivations influenced its outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Although her research was still in the early stages, her empirical analysis of China’s OFDI inflows into fifty BRI recipient countries from 2007-2018 nevertheless revealed that geopolitical factors often outweigh economic factors when it comes to China’s OFDI destinations.

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Amit Bhandari of Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations presents his research at the Belt and Road Workshop.
Participants then heard presentations from Amit Bhandari of Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations and Professor Cheng-Chwee Kuik of the National University of Malaysia. Mr. Bhandari’s talk focused on Chinese investments in India’s six neighboring countries, which tend to center more on energy rather than connectivity projects. He first found that the investments are generally not economical for the host countries because they come with high costs and high interest rates. Secondly, he argued that these projects often lacked a clear economic rationale, appearing instead to embed a geopolitical logic not always friendly to India. Professor Kuik, by contrast, provided a counterexample in his analysis of BRI projects in Southeast Asia. He described how, in Southeast Asia, host countries’ reception of the BRI has varied substantially; and how various stakeholders, including states, sub-states and other entities, have used their leverage to shape outcomes more or less favorable to themselves. Kuik’s analysis injected complexity into the often black-and-white characterizations of the BRI. He highlighted the multidimensional dynamics that play out among local and state-level players in pursuit of their goals, and in the process of BRI implementation.

Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt and Scholar-in-Residence Jeffrey Ball, both at Stanford Law School, followed with individual presentations on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the BRI and the emissions impact of the BRI on climate change, respectively. Professor Milhaupt  characterized Chinese SOEs as both geopolitical and commercial actors, simultaneously charged with implementing Party policies and attaining corporate profits. Chinese SOEs are major undertakers of significant overseas BRI projects, acting not only as builders but also as investors, partners, and operators. This situation, Milhaupt asserted, carries significant risks for SOEs because these megaprojects often provide dismal returns, have high default rates, and can trigger political backlash in their localities. Milhaupt highlighted the importance of gathering firm-level data on businesses actually engaged in BRI projects to better infer geostrategic, financial, or other motivations. Jeffrey Ball turned the discussion to carbon emissions from BRI projects and presented preliminary findings from his four-country case studies. He concluded that, on aggregate, the emissions impact of the BRI is still “more brown than green.” Twenty-eight percent of global carbon emissions may be accounted for by BRI projects, Ball asserted, underscoring the importance of the BRI to the future of global climate change.

The day concluded with presentations by  Michael Bennon, Managing Director at the Stanford Global Projects Center, and Professor David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Bennon first presented findings from two empirical case studies of BRI projects and then went on to describe how the BRI is now practically the “only game in town” for infrastructure funding for developing countries. Lengthy environmental review processes at Western multilateral banks have turned the World Bank, for example, from a lending bank into a “knowledge bank,” he argued. He also highlighted that, in general, economic returns on BRI projects for China are very poor, even though recipient countries may accrue macroeconomic benefits from these projects. Finally, Professor Lampton turned the discussion back to Southeast Asia, where China is currently undertaking massive cross-border high-speed rail projects through eight ASEAN countries. He described how each host country had varying capacity to negotiate against its giant neighbor, and how the sequential implementation of these cross-border rail projects also had varying impacts on the negotiating positions of these host countries. BRI played out differently in each country, in other words, eliciting different reactions, push-backs and negotiated terms.

The second day of the workshop was dedicated to working toward a collaborative approach to future BRI research. The group discussed the key gaps in the existing research, including how to know what China’s true intentions are, how to measure those intentions, who the main players and their interests in both China and the host countries are, and even what the BRI is, exactly. Some cautioned that high-profile projects may not be representative of the whole. Participants brainstormed about existing and future sources of data, and stressed the importance of diversifying studies and seeking empirical evidence.

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Participants in the Belt and Road Initiative Workshop at Stanford University, March 2-3, 2020.
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...water, water everywhere, nor any drop to drink...

Join Stanford's Center on Food Security and the Environment for a lecture and reception with Dr. Junaid Ahmad, the World Bank Country Director for India.

Dr. Ahmad will look at the political economy of managing service delivery in India through the prism of water. The presentation will look at the water supply and sanitation sector and water resource management in the context of India’s federalism and urban and food policies. Ahmad argues that India’s transition to middle income will depend significantly on how water will be valued in India’s political economy.  

Junaid Ahmad, from Bangladesh, is currently the World Bank Country Director for India. Over the years, Mr. Ahmad has brought an exceptional track record of management and leadership in the areas of policy reform, service delivery and international partnerships, combining intellectual and analytical rigor with strategic operational focus. Mr. Ahmad’s work has covered urban finance and city management, infrastructure finance, water, service delivery in federal systems, and local government reform. Currently, he is responsible for managing the World Bank’s India portfolio.

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Authorities don’t seem to understand the real threat from cyber-operations.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has now confirmed that there was a cyberattack on the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) in Tamil Nadu, India, in September. The nuclear power plant’s administrative network was breached in the attack, but did not cause any critical damage. KKNPP plant officials had initially denied suffering an attack and officially stated that KKNPP “and other Indian nuclear power plants are stand alone and not connected to outside cyber network and Internet. Any cyberattack on the Nuclear Power Plant Control System is not possible.”


So what really happened at Kudankulam? Here’s what you need to know.

1. The nuclear power plant and the cyberattack

The KKNPP is the biggest nuclear power plant in India, equipped with two Russian-designed and supplied VVER pressurized water reactors with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts each. Both reactor units feed India’s southern power grid. The plant is adding four more reactor units of the same capacity, making the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant one of the largest collaborations between India and Russia.

 

Read the Rest at The Washington Post

 

 

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Political scientist Asfandyar Mir has studied security affairs in South Asia for years. Now a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Mir explains the latest developments, old conflicts, and potential conflagrations in the ongoing crisis between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan.

RFE/RL: Where do you see the military situation moving after India and Pakistan engaged in what appears to be retaliatory air strikes and cross-border shelling?

Asfandyar Mir: The current stand-off between India and Pakistan hasn't fully de-escalated, but it isn't as tense as it was some days ago. After Pakistan retaliated with air strikes against India on February 27, the crisis intensified -- it appeared the Indian government was considering a follow-on retaliation. In that backdrop, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's gesture of returning the Indian Air Force pilot, captured by Pakistan after his plane was shot down, lowered the political temperature, eased the situation somewhat. That said, military forces on both sides remain mobilized in large numbers, and the Indian government still hasn’t given a clear-cut signal of wanting to de-escalate.

RFE/RL: Do you see the current leadership in India and Pakistan as capable of deescalating given the domestic pressures they currently face?

Mir: The leadership of the two countries has different political incentives. On the Indian side, Prime Minister [Narendra] Modi still has incentives to re-escalate. He is going into a national election. His government’s economic performance has been weak, so he appears to be relying more on foreign policy issues like confronting Pakistan -- an issue the Indian electorate cares about. Pakistan’s shooting down of the Indian aircraft and capturing of the air force pilot also deeply embarrassed him and his political party, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).

On the Pakistan side, two leaders matter: Prime Minister Imran Khan and chief of the country's powerful army, General Qamar Bajwa. After the first Indian military raid, both were left embarrassed before their key domestic audiences: Khan in front of his voter base and Bajwa in front of his officer corps.

 

However, Pakistan's retaliatory strikes not only reversed that damage but enhanced their domestic political standing. Now both the leaders want a deescalation. Khan has made his first move to deescalate. He is also insisting with a dialogue offer to India on terrorism on India's terms. What he hasn’t done and could do to defuse the situation is a crackdown against the group behind the February 14 terror attack, Jaish-e-Muhammed.

Khan, however, would need Bajwa’s support for such a crackdown. It remains unclear whether Bajwa would agree. The Pakistani military hasn’t acted against Pakistan-based jihadis operating in Kashmir. Instead, it has seen them as valuable allies in confronting India in Kashmir.

RFE/RL: What happens to the Kashmir issue now?

Mir: We remain very far from any meaningful progress on the dispute over Kashmir. In recent years, India has intensified its crackdown in Kashmir against violent and non-violent separatist groups. India also employs a heavy-handed counterinsurgency strategy, which frequently targets the civilian population. As a result, resentment in the Kashmiri population toward the Indian state remains very high. The Indian government continues to see a coercive approach instead of a political approach involving concessions as the way forward in the disputed region.

Pakistan also remains firm in its territorial claim over Kashmir. Given India’s unwillingness to make concessions and the deep alienation in the region toward the Indian state, Pakistan is likely to continue political and military support for the insurgency in Kashmir.

RFE/RL: What dangers do jihadi groups present to Pakistan?

Mir: It is commonly assumed that jihadi groups operating against India in Kashmir pose a direct threat to Pakistan. This was true a decade ago, when factions of Kashmir-focused jihadi groups defected toward transnational jihadis like Al-Qaeda. It appears that the process has stopped. Major Kashmir-focused jihadi groups based in Pakistan do not challenge the Pakistani government. These groups have also consolidated control over their cadres, preventing fragmentation toward Al-Qaeda and [the ultra-radical] Islamic State (IS).

This is not to say there are no indirect bad effects of such groups on Pakistan. These groups spawn a large jihadi infrastructure, which is a source of radicalization in the country. Pakistan continually faces international opprobrium, even from its allies like China privately, for allowing such groups to operate from its territory.

RFE/RL: What has the international community's role been in the current crisis?

Mir: [U.S.] President [Donald] Trump made an important statement in Hanoi on February 28, suggesting that the U.S. government has been involved in mediating an end to the India-Pakistan crisis. Besides the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, China, and Russia have sought to deescalate the tensions.

Overall, Pakistan is under pressure from the international community for not doing enough to curb anti-India jihadi groups. Still, it is striking that beyond condemnation, the U.S. and other major powers have not pledged any material support to the Indian government like sanctions against Pakistani leadership or military support for Indian operations.

RFE/RL: Did nuclear weapons play a role in the current crisis?

Mir: Nuclear weapons have played a role. Following the first Indian air strike on February 26, the Pakistani military spokesman stated that the government was activating the body which decides the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. This was a clear-cut signal by Pakistan that it would use nuclear weapons if the crisis exacerbated. I believe that deterred a sizable Indian response after Pakistan conducted its retaliatory strikes on February 27.

 

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Bio: Dr. Arvind Gupta recently retired as India's Deputy National Security Advisor. In his capacity as Deputy NSA, he also headed India's National Security Council Secretariat from 2014 until 2017. Previously, he was the Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), a thinktank funded by India's Ministry of Defence. Dr. Gupta joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1979 and served at India's diplomatic missions in Moscow, London and Ankara. At the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi, he dealt with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Russia, Kashmir, and the Central Asian affairs. He is an honorary professor in the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University. He has an MSc in Physics from the University of Delhi and a Ph.D. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is currently the Director of Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), a Delhi-based independent, non-partisan think tank focussing on foreign policy, defense and security-related issues from an Indian perspective. His most recent book How India Manages its National Security was published by Penguin Random House in 2018.

Book Overview: In this authoritative and comprehensive survey of the challenges a changing global security environment poses to India, former deputy national security advisor Arvind Gupta outlines the important aspects of the country's security apparatus and how they interface to confront internal and external conflicts. We have today a turbulent Middle East to the west; a rising and assertive China to the north; Pakistan in the grip of the military and the militants across our border and an increasingly militarizing Indian Ocean region surrounding us. Additionally, climate change, cyber security and the vulnerability of our space assets are major areas of concern. Anything that weakens a nation weakens its security, which makes the issues of food, water, health, economics and governance critically significant. Arvind Gupta draws on his long experience in these areas to argue that instead of tactical remedies, a strategic, coherent, institutional approach is needed to deal with these challenges. Strengthening the National Security Council, for instance, could be one way forward.

How India Manages Its National Security explains with great clarity and thoroughness the concept and operation of India's national security apparatus. This book will be of great interest to practitioners, analysts and laymen alike and offer an important voice in the discussion on how national security challenges should be resolved in the decades to come.

Arvind Gupta Director Vivekananda International Foundation
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Abstract: In November 1998, ‘mujahideen’ warriors climbed the heights above Kargil in Indian held Kashmir, crossed the Line of Control, and occupied Indian military posts. These ‘mujahideens’ were really Pakistani soldiers clad in civilian garb on a secret mission. This was the beginning of the war in Kargil between two nuclear neighbors (India and Pakistan). This study critically evaluates the relationship between ‘learning’ and risk-prone behavior of Pakistan in the midst of technological maturation. Should we be confident and rely on nuclear deterrence and believe that Kargil-like crisis will never happen again? This talk will explain the story of Kargil from a theoretical lens of nuclear learning, demonstrating how difficult it has been for Pakistan to learn appropriate lessons given the firewalls of convictions, cover-ups, and confirmation biases. 

Speaker bio: Sannia Abdullah is a political scientist. Her doctoral thesis is on nuclear learning in South Asia with special reference to India-Pakistan crisis behavior. She is associated with Quaid-i-Azam University in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies as a permanent faculty member. At CISAC, she is working on her book manuscript focusing on the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear behavior and its deterrence logic. Prior to joining CISAC, she was a visiting research scholar at Cooperative Monitory Center, Sandia National Labs (NM) where her research focuses primarily nonproliferation issues in South Asia. In 2016, she presented her research at Atlantic Council on Pakistan’s pursuit of full spectrum deterrence strategy and posture, conceptual nuances, and implied ramifications and at ISAC-ISSS, Annual Conference, University of Notre Dame. She was invited to deliver lectures at the USAFA on Pakistan’s deterrence stability and maturing force posture. She expressed her academic views at different forums including Pentagon, Lawrence Livermore National Labs, Congressional Budget Office and in some Think Tanks in Washington D.C. She had been a Nonproliferation Fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), in Monterey and a SWAMOS alumni of Columbia University (2011). Since 2010, Dr. Abdullah has been part of several Track-II dialogues and had an opportunity to learn decision-making trends through her regular participations in Table Top Exercises exploring escalation control and deterrence stability in South Asia.

 

CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: This research investigates why and how regional nuclear powers come to develop specific kind of nuclear delivery systems, especially a submarine-based ballistic missile (SSBN) force. In the second nuclear age, as new nuclear states develop sophisticated delivery systems including SSBNs, understanding the logic and process of their nuclear force development is essential for both regional and international security. The origins and development process of India’s nuclear submarine program suggests that nuclear force development is a historically contingent process. This data-driven research, based on newly declassified archival documents from the Indian archives and extensive oral history interviews, refutes teleological narratives that either argue for technological determinism or the need for projecting nuclear deterrence as the primary causal variables. By situating India’s nuclear submarine program in the organizational routines of its nuclear scientific bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and the military socialization of the Indian Navy, this research explains India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. This comprehensive empirical research, currently based on a single case study, also addresses an important theoretical question in the field of international security studies: why states develop specific kinds of weapon systems, including those for nuclear weapons delivery?  

Speaker bio: Prior to joining CISAC as a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Yogesh Joshi was an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He recently received his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University specializing in Indian foreign and security policy. 

At CISAC, Yogesh is finishing a book manuscript on the history of India's nuclear submarine program. His research traces the origins, process and development of India's nuclear submarine program using multi-archival sources and extensive oral history interviews. Yogesh’s data-driven research posits that India’s nuclear submarine program was riddled with shifting motivations, ambivalent rationales and halting progress. Rather than being driven by a single coherent strategic plan, India stumbled upon a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. By situating the nuclear submarine program in India’s Cold War security policy, its nuclear policy, its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, the bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and its quest for technological prestige, this research is an attempt to understand path-dependency in one of India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. It not only has implications for explaining India's nuclear program and policy but also provides an avenue to explain the process of decision-making behind state's pursuance of specific kinds of nuclear delivery systems. This research is supported by the MacArthur foundation. 

He has held fellowships at George Washington University, King’s College London and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. His research has appeared or is under review in Asian Security, International History Review, International Affairs, Survival, US Naval War College Review, Comparative Strategy, Harvard Asia Quarterly, India Review, Asia Policy, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, War on the Rocks, World Politics Review and The Diplomat. He has co-authored two books: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Emerging Balance of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and India in Nuclear Asia: Regional Forces, Perceptions and Policies (Orient Blackswan (South Asia), forthcoming 2018; also forthcoming in fall 2018 by Georgetown University Press for the rest of the world). A short introduction on India’s Nuclear Policy was recently commissioned by Oxford University Press and has been accepted for publication in 2018. A monograph titled 'India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific' was published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College in 2016. 

Yogesh Joshi Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC
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Food security will be increasingly challenged by climate change, natural resource degradation, and population growth. Wheat yields, in particular, have already stagnated in many regions and will be further affected by warming temperatures. Despite these challenges, wheat yields can be increased by improving management practices in regions with existing yield gaps. To identify the magnitude and causes of current yield gaps in India, one of the largest wheat producers globally, we produced 30 meter resolution yield maps from 2001 to 2015 across the Indo-Gangetic Plains (IGP), the nation's main wheat belt. Yield maps were derived using a new method that translates satellite vegetation indices to yield estimates using crop model simulations, bypassing the need for ground calibration data. This is one of the first attempts to apply this method to a smallholder agriculture system, where ground calibration data are rarely available. We find that yields can be increased by 11% on average and up to 32% in the eastern IGP by improving management to current best practices within a given district. Additionally, if current best practices from the highest-yielding state of Punjab are implemented in the eastern IGP, yields could increase by almost 110%. Considering the factors that most influence yields, later sow dates and warmer temperatures are most associated with low yields across the IGP. This suggests that strategies to reduce the negative effects of heat stress, like earlier sowing and planting heat-tolerant wheat varieties, are critical to increasing wheat yields in this globally-important agricultural region.

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David Lobell
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Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, FSI Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker, and CISAC Senior Fellow Scott Sagan are part of a group of 80 national security experts included in a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) focused on the prospects for peace and security in South Asia.

The MOOC, titled Nuclear South Asia: A Guide to India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, is an inaugural course in a series produced by the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. It is free to enroll and can be taken anytime and at any pace from a digital device.

Learn more about the MOOC.

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A mock-up of a missile is carried on a truck at a campaign rally in Islamabad, Pakistan, Feb. 16, 2008. | John Moore/Getty Images
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