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As the new academic year is about to get underway, the Corporate Affiliates Program of Shorenstein APARC welcomes its new class of fellows for the 2010-2011 academic year:

  • Minoru Aosaki, Ministry of Finance, Japan; 
  • Wataru Ishii, Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan; 
  • Earn Key Joo, Samsung Electronics, Republic of Korea; 
  • Toshifumi Kadowaki, Sumitomo Corporation, Japan; 
  • Takeshi Kondo, Mitsubishi Electric, Japan; 
  • Yuichi Moronaga, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan; 
  • Makoto Murata, Kansai Electric Power Company, Japan; 
  • Pradnya Palande, Reliance Industries, India; 
  • Seung Gun Park, Samsung Electronics, Republic of Korea; 
  • Puangthong Pawakapan, the Asia Foundation / Chulalongkorn University, Thailand; 
  • Oshie Sato, Sumitomo Corporation, Japan; 
  • Naoki Takeuchi, Development Bank of Japan, Japan; 
  • Hirofumi Takinami, Ministry of Finance, Japan; 
  • Sonya Vasudeva, Reliance Industries, India; and 
  • Eiichi Yamamoto, Japan Patent Office, Japan.

During their stay at Stanford University, the fellows will audit classes, study English, and conduct individual research projects, which they will then present about at the end of the year. They will have the opportunity to consult with Shorenstein APARC's scholars and attend events featuring visiting experts from around the world. The fellows will also participate in special events and site visits to gain a first-hand understanding of business, society, and culture in the United States.

The Corporate Affiliates website will feature interviews with of each of the 2010-2011 fellows throughout the coming year.

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How will population aging impact the economies and social protection systems of Japan, South Korea, China, and India? This colloquium showcases research addressing that question by contributors to a new Shorenstein APARC book, Aging Asia, co-edited by Karen Eggleston and Shripad Tuljapurkar. Dr. Bloom discusses how aging of the baby boom generation, declines in fertility rates, and an increase in life expectancy imply several changes for the economies of the region. Notwithstanding the potential challenges, Bloom argues that population aging may have less of a negative effect on economic growth than some have predicted. Bloom will also discuss the longitudinal aging study in India.

David Bloom is Clarence James Gamble Professor of Economics and Demography at Harvard University, Chair of the Department of Global Health and Population at the Harvard School of Public Health, and Director of Harvard University’s Program on the Global Demography of Aging (funded by the National Institute of Aging). He is Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, where he serves as a member of three research programs: Labor Studies, Aging, and Health Economics. He co-chairs the Public Policy Committee of the American Foundation for AIDS Research. Bloom received a B.S. in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University in 1976, an M.A. in Economics from Princeton University in 1978, and a Ph.D. in Economics and Demography from Princeton University in 1981.

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David Bloom Clarence James Gamble Professor of Economics and Demography Speaker Harvard University
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A class was given in the dSchool last spring. In this class small interdisciplinary teams focused on a term-long design project, taking advantage of the design process structures and methods that have been developed in the d.school. The course developed as a collaboration between Stanford, the University of Nairobi and Nokia Africa Research Center.  The focus area was finding ICT solutions to the healthcare needs of people living in Kibera slum outside Nairobi.

Under the guidance of Jussi Impiö at Nokia and the Computer Science faculty, 27 students from the University of Nairobi Computer Science department conducted need finding studies at a number of health-related sites, including clinics, hospitals, community health workers, community leaders, and government offices. They read background materials, made observations, and talked with a wide variety of stakeholders. Their reports became the basis of the Stanford teams' initial understanding of users and needs. Communication with the group in Nairobi was also maintained throughout the course, using a Facebook group to facilitate discussions, as well as several teleconference sessions.

Working in small teams, 20 Stanford students from a wide range of disciplines worked over 10 weeks to develop initial design concepts to respond to some of the needs that had been identified. Click on the title of each project to view their final presentations:

  • mNote: an online archive for community health worker notes. This application empowers community health workers by preserving the flexibility and control they appreciate in their current paper notebooks, but adding digital knowledge management capabilities.
  • M-MAJI ("mobile water"): an electronic information system that allows people to use their mobile phones to identify clean water sources in their community. The application seeks to decrease the time and money spent searching for water, improve water quality, and foster vendor accountability by providing a mechanism for user feedback.
  • Babybank: a dedicated savings plan designed specifically for pregnant women in the slums of Nairobi. By leveraging a popular cell phone payment system, M-Pesa, the application aims to make savings easier, so that expecting mothers can afford the services that will keep themselves and their babies healthy.
  • Mazanick: an application to provide support and advice to pregnant women via SMS, with the aim of helping motivate them to attend prenatal appointments.
  • PillCheck (Kifaa cha Tenbe): a mobile application to help people in Kibera find information on the availability and pricing of malaria drugs quickly.
  • PatientMap :a system to make the waiting process in clinics more transparent, and to increase patient trust in the medical system.

This summer, two follow up trips are planned, with Nairobi students due to spend several weeks at Stanford, while a number of students from the Stanford group will visit Nairobi to explore possibilities for developing their projects further. Building on the success and lessons learnt so far, the Designing Liberation Technologies course will be open to a new set of students next academic year. 

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Marta Sutton Weeks Professor of Ethics in Society, and Professor of Political Science, Philosophy, and Law
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Joshua Cohen is a professor of law, political science, and philosophy at Stanford University, where he also teaches at the d.school and helps to coordinate the Program on Liberation Technology. A political theorist trained in philosophy, Cohen has written extensively on issues of democratic theory—particularly deliberative democracy and the implications for personal liberty, freedom of expression, and campaign finance—and global justice. Cohen is author of On Democracy (1983, with Joel Rogers); Associations and Democracy (1995, with Joel Rogers); Philosophy, Politics, Democracy (2010); The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays (2011); and Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals (2011). Since 1991, he has been editor of Boston Review, a bi-monthly magazine of political, cultural, and literary ideas. Cohen is currently a member of the faculty of Apple University.

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Terry Winograd is a co-leader of the Liberation Technology program at CDDRL and Professor of Computer Science in the Computer Science Department at Stanford University. His research focus is on human-computer interaction design, especially theoretical background and conceptual models. He directs the teaching programs and HCI research in the Stanford Human-Computer Interaction Group, and is also a founding faculty member of the Hasso Plattner Institute of Design at Stanford.

Prof. Winograd was a founding member and former president of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. He is on a number of journal editorial boards, including Human Computer Interaction, ACM Transactions on Computer Human Interaction, and Informatica. Some of his publications includes Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design (Addison-Wesley, 1987) and Usability: Turning Technologies into Tools (Oxford, 1992). 

Terry Winograd received a B.A. in Mathematics from The Colorado College in 1966 and Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics from M.I.T in 1970.

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Providing food security for a world that will be warmer, more populous, and continually developing requires the implementation of sound policies that enhance food and agricultural consumption, production, incomes, and trade. FSE is in the midst of hosting a two-year, 12-lecture symposium series on Global Food Policy and Food Security.

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Starting winter 2011, FSE will bring the world's leading policy experts in the fields of food and agricultural development to Stanford University to participate in an integrated seminar series on pro-poor growth and food security policy. The series, funded by a grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, will consist of twelve lectures delivered on the Stanford campus over the course of two years.

"Providing food security for a world that will be warmer, more populous, and continually developing requires the implementation of sound policies that enhance agricultural production, incomes, and resource stewardship," said FSE director Rosamond L. Naylor.

"New ideas and exchanges are needed to meet this challenge and this seminar series intends to facilitate that process."

Participants will address the major themes of hunger and rural poverty, agricultural productivity, resource and climate constraints on agriculture, and food and agriculture policy. The series will draw heavily from economics, and will embrace polices related to demand, supply, price formation, marketing, trade and development.

"We focus this series on policy because it has proven to be extremely difficult to develop successful projects for hunger and poverty alleviation without first ensuring that sound policies are in play," noted Walter P. Falcon, FSE deputy director and project director. "Even the best-designed programs and projects at the local scale often fail due to counter-productive national policies."

The specific challenges will be to supply sufficient food at reasonable prices, to provide economic access to that food by all segments of society, and to do so without destroying the environment in the process, said Naylor.

In addition to lecturing, participants will write a significant paper that brings together new, relevant thinking about a particular topic area. At the end of the series, a volume of edited papers on international food security and food policy issues will be published. The volume will be designed for M.A. programs and mid-career professionals-individuals who later in their careers will have policy responsibilities. All the materials, including the videotaped lectures, will be freely available on the FSE website.

"We see an important opportunity to complement other efforts that have been funded by the Gates Foundation," said Naylor. "For example, the lecture series and educational volume are expected to contribute to the curriculum of the new Collaborative Master of Science in Agricultural and Applied Economics (CMAAE) program of the African Economic Research Consortium, partially funded by the foundation."

The lecture series will also target audiences in South Asia, and in particular India where there are more malnourished people than in all of sub-Saharan Africa.

The grant also provides funding to produce a specialized educational unit on food policy and food security for high school students. FSE will work closely with Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) to complete this project.

With the renewed interest in food, agriculture, and food security, it is important that the next generation have access to thoughtful commentary about global food issues, said Falcon.

This grant is part of the foundation's Agricultural Development initiative, which is working with a wide range of partners to provide millions of small farmers in the developing world with tools and opportunities to boost their yields, increase their incomes, and build better lives for themselves and their families. The Foundation is working to strengthen the entire agricultural value chain-from seeds and soil to farm management and market access-so that progress against hunger and poverty is sustainable over the long term.

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This research will examine the regulation of "Next Generation Telecommunications Technologies" in India, covering wireless broadband, with a focus on quality of service and universal access. The research will be undertaken during the period 2010 to 2015 in collaboration with the Indian telecommunications regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, with whom a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed.

Stanford University Representatives:

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The Woods Institute for the Environment has awarded four new Environmental Venture Project grants for interdisciplinary projects promoting global sustainability. FSI faculty Jeremy Goldhaber-Fiebert, PI, Walter P. Falcon, Paul H. Wise, and David Lobell, won an award for a project on nutrition-related health policies in India, which examines the impact of climate change on agricultural production and food availability.
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Professor Dan Banik is a Consulting Scholar at CDDRL and is currently completing a study examining the impacts of development aid from Norway and China on poverty reduction in Malawi and Zambia. He is a professor of political science and research director at the University of Oslo’s Centre for Development and Environment (SUM). He is also holds a visiting professor at China Agricultural University in Beijing.

Prof. Banik has conducted research in India, China, Bangladesh, Malawi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa and Mexico, and directs the interdisciplinary research program 'Poverty and Development in the 21st Century (PAD)' at the University of Oslo. He has previously served as the head of the Norwegian-Finnish Trust Fund in the World Bank for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD) and on the Board of the Norwegian Crown Prince and Crown Princess's Foundation. His books include ‘The Democratic Dividend: Political Transition, Poverty and Inclusive Development in Malawi (with Blessings Chinsinga, Routledge 2016), ‘The Legal Empowerment Agenda: Poverty, Labour and the Informal Economy in Africa’ (2011, Ashgate), ‘Poverty and Elusive Development’ (2010, Scandinavian University Press) and ‘Starvation and India’s Democracy’ (2009, Routledge).

Prof. Banik is married to Vibeke Kieding Banik, who is a historian at the University of Oslo.

 

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The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a live debate May 25 between Scott Sagan and Keith Payne, CEO and president of the National Institute for Public Policy. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization in Washington, D.C.

Scott Sagan's Introductory Statement

I have been asked to address the question: "What should be U.S. declaratory strategic deterrence policy?"

I continue to believe, as I wrote in my 2009 Survival article, that,

"The United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward a No-First Use declaratory policy by stating that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces and to be able to respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options if necessary in the event that deterrence fails."

I believe that slow but steady movement toward a No-First Use (NFU) doctrine is in the U.S. interest because I think U.S. declaratory policy should have three characteristics.

U.S. declaratory policy should:

a) address the full range of nuclear threats to U.S. national security objectives (not just basic deterrence);

b) be accurate and consistent, reflecting actual military doctrine rather than being mere rhetoric; and

c) U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what U.S. leaders really might want do in the event of a deterrence failure.

In my brief opening remarks, I will explain these three points and outline the logic and evidence that leads me to the conclusion that the benefits of an NFU declaratory policy outweigh its costs.

Point #1: Deterrence is one, but only one critical U.S. national security objective and prudent decisions about declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons should take into account its likely effects on deterrence of adversaries, bit also the reassurance of allies, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, the risks of nuclear terrorism, the impact of our declaratory policy on nuclear doctrines of other states; and the prospects for long-term nuclear disarmament. In this sense, the CSIS question (like previous Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) before this latest one) is too narrow in scope and could therefore lead to an excessively narrow, indeed a wrong-headed, answer. Historically, many actions and statements made in the name of deterrence - think of Richard Nixon's Madman Nuclear Alert over Vietnam or George W. Bush's suggestion that "All Options are on the Table" included nuclear preventive strikes on Iran -- might add just a smidgen of deterrence, but can be highly counterproductive with respect to other U.S. nuclear security goals. This is true of the NPR in general: just as war is too important to be left to the generals, nuclear declaratory policy is too important to be left solely to the Pentagon.

Opponents of this broader conception of nuclear posture claim that there is no evidence that U.S. nuclear posture influences others or perceptions that we are honoring our NPT Article VI commitments help with non-proliferation goals. That view is wrong. Let me give just two examples:

1. Evidence to support the point about U.S. disarmament steps helping encourage others to act is seen with Indonesia's decision to ratify CTBT earlier this month:

When Indonesia announced its decision it said it had taken note of the "serious effort" on the part of the current United States Administration in promote disarmament. "We do feel that at this time, what is needed is positive encouragement rather than pressure of a different type that we've been trying to impart in the past," he said, voicing hope that the U.S. will follow suit from his country's actions. "We are also cognizant of some positive aspects of the United States' Nuclear Posture Review."

2. For evidence on the doctrinal influence or mimicry point let me cite India. In January 2003, the BJP government in New Delhi, influenced by the U.S. NPR, adopted a revised, more offensive nuclear doctrine including the explicit threat of Indian nuclear first-use in response to biological or chemical weapons use. "India must consider withdrawing from this [NFU] commitment as the other nuclear weapons-states have not accepted this policy." Although it is too early to know the final result, the Indian government today appears to be reversing course: A group of very senior former officials has stated that, "It is time to review the objectionable parts" of India's nuclear posture and the Foreign Minister has called for universal declarations of NFU.

Point #2: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Declaratory Policy should be consistent with actual U.S. Nuclear Doctrine. That is, U.S. government officials should not misrepresent what its "real" nuclear policy is when it makes public statements about intent and plans. This may seem like an obvious point to some... but history suggests that this principle is not always followed--from Robert McNamara's mid-1960s declaratory statements about Assured Destruction (which often downplayed the heavy Counter-Force emphasis of U.S. doctrine at the time) to the Bush Administration's February 2002 statement in which in the same speech it "reaffirmed" the 1995 Negative Security Assurances not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the NPT unless they attack the U.S. or our allies with a NWS and, in the same speech, also stated that, "If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response. This followed the leaking of the classified portion of the 2001 NPR which reportedly placed Iran, Libya, and Syria on target lists, creating a flurry of negative international press reports.

In an era in which leaks should be considered highly likely, if not inevitable and, at a time in which we want more transparency around the world, the U.S. Government should err on the side of transparency. With multiple audiences present, calculated ambiguity may sometimes be necessary and even helpful; clear contradictions and calculated hypocrisy are not.

Here, I must give the current Administration some credit, for it judged that there was a small set of specific threats that could not currently be met by U.S. and allied conventional forces. It said so clearly in the Nuclear Posture Review and also clearly committed itself to deal with the challenge:

"The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons." (p. ix)

Critics say that this will weaken extended deterrence as key allies will feel abandoned. Evidence so far is to the contrary:

  Japan: Foreign Minister Okada said, in October 2009, "We cannot deny the fact that we are moving in the direction of No-First Use of nuclear weapons. We would like to discuss the issue with Washington." The Japanese 2010 Rev Con statement said, "Japan appreciates and welcomes the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States." "We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. In this connection, we call on the Nuclear Weapon States to take, as soon as possible, such measures as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that comply with the NPT." Japanese 2010 NPT Review Conference statement

  This is also the case in NATO: The German, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian governments have all called for removal of the tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. NATO meetings will address this soon. We should not just assume that the credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance to allies is threatened by NFU declarations or removal of tactical weapons. Instead, we should listen to what our allies are saying and work with them.

Point #3: U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what the U.S. might really want to do if deterrence fails. Doctrine and declaratory policy should be made with an acute awareness that deterrence might fail and not succumb to the common wishful thinking biases that assumes perfect prospects of success. This leads me to appreciate the wise advice that Brent Scowcroft gave to President George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf War to avoid "spoken or unspoken threats to use them (Nuclear Weapons) on the grounds that it is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention of carrying out."

When an official threatens actions that we have no intention of carrying out it can add a thin sliver of deterrence strength but at the grave cost, if the action occurs anyway, of either cheapening the currency of deterrence or risking the creation of a commitment trap that leads the state to execute an option that it otherwise would deem ill-advised. Here, I think of General Chilton's recent remarks about using nuclear threats to deter cyber attacks, as an example.

Here, I should note that in order to enhance non-proliferation and move slowly in the direction of a nuclear-free world the current NPR adds new NSAs and threatens conventional attacks only against NNWS in compliance with the NPT: "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations" (p.viii) and promises that its conventional responses would be "devastating" and that, "any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders , would be held fully accountable."

Dr. Payne, in his 2009 article, was critical of the whole goal of nuclear disarmament, despite the U.S. Article VI commitment to work in good faith toward that objective. He has written that, "The continuing threat posed by chemical and biological weapons is a fatal flaw in the logic of the nuclear-disarmament narrative, one that is all but ignored by its proponents.

"In fact, even if all enemies and potential enemies of the United States miraculously gave up their nuclear weapons, the United States would still need to maintain a nuclear deterrent arsenal. Why? Because some enemies reportedly retain other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as chemical and biological weapons, that could inflict enormous civilian casualties...If we also take nuclear deterrence off the table, we may, as Gen. Paul Fouilland, commander of the French Strategic Air Forces, has observed, 'Give a green light' to chemical and biological threats," Dr. Payne states.

I fail to see how a promise of "devastating" conventional responses and a promise that, "Any individuals responsible for the attack, would be held fully accountable" is giving any kind of green light to an adversary contemplating a chem/bio attack.

Furthermore, the only historical evidence that Dr. Payne cites to demonstrate his belief that, "Nuclear weapons threats have unique deterrent qualities" is the alleged success in deterring Iraqi use of Chem/Bio during the 1991 Gulf War:

The preponderance of evidence suggests that this is not right: Saddam did not use his WMD in 1991 because we threatened to march on Baghdad and overthrow his regime if he did that and "promised" to do that if he refrained from using his WMD.

First, look at the Bush, 25 January, 1991, letter to Saddam:

"Should war come it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country. Let me state too that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort." Two of the three things that Bush warned about happened...hardly good evidence that vague threats or calculated ambiguity worked as a deterrent.

Second, look at James Baker's memoirs in which he claimed that he "purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation," but also warned Aziz that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, "Our objective won't just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime." Advocates of maintaining calculated ambiguity too often cite the first statement but fail to cite the second Baker statement.

Third, look at what Saddam said under interrogation: "How would Iraq have been described if it had used nuclear weapons? A: "We would have been called stupid." In the May 2004 interrogation: "The WMD was for the defense of Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq demonstrated this with the use of WMD during the Iraq and Iran War, as Iran had threatened the sovereignty of Iraq. Yet, Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened."

In conclusion: I think you will discover today that reasonable people can certainly disagree about how to value and prioritize these different nuclear-related objectives and reasonable people can (and do) disagree about how best to pursue them. But reasonable people should not ignore the full range of U.S. objectives and narrowly conflate deterrence with security, should continue to search for evidence that supports or weakens their assumptions, and should engage in rigorous dialogues like this to help propel the debate forward.

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