We are pleased to bring you the third article of the academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. Phillip Lipscy, FSI Center Fellow and Assistant Professor, Political Science. Lipscy joined Shorenstein APARC in fall 2007 and his research interests focus on international relations and political economy, particularly as they relate to Japan and East Asia. He has been a Shorenstein APARC affiliate since his undergraduate years, when he studied under Professor Emeritus Danial Okimoto. He attended Harvard University for his doctoral studies.

Since the end of World War II, East Asia has often been characterized as a region with weak international organizations. There has been no regional integration project comparable to the European Union (EU). Cooperation on a wide variety of issues has tended to be ad hoc rather than institutionalized. Regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have generally been weak or limited in scope, with some notable exceptions such as the Asian Development Bank.

However, in recent years, there are indications that the pattern of institutionalization in Asia is shifting. Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperative arrangements have emerged and grown. With the addition of China, Japan, and South Korea, a revitalized ASEAN+3 is becoming a locus of economic cooperation. Many observers believe the Six Party Talks could be institutionalized to manage a broader set of security issues beyond North Korea. The Chiang Mai Initiative, a multilateral currency swap arrangement, might eventually develop into a monetary fund. Bilateral trade agreements are proliferating and could ultimately produce a regional free trade zone.

Under the right circumstances, regionalism can complement the broader global order. However, to a significant extent, recent regional initiatives reflect an underlying dissatisfaction with the global institutional architecture. The Chiang Mai Initiative emerged after the Asian financial crisis, from a widespread sense that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) underrepresented Asian interests and therefore imposed overly harsh conditionality on the affected states. Paralysis at the Doha Round negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has facilitated the rapid expansion of bilateral trade initiatives. The North Korean nuclear problem is precisely the sort of collective security issue the United Nations (UN) Security Council was envisioned to deal with, but the rigidity of both Security Council membership and its decision-making procedures has rendered this impractical.

Historically, international organizations have often exhibited path dependence, or a resistance to change. For example, the permanent members of the UN Security Council still remain the victorious powers of World War II. The distribution of voting shares in the IMF and World Bank has consistently overrepresented inception members such as Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, at the expense of both the defeated powers of World War II and newly independent and developing states. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) remains a predominantly European institution despite the rapid growth of Asia. Across a wide range of international organizations, Asian nationals continue to be underrepresented among employees, and in some cases leading positions are allocated to Western nationals by convention, as in the IMF and World Bank.

However, as Asia continues its rapid growth, the active involvement of Asian states in the global order will become paramount. Including India, broader East Asia encompasses more than half of the world's population. The region already accounts for about one-third of global oil consumption and CO2 emissions, and this is only likely to grow in the future. By 2020, in purchasing power parity terms, regional GDP will likely exceed that of the United States and the EU combined. Over the course of the twenty-first century, Asia's economic and geopolitical weight in the world will, in all likelihood, come to rival that of Europe in the nineteenth century. With Asia's dramatic rise, Asian problems will become increasingly indistinguishable from global problems.

Thus, a critical question in the coming decades will be whether the contemporary international organizational architecture will be able to smoothly incorporate the rising states of broader East Asia. Sweeping geopolitical shifts have often created instability in the international system -- the waning of Pax Britannica in the early twentieth century precipitated two world wars and a global depression, as the world lacked a geopolitical and economic stabilizing force in times of crisis. If universalistic institutions such as the UN, IMF, and WTO are seen as unresponsive to Asian concerns, two potentially destabilizing outcomes are likely. First, Asian regional cooperation may further intensify. For example, a full-fledged Asian Monetary Fund that acts independently of the IMF could be formed, or an Asian Free Trade Area established. Such institutions have the potential to undermine existing international organizations such as the IMF and WTO. Eventually, Asian institutions may supersede existing global institutions, but only after contestation and needless replication. A second destabilizing outcome could be that Asian states disengage from the U.S.-backed international order without developing strong regional institutions. This might create a situation akin to U.S. nonparticipation in the League of Nations in the interwar years. Without active involvement of some of the most important players, international organizations will become less effective at facilitating cooperation and resolving major disputes. International relations will become more anarchic and cooperation more ad hoc.

The rise of Asia will likely provide the first major stress test for the global organizational architecture that the United States has constructed and underpinned since the end of World War II. Of course, there are also some grounds for optimism. Among other things, China and Vietnam have joined the WTO, ongoing IMF quota revisions have produced ad hoc increases to South Korea and China, and Asian nationals increasingly play important roles in major international organizations -- e.g. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. It is paramount that concerns about Asian representation and interests in universalistic international organizations be addressed so that the rise of Asia contributes to -- rather than undermines -- the stability of the international order.

In 1990, India's information technology sector had only around $100 million in exports. Today, it has become a major force in IT. So how did India's arrival in information technology happen?

On November 27, on the release of his new book, India Arriving: How This Economic Powerhouse is Redefining Global Business, Rafiq Dossani presented a seminar for SPRIE entitled, "Is India a Knowledge Economy?"

India's success in IT has been variously attributed to its widespread knowledge of English, to Indian democracy, or to the Indian educational system. Dossani, using the IT sector as an illustration, posited that this transformation has been a result of political change in India, specifically the transition to a particular type of coalition government.

Dossani also detailed the evolution of how IT companies work in India--for example, how a shift to local managers became critical for success--and discussed the fascinating IT sector developments in cities like Indore, where constant power outages are only a minor obstacle to over fifty small firms exporting software, English language skills aren't a prerequisite for success and private schools are luring faculty away from universities.

"This conference can teach us what there is to do," former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry told faculty, students, and visiting colleagues and friends at FSI's third annual international conference on Nov. 15. "What is needed is the political will to do it."

About 350 people attended this year's conference, "Power and Prosperity: New Dynamics, New Dilemmas," which featured addresses, debates, and discussions on changing patterns of power and prosperity in the international system. Two of Stanford's most distinguished statesmen, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Perry, made opening remarks following an introduction by FSI acting director Michael A. McFaul. Providing context for the day's discussion, Christopher discussed issues related to war powers and congressional versus presidential approval for acts of war. (He is currently serving with former Secretary of State James Baker as co-chair of the National War Powers Commission.) Perry outlined what he sees as the two major challenges to international security--nuclear terrorism and climate change--and the fundamental conflict between them.

Two plenary panels and a number of breakout sessions provided the structure for analysis and discussion, and were led by FSI scholars and guests. Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin moderated the morning plenary session, with former ambassadors J. Stapleton Roy, Robert Blackwill, and Michael H. Armacost (a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow) discussing the rise of China, India, and Japan and how these three countries will shape the international landscape in the future. In the afternoon, CISAC associate director for research Lynn Eden moderated a cross-disciplinary panel on "Critical Connections: Faces of Security in the 21st Century," with Larry Diamond, Hoover senior fellow and CDDRL democracy program coordinator; CISAC Director Scott D. Sagan; and Rosamond L. Naylor, Julie Wrigley Senior Fellow and FSE director, discussing linkages between the Iraq war, nuclear risks, and food security and the environment.

Lunch and dinner addresses were given by Shashi Tharoor, former under-secretary general of the United Nations, and Gilles Kepel, professor of political science and chair of the Middle East and Mediterranean Studies program at Sciences Po. Tharoor, who is also a historian and novelist, spoke about India's soft power--its pluralism, liberal democracy, and globally popular culture--and how this, rather than India's economic potential, may well be the country's greatest asset. Kepel, widely regarded as one of the world's experts on Islamic extremism, talked about what he sees as a decline in fundamentalist Islam. With Iran and Shia Islamists claiming to be the spokespersons for Muslims worldwide, Kepel argued, there is evidence of a division among fundamentalists and a corresponding decline in their actual power.