On May 11 and 13, 1998, India tested five nuclear weapons in the Rajasthan desert. By the end of the month, Pakistan had followed suit, claiming to have detonated six nuclear devices at an underground facility in the Chagai Hills. With these tests, the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi loudly announced to the world community, and especially to each other, that they both held the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to any attack.

What will be the strategic effects of these nuclear weapons developments? There are many scholars and defense analysts who argue that the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia will significantly reduce, or even eliminate, the risk of future wars between India and Pakistan. These "proliferation optimists" argue that statesmen and soldiers in Islamabad and New Delhi know that a nuclear exchange in South Asia will create devastating damage and therefore will be deterred from starting any military conflict in which there is a serious possibility of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Other scholars and defense analysts, however, argue that nuclear weapons proliferation in India and Pakistan will increase the likelihood of crises, accidents, terrorism and nuclear war. These "proliferation pessimists" do not base their arguments on claims that Indian or Pakistani statesmen are irrational. Instead, these scholars start their analysis by noting that nuclear weapons are controlled by military organizations and civilian bureaucracies, not by states or by statesmen. Organization theory, not just deterrence theory, should therefore be used to understand the problem and predict the future of security in the region.

Ever since 1998, the year of India and Pakistan's nuclear tests, many commentators have argued that, in the absence of U.S. intervention, the two nations are headed for armed conflict that will likely end in nuclear war. The logic underlying this view is twofold. First, that religious radicalism--defined as the participation in political and/or military activities by groups in the name of religion--has become sufficiently powerful in Pakistan to make ongoing support for the Kashmir insurgency inevitable. Second is that India's concurrent growth of nationalism and religious radicalism, as well as a rise in economic power, will make the state less willing to tolerate Pakistan's support for insurgency in Kashmir. Against this seemingly inevitable clash, Pakistani President Musharraf is viewed as a lonely holdout against the forces of religious radicalism in Pakistan. U.S. support is therefore argued to be critical for sustaining Musharraf, whether through political support for Pakistan's policies in Kashmir, or economic support.

This paper reaches a different conclusion: that peace is about to "break out" between India and Pakistan. Our conclusion is based on the following analysis. First, Islamic radicalism in Pakistan relies (and has always relied) on the army to survive, as it lacks sufficient popularity to influence state policy through political parties or popular agitation. Second, the army has previously supported Islamic radicalism tactically, but not ideologically, providing such support only when it has perceived the state to be in crisis. Contrary to a common view, the elections of 2002 were no different in this respect. Third, Hindu radicalism in India, though gaining in both popular and political support, is insufficiently popular to support irrational aggression against Pakistan. At the same time, India's improved economic prospects have influenced its rulers to favor accommodation with Pakistan. Third, the outcomes of recent elections in India and Pakistan have shifted the Pakistani army's strategic priorities toward negotiating a civilian-military balance, and away from destabilizing civilian politics through "crisis-mode" tactics that have included support for Islamic radicalism.

Starting in the late 1980s many nations began to reform their electric power markets away from state-dominated systems to those with a greater role for market forces. In developing countries, especially, these reforms have proved challenging. Successful reform requires a complex set of institutions and complementary reforms, such as in public finance and corporate governance. State-dominated systems typically create their own powerful constituencies that block or redirect the reform process. In an earlier detailed study of reform in five key developing countries, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) found that the result of these pressures, in most cases, is a “hybrid” outcome—an electric power system that is partly reformed and partly dominated by the state 2. Almost always the first step in hybrid reform is the encouragement of private investors to build independent power projects (IPPs)—generators that are hooked to the main power system and, typically, supply electricity according to long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs).

Since September 11, 2001, the attitudes of Europeans toward the United States have grown increasingly more negative. For many in Europe, the terrorist attack on New York City was seen as evidence of how American behavior elicits hostility -- and how it would be up to Americans to repent and change their ways. In this revealing look at the deep divide that has emerged, Russell A. Berman explores the various dimensions of contemporary European anti-Americanism.

The author shows how, as the process of post-cold war European unification has progressed, anti-Americanism has proven to be a useful ideology for the definition of a new European identity. He examines this emerging identity and shows how it has led Europeans to a position hostile to any "regime change" by the United States -- no matter how bad the regime may be -- whether in Serbia, Afghanistan, or Iraq.

Berman details the elements -- some cultural, some simply irrational -- of this disturbing movement and tells why it is likely to remain a feature of relations between the United States and Europe for the foreseeable future. He explains how anti-Americanism operates like an obsessive prejudice and stereotype, impervious to rational arguments or factual proof, and shows how the negative response to U.S. policies can be traced to a larger, more deeply rooted movement against globalization.

Anti-Americanism in Western Europe is not just a friendly disagreement, it is a widening chasm. This book makes a major contribution to understanding this important ideological challenge.

Excerpt:

Q (T L Sankar): Why do utilities charge different rates to different consumers?

A (Rafiq Dossani): Firstly, the cost-to-serve for each category of consumer varies depending on several factors. There are technical reasons such as power factor, voltage of supply and so on which are set out in the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. There are also commercial reasons. In some situations, the total quantity of power available could not be sold, unless some categories of consumers we are charged a lower tariff. There are also considerations of equity or the need to meet the merit wants of the poorer population, which prompted differential pricing.