This article was originally published in The Stanford Daily on August 22, 2022

Since then, Jensen said, the program has grown significantly, thanks to the generous support of Bill Draper and Ingrid von Mangoldt Hills, with even “more faculty who wanted to participate than we could accommodate.”

According to Fukuyama, Draper Hills has become an important forum for training democratic leaders around the world. 

“We try to provide a mixture of practical skills, networking tools and a stronger intellectual foundation so they can think about their future careers to determine the most strategically impactful way they can behave and act in the present,” he said.

In recent years, the program has shifted its focus toward technology, global warming, and poverty, which increasingly figure large roles in the fight for democracy, according to Jensen. Case studies, panels, and guest lectures from international experts fill the fellows’ three weeks on campus.

Outside of their classes in the Bechtel Center, the fellows tour San Francisco landmarks and enjoy group dinners hosted by the core faculty. In previous years, for example, fellows have visited local technology firms like Twitter, Google, and Facebook to explore “how democracies and autocracies can use technology to promote their goals,” Stoner said.

With help from the program, Draper Hills Fellows have consistently become leaders in law, politics, civil society organizations, and international development after graduation, with a growing alumni network of almost 400. Renchinnyam Amarjargalis, the former Prime Minister of Mongolia, was a fellow in 2005, along with other alumni who have risen to international prominence. 

Diamond added that the Foreign Affairs Minister of the government in exile of Myanmar, Zin Mar Aung, is also a former Draper Hills Fellow and has become “one of the most important leaders of the opposition in Burma fighting for democracy.”

The Draper Hills program gives its fellows more confidence and tools to see their work and struggles in a larger context, according to Diamond.

“Once you realize it’s part of a global pattern, you don’t feel that your national situation is quite so cursed,” he said. “You can draw strength from this solidarity and the sharing of experiences.”

Beyond the three weeks of the program, fellows remain connected to one another through on-campus gatherings, WhatsApp channels, and regional workshops around the world.

“As fellows, we are part of a very great network that always reminds us that, as activists for democracy and human rights, we are not alone,” said former Peruvian Minister of Education and current Draper Hills Fellow Daniel Alfaro. “There are others like us who are great fighters.” 

Participants, many of whom are already rising leaders in international democratic movements, are starting to see how valuable the program will be for their future work.

“Draper Hills has already expanded my horizons in terms of the roles that I can play in Mexican society to promote change, and provided many important allies and a network that can support these changes,” said current fellow Mariela Saldivar Villalobos, a Mexican activist and politician. “I feel deeply honored to have this opportunity. And I hope one day, Stanford will feel proud of investing its time and talent in me.”

The United Nations kicks off the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on Monday, gathering 191 treaty members in New York. It’s an NPT review that typically takes place every five years, though the pandemic pushed the date back two years.

Read more at The Washington Post.

Abstract

Latin American foreign-policy elites defend the principle of non-intervention to shield their countries’ autonomy. By 2005, however, most Latin American foreign policy elites accepted the easing of limits on the use of force in international law. They supported the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which regulates the use of force to protect populations from mass atrocities. The paper presents a comparison of the Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican positions in the R2P debates to understand why they supported this norm. During the debates leading to the emergence of R2P, these elites questioned a central premise of liberal internationalism: the idea that great powers would restrain their use of military force as part of their commitment to a liberal international order (LIO). Using Republican international political theory, I argue that these Latin American foreign-policy elites viewed a restricted humanitarian-intervention norm as a new defence against great powers interfering in developing countries. Instead of trusting that great powers would restrain their actions, these elites advocated for a humanitarian-intervention norm that would prevent uncontrolled humanitarian interventions.

Read the rest at Cambridge Review of International Affairs 

In a new report for the Latin American Program, Stanford University scholar Harold Trinkunas explains the role of the armed forces in Venezuela’s current regime and why they have thus far resisted democratization efforts. He argues that the armed forces have benefited greatly during the current regime from greater access to power, responsibility, and revenues. Moreover, the regime’s successful politicization and ‘coup proofing’ efforts have made dissent unworkable, even deadly, for members of the military. Democratization is seen as a risky alternative, particularly by senior leaders, who fear accountability for human rights abuses, illicit trafficking, and corruption under Maduro. Under these conditions, the armed forces prefer to support the status quo.

Read the rest at Wilson Center

Brazil is China’s most important economic and political partner in South America, as well as a key participant in the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) grouping of emerging powers that China increasingly leads. When it comes to global aspirations, China and Brazil have historically been in sync on their critiques of the liberal international order, if not on their preferred remedies. Historically, their prescriptions for foreign policy differ in important ways. China would prefer a world order that better accommodates its interests, and it is becoming less reluctant to use the threat of force in foreign policy to maintain its ascendancy in its geopolitical neighborhood. Brazil traditionally has preferred a rules-bound liberal international order that applies to everyone, especially superpowers. Unlike China, it foreswears the use of coercion in international affairs, even to protect its interests in its immediate neighborhood, South America.

Read the rest at Brookings