The New Cold War: Putin, Medvedev, and the Threat to the West
Edward Lucas is the Central and Eastern Europe correspondent for The Economist. He has been covering the region for more than 20 years, witnessing the final years of the last Cold War, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet empire, Boris Yeltsin's downfall and Vladimir Putin's rise to power. From 1992 to 1994, he was the managing editor of The Baltic Independent, a weekly English-language newspaper published in Tallinn. He holds a BSc from the London School of Economics, and studied Polish at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow. The New Cold War is his first book.
Co-sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.
CISAC Conference Room
Victor and Yuliya: Repeating 2005?
The renewed cohabitation between Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko has quickly begun to show stress. Will they repeat the 2005 experience, when Tymoshenko was sacked, and how do these tensions complicate Ukraine's current domestic and foreign policy challenges?
Synopsis
Ambassador Pifer begins his talk by recapping the past relationship between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. Mr. Pifer then proceeds to analyze the general political situation between the two at this early stage in their coalition. He explains that Yushchenko’s camp is seriously worried about the votes Tymoshenko could take away from him in the 2009 presidential election. Mr. Pifer also reveals that many businesses that work closely with Yushchenko’s administration are more politically aligned with the opposing Party of Regions rather than Tymoshenko’s bloc. In addition, Mr. Pifer discusses the concerns with the maneuvers of the head of the presidential administration who is perhaps working for his own agenda in links with the opposing Party of Regions.
Mr. Pifer briefly analyzes the political situations for the nation’s major party leaders as well. He explains that Yushchenko is losing support as he seems more focused on the 2009 elections and has failed to advance on forming and implementing a policy agenda. Similarly, Viktor Yanukovych, head of the opposing Party of Regions, is also losing support primarily due to poor political tactics such as physically blocking the speaker of Ukraine’s parliament from entering the parliament to speak. Mr. Pifer explains that there are also rumors of internal divisions within the party. However, Mr. Pifer argues Tymoshenko seems to be staying on top and maintaining support. This is arguably due to the achievements she already has to her name with her new cabinet.
Although, it seems that this coalition arrangement is detrimental to Yushchenko politically, Mr Pifer argues that there is little alternative. He explains that it is very difficult to break a coalition and such a move could split Yushchenko’s party. At the same time, Mr. Pifer believes it is clear that Yushchenko and Tymoskenko’s relationship is costing Ukraine. Mr. Pifer feels there is too much infighting and not enough governance, and this is illustrated by the lack of much shared domestic policy. Mr. Pifer also cites the two’s competing trips to negotiate with Gazprom and disputes over the NATO membership action plan as evidence for their disagreements and inefficiency.
Mr. Pifer concludes by arguing that while this coalition is fragile, he feels it may last longer than many believe as there is very little alternative. However, although this coalition will probably not be effective in policy-making, the fact that the economy is sound and both candidates are playing by democratic rules should be taken as a good sign.
about the speaker
Steven Pifer is a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as on arms control and security issues. His assignments included deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2001-2004), ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to the president and National Security Council senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia (1996-1997). He also served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London, as well as with the U.S. delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in Geneva. He holds a B.A. in economics from Stanford University, where he later spent a year as a visiting scholar at Stanford's Institute for International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Examining Long-term Radiation Effects: Case Studies of the Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Chernobyl Power Plant Thermal Explosion
Waka Takahashi Brown
616 Jane Stanford Way
Encina Hall, E005
Stanford, CA 94305-6060
Waka Brown is a Curriculum Specialist for the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE). She has also served as the Coordinator and Instructor of the Reischauer Scholars Program from 2003 to 2005. Prior to joining SPICE in 2000, she was a Japanese language teacher at Silver Creek High School in San Jose, CA, and a Coordinator for International Relations for the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program.
Waka’s academic interests lie in curriculum and instruction. She received a B.A. in International Relations from Stanford University as well as teaching credentials and M.Ed. through the Stanford Teacher Education Program.
In addition to curricular publications for SPICE, Waka has also produced teacher guides for films such as A Whisper to a Roar, a film about democracy activists in Egypt, Malaysia, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, and Can’t Go Native?, a film that chronicles Professor Emeritus Keith Brown’s relationship with the community in Mizusawa, an area in Japan largely bypassed by world media.
She has presented teacher seminars nationally for the National Council for the Social Studies in Seattle; the National Consortium for Teaching about Asia in both Denver and Los Angeles; the National Council for the Social Studies, Phoenix; Symposium on Asia in the Curriculum, Lexington; Japan Information Center, Embassy of Japan, Washington. D.C., and the Hawaii International Conference on the Humanities. She has also presented teacher seminars internationally for the East Asia Regional Council of Overseas Schools in Tokyo, Japan, and for the European Council of International Schools in Amsterdam, Netherlands.
In 2004 and 2008, Waka received the Franklin Buchanan Prize, which is awarded annually to honor an outstanding curriculum publication on Asia at any educational level, elementary through university. In 2019, Waka received the U.S.-Japan Foundation and EngageAsia’s national Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award, Humanities category.
Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed
Anders Åslund is specializing on postcommunist economic transformation, especially the Russian and Ukrainian economies. In January 2006, he joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC, as a senior fellow. From 1994 till 2005, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as a senior associate and Director of the Russian and Eurasian Program. He also teaches at Georgetown University. Dr. Åslund has served as a senior economic advisor to the governments of Russia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. He has been a Professor at the Stockholm School of Economics and a Swedish diplomat, serving in Kuwait, Geneva and Moscow. He earned his doctorate from Oxford University.
Dr. Åslund is the author of eight books, including How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of the Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Russia’s Capitalist Revolution (Peterson Institute, 2007), Building Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 2002), How Russia Became a Market Economy (Brookings, 1995), Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Cornell University Press, 1989), and Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe: The Non-Agricultural Private Sector in Poland and the GDR, 1945-83 (Macmillan, 1985). He has also edited twelve books, most recently, Europe After Enlargement, and he has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, National Interest, New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, and Wall Street Journal.
At present, Dr. Åslund is writing a book about how Ukraine became a market economy.CISAC Conference Room
October 2007 Dispatch - Myanmar After the Saffron Revolution
We are pleased to announce the first article of the new academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. John D. Ciorciari, one of this year's Shorenstein Fellows. Dr. Ciorciari's current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. In this piece, Dr. Ciorciari shares some comments on "Myanmar After the Saffron Revolution."
In late September, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks took to the streets of Myanmar, leading the largest uprising against the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) since 1988. A sharp and sudden hike in fuel prices sparked the protests, but to the regime's many critics, the revolt displayed the depth of popular discontent with economic mismanagement, corruption, and political repression in Myanmar. Images of unarmed monks confronting the feared tatmadaw (armed forces) won the protesters considerable moral support from abroad, as did a public appearance by Aung San Suu Kyi. Some observers anticipated that the "saffron revolution" would lead to the overthrow of the regime, as occurred during the "rose," "orange," and "tulip" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.
The tatmadaw responded swiftly and brutally, however. Troops imposed tight curfews, raided pagodas, and used clubs and tear gas to disperse protesters. In a matter of days, the armed forces killed numerous demonstrators, arrested or detained thousands more, and re-imposed control. The saffron revolution thus appears to have subsided, and the outlook is not promising for advocates of regime change or dramatic policy shifts in Myanmar.
The episode did reveal some minor cracks in the SPDC edifice. Colonel Hla Win, a longtime senior member of the junta, reportedly defected into an ethnic Karen rebel-controlled area and is seeking political asylum after defying an order to massacre a group of monks. At least one senior army official has leaked incriminating evidence to the press, and a foreign ministry official resigned at the government's "appalling" response to the protests. Prime Minister Soe Win has been hospitalized with leukemia for months. Rumors even swirled of a coup. Nevertheless, SPDC chairman Than Shwe, his deputy Maung Aye, and other cabinet members appear to have closed ranks, and the SPDC looks quite firmly entrenched.
International responses to the uprising and military response have been mixed. Western governments and activist groups quickly condemned the SPDC and pushed the regime to open dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy. U.S. President George W. Bush announced tighter sanctions shortly after the crackdown began. Japan--which has favored engagement in the past--is now considering sanctions and has demanded an explanation and an apology for the shooting of a Japanese journalist.
To dampen international pressure, the SPDC allowed Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari to enter the country as a UN special envoy. Gambari has met with both Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi to convey the UN's concerns about the crackdown. The SPDC has also appointed retired general U Aung Kyi as an official interlocutor with Aung San Suu Kyi and has made gestures of conciliation to the clergy. However, the Myanmar leadership has rebuffed demands for more serious political dialogue or far-reaching policy reforms.
A degree of Chinese and Russian protection has helped shield the SPDC from international pressure. China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution demanding that the SPDC free all political prisoners. Officials in Beijing and Moscow argued that the unrest was an "internal matter" unsuited for Security Council action. Their defense of a strong norm of sovereignty--rooted largely in their fear of similar Western attacks--provides political cover for the SPDC. Their objection to isolating Myanmar economically also makes it unlikely that a program of enhanced U.S. and European sanctions will bring the junta to its knees. As long as Myanmar's neighbors do business with the SPDC, it will probably survive.
To date, divergent foreign policy priorities have conspired against a genuinely multilateral policy to drive reform in Myanmar. For China, Myanmar is a strategic gateway to the East Indian Ocean and a source of prized raw materials, as well as a political ally on issues of state sovereignty. India and Thailand have also been loath to cut off or alienate their troublesome neighbor. India has little ideological affection for the SPDC but rejects sanctions and has responded quietly to recent events in Myanmar. Indian officials view Myanmar as an important regional pivot with China and a source of natural resources. Thai policymakers, worried about refugees and instability in ethnic minority enclaves along the border, have tended to prioritize stability over reform in relations with the SPDC. Both India and Thailand derive considerable economic benefits--both legal and illicit--from an open border. In addition, they fear that using their limited leverage to attack the junta will drive it further into China's embrace.
The governments of other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have split on the issue. Indochinese states defend Myanmar's sovereignty, while the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been more openly critical. With a bit of diplomatic legerdemain, Singapore expressed ASEAN's grave concern to Myanmar, speaking as the Association's chair. Discourse in regional think tanks suggests that a growing number of Southeast Asian officials advocate Myanmar's suspension from ASEAN. Although suspension would push Myanmar even further into the margins of international society, it would be unlikely to unseat the SPDC. Isolation also bears obvious risks; cloning North Korea is not in any ASEAN government's interest.
Most analysts agree that China holds the key to improving the prospects for reform, development, and democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, a change in Chinese policy would increase the likelihood of tougher Indian and ASEAN stances, since a fear of encouraging close Sino-Myanmar ties helps justify their existing approaches. The possibility of embarrassment at the upcoming Olympic games provides a short-term incentive for China to press the SPDC for better governance. A longer-term incentive will be to secure the countries' shared border, which is plagued by narco-trafficking, illegal migration, and ethnic conflict. Finally, China has an incentive to build its credibility as a constructive force in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chinese officials have led a well-documented "charm offensive" in the region, both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, to build influence. To the extent that ASEAN governments make reform in Myanmar a priority, China can show itself to be a responsible stakeholder in Southeast Asia's future.
In the near term, a coalescence of the policies of regional powers is unlikely. Moreover, strong regional pressure does not guarantee seismic policy shifts in Myanmar. The SPDC's harsh response to the protests--like its 2006 decision to move the national capital to a remote area--testifies to considerable paranoia. Still, the outside world has economic, security, and moral reasons to hold Myanmar to higher standards of governance. The pace and direction of change will depend only marginally on the severity of Western sanctions, which bite but do not cripple the regime. Western governments' ability to identify common objectives and forge cooperation with Asian partners will be more determinative. Ultimately, the development of concerted action by relevant Asian states is likely to be the rate-limiting step in the equation. The saffron revolution suggests that many domestic actors are prepared to assume risks to promote reform if Myanmar's neighbors take a tougher stand and help provide the enabling conditions for change.
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Shorenstein APARC Dispatches are regular bulletins designed exclusively for our friends and supporters. Written by center faculty and scholars, Shorenstein APARC Dispatches deliver timely, succinct analysis on current events and trends in Asia, often discussing their potential implications for business.
Ukraine's September Elections and the Challenges Awaiting the New Government
The 2007 Ukrainian elections are a clear move forward in a variety of ways. Ambassador Steven Pifer sets out why, as well as the options for the creation of a coalition government. Mr. Pifer also clearly explains the number of key issues that the new government will have to face.
Synopsis
Ambassor Pifer begins by explaining the election results from September 2007. He reveals who he believes were the winners and losers, as well as who thinks we will have to wait for and see. Mr. Pifer argues that, in any case, the election was good news for democratization in Ukraine. Citing that this has been the third consecutive national election, he believes that the country is getting a grip of how elections are to be run. Mr. Pifer reinforces this by explaining that the election was free, fair, and basically fraudless. Another point Mr. Pifer emphasizes is the fact that the parties generally accepted the outcome, as well as that major parties such as Tymoshenko’s bloc are breaking out of their regional bases.
However, Mr. Pifer explains that the elections do not mean the work is over as a coalition is yet to be formed. He examines the possibility of the an ‘orange restoration’ involving a coalition between President Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, but there are some fears that Tymoshenko may not receive the necessary number of votes in Ukraine’s parliament to become prime minister. On the other hand, others have looked towards the possibility of a coalition between President Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Mr. Pifer believes this seems more natural, but he is again not sure deputies would support it. Mr. Pifer also examines what President Yushchenko might want personally and what would benefit him politically.
Although which coalition will be formed is not clear, Mr. Pifer feels there are some clear challenges for the government to face when it comes into power. He argues that while the economy is strong, evidence includes the emergence of a middle class, there are several steps to be made on the economy. He explains that Ukraine must complete WTO accession, abolish its outdated commercial code, free the sale of agricultural land, and reform the tax and regulatory systems. Most urgently, Mr. Pifer argues that energy security must be taken care of, and this must be part of a necessary effort to manage relations with Russia better. Inside the government, Mr. Pifer notes ambiguities in the constitution which must be amended, and he stresses serious steps must be taken to counter corruption. Mr. Pifer also hopes that Ukrainian government can develop habits of cooperation and compromise and move beyond politics to pass policies. He concludes by emphasizing that he is optimistic about Ukraine’s opportunities, but he also feels Ukraine has a tendency to miss them rather than seize them.
about the speaker
Steven Pifer is a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as on arms control and security issues. His assignments included deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2001-2004), ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to the president and National Security Council senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia (1996-1997). He also served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London, as well as with the U.S. delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in Geneva. He holds a B.A. in economics from Stanford University, where he later spent a year as a visiting scholar at Stanford's Institute for International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
German-Jewish Relations Today
This seminar will focus on the Holocaust as the most important factor in shaping the relationship between all Germans and all Jews, as well as on some of the differences in Germany's relationship with Israel on the one hand and with American Jews on the other hand. Consul General Schütte will also address the situation of Jews in Germany today, based on personal observations and research during his posting at the German Embassy in Tel Aviv, as Deputy Head of Division for Middle East Affairs in the German Foreign Office, during a speaking tour in the U.S., and as a visiting scholar at the American Jewish Committee in New York.
About the Speaker
Mr. Rolf Schütte was born on June 9, 1953 in Goslar, Germany. He studied German and Russian Philology and Political Science at Göttingen University, Germany, at Ohio University, and at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University in Italy. He joined the German Foreign Service in 1981 and served in different functions in the Foreign Office in Bonn and later Berlin (e.g. as Deputy Head of Division for Middle East Affairs and Head of Division for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) as well as in the German Embassies in Moscow, Tel Aviv and Rome and in the German Mission to the United Nations in New York. Before becoming Consul General in San Francisco he spent a sabbatical year as a Visiting Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, the American Jewish Committee in New York and the Institute of European Studies in Berkeley.
This event is jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Taube Center for Jewish Studies.
Philippines Conference Room