This piece originally appeared at Brookings.

On November 25, Russian border patrol ships attacked and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels attempting to transit from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov via the Kerch Strait. That violated both maritime law and a 2003 Ukraine-Russia agreement that governs passage through the strait.

The attack foreshadows a Russian bid to establish unilateral control over the Kerch Strait and perhaps blockade Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov. Unfortunately, the United States and Europe have reacted weakly, largely limiting their responses to expressions of concern. The West should make clear that Russia will face concrete consequences if it does not release the Ukrainian naval vessels and crews and allow Ukraine free passage through the strait.

WHAT HAPPENED?

On the morning of November 25, three Ukrainian naval vessels—a tug and two small gunboats—approached the southern entrance to the Kerch Strait. After transiting the Black Sea from Odesa, they sought to pass through the strait to a Ukrainian port on the Sea of Azov, following a course taken by two other Ukrainian gunboats in September. Although they were military vessels, the Ukrainian ships had a right of innocent passage. Moreover, a 2003 agreement between Ukraine and Russia states that Ukrainian- and Russian-flagged ships, both merchant ships and state non-commercial vessels, have a right to free navigation in the Strait of Kerch and Sea of Azov, which the sides consider the internal waters of Ukraine and Russia.

While Ukrainian and Russian accounts differ as to some details of what happened, their stories coincide on key points. Russian border patrol vessels intercepted the three Ukrainian ships in the southern approach to the strait, and the Russian vessel Don rammed the Ukrainian tug Yani Kapu. Video and audio from the Don make clear the Don’s intention to ram.

The Ukrainians say the Russian vessels sought to ram the Berdyansk and Nikipol gunboats as well, but the smaller, more agile Ukrainian ships successfully maneuvered out of the way (Russian aerial photos show the sides’ ships circling and maneuvering). In the process, it appears that the Russian vessel Izumrud rammed, or was rammed by, another Russian ship, possibly the Don.

The three Ukrainian ships then maintained station for much of the day in Russian-controlled waters at the south entrance to the Kerch Strait. In the meantime, the Russians physically blocked the main passage through the strait, positioning a tanker under the central span of the Kerch bridge.

That evening, apparently having concluded that they would not be allowed passage into the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian vessels turned south toward the Black Sea, exiting the approach to the strait. Russian border patrol vessels intercepted the Ukrainian ships, ordered them to halt and then opened fire, wounding several Ukrainian crewmen. The Russians boarded and seized the Ukrainian vessels. Crucially, as Bellingcat has showed, Ukrainian and Russian data agree that the attack took place in the Black Sea more than 12 nautical miles off the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea—that is, in international waters. The Russian action is indefensible, particularly as the Ukrainian ships clearly were heading away from the Kerch Strait when attacked.

WHAT’S AT ISSUE?

Since seizing Crimea in 2014, the Russians have moved to tighten control over the Sea of Azov. The bridge they built to link the city of Kerch in Crimea to the Taman peninsula on the Russian mainland prevents the passage of larger ships that used to call at the Ukrainian port of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. Mariupol is Ukraine’s third busiest port, exporting steel, iron and grain. Over the past nine months, the Ukrainians have complained that Russian patrol boats have stopped, boarded and/or harassed commercial vessels bound for Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov as well as Ukrainian fishing boats.

Russia seems to be trying to establish unilateral control over passage through the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainians fear that Russia will impose an economic blockade on Ukrainian ports in a bid to up the economic pressure on Kyiv. During the week of November 26, the Ukrainians reported that ships bound for Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov were not being permitted passage through the Kerch Strait.

THE WEST IS CONCERNED

Late on November 25, the European Union and NATO called on Russia to ensure unhindered passage for Ukrainian ships into the Sea of Azov. Officials of various Western countries began speaking up the next day, indicating various degrees of concern. With thanks to @sovietsergey, we learned that:

• The Slovenian, Romanian, and Finnish foreign ministries and Swedish foreign minister were “deeply concerned.”
• The Austrian foreign minister was “seriously concerned.”
• The Dutch foreign minister was “severely concerned.”
• The Czech foreign ministry was “highly concerned.”
• The French foreign ministry was “profoundly concerned.”
• The G-7 foreign ministers expressed “utmost concern.”

Some went further. The Lithuanian foreign ministry, Canadian foreign minister, and EU president “condemned” the Russian action, while the British foreign secretary “utterly condemned” it.

Washington had nothing to say on the 25th. The next day, Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made strong statements, but President Donald Trump almost immediately undercut them when he seemed to take a neutral position. National Security Advisor John Bolton did not help on November 27 when spelling out topics for the planned Trump meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the margins of the G-20 summit; he had to be prompted to put Ukraine on the list.

In an interview that same day, Trump suggested he might cancel the meeting with Putin. On November 28, however, U.S. and Russian officials indicated that the meeting was on, which the president reaffirmed the morning of November 29 before heading to Andrews Air Force Base. Then, from Air Force One en route to Argentina, he tweeted that the meeting was off, citing Russia’s seizure of the Ukrainian ships and sailors (most thought the more likely reason was that morning’s news of the guilty plea by his former lawyer and reports about his company’s efforts to build a Trump Tower in Moscow).

Nothing suggests that these expressions of concern and condemnation, or Trump’s on again/off again handling of his meeting with Putin, caused anxiety in the Kremlin. Putin in Argentina brushed off the complaints of his Western counterparts. One week after the attack, the Yani Kapu, Berdyansk, and Nikipol remain impounded at a Russian facility in Kerch, the ships’ crews sit in Lefortovo Prison in Moscow, and Russia continues to harass ships traveling to Ukrainian

THE WEST SHOULD GET SERIOUS

Russia’s November 25 attack on the Ukrainian ships was a test of Kyiv’s reaction. It was also a test of how the West would respond. Unfortunately, the West is failing miserably. If the United States and Europe do not wish to see Russia solidify its control over the Sea of Azov and blockade Ukraine’s ports, they have to make clear to Moscow that there will be consequences.

The West could consider military steps such as increasing the tempo of visits by NATO warships to the Black Sea (that tempo has already increased since Russia’s seizure of Crimea). The presence of NATO warships, particularly U.S. Navy vessels capable of carrying sea-launched cruise missiles, clearly irks the Kremlin.

Some have suggested that NATO send warships into the Sea of Azov. That would not prove wise. First, it could well provoke a shooting conflict in a region where Russia has geographic advantages. Second, it would violate the 2003 agreement, which requires the approval of both Ukraine and Russia for third-country naval vessels to enter the Sea of Azov. The West should not take actions that would delegitimize that agreement, as it is critical to Ukraine’s claim for open access through the Kerch Strait.

The United States and other NATO countries, on a national basis, might weigh what additional military assistance would be appropriate for Ukraine in view of Russia’s latest military escalation.

The United States and European Union should consider additional economic sanctions on Russia. They could draw on the following list of examples:

• Prohibit U.S. and EU member state-flagged ships from calling on Russian ports on the Sea of Azov and Black Sea.
• Prohibit ships with cargos from Russian ports in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea from entering American and European ports. (Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a close political ally of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and candidate to succeed her as head of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union, has already suggested closing European ports to ships from Russian ports on the Sea of Azov.)
• Target Russian state-owned banks or parastatal companies for specific sanctions. (In April, when the U.S. government announced sanctions on United Company Rusal, a large Russian-based aluminum producer, the company’s stock plunged by 50 percent, while the Moscow stock exchange’s index lost 8 percent. The Treasury Department subsequently eased the sanctions, but the case demonstrates that the West can inflict significant economic impacts on Russian entities.)
• Suspend work on the Nord Stream II pipeline. The pipeline project is dubious as a commercial project. Refurbishing the existing pipeline network that transits gas through Ukraine would be less expensive, but Moscow wishes to end the transit fees it pays Kyiv and have the ability to totally shut off gas into that pipeline network.

The Kremlin tries to put on a brave face about sanctions, but they do cause economic pain, particularly for a stagnant Russian economy that is growing at less than 2 percent per year. Making Moscow understand that unacceptable actions will have growing costs is key to changing calculations in the Kremlin.

This situation cries out for leadership from Washington, and it would behoove the Trump administration to act. First, it could coordinate with European allies on sanctions that would have broad impact and signal trans-Atlantic unity in the face of Russia’s unacceptable actions. Second, administration action would forestall new congressional sanctions, which likely would be less finely targeted and more difficult to remove if/when Russia corrected its misbehavior.

If the West takes no action, it should get used to Moscow treating the Sea of Azov as a virtual Russian lake. And it should think what next steps an emboldened Moscow will attempt in its conflict with Ukraine and hybrid campaign against the West.

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University is proud to announce the beginning of the second application season for the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program.

The program provides the opportunity for three mid-career professionals to spend ten months at one of the best universities in the world. The application is open to those who are actively working as policy-makers, legal experts, entrepreneurs, and civil society leaders. The participants will be mentored by Francis Fukuyama, Stephen Krasner, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner.

Candidates will be selected based on their achievements, contributions to their professional sphere and their proposed project idea. The goal of the program is for participants to strengthen their leadership skills, deepen their understanding and create connections that will help them contribute to the democratic, political and social development of Ukraine and the region upon their return. In fall 2018 the second cohort of the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program will begin their 10-month immersion in Stanford’s academic environment. Each participant will receive a stipend for the fellowship period, which provides for academic resources, relocation expenses and living expenses in the Bay Area.

This year’s application has two stages. For the first stage interested candidates must submit a pre-screen questionnaire by January 17, 2018.

More information can be found at this link. Candidates will find out about the second part of the application process in mid-February after an initial review of their pre-screen questionnaire.

Центр демократії, розвитку та верховенства права Стенфордського університету (CDDRL) з гордістю повідомляє про початок другого набору стипендіатів практичної програми для лідерів з України “Ukrainian Emerging Leaders”.

Програма надає можливість провести 10 місяців у одному з найкращих університетів світу трьом професіоналам. До участі в конкурсі на здобуття стипендії запрошуються як представники державного сектору, так і ті, хто працює за його межами. Це насамперед люди, які активно залучені у створення політик, працюють у сфері права, підприємці, лідери громадянського суспільства. Менторами учасників стануть професори Френсіс Фукуяма, Стівен Краснер, Майкл Макфол та Кетрін Стонер.

Кандидатів відберуть на основі інформації про їх досягнення, внесок у професійну сферу та потенціалу запропонованого ними проекту. CDDRL сподівається, що завдяки цій програмі учасники зміцнять свої лідерські навички, поглиблять свої знання та зміцнять зв'язки, що допоможуть їм зробити вагомий внесок у демократичний, політичний і соціальний розвиток України та регіону після їх повернення до України. Вже восени 2018 року в межах The Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program троє стипендіатів розпочнуть 10-місячне занурення в академічний світ Стенфорду. Кожен з учасників отримає стипендію, яка покриє їхнє перебування в Стенфорді. Окрім того програма покриває транспортні та деякі інші додаткові витрати.

Відбір учасників проходитиме у два етапи. На першому етапі зацікавлені кандидати повинні подати скорочену заявку до 17 січня 2018 р за цією адресою (детальні інструкції можна прочитати за цим лінком). Про відбір до другого етапу кандидати будуть повідомлені додатково електронною поштою після аналізу їх заявки.

Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) launched the inaugural Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program to an audience of over 200 from the Stanford and local Ukrainian-American community on Oct. 3, 2017. The opening event featured the visiting practitioners - Olexandr Starodubtsev, Oleksandra Matviichuk, Dmytro Romanovych - who were joined by CDDRL’s Visiting Scholar Sviatoslav Vakarchuk in conversation with former ambassador to Russia and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Michael McFaul.

The Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program provides a unique opportunity to three mid-career professionals from Ukraine to study at Stanford University for the 2017-18 academic year. Sponsored by the Western NIS Enterprise Fund (WNISEF), Tomas Fiala, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and Astem.Foundation, the Program combines coursework, mentorship, and community engagement to support capacity-building and leadership development for emerging leaders who want to make substantial contributions to Ukraine’s political development. The end goal is for each of the practitioners to return to Ukraine with an implementable project that will support democratic development and institution-building in the country.

In his opening remarks, Francis Fukuyama, the Mosbacher Director of CDDRL, discussed the importance of the program for Ukraine’s continuing struggle for democratic values. In particular he emphasized the need to train individuals to support sustainable reforms. “I do not think that a democratic revolution in a place like Ukraine will exist without cultivating a whole generation of reformers who want a different society,” he stated.

Jaroslawa Johnson, President and CEO of WNISEF explained the importance of the work the Fund has done in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union and independence of Ukraine, and why this program is a logical extension of WNISEF’s work. Johnson emphasized the importance of leadership development and investing in a new generation of leaders in Ukraine and Moldova. She continued to underscore how critical education is to Ukraine’s development, and that she hopes these three emerging leaders will use Stanford resources to support their work, return to Ukraine and contribute to the country’s future.

The Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program received 340 applications in its pilot year, making the selection process highly competitive. Starodubtsev, Matviichuk, and Romanovych were selected for their contributions to Ukraine’s political development, their leadership potential and strong project proposals. They will take coursework, consult with academic mentors and build relationships across campus to test and refine their projects over the course of the academic year.

Starodubtsev is the founder of the electronic public procurement system, ProZorro, which many consider to be the most successful Ukrainian reform since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. During his time at Stanford, he plans to focus on expanding the ProZorro model for global use, and improving his own human resource management skills to advance public administration within the Ukrainian government.

Matviichuk is a human rights defender who created the civil initiative Euromaidan SOS, which responded to calls for help from victims on Maidan. She has continued to work on human rights issues since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine. Her goal for this year is to harness the remaining energy from the Revolution of Dignity to create a network of volunteers who will work to create sustainable reforms and institutions.

Romanovych, who works at the Reform Delivery Office, discussed his own role in delivering economic reforms since the 2014 revolution. In his role he has been responsible for deregulation reform and improving the business climate in Ukraine, resulting in the abolition of hundreds of Soviet regulations. His goal is to create a roadmap for future reforms, based on the success he has already had.

Vakarchuk summarized the challenges they face, emphasizing Ukraine’s need for a strong state and rule of law to create sustainable democracy and institutions. If Ukraine is able to make progress in these areas and make them work for everyone, the country will see serious improvement in its political development.

Despite focusing on three different areas of reform, the four panelists voiced common goals for Ukraine, the most urgent of which is improving trust in political institutions. Romanovych noted the active mobilization within Ukrainian society, but that there is still a need for strong political will and organization to put this energy into effective reforms. Matviichuk continued by warning against complacency and political apathy. Around the world there has been a strong trend of democratic backsliding. Ukraine is no exception, and cannot ignore these issues in the hope that they will disappear.

Some members of the audience expressed frustration with the current political situation in Ukraine in their questions to the panelists. But despite this pessimism, the young leaders voiced their hope and optimism. When asked about the issue of corruption - one that often seems hopeless - Starodubtsev pointed to his previous successes. Before the implementation of ProZorro, the public procurement system had been symbolic of the corruption that plagued Ukraine. But with Starodubtsev’s unique and innovative idea, he and his team were completely able to rebuild the existing infrastructure, resulting in a transparent system.

For Starodubtsev, this is the attitude that reformers need to take towards all positive political change in Ukraine: “we are the ones that can do reforms, we can deliver results, and we can change the political culture through our work.”

The gravity of their roles in the future of Ukraine’s democracy was clear. As McFaul put it, “Ukraine may be the frontline state in the battle for worldwide democracy. If you fail, other democrats will face more difficulties. Remember with incredible opportunity comes incredible responsibility.”

Vakarchuk was more optimistic, not only about Ukraine’s future, but the program’s impact; “I’m convinced that these people - along with those from future cohorts of this program - will become the ones who will build a Ukraine all of us will be proud of,” he said.

With this introduction to the Stanford community Starodubtsev, Matviichuk and Romanovych have been met with high expectations in regards to their future impact on Ukraine. But this is a challenge they are all prepared, and eager, to meet.

An edited version of this piece originally appeared on the  Atlantic Council's UkraineAlert blog.  It was republished by the  KyivPost.