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Mr. Nobody Against Putin film poster

Mr. Nobody Against Putin is a 2025 documentary film that premiered at the 2025 Sundance Film Festival, where it won the World Cinema Documentary Special Jury Award.

The film follows a rural Russian teacher who resists state propaganda in his school after the invasion of Ukraine. Filmed over two years by videographer Pavel “Pasha” Talankin at Karabash Primary School #1, it reveals how he secretly documented the growing pressure to promote patriotic education and his quiet defiance under an increasingly repressive system.

Co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies (CREEES).

Screening is open to the public. Seating is limited — please register in advance. The film is in Russian with English subtitles.

Encina Commons 123 (615 Crothers Way, Stanford)

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In the context of media consumption in Russia, being online usually means having more “liberal” views, opposed to those actively instilled by the government. One of the most popular news sources online have become the Telegram channels that provide the opportunity to read a plethora of different views on the same topic. The level of trust to the Telegram channels is above 30%, being even higher for the younger generation, which is unprecedented for any other independent source in modern Russia, apart from the state-owned TV.

However, as Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treisman have pointed out, mastery over media as the key point of modern authoritarian regimes. Therefore, since the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, we have seen the rise of manifold propaganda channels on Telegram as an important part of ongoing fight for support in Russia and across the globe. They include many previously known speakers, but also a cohort of so-called war correspondents, who report and analyze the events on the front, providing first-hand information. They usually align with the pro-Russian narratives about the war, strengthening its propaganda network online. The methods they use to report on the war remain diverse and fluctuating. With the rising tension in the Russian society, we have begun to see criticism of the Russian government from “the other side,” the far-right ambassadors of the “Russian World.” They critique Putin from his right for not mobilizing further to win the war. The peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that started in 2025 at the initiative of Donald Trump have produced many postings and speculations among our target group, illustrating previously made guesses about the field and giving us fruitful ground for analysis.

As for the second part of our research, the rise of Twitter as a central hub for political discourse and content dissemination makes it a critical platform for analyzing the spread of foreign propaganda in the digital age. A striking example of this is the 2024 indictment of Tenet Media, a U.S.-based conservative media company covertly funded by Russia’s state-owned RT.  Through a complex network of foreign shell entities and fabricated personas, RT funneled millions of dollars into Tenet Media to covertly shape American political discourse. Influential commentators with millions of followers across platforms—including Twitter—were recruited under false pretenses, with generous compensation and vague direction to create content on divisive U.S. issues. While these influencers denied knowledge of the Russian connection, the DOJ highlighted how the content served Russia’s strategic interests by amplifying domestic U.S. tensions and weakening opposition to its war in Ukraine.10 This case underscores Twitter’s relevance as a tool through which propaganda can be subtly seeded and amplified to mass audiences.

The strategic use of social media for information warfare is not accidental but rooted in longstanding Russian military doctrine. Russian military theorist Valery Gerasimov emphasized the importance of the “information space” as a battlefield, recognizing social media as both a threat and an opportunity for asymmetrical warfare. Since the Western response to Russia’s 2014 actions in Ukraine, the Kremlin has intensified its efforts to influence global audiences through online disinformation. The Tenet Media operation exemplifies the evolution of these strategies—moving from overt messaging by registered foreign agents to covert infiltration of domestic media outlets. Twitter’s role in this ecosystem is central, given its fast-paced, viral nature and its prominence among political commentators. As such, Twitter is not just a platform for public discourse but also a potent battleground where narratives are shaped, contested, and often manipulated by foreign actors.

Another dimension of our research lies in analyzing content in the context of different platforms. Different affordances from the nominatively-independent and privately owned platforms (with or without algorithms) foster varying styles of posting and formulating narratives. The government’s mastery of the online platforms that were previously seen as “liberating technologies” shrinks people’s access to free, uncensored and truthful information.

Our research therefore concentrates on collecting, understanding and analyzing these peace narratives, as well as the speakers producing them, in order to understand the heterogenous and fluctuating landscape of the Russian propaganda on Telegram. Additionally, we are aiming to compare these narratives to those produced by English-speaking influencers on X (former Twitter) of various political views to see how the pro-Russian political agenda manifests differently across borders and between sources.

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This article explores the influence of the war in Ukraine on rural schools in Russia, particularly focusing on the Republic of Bashkortostan. This research analyzes social media content and official school documents to answer the following question: How has the ideological content in rural schools evolved since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine?

The analysis reveals not just an intensification of existing patriotic messaging but a significant qualitative shift towards militarization and the centralization of ideological control. Applying the “power vertical” theory and frameworks of authoritarian education, I argue that the education system is being actively used to promote the state's war-centric narrative and “traditional values.” Understanding this transformation in rural schools helps illuminate the war's broader ideological effects within Russian society.

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This paper investigates contemporary forms of Russian colonialism as manifested in three distinct regions: Ukraine’s Donbas, Georgia’s Abkhazia, and Russia’s Chechnya. Through a comparative case study approach, the analysis applies the concepts of internal colonization and selected elements of settler colonialism, drawing on postcolonial theory to explore practices such as identity erasure, militarization, and legal assimilation. The study argues that Russian imperial strategies have not disappeared but adapted into dynamic tools of governance—combining symbolic integration, coercive loyalty, and discursive control. By situating these developments within both Soviet legacies and post-Soviet transformations, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature that reconsiders Russia’s imperial role in the 21st century.

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The Russo-Ukrainian War has exacerbated several of the country’s existing public health crises. Specifically, this paper identifies 3 areas of public health concern that are inflamed by the conflict in Ukraine that will likely have an outsized effect on the economic success and political legitimacy of the country in the coming years. These are, namely, alcohol
addiction, an aging population, and attrition from war. This publication explores the complex causes, the extent of their economic and political ramifications, and an evaluation of the future success of current attempts to address them.

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Melissa Morgan
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On August 15, President Donald Trump welcomed Vladimir Putin to the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. It was the first time since their sideline meeting in 2019 at the G20 meeting in Osaka, Japan that the two leaders have met, and the first time Putin has traveled to the United States since the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 2015.

While President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine met with President Trump in Washington, DC the following  week, some observers have expressed trepidation over the prospect of a deal being made between Russia and the United States without the input of Ukraine.

Writing for Brookings ahead of the summit, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine warned:

“Putin will seek to trap Trump into endorsing a position that incorporates the major elements of long-standing Russian demands. If Trump agrees, he will suffer unflattering comparisons to Neville Chamberlain, who agreed to surrender a large part of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in 1938. While the Czechoslovakian government concluded it had no choice and accepted the territorial loss, the Ukrainians will say no. They will not embrace their own capitulation.”

So how did the meeting in Anchorage actually play out?

In commentary on social media, FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul summarized the talks in the context of the Yalta Conference, an agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union made in the waning months of WWII that quickly fell apart when Joseph Stalin broke promises made to Western leaders to maintain and support democratic elections in Eastern Europe.

Speaking on NPR’s Morning Edition, McFaul elaborated on his concerns: 

“What I think the worst outcome would be is if President Trump starts negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians without the Ukrainians in the room. Trump needs something tangible, and I hope that doesn't make him too anxious to start negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians because that would be a disaster. If he jams President Zelenskyy with something he can't accept, that would be the worst of all outcomes.”

Pifer echoed his relief about the lack of discussion over particulars about Ukraine between the two leaders, but also pointed out that the broadest goal of the meeting also hadn’t been met.

“The good news is, President Trump didn’t give away the store. I was concerned he might get into bargaining on details about Ukraine without the Ukrainians there, which would be to their detriment. But it seems Mr. Trump failed in his stated goal to achieve a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine,” said Pifer. 

But even without a concrete policy outcome, Pifer says the Alaska meeting was an optical victory for Russia: 

“The significance for Vladimir Putin is that the meeting happened in the first place. Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine back in 2022, there’s been a boycott by Western leaders of any kind of face-to-face meeting with Putin. And by hosting him in Alaska, Trump broke that boycott. That is being played up in Moscow as a huge victory that Putin has been legitimized again.”

On Monday, August 18, President Zelenskyy and a cadre of other European leaders met with President Trump at the White House to discuss the Friday meeting and reinforce Europe’s positions and redlines against capitulation to Russian demands.

In analysis for Foreign Policy, Pifer outlined the stakes of this follow-up meeting for the European delegation:

“Zelenskyy and his European colleagues face a tricky challenge. They have to diplomatically offer suggestions to walk Trump back from a position that he does not appear to understand would be bad for Ukraine, bad for Europe, and bad for American interests. And they have to do so without setting off an explosion that could disrupt U.S.-Ukrainian and U.S.-European relations.”

McFaul is also cautious about the tone and tack of the discussions moving forward:

“I think it’s a good thing [the Europeans and Trump] are talking about security guarantees,“ he told Alex Witt on MSNBC. “But the devil is in the details. We keep hearing something about ‘NATO-like security guarantees.’ Why not just NATO security guarantees?"

The argument for building a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine based on NATO membership is a proposal McFaul has long supported.

“This notion that these guarantees are going to be something like NATO but less than NATO . . . if I were the Ukrainians, that would make me nervous. They had guarantees like that in 1994 called the Budapest Memorandum, and it meant nothing. It didn’t stop Putin from invading in 2014, and it didn’t stop him from launching a full-scale war in 2022,” McFaul reminded viewers.

“To me,” he argues, “it has to be NATO, not NATO-lite. The only way to do real, credible security guarantees for Ukraine is membership in NATO.”

In assessing the White House meeting with President Zelenskyy and European leadership, Rose Gottemoeller, the William J. Perry lecturer at CISAC and former deputy secretary of NATO, is cautiously optimistic. 

“This was a major step along the road, and it was vital that the Europeans were there as well as Ukraine,” she told the CBC.

A seasoned negotiator with direct experience working on high-level diplomacy with Russia, Gottemoeller is no stranger to the long process of dealmaking with the Kremlin.

“There are many steps to get through. We are not there yet. As much as Trump would like to walk out of the Oval Office and say, ‘We got the deal done,’ I think there will be many more hoops to jump through before that is possible.”



Additional insights from our scholars on the Trump-Putin summit and White House meeting with Zelenskyy and other European leaders can be found at the following links:

Russia, Ukraine, and Trump on Katie Couric
Trump Meets with Putin: Experts React in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
There Are No Participation Trophies in High-Stakes Diplomacy on Substack

 

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2025 Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development fellows
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Ukrainian Leaders Advance Postwar Recovery Through Stanford Fellowship

Meet the four fellows participating in CDDRL’s Strengthening Democracy and Development Program and learn how they are forging solutions to help Ukraine rise stronger from the challenges of war.
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Displaying Weakness to the Kremlin

For a U.S. administration claiming that it wants to restore American power in order, among other things, to negotiate from a position of strength, the past week has not advanced the cause.
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James Goldgeier on the World Class podcast
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The Future of U.S.-Europe Security Partnerships

On the World Class podcast, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul discuss how relations are evolving between the United States and Europe, and what that means for the future of Ukraine, defense strategy in Europe, and global security interests.
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Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in conversation on the tarmac of the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on August 15, 2025 in Anchorage, Alaska. Photo Credit: Getty Images
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FSI scholars Michael McFaul, Steven Pifer, and Rose Gottemoeller analyze the Alaska meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and its implications for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty.

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Nora Sulots
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In 2022, the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) launched its Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development (SU-DD) Program — a 10-week training initiative for mid-career Ukrainian practitioners and policymakers. Designed for participants advancing well-defined projects aimed at strengthening Ukrainian democracy, enhancing human development, and promoting good governance, SU-DD builds on the successes of CDDRL’s earlier Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program, which brought 12 fellows to Stanford over four cohorts.

The third SU-DD cohort began their work in June, meeting online with CDDRL faculty to refine the scope of their projects, each focused on actionable strategies to support Ukraine’s recovery from Russia’s invasion. In their first session, fellows presented their proposals to a panel of distinguished CDDRL faculty, including Mosbacher Director Kathryn Stoner, FSI Director Michael McFaul, and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow and MIP Director Francis Fukuyama, receiving initial feedback and guidance. The second meeting invited deeper exploration of solutions, using the MIP Problem-Solving Framework co-created by Professors Fukuyama and Jeremy Weinstein. In the final session, fellows were challenged to revisit and sharpen their project scope while learning from Professor Fukuyama about the Implementation phase of the framework. Equipped with new tools, fresh perspectives, and targeted feedback, the fellows concluded the virtual portion of the program ready to begin their journey at Stanford.

A hallmark of the SU-DD program is participation in CDDRL’s three-week Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program. Last month, the Ukrainian fellows joined peers from across the globe on campus at Stanford, building connections, exchanging ideas, and exploring shared solutions to complex development challenges. This experience broadened their networks far beyond Ukraine's borders, allowing them to build relationships they will draw on as they advance their projects after the program concludes on August 29.

During the final three weeks of the program, our Ukrainian fellows will visit Silicon Valley tech companies, meet with local business experts, politicians, and government officials, as well as Stanford faculty, and finalize implementation plans to bring their proposals to life.

Learn more about each fellow and their work below.

Meet the Fellows

Polina Aldoshyna

Polina Aldoshyna is a Ukrainian lawyer and civic leader with over nine years of experience in law, public administration, and nonprofit management. She currently leads the BGV Charity Fund, overseeing social projects that support vulnerable communities. In addition, she serves as a Deputy of the Zhytomyr Regional Council, focusing on local governance and social policy. Throughout her career, Polina has managed over 60 humanitarian projects, including the establishment of psychosocial support centers and aid programs for displaced individuals and veterans.

Project: Institutionalizing Resilience Centers for Postwar Recovery 

Polina is currently working on transforming Ukraine’s emerging resilience centers—grassroots hubs that provide psychosocial support, legal aid, and essential services to displaced and vulnerable populations—into a sustainable, institutionalized model of community-based social infrastructure. While these centers have played a critical role in the war’s social response, many still lack unified standards, stable funding, and digital infrastructure, limiting their long-term impact.

Her project explores which governance structures — municipal, civic, or hybrid — are most viable in Ukraine’s decentralized context, how public, private, and donor financing can be blended to support long-term operations, and how digital tools, such as CRM systems and reporting platforms, can professionalize service delivery. Drawing on global models, such as Resilience Hubs in the United States, Polina aims to co-design a scalable framework for resilience centers that can be integrated into Ukraine’s broader post-war recovery strategy.

To support this work, Polina is interested in meeting with NGOs, charitable foundations, and private philanthropists who support Ukraine in the reconstruction of human social capital in the United States. She hopes to learn how democratic institutions adapt and deliver services during crisis and post-conflict transitions, as well as engage with scholars and practitioners working at the intersection of governance, social development, and recovery.
 


 

Oleksii Movchan

Oleksii Movchan is a Member of the Ukrainian Parliament and Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development, representing the “Servant of the People” faction. He chairs the subcommittee on public procurements and state property management, and is active in inter-parliamentary groups with the USA, UK, Japan, and others. Before parliament, he led projects at Prozorro.Sale. Oleksii holds degrees from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukrainian Catholic University, and Kyiv School of Economics. He has advanced key reforms in procurements, state-owned companies, and privatization to support Ukraine’s European Union integration.

Project: Improving Corporate Governance in Municipally-Owned Enterprises (MoEs) in Ukraine

Oleksii is currently working to improve the governance of Ukraine’s municipally owned enterprises (MoEs), which number nearly 14,000—more than triple the number of state-owned enterprises. While some MoEs serve as critical infrastructure providers in areas such as water, heating, and public transport, most operate without modern governance standards. Over 82% are unprofitable and many are subsidized, making them susceptible to inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption. These shortcomings erode public trust, distort competition, and weaken essential service delivery.

His project focuses on designing and advocating for national legislation to institutionalize OECD-based governance practices across approximately 60 high-impact MoEs in 19 cities. Proposed measures include strategic property management policies, independent supervisory boards, transparent CEO selection, and robust audit, compliance, and risk management systems. The legislation also calls for standardized financial reporting and regular external audits to enhance transparency and creditworthiness.

To support this work, Oleksii is drawing on Ukraine’s pilot reforms in Mykolaiv and Lviv, as well as prior SOE governance reforms since 2015, and global best practices from EU and OECD countries. He is particularly interested in how institutional reform can advance anti-corruption goals and how reformers in other countries have successfully designed and implemented large-scale changes. He hopes to meet with Stanford faculty, civic technologists, and philanthropic organizations, such as the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Code for America, and the Skoll Foundation, to explore how policy and technology innovations can support municipal reform and Ukraine’s post-war recovery.
 


 

Maria Golub

Maria Golub is a recognized expert on Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration, with deep expertise in EU-Ukraine bilateral relations. Based in Brussels, she currently serves as a Senior Political and Policy Advisor to Ukrainian leadership, where she advocates for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and supports the country’s advancement along the EU integration path through a decisive reform agenda. She is also actively involved in shaping Ukraine’s reconstruction strategy and is a strong proponent of the “build back better” principle, championing an ambitious revival plan for the country.

Project: Building a National Recovery Platform and Transatlantic Innovation Alliance

Maria is currently working to establish a national Coalition for Recovery—an inclusive, cross-sectoral platform designed to unify Ukraine’s defense, reconstruction, and reform agendas. As Ukraine faces the twin imperatives of resisting ongoing military aggression and laying the groundwork for long-term renewal, Maria’s project aims to ensure that recovery planning is not siloed but instead integrates priorities across security, governance, innovation, and transatlantic cooperation.

The Coalition will convene key domestic and international stakeholders to shape Ukraine’s internal reform agenda, embed EU and NATO-aligned governance standards, and streamline policy frameworks across recovery sectors. A core pillar of the project is embedding security priorities and military technological innovation directly into the recovery strategy, positioning defense modernization as a foundation — not a separate track — for rebuilding state capacity and competitiveness. In tandem, Maria is developing the concept for a large-scale technology and defense innovation alliance between Ukraine, the EU, and the United States. By fostering deeper collaboration in emerging technologies and military-industrial partnerships, the initiative seeks to contribute to Ukraine’s economic resurgence in 2025–2026 and anchor its strategic integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Maria is particularly interested in successful strategies and action plans that demonstrate how countries emerging from large-scale conflict can simultaneously pursue national recovery and build resilient, future-oriented security and defense architectures. She aims to explore cutting-edge developments in the tech and military tech sectors, as well as innovative tools like digital twin cities, to help design an integrated national revival plan. In addition, she hopes to deepen her understanding of how AI tools and techniques can support planning, coordination, and implementation across Ukraine’s postwar recovery landscape.
 


 

Alyona Nevmerzhytska

Alyona Nevmerzhytska is CEO of hromadske.ua, Ukraine’s leading independent online media platform. She began her career in 2012 at the Kyiv Post and has since focused on business development and organizational strategy. At hromadske, she has enhanced audience engagement and strengthened data-driven decision-making. Committed to building sustainable models for independent media, she ensures ethical newsroom operations and promotes democratic values. She is a graduate of the Stockholm School of Economics, an Atlantic Council Millennium Fellow, and a 2024 McCain Institute Global Leader.

Project: Strengthening Independent Media for Postwar Accountability and Recovery

Alyona is currently working to build a more resilient and innovative media ecosystem in Ukraine that can serve as both a watchdog and a unifying force during the country’s postwar recovery. As CEO of Hromadske.ua, she is leading efforts to combine investigative journalism, compelling storytelling, and technological advancement with a focus on financial sustainability and editorial independence.

Her project explores how independent media can most effectively cover Ukraine’s complex reconstruction process — holding public institutions and international aid mechanisms accountable while also building trust across communities fractured by war. Alyona is particularly interested in leveraging technology, including AI tools, to enhance investigative capacity, analyze data, and uncover patterns of corruption or inefficiency in recovery efforts.

Through the SU-DD fellowship, she also seeks to explore global models for sustainable journalism beyond donor-driven funding, learning how to strengthen independent media institutions to ensure their long-term viability and public impact. A key area of inquiry is the ethical integration of AI into journalism, ensuring that innovation does not compromise transparency, integrity, or audience trust. Alyona is eager to connect with Stanford faculty in communication and business, as well as experts, to explore sustainable models for independent journalism and civil society resilience. She is also interested in meeting with philanthropic organizations, alongside tech leaders, and Ukrainian NGOs to strengthen partnerships that support innovative, mission-driven media.

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(Clockwise from left) Oleksandra Matviichuk, Oleksandra Ustinova, Oleksiy Honcharuk, and Serhiy Leshchenko joined FSI Director Michael McFaul to discuss Ukraine's future on the three-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion.
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Through War and Loss, Ukrainians Hold Onto Hope

FSI scholars and civic and political Ukrainian leaders discussed the impact of the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, three years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
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Ukraine and Russia flags on map displaying Europe.
Commentary

The future of Russia and Ukraine

How the present conflict plays out has important implications for other former Soviet states and for the future of the E.U., says political scientist Kathryn Stoner.
The future of Russia and Ukraine
Oleksandra Matviichuk speaks to an audience at Stanford University on April 15, 2024.
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Ukraine Needs Western Assistance, Global Implications if Conflict is Lost

Nobel Peace Prize winner and CDDRL alumna Oleksandra Matviichuk delivered the S.T. Lee Lecture on April 15 and spoke of the broader implications of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and for the world if the West does not continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia.
Ukraine Needs Western Assistance, Global Implications if Conflict is Lost
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2025 Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development fellows
Alyona Nevmerzhytska, Oleksii Movchan, Maria Golub, and Polina Aldoshyna.
Rod Searcey
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Meet the four fellows participating in CDDRL’s Strengthening Democracy and Development Program and learn how they are forging solutions to help Ukraine rise stronger from the challenges of war.

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Khushmita Dhabhai
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As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the resilience of international support is being tested. Public opinion in neighboring countries — many of which have absorbed refugees and face direct geopolitical pressure — has become a critical variable in sustaining aid and solidarity. In a REDS seminar talk, co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Princeton Professor of Politics Grigore Pop-Eleches shared findings from a major research project examining what drives support for Ukraine — and whether empathy can help counter growing war fatigue.

The study draws on two waves of public opinion surveys conducted in eight countries bordering Ukraine and/or Russia: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Over 1,000 people were surveyed in each country, with a randomly assigned half receiving a brief empathy prompt. This prompt asked them to reflect on the daily challenges Ukrainians face living in a war zone. The goal was to measure whether simply imagining life in Ukraine could increase support for the Ukrainian cause.

The presentation began by outlining the stakes. Support for Ukraine has implications beyond aid flows. It affects how elites justify their positions, how international coalitions hold, and how misinformation, especially from Russia, can shift public discourse. The researchers focused on whether empathy-based interventions could increase not only emotional identification with Ukrainians, but also concrete actions such as signing petitions, donating money, or supporting humanitarian and military aid.

The results were striking. The empathy prompt had a clear and consistent effect: participants who received it expressed more sympathy for Ukrainians, more concern for their well-being, and greater willingness to support aid, both humanitarian and military. Statistical tests showed that these effects were driven by increased emotional connection (not concerns about the security of their own country), highlighting the central role of affective empathy.

Importantly, the effects were not uniform. They were strongest in countries like Hungary and Lithuania, and among individuals with strong attachments to their own national group and among those who had not previously interacted with Ukrainian refugees. Conversely, those who identified closer with Russians or who regularly consumed Russian media showed weaker or even no response. This suggests that perspective-taking can be powerful — but only in the absence of competing narratives.

The presentation concluded with a discussion of the broader implications. Empathy may offer a low-cost, scalable way to strengthen international solidarity — but its success depends on timing, exposure, and context. In countries with few refugees or limited media exposure to Ukraine, empathy interventions can fill an important emotional gap. However, where pro-Russian sentiment or misinformation dominates, their effects are muted.

At a moment when global support for Ukraine hangs in the balance, this research offers an encouraging insight: even brief moments of reflection can move people toward solidarity — if the conditions are right.

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Brian Taylor
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“No Peace in Sight:” Ideology, Territory, and the Stalemate in the Russo-Ukraine War

In a recent REDS Seminar, Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression.
“No Peace in Sight:” Ideology, Territory, and the Stalemate in the Russo-Ukraine War
Juliet Johnson presented her research in a REDS Seminar, co-hosted by CDDRL and TEC, on February 27, 2025.
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Show Me the Money: Central Bank Museums and Public Trust in Monetary Governance

Juliet Johnson, Professor of Political Science at McGill University, explores how central banks build public trust through museums.
Show Me the Money: Central Bank Museums and Public Trust in Monetary Governance
Yoshiko Herrera presented her research in a REDS Seminar co-hosted by CDDRL and TEC on January 16, 2025.
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Identities and War: Lessons from Russia’s War on Ukraine

Political Science scholar Yoshiko Herrera examines how identity shapes the causes, conduct, and consequences of war, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Identities and War: Lessons from Russia’s War on Ukraine
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Grigore Pop-Eleches discussed his research in a REDS Seminar on May 1, 2025.
Grigore Pop-Eleches discussed his research in a REDS Seminar on May 1, 2025.
Soraya Johnson
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In a REDS seminar talk, co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Princeton Professor of Politics Grigore Pop-Eleches shared findings from a major research project examining what drives support for Ukraine — and whether empathy can help counter growing war fatigue.

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Khushmita Dhabhai
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On April 17, 2025, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), alongside The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution, hosted a seminar entitled “The Russo-Ukraine War: Peace for Our Time?” featuring Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor. The seminar examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression. Taylor emphasized that, despite mounting casualties and economic costs, peace remains unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the ideological rigidity and strategic goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Putin’s own speeches, notably from February 2022 and June 2024, underscore his belief that Ukraine lacks legitimate statehood and is a ‘Western puppet.’ He accuses Kyiv of fostering “neanderthal nationalism” and allowing NATO to develop Ukraine as a military outpost. These views culminated in his June 2024 and April 2025 peace proposals, which demand complete Ukrainian military withdrawal from occupied regions, recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” These demands remain wholly unacceptable to Ukraine, where President Zelensky has repeatedly asserted that ceding territory violates the constitution and would betray over a million Ukrainian citizens still living in unoccupied portions of the contested areas.

The seminar highlighted three core issues blocking peace: territorial integrity, security guarantees, and domestic political sovereignty. Ukraine insists on reclaiming all occupied land and seeks NATO membership or bilateral security commitments from Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia demands not only territorial concessions but also structural constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities and internal laws. The Kremlin's calls for “denazification” include repealing post-2014 legislation on language and historical memory — proposals Ukraine sees as direct infringements on its sovereignty.

Territorially, the stakes are high. Ukraine holds parts of Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia, and is unwilling to legitimize Russian claims. International law supports Ukraine’s position: the UN Charter, Budapest Memorandum, and several treaties confirm Russia’s previous recognition of Ukrainian borders. The war, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described, is the largest attempted annexation in Europe since World War II — a recolonization effort with severe implications for the international order.

On the battlefield, the war shows no signs of abating. Russian casualties exceeded 400,000 in 2024 alone, yet recruitment incentives and resource reserves remain robust. Some analysts argue that Putin is ideologically committed and politically insulated, making him indifferent to the war’s costs. Ceasefire discussions, while briefly floated in early 2025, have faltered amid escalating demands.

Taylor also explored the U.S. political context. President Donald Trump’s shifting rhetoric — from claiming he could end the war in 24 hours to hedging that he would “like to get it settled” — reflects uncertainty about future American policy. According to Russian sources, Putin believes he can manipulate Trump to secure favorable terms.

Ultimately, Taylor concluded that both sides see more advantage in fighting than in negotiating. The war is deeply rooted in Putin’s imperial ambition and ideological confrontation, not just geopolitics. Without dramatic shifts in leadership or battlefield fortunes, peace will remain elusive.

A full recording of Professor Taylor's seminar can be viewed below:

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on April 24, 2025.
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How Transnational Repression Impacts Exiled Opposition

CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva’s research on the Russian diaspora’s willingness to donate to oppositional organizations demonstrates that the criminalization of groups can incentivize greater donor support among emigrants, contrary to the Putin regime’s intentions.
How Transnational Repression Impacts Exiled Opposition
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In a recent REDS Seminar, Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression.

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Evolving negotiations over the war in Ukraine; uncertainty about the unity of NATO; increased transatlantic mistrust. There is a seeming divide growing between the United States and Europe, and that could have major impacts on future security on both sides of the Atlantic.

James Goldgeier, a scholar of European security, NATO, Russia, and Ukraine and a research affiliate at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, joins the institute's director, Michael McFaul, on the World Class podcast to discuss what's happening, and why. 

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or other major podcast platforms. 

TRANSCRIPT:


McFaul: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of FSI. Today I'm joined by Jim Goldgeier, research affiliate both at the Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law and the Center on International Security and Cooperation here at FSI.

Jim is also a professor at American University, but most importantly, he's a co-author with Michael McFaul on many things, including a book about U.S. policy towards Russia after the Cold War. He also has written extensively on European security, NATO, Russia, and Ukraine. And given what's going on in the news, Jim, I didn't think there could be a better person to chat about all those things. From when we planned this a couple of weeks ago till today, there's actually been a lot of news. 

So why don't we just start with the latest in terms of the negotiations. And then I want to pull back to this broader picture. Really, by the end of our conversation today, I want to know, is there a future for transatlantic security partnerships and the future of NATO? But let's go micro first and then we'll end with that macro. So tell us what's going on as to the best of you can figure it out in terms of these alleged peace negotiations to try to end the war in Ukraine. Tell us what you think is going on and how well you think it's going.

Goldgeier: Well, first of all, thanks for having me on. It's great to be with you and lots of tough issues to talk about, including this one. And I think it's just worth people remembering that, you know, a real negotiation process would be one in which, especially if the United States was really playing a central role in negotiations, in which the US negotiator was going back and forth between the Russian president and the Ukrainian president and trying to figure out how to really resolve some super tough issues, particularly regarding how Russian occupied territory is going to be treated. Even if Ukraine has to accept that for now it can't control that territory, it shouldn't be asked to have to recognize that territory as Russian. And Russia wants, of course, that that territory be recognized as Russian. So a negotiator would be going back and forth. That's not happening.

There isn't a real negotiation. Also in a real negotiation, both sides would be asked to make concessions. Vladimir Putin isn't being asked to make concessions. And he still has the same maximalist goals he had at the beginning of this war. He wants a Ukraine that's basically a subsidiary to Russia. Even if he doesn't conquer the whole thing, he doesn't want it to be independent and sovereign. He doesn't want it to be Western oriented. He wants it under his thumb.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: He wants a new government, a government that he would control. And it would really be incumbent on the United States to explain to him why that's not going to happen. But so far, he hasn't been asked to make concessions, and he also wants Ukraine not to have any military capability to defend itself in the future.

McFaul: So lots of things I want to pull on there if we have time. What do you think the Trump strategy is? Why is he not being asked to make any concessions?

Goldgeier: I think the basic problem comes down to the fact that it just appears that Donald Trump views Ukraine as a nuisance. And he views President Zelensky as a real nuisance. We saw that in the Oval Office meeting. Zelensky's like, you know, we need some security guarantees, otherwise how can we agree to anything? And you know, to Trump, this is all just a nuisance. He wants it to go away. He wants to be able to have a quick victory. I achieved a ceasefire.

Goldgeier: I said I would, I did, and then he can move on to something else. He doesn't care whether Ukraine has peace or not. He doesn't care whether Ukraine's government survives or not. And he has this weird affinity for Putin. We've seen it since 2017 and before. He admires the guy. He wants to hang out with the guy. He wants to do deals with the guy.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: He clearly doesn't want to press him. And so that's not a good recipe for a solution to what is a very serious situation that Russia created.

McFaul: That doesn't sound like a good strategy to me either, I agree. But help Americans understand why it matters. Maybe there are other people that think, well, why do we care about Ukraine? Maybe it is a nuisance, right? What are the bigger interests for America at stake in this negotiation?

Goldgeier: Well, I think we do have to go back to what this country has decided to believe in and support since the end of the Second World War. I mean, we fought a second world war. We fought a war against countries that had used their militaries to go into neighboring countries, take territory that wasn't theirs, and created conflict. That was a big war, a world war.

McFaul: Yeah.

Goldgeier: And we decided at the end of that that we were going to try to create a system internationally that would either prevent those things from happening or impose real costs on countries that try to break that order. And we did that, for example, in 1991 when we went to war against Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait in 1990, and George H.W. Bush put together an international coalition to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.

And that was something we stood for. We saw it as in our security. And I would argue it is in our security to live in that kind of world. Who wants to live in a world where countries can just go in and take territory from their neighbors, because you don't know whether they're going to keep going. And we have an interest in security and stability in Europe. So when Putin invaded, we supported the government of Ukraine, along with our European allies and other allies as well.

South Korea, for example, which has played a big role in supporting the Ukrainians. And I would say, you know, this is one of the things that's, I would use the word problematic, but it's so far beyond that, about the Trump administration is his own discussion about taking the territory of Greenland, which he said in front of a joint session of Congress, we're gonna take one way or the other. Well, you know.

That's the same thing. You're threatening to use military force to take something that doesn't belong to you. In that case, it belongs to an ally, I mean, a NATO ally. So it's even worse. So, you know, is that the world Americans want to live in? Where powers use military force that way and create the kind of conflicts that led us into a world war previously that was pretty significant for the United States. I don't think Americans want to go through that again.

McFaul: Great explanation. We should study that history so we don't have to repeat it, right? Tell us a little bit about how this is playing in European capitals, these negotiations, right? It was striking to me, for instance, when there was the first meeting with the Russians, Lavrov and Ushakov in Saudi Arabia, and on our side of the table, Secretary Rubio was there, National Security Waltz was there.

But at the other end of the table, there were no Ukrainians, of course. To your point, there's no shuttle diplomacy nor is there direct negotiations. But there were two Saudi officials sitting there. There weren't two Europeans sitting there. How is this playing out as the Europeans observe what is going on, but also are now starting to take actions on their own towards what they might do separately and apart from us vis-à-vis Ukraine?

Goldgeier: It's tough for the Europeans because they are dependent on the United States for their security. They're going to be trying to get out of that situation as best they can because they now, and we can get into that, see that the United States is now an unreliable ally for them. So that puts them in a very different situation than they've been in since the end of the Second World War.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: They don't really have a choice but to stay engaged and to support Ukraine because Putin's Russia remains a threat to them. As long as Vladimir Putin keeps talking about territory that's not his as being subject to potential Russian aggression, they have to worry about what his ambitions might be. They don't really know. They know he has these grand visions of himself as a world historical figure in Russia like Catherine the Great and Peter the Great. And so he's a threat to them. They would love to be able to do this as they had been doing prior to January 20th. They would love to be supporting Ukraine militarily and trying to help it achieve peace that enables Ukraine to remain a sovereign and independent country.

But if they can't do it with the United States, they're going to do everything they can to do it themselves. And so they're going to stand, they're going to help send Ukraine what they can and potentially put troops in Ukraine, although that's a very complicated issue. But they want Ukraine to know that Europe is there for it. And I think they now recognize that they can't count on the United States on this or really much anything else. And so they have to adjust accordingly.

McFaul: And are you impressed by what they're doing collectively or does it seem kind of slow and difficult because you don't have NATO doing this all together? Is the glass half empty or half full, I guess is what I'm asking.

Goldgeier: I think it's half full because I think we just have to accept that they don't have the same capabilities that the United States does. I mean, it's just a fact. They know it. Now they're very aware of it. For example, intelligence capabilities. I mean, this is something the United States has been able to provide to Ukraine. They just don't have the same intelligence capabilities, and that would take them a long time to develop.

They have some defense production capabilities and they're trying to ramp that up as quickly as possible and they're trying to provide what they can. It's not enough, but I am impressed with the urgency that they do feel and the ways in which they're thinking, okay, we can't count on the US anymore. How are we going to take care of our own security in Europe as Europeans? And in that regard, how can we best support Ukraine so that we can stop Putin there so that he doesn't get tempted to do it elsewhere.

McFaul: Let's open the aperture a little bit wider, just talk more generally about transatlantic relations, not just Ukraine. It seems like there's been some pretty big shocks to this relationship. I'm thinking first and foremost about the speech that Vice President Vance gave at the Munich Security Conference, where he lectured all the Europeans about how badly they're doing with their practice of democracy. There's then been the tariffs, of course, and there's been hints that we might be pulling our troops back. You can update us as to whether that's real or not, but give us your update on transatlantic relations in the first hundred days of the Trump administration.

Goldgeier: So JD Vance, his speech in Europe at the Munich Security Conference, also his efforts on behalf of the far right AFD party in Germany interfering in the German elections to support an extremist party, was definitely a wake up call for the Europeans. I think even more than what we're seeing with respect to Ukraine, this was a sign that the United States is not an ally anymore. Donald Trump treats the European Union as an adversary. He talks about how it was created to screw over the United States. By the way, the United States was strongly supportive of building a more united Europe. That was true for post-war presidents who thought it would be great for Europe to be more united as a partner with the United States.

McFaul: And that turned out to be true, right? I mean, that was a pretty good investment. 

Goldgeier: It was true. It's been true. Great trading partners, great military partners. They're great partners. And now we're telling them, you know what, we don't see you as a partner anymore.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: First Trump term, the Europeans sort of tried to just tell themselves they would just get through those four years, hoping things didn't go hugely terribly and that they could get through it. And they did.

And I think a lot of them with Trump winning this second time in 2024 thought initially, okay, maybe we could just get through these four years again. And I think now they're recognizing that this is just a different situation, the kinds of people that Trump had around him as advisors, as national security advisors, as secretaries of defense, they don't have that, you know, what were termed adults in the room in the first Trump administration. He's unleashed. He clearly hates Europe. I mean, I just think this is just a longstanding belief he has that they've taken advantage of the US. He's treating them as an adversary. 

The tariff situation is, I think, the most serious because it's basically telling the Europeans, we're going to make it harder for you to trade with the US. And what that's going to do is cause the Europeans, as they're currently doing, to look elsewhere. I mean, this is the general problem for US foreign policy right now is, you know, nobody likes a bully. He is a bully. But other countries have to pursue their interests. So if they can't do that in concert with the United States, they're going to figure out other ways to do it. 

The trade agreement that was the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Trump walked away from in his first term, well, the other countries in that TPP reformed it as a different entity. And Europe now is interested in figuring out how to get in. Europe's interested in figuring out with Australia how to form a free trade agreement.

Goldgeier: They're actively looking elsewhere… 

McFaul: Without us involved, right? 

Goldgeier: …without us, because they can't count on us and they don't know. You know, he put 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminum. He's got 10 % tariffs worldwide. There's a possibility he's going to go up to 20% with Europe. They don't know. He's unreliable, he's unpredictable, and they have got to start making other calculations. And so they're going to do that.

McFaul: That's sobering. And on the military side too, tell us a little bit about what you see happening within NATO and other conversations of European security architecture outside of or next to NATO.

Goldgeier: I think the two really big issues for us to watch and think about, one is Europe's own defense production. In the world we've lived in, Europe could buy military equipment from the United States. You want F-16s, you want F-35s, you can buy from the US. Europeans now are thinking, all right, we don't want to do that anymore. American defense companies are going to lose through this because the Europeans don't want to put themselves into that dependence situation anymore. So they are developing their own systems. And while that will take time, these are rich economies. They've got technological capabilities. A lot of it's going to be whether or not countries can work together in terms of developing new fighter aircraft, which they've already started doing and they're starting to...

McFaul: The Europeans have?

Goldgeier: The Europeans are doing this. They're finding markets in the Middle East, for example. I think this is going to be bad for the United States. And I would think Lockheed Martin and Boeing and others are going to the Trump administration and saying, this isn't going to be good for us. So that's one thing to watch, just that defense production. And then the other, as you were just mentioning, is institutionally, how does Europe do this?

McFaul: Yeah.

Goldgeier: You know, NATO has existed all this time since 1949 with the United States as its undisputed leader. The United States has been the major power in Europe. There's always been an American who's been the supreme allied commander in Europe, the SACUR. This is the military official who oversees the military operations for NATO and that person has always been an American. With the Trump administration, there's been grumblings about maybe not wanting to do that anymore. 

We don't know whether Trump really would fully withdraw from NATO or whether the United States would just have less of a presence and I think the real question and I don't know the answer to it is, can NATO function without that US leadership? Can the other countries of NATO, there are 32 countries in NATO, can they work together within that organization that's been set up without the United States having much of a presence? I mean, we haven't been in that situation before, so we just don't know.

I mean, the European Union isn't really set up to do what NATO does. So I think it's still a hugely open question. And I believe we will see lots of sessions at think tanks in America and in Europe on the future of European security and re-imagining European security and trying to understand this. It's just uncharted waters.

McFaul: Right. Say a little bit, again, in the same question I had about Ukraine. So why should Americans care, right? Europeans haven't been spending much on defense, as you alluded to. I think we agree they probably should have been doing more. And maybe had we started that conversation earlier, we wouldn't be here. I'm not convinced of that, but some people make that argument. 

There's a more extreme argument that you hear from Trump administration officials and Trump himself is like, let the Europeans take care of Europe. We got to take care of Asia. Putin, that's their problem. What's the downside of the breakdown or weakening of NATO from America's national interests?

Goldgeier: I'd say two things to that. One is just that… Of course, Europeans have been spending more and of course they should have been spending even more. And I do think Joe Biden was wrong. The first thing he said when he came back in was, to the Europeans, America is back. Which basically led many of them to think, okay, phew, we don't actually have to do a lot more. When we should have taken those four years to really put this on a better path because I think the United States should have less of a presence in Europe. 

They are rich countries. We don't have to do everything for them as we have in the past. They know, they should know that by now, but we should do it in partnership with them. We could still be partners with them, even if we're doing less.

McFaul: And why is that important from your perspective in terms of America's national interests? That partnership versus just go at it alone. We'll be in charge of North America. They'll be in charge of Europe. What's wrong with that kind of thinking?

Goldgeier: You never know when you're going to need your friends. So I think it's good to have friends. I mean, one of things that's been an advantage for the United States in the world compared to countries like Russia and China is we have lots of friends. We have allies. They're there for us. When we asked them to join us in Afghanistan, they were there. They came. A lot of them lost lives, had troops that were killed.

And the other thing is, actions in one part of the world have implications in others. There's a reason in the last three summits that the countries, the so-called Indo-Pacific Four, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, the heads of state and government from those four have come to the NATO summits the last three years and presumably are coming to the one this summer. They see these linkages. They see the importance of Ukraine. South Korea has been providing artillery to Ukraine because they don't want Putin to succeed in Ukraine because they don't want to see the signal that will send to Xi Jinping regarding Taiwan and regarding potential Chinese aggression more broadly in the Western Pacific. 

So, countries are definitely watching. And I just think from a U.S. perspective — and I do think most Americans understand this — it is good to have friends. We have good, strong friends who've been with us and we can explain why they're gonna need to do more and I think the Europeans have gotten the message and are gonna try to do more, but it should be with us and not against us. Why do we need them as an adversary? We already have other adversaries. 

McFaul: Yeah. We have serious adversaries. 

Goldgeier: We don't need to make our best friends adversaries.

McFaul: And wasn't it Churchill who said, or I'm paraphrasing the word, the only thing worse than going to war is going to war alone? I think he's said something along those lines. 

Goldgeier: Right. Yeah.

McFaul: So Jim, last question. Tell us about the future. Speculate a little bit about, is this the end or, and just maybe focus on NATO, because we don't have time to talk about all the institutions, or if they survive and muddle along for the next four years, is there a possibility of renewal of these transatlantic security relationships, a renewal of the NATO alliance?

Goldgeier: Well, I hope we could renew a transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. The problem is the Europeans now know that the United States is not reliable. We had Trump one, we had Joe Biden, we had Trump two. They can't keep bouncing back and forth. If we have another president like Joe Biden after Donald Trump, who wants to rebuild things with Europe, they still have to be thinking, okay, we don't know what's gonna happen four years later. Is J.D. Vance going to come and start yelling at us, talking about how pathetic we are as he did in the signal chat? I mean, in my view, NATO as a collective defense organization that at its core has the United States there to help defend the member states. I don't believe the Europeans can count on the United States in the future to defend them.

And I think that given that that is the core of NATO, I think NATO as we've known it is finished. What NATO can be, the different thing it can be, more European organization, less US, we don't know how that's gonna play out. But as an organization where the United States was fundamentally there and saying, we are with you in collective defense, I think they know Donald Trump's not going to defend any country in Europe. And they don't know whether a future president would or wouldn't. And so I think they have to adjust accordingly.

McFaul: Well, we can't end on that sobering note. Give us one piece of hope for the future of transatlantic relations, US-European relations, long term, even if you have to go way into the future.

Goldgeier: Well, I think long term Americans and Europeans will still want to, I mean, as peoples, I think the peoples will still want to be partners with each other. So it's just getting the governments back to reflect what the populations would like to see.

McFaul: Okay, we can’t end on that horrible end note that the feature is over. I think the thing you had is really true. I think that our societies are connected and we have shared values. We're part of a democratic world and you and I travel to Europe all the time and they want that connection. I think that's a thing that the Trump world sometimes wants us to convince the world that nobody wants America. That's definitely not my feeling when I travel. And in Asia too, by the way. I would say they want an American presence. So that gives us something to chew on and work on in the future. 

Jim, thanks for being on World Class. Great to have you. 

Goldgeier: Thanks for having me.

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

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On the World Class podcast, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul discuss how relations are evolving between the United States and Europe, and what that means for the future of Ukraine, defense strategy in Europe, and global security interests.

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