Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain
This talk presents an unconventional look at the creation of a deadly barrier between East and West Germany. It reveals how the Iron Curtain was not simply imposed by communism, but had been emerging haphazardly in both East and West long before the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. From the end of the Third Reich, ad hoc enforcement of the tenuous border between the two Germanys led to the creation of difference where there was no difference, institutionalization of violence among neighbors, popular participation in a system that was deeply unpopular--and people normalizing a monstrosity in their midst.
Edith Sheffer is assistant professor of Modern European History at Stanford. Edith Sheffer came to Stanford as an Andrew W. Mellon Fellow in the Humanities in 2008 and joined the History Department faculty in 2010. She recently completed Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain, and was the winner of the 2011 Fraenkel Prize, awarded by the Wiener Library Institute of Contemporary History, London.
Co-sponsored by The Europe Center (TEC), the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), the Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies (CREEES) and the Department of German Studies
Event Summary
Professor Sheffer's presentation includes a social history of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. She examines the process by which culturally homogenous populations internalized ideas of difference, and erected arbitrary physical and mental borders accordingly. She argues that the Iron Curtain was a "wall of the mind" reinforced not only by Communist authorities but by the everyday actions of ordinary Germans.
Professor Sheffer first outlines her recent book, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain. Drawing on archives, news stories, and personal interviews with people from East and West Germany, she argues that the Berlin Wall was simply a visible manifestation of an existing rift within the country that had been building for 16 years. She examines the process of institutionalization of difference, by which people living in a once-cohesive community with no stark religious or cultural differences began to view those on the opposite side of an arbitrary border as "other." Professor Sheffer offers several explanations for why Germans largely accepted the divide, including the gradual internalization by individual citizens, on both sides of the wall, of what Sheffer describes as "the living wall" and a "wall in the head formed by a wall on the ground." The fact that the wall was a structural response to a social set of conflicts can explain why it both went up and came down so quickly, as the result of many small steps and individual actions.
CISAC Conference Room
Edith Sheffer
Department of History 200-120
Edith Sheffer joined the History Department faculty in 2010, having come to Stanford as an Andrew W. Mellon Fellow in the Humanities in 2008. Her first book, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford University Press, 2011), challenges the moral myth of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War’s central symbol. It reveals how the barrier between East and West did not simply arise overnight from communism in Berlin in 1961, but that a longer, lethal 1,393 kilometer fence had been developing haphazardly between the two Germanys since 1945.
Her current book, Soulless Children of the Reich: Hans Asperger and the Nazi Origins of Autism, investigates Hans Asperger’s creation of the autism diagnosis in Nazi Vienna, examining Nazi psychiatry's emphasis on social spirit and Asperger's involvement in the euthanasia program that murdered disabled children. A related project through Stanford's Spatial History Lab, "Forming Selves: The Creation of Child Psychiatry from Red Vienna to the Third Reich and Abroad," maps the transnational development of child psychiatry as a discipline, tracing linkages among its pioneers in Vienna in the 1930s through their emigration from the Third Reich and establishment of different practices in the 1940s in England and the United States. Sheffer's next book project, Hidden Front: Switzerland and World War Two, tells an in-depth history of a nation whose pivotal role remains unexposed--yet was decisive in the course of the Second World War.
Norman M. Naimark
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C235
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
Norman M. Naimark is the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies, a Professor of History and (by courtesy) of German Studies, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution and (by courtesy) of the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. Norman formerly served as the Sakurako and William Fisher Family Director of the Stanford Global Studies Division, the Burke Family Director of the Bing Overseas Studies Program, the Convener of the European Forum (predecessor to The Europe Center), Chair of the History Department, and the Director of Stanford’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies.
Norman earned his Ph.D. in History from Stanford University in 1972 and before returning to join the faculty in 1988, he was a professor of history at Boston University and a fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. He also held the visiting Catherine Wasserman Davis Chair of Slavic Studies at Wellesley College. He has been awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (1996), the Richard W. Lyman Award for outstanding faculty volunteer service (1995), and the Dean's Teaching Award from Stanford University for 1991-92 and 2002-3.
Norman is interested in modern Eastern European and Russian history and his research focuses on Soviet policies and actions in Europe after World War II and on genocide and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century. His published monographs on these topics include The History of the "Proletariat": The Emergence of Marxism in the Kingdom of Poland, 1870–1887 (1979, Columbia University Press), Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (1983, Harvard University Press), The Russians in Germany: The History of The Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (1995, Harvard University Press), The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (1998, Westview Press), Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing In 20th Century Europe (2001, Harvard University Press), Stalin's Genocides (2010, Princeton University Press), and Genocide: A World History (2016, Oxford University Press). Naimark’s latest book, Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty (Harvard 2019), explores seven case studies that illuminate Soviet policy in Europe and European attempts to build new, independent countries after World War II.
“Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain”
Co-sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies (CREEES), the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), The Europe Center and the German Studies department
About the topic: This talk presents an unconventional look at the creation of a deadly barrier between East and West Germany. It reveals how the Iron Curtain was not simply imposed by communism, but had been emerging haphazardly in both East and West long before the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. From the end of the Third Reich, ad hoc enforcement of the tenuous border between the two Germanys led to the creation of difference where there was no difference, institutionalization of violence among neighbors, popular participation in a system that was deeply unpopular--and people normalizing a monstrosity in their midst.
About the Speaker: Edith Sheffer is assistant professor of Modern European History at Stanford. Edith Sheffer came to Stanford as an Andrew W. Mellon Fellow in the Humanities in 2008 and joined the History Department faculty in 2010. She recently completed Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain, and was the winner of the 2011 Fraenkel Prize, awarded by the Wiener Library Institute of Contemporary History, London.
Her future research will also examine the intersection of public events and private choices, from Germans’ “zero Hour” diaries in 1945 to the development and dissemination of corporate cultures. Research and teaching interests span modern Europe and Germany, especially the social and cultural history of the twentieth century.
CISAC Conference Room
Edith Sheffer
Department of History 200-120
Edith Sheffer joined the History Department faculty in 2010, having come to Stanford as an Andrew W. Mellon Fellow in the Humanities in 2008. Her first book, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford University Press, 2011), challenges the moral myth of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War’s central symbol. It reveals how the barrier between East and West did not simply arise overnight from communism in Berlin in 1961, but that a longer, lethal 1,393 kilometer fence had been developing haphazardly between the two Germanys since 1945.
Her current book, Soulless Children of the Reich: Hans Asperger and the Nazi Origins of Autism, investigates Hans Asperger’s creation of the autism diagnosis in Nazi Vienna, examining Nazi psychiatry's emphasis on social spirit and Asperger's involvement in the euthanasia program that murdered disabled children. A related project through Stanford's Spatial History Lab, "Forming Selves: The Creation of Child Psychiatry from Red Vienna to the Third Reich and Abroad," maps the transnational development of child psychiatry as a discipline, tracing linkages among its pioneers in Vienna in the 1930s through their emigration from the Third Reich and establishment of different practices in the 1940s in England and the United States. Sheffer's next book project, Hidden Front: Switzerland and World War Two, tells an in-depth history of a nation whose pivotal role remains unexposed--yet was decisive in the course of the Second World War.
Business as Usual: Fukushima in Light of the Great Cold War Plutonium Disasters
While Chernobyl, and now Fukushima, are household words, far fewer people have heard of Maiak in the southern Urals and Hanford in eastern Washington State where Soviet and American engineers built plutonium plants to fuel the Cold War nuclear arsenal. Within nuclear "buffer zones," plant managers, who were pushed to produce as much plutonium as quickly as possible, polluted freely, liberally and disastrously. During the plutonium disasters that ensued, each plant issued over 200 million curies of radioactive isotopes into the surrounding environment, at least twice the amount released at Chernobyl. Under cover of nuclear security and powered by generous corporate welfare, plant managers employed influential public relations campaigns, restricted medical research, deployed temporary, migrant workers as ‘"jumpers" for the dirtiest work, and generally denied the existence and hazards of radioactive contamination. This was the house plutonium built. Kate Brown argues these histories are important because they supplied models, staff, blueprints and subsequent ready-made disasters for Chernobyl and Fukushima.
Kate Brown is an associate professor of history at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. She is the author of a Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Harvard 2004), which won the American Historical Association’s George Louis Beer Prize for the Best Book in International European History. Brown is a 2009 Guggenheim Fellow and is working on a book called Plutopolia, a tandem history of the world’s first plutonium cities, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2012.
---------
Special Japan Studies Program and CEAS Series: Winter-Spring 2011-12
Looking Back, Looking Forward: Japan's March 11 Disasters One Year Later
The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster that hit Japan in March 2011 had both immediate catastrophic consequences and long term repercussions. Fundamental areas of Japan’s environment, economy, society, and collective national psyche were deeply affected, giving rise to a broad range of urgent issues. These include economic debates about how to meet the country’s energy demands with nuclear power plants offline, and what path to take for the country’s energy future; political crises, including criticism of the government’s disaster response; the psychological challenges of coping with trauma and grief; a daunting environmental clean-up; and social developments, including a new wave of civil society activism. This series brings together scholars and activists from a wide range of specialties to take stock of how the Japanese have been affected by the disasters, and to assess the efforts of residents, volunteers, and policy makers to recover and move forward.
Philippines Conference Room
Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply
National oil companies (NOCs) produce most of the world’s oil and natural gas and bankroll governments across the globe. Although NOCs superficially resemble private-sector companies, they often behave in very different ways. To understand these pivotal state-owned enterprises and the long shadow they cast on world energy markets, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at Stanford University commissioned Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply. The 1000-page volume, edited by David Victor, David Hults, and Mark Thurber, explains the variation in the performance and strategy of NOCs, and provides fresh insights into the future of the oil industry as well as the politics of the oil-rich countries where NOCs dominate. It comprises fifteen case studies, each following a common research design, of NOCs based in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe. The book also includes cross-cutting pieces on the industrial structure of the oil industry and the politics and administration of NOCs.
NOCs are distinguished from private companies by their need to respond to state goals beyond profit maximization. Governments seeking to retain their hold on power use NOCs to deliver benefits to influential elites (“private goods”) or to the broader population (“social goods”). Oil and Governance finds a strong correlation between such non-hydrocarbon burdens on the NOC—which include providing employment, subsidizing fuel, or handing out plum jobs to the politically connected—and deficiencies in oil and gas performance. The highest-performing NOCs, like Norway’s Statoil and Brazil’s Petrobras, face relatively circumscribed non-oil demands from their governments.
How governments administer their oil sectors also proves to be a crucial determinant of NOC performance. Democracies (e.g., Norway, Brazil) and autocracies (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Angola) alike are capable of grooming successful NOCs. What matters most for outcomes is not regime type per se but rather that governance systems provide unified signals to the NOC. (By contrast, regime type is observed to be an important driver of whether governments nationalize their oil sectors in the first place, or privatize existing NOCs.) Fragmented governance, in which multiple government actors assert their interests but no one assumes strategic responsibility, appears uniformly fatal to NOC performance. Nascent democracies like Mexico’s can be particularly vulnerable to oil sector dysfunction stemming from fragmentation. Governance systems must also be matched to a country’s institutional and political realities. Nigeria has arguably set back its progress in oil through attempts to slavishly imitate Norway’s forms of oil organization in the absence of Norway’s mature political and civil service institutions.
The close ties between the NOC and its government can have a detrimental effect on the ability of the NOC to manage the risks that are so characteristic of the oil and gas industry. Whereas private companies are forced to hone their geological knowledge and skills through global competition for capital and hydrocarbon licenses, NOCs for the most part are comfortably sheltered from competitive threats at home. They therefore fail to develop the global reach that helps private players (the international oil companies, or IOCs) manage risk by means of a diversified global portfolio and the ability to link resources to customers around the world. (Some NOCs have begun to internationalize in recent years, but it is striking that none of the NOCs studied in Oil and Governance went down this path until forced to by domestic resource scarcity, or at least of the perception of future scarcity.) The soft budget constraint faced by the NOC also discourages the cost efficiencies that help mitigate risk.
This gulf in risk management capabilities between IOCs and most NOCs suggests that the resource dominance of NOCs does not pose an existential threat to private oil companies. Private players will continue to play a key role in the frontiers of oil and gas development—frontiers like shale gas, oil sands, and the remote Arctic. NOCs will continue to control low-cost oil around the world, while a select few of the most focused and unencumbered among them start to build up their own risk management skills through partnerships with IOCs.
NOC control over resources has important implications for the world oil price. The NOCs studied in the book produce their reserves at half the rate of the major IOCs—whether due to lower performance or a deliberate attempt to preserve resources for the future. Moreover, governments tend to rely most heavily on the risk management skills of IOCs when prices are low and then swing back towards NOCs in high price periods when they can afford to focus on delivering benefits to favored constituencies. The result of this dynamic, which is observed in the case studies of Oil and Governance, can be “backward bending supply curves” that exaggerate price volatility in the world oil market.
This effect of NOCs on global oil supply and price appears to be much more important than any geopolitical fallout from NOC primacy around the world. Oil and Governance finds very little evidence that NOCs act as effective foreign policy weapons on behalf of their host states. Even where politicians may desire to employ NOCs in this way, the incentives of the NOC itself are usually strongly opposed to such an exercise of power. As one example, Europe’s Gazprom depends overwhelmingly on revenues from gas exports to Europe because gas is so heavily subsidized in Russia. When NOCs do venture abroad, as in the case of China’s CNPC, they are often motivated to do so precisely by the desire to achieve more autonomy from their political masters at home.
Stanford's Shin on Kim Jong Il's death and what's next for North Korea
As the world reacts to the death of Kim Jong Il, Stanford’s Gi-Wook Shin talks about the transition of power in North Korea. He discusses what’s in store for relations between Pyongyang and Washington, and what to expect of what is perhaps Kim’s most troubling legacy: his nuclear weapons program.
Shin is a senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of FSI's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and its Korean Studies Program. The sociology professor is also the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies.
Kim Jong Il’s son, Jong Un, is set to take over North Korea’s leadership. What do we know about him, and what can we expect from his leadership?
Unlike his father, who had been groomed as a successor for many years, Kim Jong Un was designated as a successor only recently. As a result, it is questionable whether he is ready to take over the failing regime. Kim Jong Il’s death was not entirely unexpected, but still came sooner than many experts had thought.
Jong Un is only 28 years old without much experience in politics and governance and has not yet been able to consolidate his power. Although his status as a new leader is not likely to be challenged, it won’t be easy at all to establish himself as a strong leader like his father, let alone like his grandfather, Kim Il Song.
In the years to come, his in-laws—such as Jang Seong Taek—will play an important role behind Kim. The military will also be a key player in the post-Kim Jong Il era.
You were in South Korea when Kim Jong Il died. What was the mood and reaction to the news?
People were taken by surprise but there was no panic. The government is handling the situation well, while many citizens wonder what will happen to North Korea with the passing of Kim Jong Il.
How can the United States deal with this transition in power? Will there be any change in relations between Washington and Pyongyang?
Representatives of North Korea and the U.S. recently met in Beijing to discuss food aid and nuclear issues. There was some optimism with the prospect to improve the bilateral relations. However, any direct talks between the two countries to discuss major issues will be on hold for a while as the northern regime mourns the loss of its leader and focuses on internal stability. The U.S. should pay keen attention to the transitional process and needs to support a smooth transition in power. That should entail close collaboration with neighboring countries, especially South Korea and China. And it should include providing food aid that the U.S. has been considering.
How does Kim Jong Il's death fit in with other key political transitions happening throughout the world in the coming year?
There is a great deal of uncertainty on the Korean peninsula. Besides this transition in power in North Korea, there will also be power transitions in China and Russia next year. And there will also be presidential elections in the U.S., South Korea, and Taiwan in 2012. Japan may have a new prime minister too, adding more uncertainty to the situation.
On the other hand, uncertainty does not necessarily mean a crisis—it is unlikely that the North will provoke tensions on the peninsula. The coming year is a very important one for North Korea as it celebrates itself as a “mighty, prosperous nation.” But it faces many challenges.
I don’t expect any significant change in inter-Korean relations until perhaps 2013, when South Korea elects a new administration and North Korea is stabilized with a new political leadership.
What does Kim Jong Il’s death mean for North Korea’s nuclear program?
North Korea has nuclear weapons and an enriched uranium program that could produce nuclear bombs. Very few expect the North to give up its nuclear bombs. Added uncertainty over the transition of power and heightened concern about regime survival will only increase the value that North Korea sees in possessing nuclear weapons.
Stanford's McFaul is next ambassador to Russia
Michael A. McFaul, a Stanford political science professor and senior fellow at the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, was confirmed by the Senate to be the next ambassador to Russia.
McFaul, President Barack Obama’s top advisor on Russia and a Bing Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, will succeed John Beyrle.
"Mike will bring to his new posting in Moscow the same intensity, clarity of vision and imagination that he demonstrated as President Obama's point person on Russia at the White House," said Coit D. Blacker, FSI’s director and the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies.
The Dec. 17 voice vote confirming McFaul came on the last day the Senate was in session before its winter break. Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., had held up McFaul's approval over issues with U.S. policies toward Russia.
During confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October, McFaul discussed the overall status of U.S.-Russian relations, missile defense, arms reduction agreements and trade relations.
Since the beginning of the Obama administration, McFaul has been the special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Security Council.
He served as senior adviser on Russia and Eurasia to Obama during the presidential campaign and continued to advise on foreign policy issues during the transition.
The Obama administration has achieved new momentum in relations with Russia with McFaul's involvement.
The two countries have signed the New Start arms control treaty, which calls for significant cuts in nuclear arsenals; finalized a civilian nuclear cooperation pact; forged agreement on tougher sanctions on Iran; and expanded the supply route to Afghanistan through the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The two powers now turn to the efforts to forge cooperation on missile defense in Europe and to gain Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization, as well as the challenges posed by Iran and Libya.
"This is a complex and sensitive time in the ever-evolving relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation," Blacker said. "Having an ambassador in place who gets the relationship has never been more important. For this reason above all others, Mike is the perfect choice. We are all deeply proud of Mike and all that he has accomplished."
McFaul, who has served as FSI’s deputy director and director of the institute’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, received a bachelor’s degree in international relations and Slavic languages and an master’s in Slavic and East European studies from Stanford in 1986. He was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, where he completed his PhD in international relations in 1991.
Engineering education, finance, and policy in BRIC countries
Between 2008 and 2009, approximately 25 new private engineering colleges opened in India every week—adding 2500 schools in only two years. Engineering education is also on the rise in the other so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, and China). But does quantity guarantee quality? And what should government policymakers keep in mind to ensure that their higher education investments pay off?

Rafiq Dossani, a senior research scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, recently collaborated with Stanford professor of education Martin Carnoy and a team of scholars in Russia, China, and India on a leading-edge comparative study of higher education systems in BRIC countries. Carnoy led the project, which focused on engineering education, and he, Dossani, and other researchers are currently writing a book coming out in 2012. Dossani speaks here about the project.
What is unique to the approach that you have taken with this study compared to anything similar previously conducted?
This is the first systematic study based on a large data collection. Over 7,000 students were surveyed in China and India respectively, and 2,300 students were surveyed in Russia. Brazil regularly collects detailed data on a very large nationwide sample of university students, and we have used this in our study. We also surveyed over 100 educational institutions, including several dozen face-to-face interviews with trustees, heads of institutions, heads of departments, faculty, administrators, and students.
We focus on engineering education in our study because it is the field that attracts the largest number of students. For example, in China, about 63% of students in 2009, or about 1.8 million students, entered through the science track, which is the route to an engineering degree. In India, 1.4 million freshmen engineering students were enrolled in 2011, which is over 40% of the total number of freshmen.
In our study, we ask how governance and finance affect outcomes in higher education. Every country’s educational system shares certain objectives: quality, access, and equity. What has not been studied for the BRIC countries is whether the governance and finance of higher education is consistent with some of these objectives but not others, and how this impacts the shape and effectiveness of the higher education system. The choice of governance and finance are themselves outcomes of the institutional settings in each country. For example, in India, the dramatic transfer of political power in the last two decades from the national government to the provinces has been the key driver of change.
As a result of this shift in political power, the states took charge of higher education and focused on increasing access and equity as their political goals. Given the extreme shortage of funds, they contracted out the actual provision of education to the private sector on attractive terms. The private sector responded briskly. Of the 1.4 million freshmen enrollees in engineering studies in 2011, 98% were enrolled in private institutions, compared with less than 5% in 1990. The rate of growth was so high that in just two years, 2008 and 2009, 2500 new engineering colleges opened their doors. That works out to about five new colleges for each working day!
There were upsides and downsides to this growth. On the positive side, the state offered attractive financial terms for new institutions located in underprivileged areas and mandated that about 50% of seats be reserved for underprivileged students (mostly identified by caste). It also kept tuition fees for the reserved seats very low at about $500 per student per year and allowed the colleges to recover costs and margins by charging a higher fee for the rest. The result was that growth has been geographically spread and access by underprivileged students is high—in our study, 55% of the students came from underprivileged categories.
The downside is that quality remains elusive. Although this does not show up in job placement rates due to pent-up demand, comparisons with the other BRIC countries suggest that the quality is low. The reason is that private providers, for the moment, find it more profitable to provide minimal infrastructure and employ inadequate faculty than to invest in building up quality for the long-term. In fact, given that the investment in long-term quality is likely to be unaffordable, one of our conclusions is that we question the sustainability of the Indian governance and finance model vis-à-vis the other countries in our study, particularly China, where the central government is taking an activist approach in trying to increase quality, at least in the elite universities.
How do your findings in India’s higher education system for engineering compare to the other BRIC countries, especially China as the study’s other Asian country?
In terms of sheer growth and the number of engineering freshmen, China exceeds India. The cost of education is lower in India. In terms of quality, China, Brazil, and Russia, do better. Part of the reason is a superior entering cohort in the case of China and Russia. But the main reason appears to be that governance in the other BRIC countries is more faculty-driven than driven by profit-oriented trustees. We found that the former model is more likely to deliver quality. In the case of China, for example, academic departments determine courses, course content, and the types of disciplines available, whereas in India, trustees make such choices, with poorer quality outcomes.
You have previously said that India’s higher education system is very politicized—how did it come to be this way?
The politicization began at the country’s independence in 1947. Prior to independence, higher education was managed by provinces to produce graduates from the upper classes who would join the colonial civil service. After independence, the state governments faced new demands for higher education from the middle classes. Since these were also important voting classes, the state responded by setting up a large number of public universities. The state controlled all aspects of the university to ensure that their priorities were met, in terms of location, fees, and personnel hired. For example, the state government was represented in the senate of every university and public college. Every senior-level hire needed to be approved by the state government. State government nominees on the senate also reviewed textbook selections and disciplinary choices.
As may be imagined, educational quality suffered and continues to do so in the public colleges. In the mid-1990s, the states faced demands from new voter categories, particularly lower-caste groups. These were earlier excluded from political power but acquired power in the federalization of politics that took place from 1990 onwards. This time around, though, the states decided to subcontract the work to the private sector rather than set up public colleges. This was largely a matter of cost management—the state thought that the private sector would respond to the incentive of providing technical education to those willing to pay full-cost, and invest the needed capital. This would free up the state’s capital for other demands, including for education, such as for primary and secondary education. To ensure that the lower-caste groups were part of the expansion, the state mandated quotas and subsidized fees. In the name of preserving quality—although, in fact, it preserves quality only at low levels—the state continued to exercise other controls. For example, it imposes common curricula and assessment, and, in most cases, certifies a private college only if it is part of a publicly owned university system.
The state’s policies also led to a shift in the profile of the graduates towards technical and professional education, since these were the fields in which the private sector was willing to establish new institutions. This was greatly stimulated by rising income payoffs to higher education engineering and business training. Private colleges account for 60% of the growth in educational provision between 1995 and 2011, and almost all of that growth is in engineering, management, and other professional fields. The value of this is debatable: it reflects the “market” but, deprived of state support, some fields that may be considered to be socially valuable, such as the liberal arts, are in steep decline.
Has the state of higher education in BRIC countries, such as India, led students to seek education opportunities abroad?
In China and India, these are important reasons for student migration to the West. For example, 500,000 students enroll as freshmen overseas from India alone every year. They come mostly from elite families, since the costs of an overseas education are very high.
What long-term policy changes are you hoping to influence through this study and your forthcoming book?
First, we show that the evolution of higher education in the BRICs can be explained by the role of the state (the government sector) and the policy choices it makes in governance and finance.
Second, we show that private provision can substitute for public provision, but with certain disadvantages in terms of quality and educational diversity. In this context, we show that state policy can still influence some outcomes positively, such as access, equity, and cost-control. However, the long-term implications for quality are much more negative through such a model.
Third, we show that the provincial governance of education offers certain advantages and disadvantages over national regulation. This is a hotly debated topic in China and India. In India, the national regulators seek greater control out of concern about the implications of too politicized an environment created by the states and the poor quality emerging from private colleges. However, we argue that there may be downsides to centralized control, as was witnessed in an earlier period (during the tenure of Indira Gandhi).
Finally, we make the case that the current ”trend” among governments in developing countries of focusing on the creation of a few world-class universities can succeed in the limited sense of creating a few high-quality teaching and research institutions. However, it comes at a very high cost and in no sense guarantees a trickle-down of quality to the remaining institutions. This is particularly the case in the current model in China and Russia, where the emphasis on world-class universities is greatest and these high-cost elite institutions are given increasing funding per student. At the same time, mass universities absorb increasing numbers of students at low and possibly declining per-student funding.
Population Exchanges in the Modern Era
This roundtable engages the causes, courses and consequences of the policy of mass population exchanges that have shaped the political and ethnographic boundaries of modern Eurasia.
Co-sponsored by the Department of History, Mediterranean Studies Forum, Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies, and the Stanford Humanities Center.
Levinthal Hall