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Aurelia is an undergraduate student at Stanford studying International Relations. Her background lies in studies of Southeast Asia and Psychology. Her current research interests focus on Comparative International Governance of foreign policy approaches and law reform across the Global North and South. She is serving as a research assistant over the summer of '25 with CDDRL. In her spare time, she enjoys watching musical theatre, cooking, and hanging out with her closest friends.

Research Assistant, Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program, Summer 2025
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Khushmita Dhabhai
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As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, the resilience of international support is being tested. Public opinion in neighboring countries — many of which have absorbed refugees and face direct geopolitical pressure — has become a critical variable in sustaining aid and solidarity. In a REDS seminar talk, co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Princeton Professor of Politics Grigore Pop-Eleches shared findings from a major research project examining what drives support for Ukraine — and whether empathy can help counter growing war fatigue.

The study draws on two waves of public opinion surveys conducted in eight countries bordering Ukraine and/or Russia: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Over 1,000 people were surveyed in each country, with a randomly assigned half receiving a brief empathy prompt. This prompt asked them to reflect on the daily challenges Ukrainians face living in a war zone. The goal was to measure whether simply imagining life in Ukraine could increase support for the Ukrainian cause.

The presentation began by outlining the stakes. Support for Ukraine has implications beyond aid flows. It affects how elites justify their positions, how international coalitions hold, and how misinformation, especially from Russia, can shift public discourse. The researchers focused on whether empathy-based interventions could increase not only emotional identification with Ukrainians, but also concrete actions such as signing petitions, donating money, or supporting humanitarian and military aid.

The results were striking. The empathy prompt had a clear and consistent effect: participants who received it expressed more sympathy for Ukrainians, more concern for their well-being, and greater willingness to support aid, both humanitarian and military. Statistical tests showed that these effects were driven by increased emotional connection (not concerns about the security of their own country), highlighting the central role of affective empathy.

Importantly, the effects were not uniform. They were strongest in countries like Hungary and Lithuania, and among individuals with strong attachments to their own national group and among those who had not previously interacted with Ukrainian refugees. Conversely, those who identified closer with Russians or who regularly consumed Russian media showed weaker or even no response. This suggests that perspective-taking can be powerful — but only in the absence of competing narratives.

The presentation concluded with a discussion of the broader implications. Empathy may offer a low-cost, scalable way to strengthen international solidarity — but its success depends on timing, exposure, and context. In countries with few refugees or limited media exposure to Ukraine, empathy interventions can fill an important emotional gap. However, where pro-Russian sentiment or misinformation dominates, their effects are muted.

At a moment when global support for Ukraine hangs in the balance, this research offers an encouraging insight: even brief moments of reflection can move people toward solidarity — if the conditions are right.

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Grigore Pop-Eleches discussed his research in a REDS Seminar on May 1, 2025.
Grigore Pop-Eleches discussed his research in a REDS Seminar on May 1, 2025. | Soraya Johnson
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In a REDS seminar talk, co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Princeton Professor of Politics Grigore Pop-Eleches shared findings from a major research project examining what drives support for Ukraine — and whether empathy can help counter growing war fatigue.

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On April 17, 2025, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), alongside The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution, hosted a seminar entitled “The Russo-Ukraine War: Peace for Our Time?” featuring Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor. The seminar examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression. Taylor emphasized that, despite mounting casualties and economic costs, peace remains unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the ideological rigidity and strategic goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Putin’s own speeches, notably from February 2022 and June 2024, underscore his belief that Ukraine lacks legitimate statehood and is a ‘Western puppet.’ He accuses Kyiv of fostering “neanderthal nationalism” and allowing NATO to develop Ukraine as a military outpost. These views culminated in his June 2024 and April 2025 peace proposals, which demand complete Ukrainian military withdrawal from occupied regions, recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” These demands remain wholly unacceptable to Ukraine, where President Zelensky has repeatedly asserted that ceding territory violates the constitution and would betray over a million Ukrainian citizens still living in unoccupied portions of the contested areas.

The seminar highlighted three core issues blocking peace: territorial integrity, security guarantees, and domestic political sovereignty. Ukraine insists on reclaiming all occupied land and seeks NATO membership or bilateral security commitments from Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia demands not only territorial concessions but also structural constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities and internal laws. The Kremlin's calls for “denazification” include repealing post-2014 legislation on language and historical memory — proposals Ukraine sees as direct infringements on its sovereignty.

Territorially, the stakes are high. Ukraine holds parts of Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia, and is unwilling to legitimize Russian claims. International law supports Ukraine’s position: the UN Charter, Budapest Memorandum, and several treaties confirm Russia’s previous recognition of Ukrainian borders. The war, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described, is the largest attempted annexation in Europe since World War II — a recolonization effort with severe implications for the international order.

On the battlefield, the war shows no signs of abating. Russian casualties exceeded 400,000 in 2024 alone, yet recruitment incentives and resource reserves remain robust. Some analysts argue that Putin is ideologically committed and politically insulated, making him indifferent to the war’s costs. Ceasefire discussions, while briefly floated in early 2025, have faltered amid escalating demands.

Taylor also explored the U.S. political context. President Donald Trump’s shifting rhetoric — from claiming he could end the war in 24 hours to hedging that he would “like to get it settled” — reflects uncertainty about future American policy. According to Russian sources, Putin believes he can manipulate Trump to secure favorable terms.

Ultimately, Taylor concluded that both sides see more advantage in fighting than in negotiating. The war is deeply rooted in Putin’s imperial ambition and ideological confrontation, not just geopolitics. Without dramatic shifts in leadership or battlefield fortunes, peace will remain elusive.

A full recording of Professor Taylor's seminar can be viewed below:

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Brian Taylor
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In a recent REDS Seminar, Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression.

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Evolving negotiations over the war in Ukraine; uncertainty about the unity of NATO; increased transatlantic mistrust. There is a seeming divide growing between the United States and Europe, and that could have major impacts on future security on both sides of the Atlantic.

James Goldgeier, a scholar of European security, NATO, Russia, and Ukraine and a research affiliate at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, joins the institute's director, Michael McFaul, on the World Class podcast to discuss what's happening, and why. 

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or other major podcast platforms. 

TRANSCRIPT:


McFaul: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of FSI. Today I'm joined by Jim Goldgeier, research affiliate both at the Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law and the Center on International Security and Cooperation here at FSI.

Jim is also a professor at American University, but most importantly, he's a co-author with Michael McFaul on many things, including a book about U.S. policy towards Russia after the Cold War. He also has written extensively on European security, NATO, Russia, and Ukraine. And given what's going on in the news, Jim, I didn't think there could be a better person to chat about all those things. From when we planned this a couple of weeks ago till today, there's actually been a lot of news. 

So why don't we just start with the latest in terms of the negotiations. And then I want to pull back to this broader picture. Really, by the end of our conversation today, I want to know, is there a future for transatlantic security partnerships and the future of NATO? But let's go micro first and then we'll end with that macro. So tell us what's going on as to the best of you can figure it out in terms of these alleged peace negotiations to try to end the war in Ukraine. Tell us what you think is going on and how well you think it's going.

Goldgeier: Well, first of all, thanks for having me on. It's great to be with you and lots of tough issues to talk about, including this one. And I think it's just worth people remembering that, you know, a real negotiation process would be one in which, especially if the United States was really playing a central role in negotiations, in which the US negotiator was going back and forth between the Russian president and the Ukrainian president and trying to figure out how to really resolve some super tough issues, particularly regarding how Russian occupied territory is going to be treated. Even if Ukraine has to accept that for now it can't control that territory, it shouldn't be asked to have to recognize that territory as Russian. And Russia wants, of course, that that territory be recognized as Russian. So a negotiator would be going back and forth. That's not happening.

There isn't a real negotiation. Also in a real negotiation, both sides would be asked to make concessions. Vladimir Putin isn't being asked to make concessions. And he still has the same maximalist goals he had at the beginning of this war. He wants a Ukraine that's basically a subsidiary to Russia. Even if he doesn't conquer the whole thing, he doesn't want it to be independent and sovereign. He doesn't want it to be Western oriented. He wants it under his thumb.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: He wants a new government, a government that he would control. And it would really be incumbent on the United States to explain to him why that's not going to happen. But so far, he hasn't been asked to make concessions, and he also wants Ukraine not to have any military capability to defend itself in the future.

McFaul: So lots of things I want to pull on there if we have time. What do you think the Trump strategy is? Why is he not being asked to make any concessions?

Goldgeier: I think the basic problem comes down to the fact that it just appears that Donald Trump views Ukraine as a nuisance. And he views President Zelensky as a real nuisance. We saw that in the Oval Office meeting. Zelensky's like, you know, we need some security guarantees, otherwise how can we agree to anything? And you know, to Trump, this is all just a nuisance. He wants it to go away. He wants to be able to have a quick victory. I achieved a ceasefire.

Goldgeier: I said I would, I did, and then he can move on to something else. He doesn't care whether Ukraine has peace or not. He doesn't care whether Ukraine's government survives or not. And he has this weird affinity for Putin. We've seen it since 2017 and before. He admires the guy. He wants to hang out with the guy. He wants to do deals with the guy.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: He clearly doesn't want to press him. And so that's not a good recipe for a solution to what is a very serious situation that Russia created.

McFaul: That doesn't sound like a good strategy to me either, I agree. But help Americans understand why it matters. Maybe there are other people that think, well, why do we care about Ukraine? Maybe it is a nuisance, right? What are the bigger interests for America at stake in this negotiation?

Goldgeier: Well, I think we do have to go back to what this country has decided to believe in and support since the end of the Second World War. I mean, we fought a second world war. We fought a war against countries that had used their militaries to go into neighboring countries, take territory that wasn't theirs, and created conflict. That was a big war, a world war.

McFaul: Yeah.

Goldgeier: And we decided at the end of that that we were going to try to create a system internationally that would either prevent those things from happening or impose real costs on countries that try to break that order. And we did that, for example, in 1991 when we went to war against Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait in 1990, and George H.W. Bush put together an international coalition to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.

And that was something we stood for. We saw it as in our security. And I would argue it is in our security to live in that kind of world. Who wants to live in a world where countries can just go in and take territory from their neighbors, because you don't know whether they're going to keep going. And we have an interest in security and stability in Europe. So when Putin invaded, we supported the government of Ukraine, along with our European allies and other allies as well.

South Korea, for example, which has played a big role in supporting the Ukrainians. And I would say, you know, this is one of the things that's, I would use the word problematic, but it's so far beyond that, about the Trump administration is his own discussion about taking the territory of Greenland, which he said in front of a joint session of Congress, we're gonna take one way or the other. Well, you know.

That's the same thing. You're threatening to use military force to take something that doesn't belong to you. In that case, it belongs to an ally, I mean, a NATO ally. So it's even worse. So, you know, is that the world Americans want to live in? Where powers use military force that way and create the kind of conflicts that led us into a world war previously that was pretty significant for the United States. I don't think Americans want to go through that again.

McFaul: Great explanation. We should study that history so we don't have to repeat it, right? Tell us a little bit about how this is playing in European capitals, these negotiations, right? It was striking to me, for instance, when there was the first meeting with the Russians, Lavrov and Ushakov in Saudi Arabia, and on our side of the table, Secretary Rubio was there, National Security Waltz was there.

But at the other end of the table, there were no Ukrainians, of course. To your point, there's no shuttle diplomacy nor is there direct negotiations. But there were two Saudi officials sitting there. There weren't two Europeans sitting there. How is this playing out as the Europeans observe what is going on, but also are now starting to take actions on their own towards what they might do separately and apart from us vis-à-vis Ukraine?

Goldgeier: It's tough for the Europeans because they are dependent on the United States for their security. They're going to be trying to get out of that situation as best they can because they now, and we can get into that, see that the United States is now an unreliable ally for them. So that puts them in a very different situation than they've been in since the end of the Second World War.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: They don't really have a choice but to stay engaged and to support Ukraine because Putin's Russia remains a threat to them. As long as Vladimir Putin keeps talking about territory that's not his as being subject to potential Russian aggression, they have to worry about what his ambitions might be. They don't really know. They know he has these grand visions of himself as a world historical figure in Russia like Catherine the Great and Peter the Great. And so he's a threat to them. They would love to be able to do this as they had been doing prior to January 20th. They would love to be supporting Ukraine militarily and trying to help it achieve peace that enables Ukraine to remain a sovereign and independent country.

But if they can't do it with the United States, they're going to do everything they can to do it themselves. And so they're going to stand, they're going to help send Ukraine what they can and potentially put troops in Ukraine, although that's a very complicated issue. But they want Ukraine to know that Europe is there for it. And I think they now recognize that they can't count on the United States on this or really much anything else. And so they have to adjust accordingly.

McFaul: And are you impressed by what they're doing collectively or does it seem kind of slow and difficult because you don't have NATO doing this all together? Is the glass half empty or half full, I guess is what I'm asking.

Goldgeier: I think it's half full because I think we just have to accept that they don't have the same capabilities that the United States does. I mean, it's just a fact. They know it. Now they're very aware of it. For example, intelligence capabilities. I mean, this is something the United States has been able to provide to Ukraine. They just don't have the same intelligence capabilities, and that would take them a long time to develop.

They have some defense production capabilities and they're trying to ramp that up as quickly as possible and they're trying to provide what they can. It's not enough, but I am impressed with the urgency that they do feel and the ways in which they're thinking, okay, we can't count on the US anymore. How are we going to take care of our own security in Europe as Europeans? And in that regard, how can we best support Ukraine so that we can stop Putin there so that he doesn't get tempted to do it elsewhere.

McFaul: Let's open the aperture a little bit wider, just talk more generally about transatlantic relations, not just Ukraine. It seems like there's been some pretty big shocks to this relationship. I'm thinking first and foremost about the speech that Vice President Vance gave at the Munich Security Conference, where he lectured all the Europeans about how badly they're doing with their practice of democracy. There's then been the tariffs, of course, and there's been hints that we might be pulling our troops back. You can update us as to whether that's real or not, but give us your update on transatlantic relations in the first hundred days of the Trump administration.

Goldgeier: So JD Vance, his speech in Europe at the Munich Security Conference, also his efforts on behalf of the far right AFD party in Germany interfering in the German elections to support an extremist party, was definitely a wake up call for the Europeans. I think even more than what we're seeing with respect to Ukraine, this was a sign that the United States is not an ally anymore. Donald Trump treats the European Union as an adversary. He talks about how it was created to screw over the United States. By the way, the United States was strongly supportive of building a more united Europe. That was true for post-war presidents who thought it would be great for Europe to be more united as a partner with the United States.

McFaul: And that turned out to be true, right? I mean, that was a pretty good investment. 

Goldgeier: It was true. It's been true. Great trading partners, great military partners. They're great partners. And now we're telling them, you know what, we don't see you as a partner anymore.

McFaul: Right.

Goldgeier: First Trump term, the Europeans sort of tried to just tell themselves they would just get through those four years, hoping things didn't go hugely terribly and that they could get through it. And they did.

And I think a lot of them with Trump winning this second time in 2024 thought initially, okay, maybe we could just get through these four years again. And I think now they're recognizing that this is just a different situation, the kinds of people that Trump had around him as advisors, as national security advisors, as secretaries of defense, they don't have that, you know, what were termed adults in the room in the first Trump administration. He's unleashed. He clearly hates Europe. I mean, I just think this is just a longstanding belief he has that they've taken advantage of the US. He's treating them as an adversary. 

The tariff situation is, I think, the most serious because it's basically telling the Europeans, we're going to make it harder for you to trade with the US. And what that's going to do is cause the Europeans, as they're currently doing, to look elsewhere. I mean, this is the general problem for US foreign policy right now is, you know, nobody likes a bully. He is a bully. But other countries have to pursue their interests. So if they can't do that in concert with the United States, they're going to figure out other ways to do it. 

The trade agreement that was the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Trump walked away from in his first term, well, the other countries in that TPP reformed it as a different entity. And Europe now is interested in figuring out how to get in. Europe's interested in figuring out with Australia how to form a free trade agreement.

Goldgeier: They're actively looking elsewhere… 

McFaul: Without us involved, right? 

Goldgeier: …without us, because they can't count on us and they don't know. You know, he put 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminum. He's got 10 % tariffs worldwide. There's a possibility he's going to go up to 20% with Europe. They don't know. He's unreliable, he's unpredictable, and they have got to start making other calculations. And so they're going to do that.

McFaul: That's sobering. And on the military side too, tell us a little bit about what you see happening within NATO and other conversations of European security architecture outside of or next to NATO.

Goldgeier: I think the two really big issues for us to watch and think about, one is Europe's own defense production. In the world we've lived in, Europe could buy military equipment from the United States. You want F-16s, you want F-35s, you can buy from the US. Europeans now are thinking, all right, we don't want to do that anymore. American defense companies are going to lose through this because the Europeans don't want to put themselves into that dependence situation anymore. So they are developing their own systems. And while that will take time, these are rich economies. They've got technological capabilities. A lot of it's going to be whether or not countries can work together in terms of developing new fighter aircraft, which they've already started doing and they're starting to...

McFaul: The Europeans have?

Goldgeier: The Europeans are doing this. They're finding markets in the Middle East, for example. I think this is going to be bad for the United States. And I would think Lockheed Martin and Boeing and others are going to the Trump administration and saying, this isn't going to be good for us. So that's one thing to watch, just that defense production. And then the other, as you were just mentioning, is institutionally, how does Europe do this?

McFaul: Yeah.

Goldgeier: You know, NATO has existed all this time since 1949 with the United States as its undisputed leader. The United States has been the major power in Europe. There's always been an American who's been the supreme allied commander in Europe, the SACUR. This is the military official who oversees the military operations for NATO and that person has always been an American. With the Trump administration, there's been grumblings about maybe not wanting to do that anymore. 

We don't know whether Trump really would fully withdraw from NATO or whether the United States would just have less of a presence and I think the real question and I don't know the answer to it is, can NATO function without that US leadership? Can the other countries of NATO, there are 32 countries in NATO, can they work together within that organization that's been set up without the United States having much of a presence? I mean, we haven't been in that situation before, so we just don't know.

I mean, the European Union isn't really set up to do what NATO does. So I think it's still a hugely open question. And I believe we will see lots of sessions at think tanks in America and in Europe on the future of European security and re-imagining European security and trying to understand this. It's just uncharted waters.

McFaul: Right. Say a little bit, again, in the same question I had about Ukraine. So why should Americans care, right? Europeans haven't been spending much on defense, as you alluded to. I think we agree they probably should have been doing more. And maybe had we started that conversation earlier, we wouldn't be here. I'm not convinced of that, but some people make that argument. 

There's a more extreme argument that you hear from Trump administration officials and Trump himself is like, let the Europeans take care of Europe. We got to take care of Asia. Putin, that's their problem. What's the downside of the breakdown or weakening of NATO from America's national interests?

Goldgeier: I'd say two things to that. One is just that… Of course, Europeans have been spending more and of course they should have been spending even more. And I do think Joe Biden was wrong. The first thing he said when he came back in was, to the Europeans, America is back. Which basically led many of them to think, okay, phew, we don't actually have to do a lot more. When we should have taken those four years to really put this on a better path because I think the United States should have less of a presence in Europe. 

They are rich countries. We don't have to do everything for them as we have in the past. They know, they should know that by now, but we should do it in partnership with them. We could still be partners with them, even if we're doing less.

McFaul: And why is that important from your perspective in terms of America's national interests? That partnership versus just go at it alone. We'll be in charge of North America. They'll be in charge of Europe. What's wrong with that kind of thinking?

Goldgeier: You never know when you're going to need your friends. So I think it's good to have friends. I mean, one of things that's been an advantage for the United States in the world compared to countries like Russia and China is we have lots of friends. We have allies. They're there for us. When we asked them to join us in Afghanistan, they were there. They came. A lot of them lost lives, had troops that were killed.

And the other thing is, actions in one part of the world have implications in others. There's a reason in the last three summits that the countries, the so-called Indo-Pacific Four, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, the heads of state and government from those four have come to the NATO summits the last three years and presumably are coming to the one this summer. They see these linkages. They see the importance of Ukraine. South Korea has been providing artillery to Ukraine because they don't want Putin to succeed in Ukraine because they don't want to see the signal that will send to Xi Jinping regarding Taiwan and regarding potential Chinese aggression more broadly in the Western Pacific. 

So, countries are definitely watching. And I just think from a U.S. perspective — and I do think most Americans understand this — it is good to have friends. We have good, strong friends who've been with us and we can explain why they're gonna need to do more and I think the Europeans have gotten the message and are gonna try to do more, but it should be with us and not against us. Why do we need them as an adversary? We already have other adversaries. 

McFaul: Yeah. We have serious adversaries. 

Goldgeier: We don't need to make our best friends adversaries.

McFaul: And wasn't it Churchill who said, or I'm paraphrasing the word, the only thing worse than going to war is going to war alone? I think he's said something along those lines. 

Goldgeier: Right. Yeah.

McFaul: So Jim, last question. Tell us about the future. Speculate a little bit about, is this the end or, and just maybe focus on NATO, because we don't have time to talk about all the institutions, or if they survive and muddle along for the next four years, is there a possibility of renewal of these transatlantic security relationships, a renewal of the NATO alliance?

Goldgeier: Well, I hope we could renew a transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. The problem is the Europeans now know that the United States is not reliable. We had Trump one, we had Joe Biden, we had Trump two. They can't keep bouncing back and forth. If we have another president like Joe Biden after Donald Trump, who wants to rebuild things with Europe, they still have to be thinking, okay, we don't know what's gonna happen four years later. Is J.D. Vance going to come and start yelling at us, talking about how pathetic we are as he did in the signal chat? I mean, in my view, NATO as a collective defense organization that at its core has the United States there to help defend the member states. I don't believe the Europeans can count on the United States in the future to defend them.

And I think that given that that is the core of NATO, I think NATO as we've known it is finished. What NATO can be, the different thing it can be, more European organization, less US, we don't know how that's gonna play out. But as an organization where the United States was fundamentally there and saying, we are with you in collective defense, I think they know Donald Trump's not going to defend any country in Europe. And they don't know whether a future president would or wouldn't. And so I think they have to adjust accordingly.

McFaul: Well, we can't end on that sobering note. Give us one piece of hope for the future of transatlantic relations, US-European relations, long term, even if you have to go way into the future.

Goldgeier: Well, I think long term Americans and Europeans will still want to, I mean, as peoples, I think the peoples will still want to be partners with each other. So it's just getting the governments back to reflect what the populations would like to see.

McFaul: Okay, we can’t end on that horrible end note that the feature is over. I think the thing you had is really true. I think that our societies are connected and we have shared values. We're part of a democratic world and you and I travel to Europe all the time and they want that connection. I think that's a thing that the Trump world sometimes wants us to convince the world that nobody wants America. That's definitely not my feeling when I travel. And in Asia too, by the way. I would say they want an American presence. So that gives us something to chew on and work on in the future. 

Jim, thanks for being on World Class. Great to have you. 

Goldgeier: Thanks for having me.

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

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On the World Class podcast, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul discuss how relations are evolving between the United States and Europe, and what that means for the future of Ukraine, defense strategy in Europe, and global security interests.

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A potential historic trilateral appearance by Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Vladimir Putin at Moscow's May 9 Victory Day parade would signal powerful solidarity against U.S. pressure, following the June 2024 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' treaty between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Join our expert panel as we analyze this unprecedented geopolitical alignment amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. We'll examine covert arms exchanges trading North Korean missiles for Russian defense systems, North Korean troops in Ukraine honing combat skills, and China's evolving role as it perceives American decline and builds its own alliance network.

Could this potential summit herald a new Cold War framework? We'll explore the profound implications for international relations, strategic partnerships, and regional security in what may become a defining moment in 21st-century global politics.

Speakers:

Seong-Hyon Lee headshot

Seong-Hyon Lee is a Senior Fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Asia Center. A China scholar, Lee gained unique insights during his 11 years residing in China; after completing his Harvard degree, he worked in Beijing as a U.N. consultant and foreign correspondent before earning his Ph.D. from Tsinghua University – President Xi Jinping's alma mater – as the sole international student in his cohort. His connection to Stanford includes previously serving as the Pantech Fellow at the Shorenstein APARC following his time in China.

Lee is the author of two books on U.S.-China relations and their impact on the Korean Peninsula, with his latest publication being The New Cold War: U.S.-China Rivalry and the Future of Global Power. His research spans East Asian international relations, specializing in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, North Korea, nuclear weapons, and techno-economic competition. His prior roles include serving as China Director at a Seoul-based think tank advising the South Korean government, holding an Assistant Professorship at Japan’s Kyushu University, and being a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.

Joseph Torigian headshot

Joseph Torigian is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution; an associate professor at the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC; a Global Fellow in the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center; and a Center Associate of the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan.

Torigian was previously a visiting fellow at the Australian Center on China in the World at Australian National University; a Stanton Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; a postdoctoral fellow at the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program; a postdoctoral (and predoctoral) fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; a predoctoral fellow at George Washington University’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies; an IREX scholar affiliated with the Higher School of Economics in Moscow; and a Fulbright Scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai.

His book Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao was published in 2022 by Yale University Press. His biography on Xi Jinping’s father, The Party’s Interests Come First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping, will be published in June 2025 with Stanford University Press. He studies Chinese and Russian politics and foreign policy.

Moderator:

Ria Roy headshot

Ria Roy is a Kleinheinz Fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a specialist in the history of modern Korea and East Asia. Her doctoral dissertation, which she is currently turning into a book, examines the intellectual and cultural history of North Korea in the context of the Japanese Empire’s legacy as well as the influence of the revolutionary bloc. In particular, she explores the history and development of the leadership succession in North Korea, focusing on the role of intellectuals and their ideas in the generation of the unique North Korean model of leadership. More broadly, she is interested in the intellectual interplay between East and West and how it paved the way for a transition to an illiberal modernity.

Roy received her PhD from the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Cambridge as a Gates Cambridge Scholar. She previously received her MA from Harvard University and her BA from Waseda University in Japan. 

Directions and Parking > 

Ria Roy, Kleinheinz Fellow, Hoover Institution

Philippines Conference Room (C330)
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Seong-Hyon Lee, Senior Fellow, George H. W. Bush Foundation; Associate in Research, Harvard University
Joseph Torigian, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution; Associate Professor, American University
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Soraya Johnson
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In an era of increased transnational repression against dissidents, opposition groups need to become more effective in galvanizing support and avoiding suppression. These organizations are simultaneously losing critical institutional donors, as governments are becoming less inclined to donate to pro-democratic movements. This makes it more important than ever for such organizations to find out how to stimulate collective action among diasporic communities and uncover new outlets for donations. 

Therefore, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva and her collaborator, Emil Kamalov (EUI), decided to start the OutRush project to survey Russians who have fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By understanding the conditions that drive Russian emigrants to donate to activist organizations, Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research, presented in a recent CDDRL seminar, could prove vital to more effectively mobilizing diaspora communities.

The Russian government has expanded its criminalization of oppositional organizations since the 2022 invasion, increasingly labeling groups as “undesirable.” This designation is for organizations that are allegedly a threat to Russian security, making any collaboration with them illegal. For example, Russian citizen Alexey Malyarevsky was recently sentenced to prison for donating to Alexey Navalny’s “undesirable” Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK). With 70% of Russian emigrants being afraid of repression since the invasion, Sergeeva predicted that this designation would discourage emigrants from donating.

To test their hypothesis, Sergeeva and Kamalov surveyed respondents annually through OutRush about their willingness to donate to theoretical organizations that fit various criteria. They utilized nonmonetary incentives, such as promising to send reports to respondents, which lowered the cost of the study.

Contrary to expectations, there was a positive correlation between the criminalization of an organization and the diaspora’s willingness to donate. The “undesirable” designation did not deter support as intended. Instead, it served as a marker that the organization was effective in its opposition, incentivizing donations. This effect was especially prominent among those residing in countries outside of Russia’s sphere of influence. At the same time, it diminished in host countries friendly to Russia, reflecting the continued fear of transnational repression. Furthermore, donor anonymity and organizational transparency further incentivized support. 

The very means through which authoritarian regimes attempt to suppress dissent — the criminalization of opposition groups — can actually be used to galvanize diasporic support. Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research serves as evidence that activist organizations have the opportunity to mobilize emigrants discontented with the regimes they fled, despite oppression. 

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on April 24, 2025.
CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on April 24, 2025. | Soraya Johnson
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CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva’s research on the Russian diaspora’s willingness to donate to oppositional organizations demonstrates that the criminalization of groups can incentivize greater donor support among emigrants, contrary to the Putin regime’s intentions.

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Vladimir Putin has been the undisputed leader of Russia (either as president or prime minister) for almost 25 years. Barring an accident or assassination, Putin seems almost certain to surpass Joseph Stalin's record long reign over the Soviet Union of 29 years. The durability of Putin's regime comes despite a record of endemic corruption, poor governance, economic growth that gave way to recession, a poorly managed COVID response, and a disastrous invasion of a peaceful neighbor in 2022. Despite all of this, Putin endures. How does he do it? A new book by Hannah Chapman, Dialogue with the Dictator: Authoritarian Legitimation and Information Management in Putin's Russia is a welcome addition to a lengthening list of recent studies seeking to explain the resilience and potential vulnerabilities of authoritarianism and of Putin's regime in particular. In one way or another, all of these books focus on the question that also puzzles Russia's opposition politicians: Why is Putin's autocracy so resilient? Chapman offers one answer in exploring the ways in which his regime uses “participatory technologies” to not only enhance regime legitimacy from Russian society but also to control what information reaches Russian citizens. This article reviews her book in the context of other recent studies of how Putin's autocracy works and why it has lasted so long.

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Political Science Quarterly
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Kathryn Stoner
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This report investigates the lives of Russians who emigrated after February 2022, based on longitudinal data from the OutRush project. The primary focus is on emigrants' adaptation processes, their political activity, and their connections with Russia. Findings indicate that emigrants—predominantly highly skilled specialists in IT, culture, and science—contribute to the economic and cultural life of their host countries, while simultaneously experiencing complex and ambivalent feelings toward Russia.

Despite reports about reverse migration, most emigrants do not plan to return to Russia without significant political changes. Host countries have varied approaches to managing the influx of emigrants: some provide stable conditions and low levels of discrimination, becoming hubs for secondary migration, while others are less successful in integrating new residents, prompting emigrants to seek alternative countries for relocation.

Despite progress in adaptation, many emigrants remain embedded in the Russian-speaking community, retaining political engagement and interest in Russia. However, an increasing concern for local environmental issues and domestic politics highlights a gradual shift in the relative importance of local events compared to those in Russia.

This study emphasizes:

  1. the "brain drain" from Russia is unlikely to be reversed without systemic political changes within the country;
  2. the necessity of simplifying legalization procedures for migrants to effectively leverage their potential in host societies.
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A research report on the fourth wave of the survey conducted in 2024.

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Ivetta Sergeeva
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This paper examines the impact of autocratic homelands on the subjective well-being of political emigrants. Drawing on unique survey data comprising 2,567 observations and in-depth interviews with Russian emigrants who left the country following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, we demonstrate that the actions of autocratic homelands contribute significantly to emigrants’ well-being, often surpassing conventional economic and social determinants. Specifically, fear of transnational repression from the Russian government is strongly associated with lower subjective well-being, with effects comparable to those of income loss and unemployment. Even more pronounced negative effects arise from experiences of discrimination and the anticipation of such discrimination due to host-country backlash against the actions of autocratic states. Additionally, feelings of guilt stemming from homeland’s aggression further exacerbate political emigrants’ distress. Autocratic regimes thus continue to exert influence over their citizens abroad by imposing “invisible costs” on political emigrants, contributing to depressive states and activist burnout.

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Post-Soviet Affairs
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Ivetta Sergeeva
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1-27
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