The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role, writes Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and a retired US Foreign Service officer.

The Biden administration sees arms control as a tool that can advance security and stability. It will seek to engage Russia on further nuclear arms reductions and other measures. Arms control in the 2020s will reflect continuity with earlier efforts—nuclear arms reductions will remain a bilateral matter between Washington and Moscow—but also contain new elements. That reflects the fact that strategic stability has become a more complex concept.

Start with Strategic Stability

Donald Trump was the first American president in 50 years to reach no agreement in the area of nuclear weapons. President Biden sees arms control as an important policy tool. On his first full day in office, he agreed to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. His administration plans to do more. On February 3, Secretary of State Blinken said Washington would “pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and US allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”

This will not happen immediately. The administration needs to get its team in place. It will conduct a review of US programs and doctrine, which may be broader than the nuclear posture reviews conducted by past administrations.

The first serious US-Russian engagement on nuclear arms issues will likely occur in strategic stability talks. The classic definition of strategic stability is a situation in which neither side has an incentive, in a severe crisis or conventional conflict, to use nuclear weapons first. For five decades beginning in the 1960s, strategic stability was based largely on comparing US and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. If each side had the ability, even after absorbing a massive first strike, to retaliate with devastating consequences, neither had an incentive to use nuclear weapons.

Today’s strategic stability model is more complex. Instead of a two-player model based just on strategic nuclear forces, today’s is multi-player and multi-domain. Third-country nuclear forces such as China need to be factored in. In addition to nuclear weapons, the model should take account of missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike, space and cyber developments.

US-Russian strategic stability talks should address all these factors. They should also address doctrine. Case in point: escalate-to-deescalate. Most Russian experts assert that this never became official Russian doctrine. However, the Pentagon believes it has, and that influenced the 2018 US nuclear posture review. At the least, each side appears to believe that the other has lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons. That should leave no one comfortable.

Nuclear Arms

Formal nuclear arms negotiations will, for the foreseeable future, remain a bilateral US-Russian matter. That is due to the disparity in numbers. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States has about 3,600 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile, while Russia has about 4,300. No third country has more than about 300.

The Trump administration tried to bring China into a US-Russia negotiation, but it never articulated a plan for doing so. That is no surprise. Washington and Moscow would not agree to reduce to China’s level, nor would they agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to their levels, and China would not accept unequal limits.

New START caps the United States and Russia each at no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear-capable bombers and no more that 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits will remain in force until February 2026.

However, New START’s limits do not cover 60-65 percent of the active nuclear stockpiles of the two countries. Reserve (or non-deployed) strategic nuclear warheads, and non-strategic nuclear warheads—whether deployed or non-deployed—are unconstrained.

After the Cold War, the United States dramatically reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, eliminating all sea-based and land-based systems. Today, the only US non-strategic nuclear weapon is the B61 gravity bomb. Russia, on the other hand, maintains a large number and variety of non-strategic nuclear warheads—close to 2,000 for land-, sea- and air-based delivery as well as for defensive systems. This raises concern that Russia might be postured to use such weapons in a conflict.

The US military maintains more reserve strategic warheads. This reflects a desire to hedge against technical surprises or adverse geopolitical developments. The US military has implemented New START reductions in a manner that would allow it, should the treaty collapse, to add or “upload” warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs that now carry fewer than their capacity. As Russia modernizes its strategic ballistic missiles, it also is expanding its upload capacity.

The logical next step for the United States and Russia would entail negotiation of an agreement with an aggregate limit covering all their nuclear warheads. (Retired but not yet dismantled warheads could be dealt with separately.) An aggregate limit could offset reductions in Russia’s numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear warheads with reductions in the US numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads.

For a notional agreement, assume an aggregate limit of no more than 2,500 total nuclear warheads. Within that aggregate, there could be a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and any new kinds of strategic systems with deployed warheads—the weapons most readily launched. This approach would treat bomber weapons as non-deployed, since they are not maintained on board aircraft. Ideally, all nuclear weapons other than those on deployed strategic delivery systems would be kept in storage. A new agreement could also lower the New START limits on deployed delivery systems and deployed and non-deployed launchers.

This would be ambitious. That said, it would leave each nuclear superpower with eight times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. Even if the agreement did not entail such dramatic reductions, the structure would, for the first time, capture all US and Russian nuclear warheads.

Such an agreement could enable the United States and Russia to begin to deal with third-country nuclear weapons states, and here is where nuclear arms control in the 2020s might get into new territory. Washington and Moscow could ask China, Britain and France to undertake unilateral commitments not to increase their nuclear weapon numbers as long as the United States and Russia were reducing theirs and agree to limited transparency measures to provide confidence that they were abiding by those commitments.

This US-Russian agreement would require new verification measures to monitor numbers of nuclear weapons in storage. That likely will make both sides’ militaries uncomfortable. But both have adjusted to uncomfortable monitoring measures in the past.

Some arms control experts assess that an agreement limiting all nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic nuclear arms, is too ambitious and have suggested alternative approaches. One would expand New START’s limits to capture systems such as intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes, ban other new kinds of strategic systems, and reduce the ratio of deployed strategic warheads to deployed strategic delivery systems, but would not attempt to constrain non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Another alternative would require that non-strategic nuclear weapons be relocated away from bases with associated delivery systems to a small number of storage sites, with monitoring activities designed to verify the absence of nuclear weapons at the bases housing delivery systems, not at confirming or monitoring the number of weapons in storage. While originally suggested for Europe only, it could be broadened to apply on a global basis.

A third alternative would simply seek to lower New START’s limits. Hopefully, however, the US and Russian governments will demonstrate greater ambition.

Other Possible Issues on the US-Russia Agenda

Arms control may enter new territory in the 2020s on issues and types of weapons that, while not nuclear arms, still affect strategic stability. They could be discussed in US-Russian strategic stability talks. If a mandate were agreed, they could be spun off into separate negotiations.

One set of issues concerns missile defense. The US ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system is designed to defend against rogue states, such as North Korea, not against a Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack. Russian officials in the past have nevertheless indicated an interest in constraining missile defenses. Whether they will insist on negotiating on missile defense in connection with a next round of nuclear arms negotiations remains to be seen.

US missile defenses now and for the foreseeable future pose no serious threat to Russian strategic ballistic missiles, a point Russian officials sometimes appear to acknowledge. (China, with a much smaller strategic force, has greater grounds for concern, though the performance of GMD system has not been particularly good.) On the other hand, it would not seem difficult to craft an agreement covering strategic missile defenses such as the GMD system and Moscow missile defense system that would apply constraints but still leave the United States room for capabilities to defend against a North Korean ICBM attack. What would prove difficult would be the Washington politics, where Republicans oppose any limits on missile defense.

Another issue is precision-guided conventional strike weapons. In some cases, these can fulfill missions that previously required nuclear weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been in the US inventory for decades and now in the Russian inventory. Both sides are developing hypersonic weapons. With the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, there is the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile and likely other future intermediate-range missiles. It would be difficult to devise an arrangement that constrained all such weapons, but US and Russian officials might consider whether a subset poses a particular threat to strategic stability and should be subject to negotiation.

One possibility would seek to ban nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles. Another possibility, though it has drawbacks, would build on the Russian idea for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, provided that it would mean relocation of 9M729 missile systems out of Europe.

Operations in space—used for early warning, command, control and communications and other purposes—also can affect strategic stability. A broad agreement banning the militarization of space is difficult to envisage. However, US and Russian officials might explore more limited measures, such as keep-out zones around certain declared satellites, a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris and a ban on emplacing weapons in space designed to strike targets on the Earth.

As for the cyber domain, traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed.

In contrast to nuclear arms reductions, which will remain a US-Russia issue in the 2020s, some related issues might be considered on a broader basis. For example, China increasingly appears a peer competitor with the United States and Russia in space operations. Moreover, China has many intermediate-range missiles. It remains in the US interest to engage China in strategic stability talks. At some point, trilateral or multilateral discussions might be appropriate.

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role. There is much that could be done to enhance stability and strengthen global security. Washington and Moscow will have to overcome the mistrust created by violations of earlier arms control agreements and take an innovative approach, even if certain problems prove insoluble, at least in the near term. But they have an opportunity, and an obligation, to try.

Originally for Valdai Discussion Club

Two weeks ago, President Joe Biden affirmatively responded to George Stephanopoulos’s question, “Vladimir Putin. You think he’s a killer?” Russian commentators voiced outrage, while some American observers foresee a new or intensified ice age in U.S.-Russia relations.

The Russian president is a big boy though. He surely did not like Biden’s answer, but it is difficult to imagine that he would refuse to engage when he sees doing so in his or Russia’s interest.

Biden could and should have used more diplomatic language in replying to Stephanopoulos: “Look, there is a tightly controlled system over there. Certain things do not happen without the approval of the guy at the top.” Still, was his assessment incorrect? 

Russia has carried out a conflict against Ukraine in eastern Donbas that has taken more than thirteen thousand lives and has no discernible motive other than to destabilize Kyiv. Putin-opponent Alexei Navalny was poisoned last summer, apparently by a special unit of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 2018, a Russian military intelligence hit team traveled to Britain, where it tried to poison Sergei Skripal, a busted double-agent who wound up in London after a spy swap.

Over twenty years, Putin has built a “power vertical” that concentrates authority in the Kremlin. It strains credulity to think the Donbas conflict or failed attacks on Navalny and Skripal would have occurred without his knowledge and consent.

It’s true that a comment like Biden’s is not usual between Washington and Moscow.  Recall, however, that Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” whose leaders “reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat.”  He poured Stinger missiles and other weapons into Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet army.  Mikhail Gorbachev nonetheless chose to deal with Reagan, and the two recorded major successes for relations between Washington and Moscow.

While Biden intends to push back against Russian overreach, his administration has also indicated readiness to cooperate where U.S. and Russian interests coincide.  On his first day in office, Biden agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty until 2026, essentially accepting Putin’s offer from 2019.  His officials plan to talk to Russian officials on a range of strategic stability issues. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has a channel to his Russian counterpart. U.S. ambassador to Russia John Sullivan (no relation) is the rare Trump political appointee kept in place after Biden took office.  The Russians presumably noticed all this.

Dr. Julie Newton, an associate professor at the American University of Paris, recently expressed concern that Biden’s comment will fuel Russian grievances. Not to say that the deterioration in U.S.-Russia and West-Russia relations is solely the Kremlin’s fault, but Russian officials have a long list of grievances that often seem to boil down to “everyone is mad at us, what’s wrong with everyone?” They show no sign of having asked themselves whether invading neighboring states, cyber hacks against Western governmental and private institutions, and assassination attempts on the streets of European cities contribute to the problem.

Newton seems to believe Biden’s comment could make Putin less prepared to engage on issues that matter to Washington. Perhaps, but Putin calculates costs and benefits. Russia, like the United States, has an interest in keeping the nuclear arms competition bounded. While a nuclear Iran might pose a bigger problem for Washington, Moscow certainly would not welcome it. The Kremlin has an interest in a stable Afghanistan; if things go badly there, it’s much closer to Russia. Climate change poses challenges for Russia. Moscow and Washington can benefit from cooperation on these questions. Would Putin forgo that? Indeed, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on March 29 listed a number of issues for U.S.-Russian engagement.

Additionally, Newton appears to suggest a double standard. She notes that Biden has not sanctioned Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman. That is not exactly true. The White House has indicated that Biden will deal with the Saudi king, not Mohammed bin Salman. Putin and the Saudi king, not MbS, have invitations to Biden’s virtual climate summit in April.

Biden’s comment shocked those in Moscow, where they had become used to Donald Trump. Trump rarely, if ever, criticized Putin or Russian misbehavior. He also did not produce a single positive achievement in U.S.-Russia relations. Under Biden, New START extension got done in two weeks. To be sure, that does not mean a reset for U.S.-Russia relations, but in contrast to his predecessor, Biden is a serious interlocutor. Putin may not like being called a killer—who would? However, when he sees engagement with Biden can advance his goals, he will engage.

Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and also affiliated with the Brookings Institution and Stanford University, is a retired Foreign Service officer. 

Originally for National Interest

Ukraine finally has a chance to create a strong counterintelligence service and shed the Soviet standards of the old KGB.  

The Ukrainian parliament recently passed the first reading of a bill to reform the Security Service of Ukraine, known as the SBU. This is a crucial step in efforts to remake the SBU into a modern security service guided by Western democratic standards. 

This process owes much to the US Congress. In 2019, Congress voted to condition half of American defense assistance to Ukraine on adoption of a bill on national defense that laid the groundwork for future security service reform. 

In 2021, the United States will allocate USD 250 million for the Ukrainian defense sector. If this money is conditioned on real security service reform, it can prove a game-changer, not only for domestic law enforcement, but also in Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

A modern security service for Ukraine should deal exclusively with counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, protection of state secrets, and countering subversion. The SBU should not be included in any foreign intelligence operations, since this is done by the Service of Foreign Intelligence, which reports directly to the Ukrainian president.

The question now is whether Ukrainian MPs are ready to take responsibility and vote for such a security service. Recently, Maryana Bezugla, deputy head of the Ukrainian National Security, Defense, and Intelligence Committee, reported about pressure on MPs from the SBU’s leadership not to vote for the bill.

The SBU reform bill envisions a number of major changes in Ukraine’s security services. Crucially, it will eliminate the anti-corruption and organized crime department of the SBU. Ukraine has created specific agencies to fight corruption, namely the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI).

In the past, the SBU has duplicated the functions of both NABU and the SBI, and has been accused of misusing its authority to protect corrupt state officials. Eliminating the SBU’s anti-corruption function would also meet a key demand of the international community. 

The current anti-crime department is regarded as one of the most corrupt wings of the SBU. It stands accused of regularly engaging in raids on businesses. Pavlo Demchyna, former head of the SBU’s Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Department, came under criminal investigation a few years ago for precisely such actions. He could not explain how he came to own his elite property and luxury cars. 

In line with the current reform proposals, the number of SBU employees would be reduced from 27,000 to 17,000 within four years. At present, Ukraine has the largest security service in Europe. The proposed cuts would still leave the SBU far larger than many comparative services. For example, Britain’s MI5 has only 4,400 employees, even though it is recognized as one of the top security services in the world. 

Reducing the number of SBU employees over four years can be done without harming Ukraine’s national security. The reduction will provide an opportunity to retain the best officers and raise salaries while ridding the service of old Soviet functions. The SBU does not need its own kindergartens, hospitals, or sanatoriums filled with “secret nannies and doctors” in order to be an effective security service.

While these proposed changes are encouraging, the new bill on Ukraine’s security service still needs to include additional important reforms.

It is vital to eliminate the SBU’s investigative functions. As long as the SBU has investigative powers, the service will remain a law enforcement agency rather than a Western-style security service. The SBU should focus on counterintelligence and national security, not ordinary crime, which should be left to the National Police. 

Eliminating the SBU’s investigative functions would cut opportunities for corruption. The European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine also notes that the SBU should not have authority to conduct pretrial investigations, which are the purview of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and National Police.

All SBU employees (except covert counterintelligence officers) should submit transparent asset declarations. Reforms introduced in 2015 obliged SBU officials, along with millions of other Ukrainian state employees, to publish asset declarations. However, SBU officials have ignored this rule, claiming that all 27,000 employees (including “secret” kindergarten nannies) should be exempt due to national security requirements.

It is important to remove the loopholes that currently enable corruption within the security service. In its present state, the new bill would allow the SBU to put inappropriate pressure on private businesses. This includes the ability to access databases, documents, audio, and video files without requiring any prior court permission. Such powers are subject to widespread abuse and should be eliminated.

The selection process for SBU officers must be competitive. Officers need to be chosen on the basis of competence not nepotism. 

Given Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, those with family ties or other links to Russia require specific scrutiny. It makes no sense, for example, to appoint someone as head of the security service whose wife holds Russian citizenship, but this has happened in the past.

Ukraine must end the SBU monopoly in wiretapping. Understandably, the SBU wants to retain that monopoly, which allows the service to control criminal investigations, even against its own officers. A few years ago, SBU officers misused this power and declassified the identities of NABU agents working on a corruption case.

The current reform drive is also an opportunity to provide public access to declassified information. The SBU tends to overprotect information. For instance, even Ukrainian MPs are currently forbidden from knowing the exact number of SBU employees.

As Ukraine reforms its security service, it is important to avoid creating any new threats to the country’s democratic system. The new bill would empower the SBU to ban, without any court decision, political parties or individual candidates from participating in elections. That provision should be removed.

At a time when Ukraine finds itself engaged in an undeclared war with Russia, the country urgently needs to abandon the Soviet standards of the KGB and adopt the best practices and standards of Western security services. Ukraine also needs to restrict or remove powers that allow the SBU to pressure business or help certain oligarchs.

The current reform process has been a long time coming. It gives Ukrainian MPs the chance to transform the SBU into a modern, Western-style counterintelligence agency that will better serve the country’s national security interests. Parliament must not pass up this opportunity.

Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian MP with the Holos party, is an alumna of Stanford's Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin and affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, is a former US ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000).

Originally for Ukraine Alert

Since November 2020, the world has watched the presidential transition in the United States with unease. After a violent mob of Trump supporters stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6 in an effort to overturn Joe Biden’s election, headlines around the world questioned, for the first time, whether a democratic transfer of power would occur as expected. These reports also included the well-documented risks of violence that might occur at President Biden’s inauguration. 

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog

ABSTRACT

In October 1957, Poland proposed the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members attacked the initiative, Canada viewed it as a means to ease Cold War tensions. Although Canada joined with its allies to reject the Plan, it embarked on a quest for counterproposals to restrain NATO nuclear sharing and reduce the chances of nuclear war. Canada’s efforts alarmed Western allies and helped lead to a second Rapacki Plan. Overall, this article details Canada’s struggle to assert itself as a middle power and provides a robust example of Western interest in the Rapacki Plan.

Read the rest at Cold War History

The U.S. and Russia on Wednesday extended the only remaining treaty that limits the deployment of nuclear weapons. But did the agreement go far enough? Rose Gottemoeller, a distinguished lecturer at Stanford University who served as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security during the Obama administration, joins Nick Schifrin to discuss the New START treaty.

Read the rest at PBS News Hour

Extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, with Russia was one of President Biden’s first foreign policy acts after he took the oath of office on Jan. 20. The treaty would have otherwise ended on Feb. 5, leaving the U.S. and Russia without any agreed upon limits on their strategic nuclear forces for the first time since 1972. When relations are as bad as they are now between Moscow and Washington, U.S. national security would suffer from severe uncertainty over an unconstrained Russian nuclear arsenal.

Read the rest at The Hill