Based on interviews with participants and research in newly opened archives, the book reveals how the American atomic monopoly affected Stalin's foreign policy, the role of espionage in the evolution of the Soviet bomb, and the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders.

Hostage to Revolution makes an important contribution to the understanding of a timely and significant subject. It deals with the aspect of the final years of Soviet policy most directly relevant to American security, and relevant today as the foundation on which present and future Russian policy is being built.

Blacker shows the integral nature of Soviet internal and external policy, and of Gorbachev's new thinking on security and attempt to reform the economy and transform the society. Remarkably successful in bringing the Cold War to an end, Gorbachev's security policies - and Gorbachev, and even the Soviet Union - ultimately fell victim to the failure of perestroika to bring about the reformation of the Soviet system. It is a fascinating story, told with clear analysis and in a clear language. (Raymond Garthoff, The Brookings Institution)

also in Franklin A. Long, Donald Haffner, and Jeffrey Boutwell (eds.), Weapons in Space, W.W. Norton & Co., 1986, pp. 257-278; exerpted in P. Edward Haley and Jack Merritt (eds.) Strategic Defense Initiative: Folly or Future?, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 139-150

A paperback edition with a new introduction was published in 1984.

The development of thermonuclear weapons marked one of the major turning points in the history of Soviet-American strategic arms competition. In his book The Advisors Herbert York enhances our understanding of this turning-point by showing that the first Soviet thermonuclear device, which was exploded on 12 August 1953, was not a superbomb but had a different configuration and a substantially lower yield. York's analysis is important because it makes it possible to assess more accurately the progress of the Soviet nuclear weapons development in the 1950s, and to understand more clearly the nature of Soviet-American strategic arms competition.

The object of this note is to make public a document which gives more detailed information about Soviet nuclear weapons test in the 1950s. The data given here support York's analysis.