The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E214
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.
Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.
Stanford opened a research and education center at China’s Peking University, strengthening an already close academic bond and building a stronger tie to one of the world’s fastest-growing countries.
“Globalization is the defining characteristic of the 21st Century,” Stanford President John Hennessy said during an opening ceremony on March 21 that drew hundreds of academics, donors and government officials to the opening of the Stanford Center at Peking University.
“It is increasingly important for our students to understand what it means to be citizens of the world, to bring a more international perspective, to be able to communicate with others from different backgrounds or with different expertise,” he said. “Both Peking University and Stanford are stepping up to that challenge and moving to become more global institutions to address the challenges of this century. This new center exemplifies that.”
"It is increasingly important for our students to understand what it means to be citizens of the world, to bring a more international perspective, to be able to communicate with others from different backgrounds or with different expertise," Stanford President John Hennessy said at the opening of SCPKU.
FSI faculty already doing research in China showcased their work during conferences held in conjunction with the opening of the center.
The new building is available to the several hundred Stanford scholars studying, researching and conducting university activities in China each year. It also offers the opportunity for Stanford faculty to work with academics from Peking University and other universities throughout China.
“Stanford is one of the most valued partners of Peking University,” PKU President Zhou Qifeng said. “The center will create more opportunities through collaborative research, student and faculty exchange programs, joint teaching and other activities.”
The center makes Stanford the first American university to construct a building for its use on a major Chinese university campus. SCPKU will allow current educational programs to expand, but will not grant Stanford degrees.
The center’s distinctiveness is reflected in the building that houses it – a 36,000-square-foot structure that combines Chinese and Western architecture. The courtyard building was constructed with interlocking mortise-and-tenon joinery – a classic Chinese technique that eliminates the need for nails or glue.
Hand-painted scenes depicting typical Chinese landscapes and views from Stanford’s campus are featured on the building beams. At the point where beams and columns meet, artists added Chinese symbols for teaching, learning and scholarship.
State-of-the-art classrooms, conference rooms and meeting spaces fill out the two floors below the courtyard. Skylights, interior gardens and a reflecting pool invoke a natural setting.
The melding of styles brings as much substance as symbolism.
The SCPKU opening drew hundreds of academics, donors and government officials.
“There are virtually no problems in the world today that cannot be solved if the people – the scientists and engineers, and the business people – of the United States and China join together,” Locke said. “And this center will help make that happen.”
Stanford’s relationship with China dates to the late 1970s, when the university began accepting Chinese graduate students. Students from China have accounted for the largest number of Stanford’s foreign graduate students for the past decade, with about 600 enrolled last year.
Those scholars are part of the 160,000 Chinese students studying in American colleges and universities every year, a number that eclipses the 16,000 American students taking classes in China, Locke said.
“We have to know much more about each other’s cultures, customs, traditions, values and languages so we can build a mutual trust and understanding that will allow us to face all of the challenges we face,” he said. “The way to build that trust starts with building people-to-people interactions. It starts with more student exchanges…and it most certainly starts with the Stanford center here at Peking University.”
Over the last 30 years, Stanford’s bond with Peking University has grown from an initial collaboration between the schools’ Asian language departments to a wide range of joint research and academic exchanges.
In 2004, Stanford’s undergraduate study abroad and internship programs began at Peking University. The study abroad program continues to be managed by the Bing Overseas Studies Program, which hosts roughly 60 undergraduates every year on the Peking University campus. The internship programs are coordinated by the International, Comparative, and Area Studies Program.
The overseas studies program offers a broad curriculum taught by a Stanford faculty-in-residence who spends a 10-week quarter with the students in Beijing. A range of topical and language courses are taught by Peking University faculty.
“The new center at PKU allows us to continue this dynamic program in a new environment designed to encourage interaction across disciplines and with graduate students and faculty from both universities,” said Irene Kennedy, the program’s executive director. “We also plan to continue supporting and developing interactions between Stanford and PKU students through language partnering and by including Chinese students in classes taught by Stanford faculty and associated field trips.”
Jean Oi and Andrew Walder – both senior fellows at the Freeman Spogli Institute – began building on that relationship in 2006 by envisioning a way to bolster Stanford research, teaching, training and outreach activities in China. Their ideas led to the creation of SCPKU and several new academic programs, including a law school exchange program.
The $7 million project is funded entirely from gifts made to the Stanford International Initiative. The lead donor was the charitable foundation of the family of Chien Lee, a Hong Kong-based private investor and Stanford emeritus trustee who received his bachelor's and master's degrees from the university in 1975 and his MBA from the Graduate School of Business four years later.
The SCPKU building is named for his father, the late Lee Jung Sen, who attended Peking University in the mid-1930s when it was Yenching University. Lee’s mother, Leatrice Lowe Lee, graduated from Stanford in 1945.
A bust of Lee Jung Sen sits in SCPKU’s courtyard, one level above the modern facility and surrounded by the more familiar, traditional Chinese architecture.
Imagine you are on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) and a naval dispute breaks out on the Korean Peninsula while you are at home celebrating Thanksgiving. You have just three hours to prepare a detailed memorandum summarizing the situation and offering recommendations for how the United States should respond.
This is a major responsibility with a large number of interrelated issues that must be taken into account—how would you proceed?
Stanford students in the winter quarter course U.S. Policy toward Northeast Asia (IPS 244) had the opportunity to step into the challenging role of the NSC senior director for Asia and consider such a security situation. They wrote and presented memoranda on this and an East Asia trade crisis scenario in class, as well as a final memorandum to the president proposing a China policy for his second term. The assignments required students to consider a wide range of global, regional, and domestic factors—many pulled directly from current global events.
Each member of the team of Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) Asia experts teaching the course drew on decades of related expertise to write the scenarios.
In the first assignment, students read about a proposed China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement (FTA). Navigating through a web of regional and domestic issues, they advised on how the United States should respond to an appeal from Japan for certain trade concessions in exchange for its backing out of the FTA. The assignment described complex economic and political conditions in May 2013 after elections in the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and a leadership transition in China. The U.S.-Japan alliance was one of many key factors students took into account.
“It was my great pleasure to participate in this class—it truly broadened my views of U.S. foreign policy toward Northeast Asia. The substantive knowledge presented by both instructors and students during the class will undoubtedly contribute to a much safer, more peaceful, and unified world.”
-Heeyoung Kwon, Visiting Scholar, Korea Foundation
The next memorandum assignment described an inter-Korean naval dispute falling in the crucial weeks between the 2012 U.S. and South Korean presidential elections. It narrated the economic and political situation of each country in precise detail, and set the stage for the dispute with real-life events like the 2010 sinking of the South Korean navy ship the Cheonan. Students were asked to consider the possible role China could play in mediating with North Korea, and how U.S. tensions with Iran could limit its involvement in negotiations.
“In IPS 244…no conversation is irrelevant to current events in Northeast Asia…The memo assignments…are so detailed, so current, and so realistic, that even a seasoned diplomat would be challenged by them—I know this because there are seasoned diplomats taking the class.”
-Jeffrey Stern, MA Student, International Studies Program
Shorenstein APARC offers U.S. Policy toward Northeast Asia each winter quarter. The diverse mix of students, combined with the “in-the-field” expertise of the instructors, creates a lively and challenging class environment. IPS 244 goes beyond a traditional academic course to create assignments based on real-life events and global conditions, and place students in the position of thinking like a government official. For the many of them that will go on to pursue government careers, the course serves as an important first-step in training for “scenarios” very similar to those they address in class.
About the topic: The U.S. military has entered a period of transition. In terms of strategy, the Department of Defense is shifting away from a decade spent fighting two ground wars to a new era in which the United States hopes to spend more time preventing and deterring conflicts and preparing for future challenges. Yet at the same time, the U.S. military faces significant budget cuts in the years ahead. DOD has already released its plans for reducing the Pentagon’s base budget by $487 billion over the next decade, but the Budget Control Act of 2011 will impose an additional $500 billion in cuts on January 1 unless Congress changes the law before then. What are the strategic, military, and financial consequences of these budget cuts? Can DOD implement cuts of this magnitude and still maintain its broad global engagement strategy? Or do they pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security objectives? This talk draws on ongoing research at the Center for a New American Security to address these questions.
About the Speaker: Nora Bensahel is Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Her current areas of research include stability operations, counterinsurgency, civilian capacity for operations abroad, and coalition and alliance operations. Prior to joining CNAS, Dr. Bensahel served as a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is also an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where she teaches M.A. classes and received the Alumni Leadership Council Teaching Award. She also serves on the Executive Board of Women in International Security. She received her Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University and her B.A. from Cornell University.
CISAC Conference Room
This talk will address a primary foreign policy challenge for independent Ukraine which has been to strike a proper balance between its relations with the West and those with Russia. Today, democratic backsliding is upsetting the balance, which will undermine President Yanukovych’s ability to achieve his professed foreign policy aims.
Steven Pifer is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe and director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative. He focuses on nuclear arms control, Russia and Ukraine. He has offered commentary on these issues on CNN, Fox News, BBC, National Public Radio and VOA, and his articles have run in the International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Washington Post and Moscow Times, among others.
A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine (2001-2004), U.S. ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council (1996-1997).
His publications include “Ukraine’s Perilous Balancing Act,” Current History (March 2012), “NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control,” Brookings Arms Control Series (July 2011); “The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START,” Brookings Arms Control Series (November 2010); “Ukraine’s Geopolitical Choice, 2009,” Eurasian Geography and Economics (July 2009); and “Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009,” Brookings Foreign Policy Paper (January 2009).
Ambassador Pifer is a 1976 graduate of Stanford University with a B.A. in Economics. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Co-sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
What are the right questions the president should ask — and we as his employers should ask — when deciding whether going to war is (a) justified and (b) worth it, asks Bill Keller in the <i>New York Times</i>. Karl Eikenberry, who served in Afghanistan both as a military commander and as ambassador, put it this way: “If we do not in the future better align ends, ways and means, historians may find that in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States was compelled to contract its global posture similar to the British when they announced their ‘East of Suez’ policy in the late 1960s.”
North Korea’s government announced it will launch a long-range rocket to orbit a satellite within a few days of the 100th anniversary of founder Kim Il Sung’s birthday on Apr. 15.
The statement comes on the heels of an important U.S.-North Korea agreement on Feb. 29, in which the United States promised to provide North Korea with 240,000 tons of food aid over the next year while North Korea would refrain from nuclear and long-range missile tests and allow international inspection of its declared nuclear facilities. The situation echoes that of 2009, when North Korea also gave advance notice of a "peaceful" long-range rocket launch. North Korea’s 2009 missile test prompted a United Nations condemnation, after which North Korea conducted its second test of a nuclear device.
David Straub, associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program and a former State Department Korea expert, speaks about North Korea’s latest statement.
Why is the new North Korea announcement of possible concern?
This type of launch is something the U.N. Security Council earlier condemned and forbade North Korea to do again. There is a large overlap in the technologies used for such a rocket and for a long-range ballistic missile, and the international community is deeply suspicious that North Korea will use what it learns from such launches to develop long-range missile technology.
The larger concern is that North Korea intends eventually to pair long-range missiles with nuclear warheads, creating a much greater threat to other countries, including the United States.
Was there any indication North Korea would issue this statement?
Given North Korea’s history of reneging on deals, the Obama administration wisely noted at the time of the Feb. 29 announcement that it was a "limited" agreement. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that North Korea’s upholding of its side of the agreement would be the key to the deal’s overall success.
There is no doubt the U.S. government would not have announced this agreement if it had anticipated that North Korea would almost immediately have declared its intention to launch another long-range rocket.
Why would North Korea decide to announce a rocket launch?
At this point, we can only speculate about North Korea’s motivations for the announcement. It could be related to the recent leadership succession in North Korea. Kim Jong Un, the grandson of Kim Il Sung, is an inexperienced leader still in his 20s. He and his advisors may feel it is necessary to defy the United States so blatantly to demonstrate at home how strong a leader he is.
Or perhaps, after testing two nuclear devices and several long-range missiles, the North Korean government has become more confident about its diplomatic ability to withstand international condemnations and sanctions.
In any event, it is a stunning slap in the face of the Obama administration, which will need to react firmly. Already, less than 24 hours after the North Korean announcement, the Department of State has publicly said that the entire Feb. 29 agreement, including the delivery of food aid, has been put on hold.
What should we expect to happen next?
A real danger is that the events of 2009 will be repeated. The North Korean government reacted angrily to the U.N. Security Council’s presidential statement against it three years ago, and withdrew from the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang then proceeded to conduct a nuclear test only a month later.
The most worrisome aspect is the possibility that the new leadership in North Korea feels insecure at home and thus obliged to act tough, and also has poor judgment about the United States and the international community as a whole. If so, the North Korea issue could become significantly more confrontational—and dangerous—in the coming months.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
U.S. Department of State: North Korean announcement of missile launch
Reuters: North Korea’s missile and "satellite" programs
Abstract:
We present a new framework for conceptualizing and assessing the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice. This framework constitutes the backbone of the WJP Rule of Law Index® and is organized around nine basic concepts or factors: limited government powers; absence of corruption; order and security; fundamental rights; open government; effective regulatory enforcement; access to civil justice; effective criminal justice; and informal justice. These factors are further disaggregated into 52 sub-factors. We estimate numerical scores of these factors and sub-factors for a group of 66 countries and jurisdictions. These estimates are built from two novel data sources in each country: (1) a general population poll; and (2) qualified respondents’ questionnaires. All in all, the data contain more than 400 variables drawn from the assessments of over 66,000 people and 2,000 local experts. Our presentation will conclude with an overview of some highlights from Index data findings, as well as examples of ways in which the data have been applied in different contexts.
The World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent, non-profit organization that works to advance the rule of law for the development of communities of opportunity and equity worldwide. The WJP’s multinational and multidisciplinary efforts are aimed at: government reforms; development of practical programs on the ground in support of the rule of law; and increased awareness about the concept and impact of the rule of law. The Project has three complementary programs: Research and Scholarship, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, and mainstreaming practical on-the-ground programs to strengthen the rule of law.
Speaker Bio:
CISAC Conference Room
Abstract:
The hegemony of the democratic ideal may be waning. Until recently, even the custodians of dictatorships claimed democratic status for their regimes. Many still do. But other rulers now drop the pretense of democracy and claim that their nondemocratic regimes provide the people with conditions that are superior to those found in democracies. They portray themselves as demophiles rather than democrats, and claim that their concern for their people provides a superior alternative to popular control over the state. What is more, some actually do pursue policies that differ meaningfully from the predation that characterizes the behavior of elites in many nondemocratic regimes. How may we understand contemporary demophily, and how does it challenge democracy?
Speaker Bio:
M. Steven Fish is a comparative political scientist who studies democracy and regime change in developing and postcommunist countries, religion and politics, and constitutional systems and national legislatures. He is the author of Are Muslims Distinctive? A Look at the Evidence (Oxford, 2011). He is also author of Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (Cambridge, 2005), which was the recipient of the Best Book Award of 2006, presented by the Comparative Democratization Section of the American Political Science Association, and Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1995). He is coauthor of The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey (Cambridge, 2009) and Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton, 2001). He served as a Senior Fulbright Fellow and Visiting Professor at the Airlangga University, Surabaya, Indonesia, in 2007 and at the European University at St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg, Russia, in 2000-2001. In 2005, he was the recipient of the Distinguished Social Sciences Teaching Award of the Colleges of Letters and Science, University of California-Berkeley.
CISAC Conference Room