The U.S. and the E.U. are often seen as fundamentally different democracy promoters. It has been argued that the U.S. has a more political approach, which is confrontational vis-à-vis host governments and promotes democracy bottom-up via civil society. The E.U., on the other hand, is perceived as more developmental, focusing on non-confrontational projects that are mostly top-down or focused on civil society organizations not critical of the government. The U.S.’s political approach has been criticized for being too donor-led, unilateral, and hardly respecting country ownership. But should American democracy assistance become more European?
Based on research on E.U. and U.S. democracy assistance programs in Ethiopia, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Karen Del Biondo explains the causes and consequences of a political and developmental approach to democracy assistance. She argues that the E.U. has indeed taken a more developmental approach, which can be explained by the European Commission’s commitment to the Paris Declaration principles on aid effectiveness, including ownership, alignment and, harmonization. This was possible because of the relatively autonomous position of the Commission vis-à-vis the Member States and the European Parliament. In contrast, USAID does not enjoy this bureaucratic autonomy, and has therefore paid lip service to aid effectiveness. Del Biondo discusses the advantages and disadvantages of a political and developmental approach in a semi-authoritarian regime such as Ethiopia. She finds that, although the impact of E.U. democracy assistance in Ethiopia can be questioned, the E.U.’s developmental approach has made the government of Ethiopia more open to E.U. democracy assistance, while the U.S.’s political approach led to a backlash.
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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kdelbion@stanford.edu
Fulbright and BAEF postdoctoral fellow 2012-2013
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Karen Del Biondo is a 2012-2013 postdoctoral scholar at CDDRL. Her research is funded with a Fulbright-Schuman award and a postdoctoral grant from the Belgian-American Educational Foundation (BAEF). She holds an MA in Political Science (International Relations) from Ghent University and an MA in European Studies from the Université Libre de Bruxelles. In 2007-2008 she obtained a Bernheim fellowship for an internship in European affairs at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representation to the EU.
Karen Del Biondo obtained her PhD at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University in September 2012 with a dissertation entitled ‘Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: Explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa’. Her PhD research was funded by the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research (FWO). Apart from her PhD research, she has been involved in the research project ‘The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion’ (Ghent University/University of Mannheim/Centre of European Policy Studies) and has published on the securitisation of EU development policies. In January 2011 she conducted field research in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Her postdoctoral research will focus on the comparison between EU and US democracy assistance in sub-Saharan Africa.
Karen Del Biondo’s recent publications include: ‘Security and Development in EU External Relations: Converging, but in which direction?’ (with Stefan Oltsch and Jan Orbie), in S. Biscop & R. Whitman (eds.) Handbook of European Union Security, Routledge (2012); ‘Democracy Promotion Meets Development Cooperation: The EU as a Promoter of Democratic Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 16, N°5, 2011, 659-672; and ‘EU Aid Conditionality in ACP Countries. Explaining Inconsistency in EU Sanctions Practice’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 7, N°3, 2011, 380-395.
“I love a book party because we’re all devoted to the advancement of knowledge, but we all know it’s really hard to do and it’s not always appreciated when we do it,” Stanford Law School Dean Mary Elizabeth Magill told a gathering of law faculty to honor the book by Cuéllar, a law professor who also will be the next director of CISAC’s umbrella organization, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. The law faculty were also honoring law professor Michele Landis Dauber’s new book, “The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State.”
Cuéllar’s book explores the history of two major federal agencies: the Roosevelt-era Federal Security Agency – today the Department of Health and Human Services – and the Department of Homeland Security, established in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Through the stories of both agencies, Cuéllar shows how Americans often end up choosing security goals through overlapping ambitions and conflicts over agency autonomy, presidential power and gut reactions to national security crises.
“More than other academic monographs which tend to be dry, impersonal affairs, I could see the person behind the prose in this book,” David Engstrom, an assistant law professor, told the gathering. “In the introduction, Tino crafts a beautiful metaphor by noting how easy it is to stand just to the north of the United States-Mexico border and to think that it’s somehow timeless, and to forget that it was state action that made that border such a consequential part of the social world for so many people. Now as you read, you soon realize that this book really isn’t about nation-state borders, in that sense, but rather about the border between domestic policy and national security and about the boundaries between public agencies.
“But then you also realize,” Engstrom continued, “Who better than Tino, who grew up along that U.S.-Mexico border, first to see and then to show us how seemingly arbitrary borders and boundaries can, through administrative action, become so consequential.”
Tension between Pyongyang and allies the United States and South Korea has mounted in recent weeks since North Korea's February nuclear test. Shorenstein APARC experts weigh in on the possibility of conflict.
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A soldier stands guard in front of the Unha-3 (Milky Way 3) rocket sitting on a launch pad at the West Sea Satellite Launch Site, during a guided media tour by North Korean authorities in the northwest of Pyongyang April 8, 2012.
On June 6 and 7, the Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship (STAJE) of SPRIE at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, in cooperation with the Stanford Technology Ventures Program (STVP) of the Stanford School of Engineering, will present the 5th Annual Academic Conference on Japanese Entrepreneurship at the Huang Engineering Center at Stanford University. The theme of the conference is "Entrepreneurial Policy, Outcomes, and Strategies in Japan: Lessons for the Rest of the World". We invite papers, as in past years, from the fields of management, strategy, organizations, sociology, political science and economics to be submitted to this conference, which will be attended by scholars from Japan, the United States, and Europe.
Consul General Hiroshi Inomata will give the opening address.
The following scholars will deliver keynote speeches:
Hugh Patrick, Columbia University Tom Byers, Stanford University Tina Seelig, Stanford University
The following scholars will present papers:
Christina Ahmadjian, Hitotsubashi University Serguey Braguinsky, Carnegie-Mellon University Steven Casper, Keck Graduate Institute, Claremont Colleges Joseph Cheng, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Robert Cole, UC Berkeley Charles Eesley, Stanford University George Foster, Stanford University Masayo Fujimoto, Doshisha University Kathryn Ibata-Ahrens, DePaul University Martin Kenney, UC Davis Robert Kneller, Tokyo University Masahiro Kotosaka, Oxford University Kazuyuki Motohashi, Tokyo University Renee Rottner, New York University Ulrike Schaede, UC San Diego Kay Shimizu, Columbia University Janet Smith, Claremont-McKenna University Richard Smith, UC Riverside
The following are confirmed discussants:
Charla Griffy-Brown, Pepperdine University Richard Dasher, Stanford University Robert Eberhart, Stanford University Kathleen Eisenhart, Stanford University Nobuhiko Hibara, WASEDA Business School Glenn Hoetker, University of Arizona Takeo Hoshi, Stanford University Riitta Katila, Stanford University Christine Isakson, Stanford University Joachim Lyon, Stanford University Tammy Madsen, Santa Clara University William F. Miller, Stanford University Tom Roehl, Washington University Steve Vogel, UC Berkeley Dan Wang, Stanford University Jennifer Wooley, Santa Clara University
The following practitioner and financial supporter will give short talks:
Mike Alfant, CEO Fusion Systems, President ACCJ
STAJE applies the principles of entrepreneurship to the academic domain by creating opportunities for innovative, creative and multidisciplinary approaches to research on contemporary Japan. During this conference we will present high quality contributions on issues related to entrepreneurship, institutions, and Japan such as empirical studies, case studies, political and social institutional studies in Japan, and new research methodology including experimental design.
Without a Fight is a feature length documentary film that explores how soccer can facilitate social change in Kibera, one of Africa’s largest slums.
When: Thursday, April 11th at 6pm
Where: Branner Lounge, Stanford University
RSVP: Join the event on Facebook
Dinner Provided from DARBAR Indian Restaurant
· Introduction by Sarina Beges, CDDRL Program Manager
· Post-screening Q&A with CFK-Kenya Executive Director Hillary Omala and Producer Beth-Ann Kutchma
About the Film
Footage of violent clashes fueled by polarizing national presidential elections is intertwined with profiles of youth from different religious and ethnic backgrounds as they navigate daily life and prepare for the final championship soccer game of the season. The film provides a glimpse often a very positive one into an Africa few have seen. It attempts to break stereotypes associated with people who live in extreme poverty while depicting sports as a tool that could be used to prevent violence among at-risk youth. The film made its World Premiere at the 11 MM Festival in Berlin, Germany in March 2012 and its North American Premiere at the Full Frame Documentary Festival in Durham, NC in April 2012. The soccer league is run by the international development organization,Carolina for Kibera. Watch the Film’s Trailer.
North Korea announced on April 2 that it would restart its nuclear facilities, including its 5-megawatt-electric (5-MWe) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, north of the capital, which had been disabled and mothballed since an agreement in October 2007.
Pronouncements from Pyongyang during the past few weeks have been ominous, including threatening the United States and South Korea with pre-emptive nuclear attacks. On April 2, 2013, a spokesman for North Korea’s General Department of Atomic Energy told the Korean Central News Agency that at the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea: “A new strategic line was laid down on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed forces.”
The pronouncement continued: “The field of atomic energy is faced with heavy tasks for making a positive contribution to solving the acute shortage of electricity by developing the self-reliant nuclear power industry and for bolstering up the nuclear armed force both in quality and quantity until the world is denuclearized.”
We ask Stanford Professor Siegfried S. Hecker – former CISAC co-director and now a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute – to weigh in. Hecker has been invited seven times to North Korea and he made international headlines when he returned from his last trip in November 2010 and announced the isolated North Asia nation had built a modern uranium enrichment facility.
Q: How concerned should we be about North Korea’s announcement that it will restart all its nuclear facilities? Does this fundamentally change the threat imposed by Pyongyang?
Hecker: It does not immediately change the threat, but it really complicates the long-term picture. This announcement indicates that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is severely limited by a lack of fissile materials, plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel its bombs. Despite its recent threats, North Korea does not yet have much of a nuclear arsenal because it lacks fissile materials and has limited nuclear testing experience. In the long term, it’s important to keep it that way; otherwise North Korea will pose a much more serious threat. So, it is important that they don’t produce more fissile materials and don’t conduct more nuclear tests. The Kim Jong Un regime has already threatened to conduct more tests and with this announcement they are telling the world that they are going to make more bomb fuel. I should add that they also need more bomb fuel to conduct more nuclear tests.
Q: What do you make of the previous threats to launch an all-out nuclear war against the United States and South Korea? Does North Korea have the technical means to do so?
Hecker: I don’t believe North Korea has the capacity to attack the United States with nuclear weapons mounted on missiles, and won’t for many years. Its ability to target and strike South Korea is also very limited. And even if Pyongyang had the technical means, why would the regime want to launch a nuclear attack when it fully knows that any use of nuclear weapons would result in a devastating military response and would spell the end of the regime? Nevertheless, this is an uneasy situation with a potential for miscalculations from a young and untested leader.
Hecker spoke about North Korea with Christiane Amanpour on CNN, April 2, 2013.
Q: The Kim Jong Un regime has reiterated and apparently put into law that North Korea will not give up its nuclear arsenal. Does the current announcement really make things that much worse?
Hecker: I have previously stated that North Korea has the bomb, but not yet much of an arsenal. It has been clear for some time that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons, so what we should have focused on is to make sure things don’t get worse. I have stated it as the three No’s: no more bombs, no better bombs and no export. We don’t know much about North Korea’s nuclear exports, but that potential is a serious concern. Pyongyang took a step toward better bombs with its successful Feb. 12 nuclear test, although it still has little test experience. The current announcement demonstrates that they will now redouble efforts to get more bombs by increasing their capacity to make plutonium and HEU. It won’t happen quickly because these are time-consuming efforts – but it bodes ill for the future.
Q: Let’s look at the technical issues of the latest announcement. What do you think Pyongyang means by “readjusting and restarting all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon?
Hecker: The restarting is easy to decipher: They plan to take the 5-MWe gas-graphite plutonium production reactor out of mothballs and bring the plutonium reprocessing facility back into operation. The “readjusting” comment is less clear. It may mean that they will reconfigure the uranium enrichment facility they showed to John Lewis, Bob Carlin and me in 2010 from making low enriched uranium (LEU at 3 to 5 percent for reactor fuel) to making highly enriched uranium (HEU at 90 percent for bomb fuel).
Q: What did you learn about the 5-MWe reactor during your November 2010 visit to Yongbyon? Will they really be able to restart it?
Hecker: Lewis, Carlin and I were shown the beginning of the construction of the small experimental light-water reactor. The containment structure was just going up. I pointed to the 5-MWe reactor right next door and asked the chief engineer of the reactor, "What about the 5-MWe gas-graphite reactor?" He replied: “We have it in standby mode.” I told him that people in the West claim it is beyond hope to restart. He chuckled and said, "Yes, I know, that's what they also said in 2003, and they were wrong then as well." The reactor had been mothballed since 1994 as part of the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans restarted it in 2003 without much of a problem and ran two more campaigns to make plutonium.
Q: Is there any indication that they actually have an HEU bomb?
Hecker: We really don’t know. To the best of our knowledge, the first two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 used plutonium for the bomb fuel. We do not know what was used in the most recent test on Feb. 12. It could have been either HEU or plutonium. It would not surprise me if they have been pursuing both paths to the bomb; that’s what the United States did during the Manhattan Project.
Q: Will we know when they restart the reactor?
Hecker: Yes, using satellite imagery we should be able to see the steam plume from the cooling tower as soon as they rebuild and restart it.
Q: Didn’t North Korea also have a 50-MWe reactor under construction? What happened to that?
Hecker: As part of the Agreed Framework in 1994, North Korea agreed to freeze the operation of the 5-MWe reactor and the construction of its bigger cousins, a 50-MWe reactor in Yongbyon and a 200-MWe reactor in Taecheon. We saw the 50-MWe reactor in 2004 and were told that they were evaluating what it would take to get it restarted. During later visits we were told and saw for ourselves that it was not salvageable. We were told the same was true for the Taecheon reactor. The North Koreans had been willing to trade these two gas-graphite reactors for the KEDO light-water reactors that the United States, South Korea and Japan had agreed to build at Sinpo. However, the deal fell apart when the Agreed Framework was terminated in 2003.
Q: What would it take to restart the 5-MWe reactor? And how much plutonium could it make?
Hecker: The reactor has been in standby since July 2007. In June 2008, as a good-will gesture to Washington (and a reputed fee of $2.5 million from the U.S., according to North Korean officials), Pyongyang blew up the cooling tower. In addition, based on our previous visits, we concluded that they also needed to do additional work to prepare the fresh 8,000 fuel rods required to restart the reactor. If they restart the reactor, which I estimate will take them at least six months, they can produce about 6 kilograms of plutonium (roughly one bomb’s worth) per year. What they may do is to run the reactor for two to four years, withdraw the spent fuel, let it cool for six months to a year, and then reprocess the fuel to extract the plutonium. In other words, from the time they restart the reactor, it would take roughly three to four years before they could harvest another 12 kilograms of plutonium. The bottom line is that this is a slow process.
Q: How difficult would it be for North Korea to adjust its centrifuge facility to make HEU? And, if they did, how much HEU can they make?
Hecker: Not very difficult. It just requires reconfiguration of the various centrifuge cascades and adjusting operational procedures. That could be done very rapidly. They most likely had everything prepared in case they ever wanted to make this move. If they reconfigure, then based on our estimates, they could make roughly 40 kilograms of HEU annually in that facility – enough for one or two HEU bombs a year.
Q: How big is North Korea’s plutonium stockpile?
Hecker: After our 2010 visit, I estimated that they had 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium, roughly enough for four to eight bombs. If the 2013 nuclear test used plutonium, then they may have 5 or 6 kilograms less now. Because they have so little plutonium, I believed that they might have turned to uranium enrichment to develop the HEU path to the bomb as an alternative.
Q: Could you explain what you see as North Korea's capabilities in regard to putting nuclear warheads on short-, medium-, and long-range missiles?
North Korea has conducted only three nuclear tests. The 2006 test was partially successful; the 2009 and 2013 tests likely were fully successful. With so few tests, the North Korean ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads to fit on its missiles is severely limited. After the first two tests, I did not believe North Korea had sufficient test experience to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit on any of its missiles. I believed the nuclear devices tested were likely primitive -- on the order of the Nagasaki device, which weighed roughly 5,000 kilograms. Official North Korea news outlets implied they were more advanced, and some Western analysts agreed. I stated that they needed additional nuclear tests to miniaturize.
Q: After the test in February, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully tested a smaller and lighter nuclear device. North Korean news media also specifically stated that this was unlike the first two, confirming that the earlier tests involved primitive devices. The Kim Jong Un regime followed the claim of having smaller and lighter warheads with threats of launching nuclear-tipped missiles against the United States and South Korea.
My colleague, CISAC Affiliate Nick Hansen, and I do not believe that the North Koreans have the capability to miniaturize a warhead to fit on a long-range missile that can reach the United States because the weight and size limits are prohibitive for them. They have insufficient nuclear test experience. Although last December they were able to launch a satellite into space, it is much more difficult to develop a warhead, fit it into a reentry body, and have it survive the enormous mechanical and thermal stresses of reentry on its way to a target. In April 2012, Pyongyang paraded a road-mobile long-range missile we call the KN-08. It may have been designed to reach as far as Alaska and the US West Coast, but to our knowledge it has never been test fired. There is some evidence that the first-stage engine may have been tested last year and early this year at the Sohae (Tongchang) launch site on North Korea's West Coast. North Korea would need a lot more missile tests as well as more nuclear tests to present a serious long-range threat.
In his blog posting SORT vs. New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty, Steven Pifer continues with his previous posting Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate. He points to the ratification experience between George W. Bush's 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and Burak Obama's 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as the basis for the Obama administration fear that the Republican majority Senate would not consider a treaty for further nuclear reductions on its merits.
President Barack Obama desires to further reduce nuclear arsenals below the levels set in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and Republicans and former officials of the George W. Bush administration assert that this can only be done through a new treaty. Steven Pifer, director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative, in his blog posting Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate, points out that nuclear reduction efforts have not always been accomplished through treaties requiring ratification by the senate. History shows that past presidents, including Republicans, have used alternative methods that did not require a 2/3 majority vote by the Senate.
China’s “rise” has been achieved through participation in the international system led by the United States, but many predict that Beijing will attempt to replace the US-led global order with one shaped by its own vision and priorities. The 2013 Oksenberg Lecture will examine China’s desire and ability to remake the global order by focusing on what it would like to retain and what it would like to change. Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow Thomas Fingar will give the keynote address, and Professors Thomas Christensen (Princeton) and Jia Qingguo (Peking University) will provide commentary and their own views on the subject.
The Oksenberg Lecture, held annually, honors the legacy of Professor Michel Oksenberg (1938-2001). A senior fellow at Shorenstein APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor Oksenberg served as a key member of the National Security Council when the United States normalized relations with China, and consistently urged that the United States engage with Asia in a more considered manner. In tribute, the Oksenberg Lecture recognizes distinguished individuals who have helped to advance understanding between the United States and the nations of the Asia-Pacific.
SPEAKERS
Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–1994), and chief of the China Division (1986–1989). Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history, 1968), and Stanford University (MA, 1969 and PhD, 1977 both in political science).
Thomas Christensen is William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. From 2006-2008 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security. Before arriving at Princeton in 2003, he taught at Cornell University and MIT. He received his B.A. from Haverford College, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania, and Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
Jia Qingguo is Professor and Associate Dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1988. He has taught in University of Vermont, Cornell University, University of California at San Diego, University of Sydney in Australia as well as Peking University. He was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution between 1985 and 1986, a visiting professor at the University of Vienna in 1997 and a CNAPS fellow at the Brookings Institution between 2001 and 2002. He is a member of Standing Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League.
Welcome to the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, a unique Stanford University institution focused on the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia.
A visionary group of Stanford scholars established the Center three decades ago to address the need for research on Asia that — rather than being siloed by discipline and by country — reached across departments, from sociology to engineering, and looked at Asia in a regional context. The Center’s work was imbued with the desire to promote cooperation rather than the distrust of the Cold War. We take great pride in our contribution to the growing understanding of Asia’s global significance, and to the improvement in U.S.-Asia relationships developing today.
The following pages provide a glimpse of how Shorenstein APARC has fulfilled its mission over the past thirty years, by producing outstanding interdisciplinary research; by educating students and the next generation of scholars; by promoting constructive interaction in the pursuit of influencing U.S. policy toward Asia-Pacific regions; and by contributing to how Asian nations understand issues key to regional cooperation and to their relations with the United States.
While we are proud of what we have achieved, it is only the beginning. Shorenstein APARC’s efforts are as dynamic as the rapid changes now taking place in Asia, and we look forward to many decades more of leading the way to deeper, more meaningful understanding and relations with this vital and vibrant world region.
Welcome
Shorenstein APARC Leadership, 1983–2013
Director’s Message
1983–1989 Asia’s Emergence
1990–1996 Asia After the Cold War
1997–2005 Asian Financial Crisis / The War on Terror
