Tension between Pyongyang and allies the United States and South Korea has mounted in recent weeks since North Korea's February nuclear test. Shorenstein APARC experts weigh in on the possibility of conflict.
Hero Image
A soldier stands guard in front of the Unha-3 (Milky Way 3) rocket sitting on a launch pad at the West Sea Satellite Launch Site, during a guided media tour by North Korean authorities in the northwest of Pyongyang April 8, 2012.
On June 6 and 7, the Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship (STAJE) of SPRIE at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, in cooperation with the Stanford Technology Ventures Program (STVP) of the Stanford School of Engineering, will present the 5th Annual Academic Conference on Japanese Entrepreneurship at the Huang Engineering Center at Stanford University. The theme of the conference is "Entrepreneurial Policy, Outcomes, and Strategies in Japan: Lessons for the Rest of the World". We invite papers, as in past years, from the fields of management, strategy, organizations, sociology, political science and economics to be submitted to this conference, which will be attended by scholars from Japan, the United States, and Europe.
Consul General Hiroshi Inomata will give the opening address.
The following scholars will deliver keynote speeches:
Hugh Patrick, Columbia University Tom Byers, Stanford University Tina Seelig, Stanford University
The following scholars will present papers:
Christina Ahmadjian, Hitotsubashi University Serguey Braguinsky, Carnegie-Mellon University Steven Casper, Keck Graduate Institute, Claremont Colleges Joseph Cheng, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Robert Cole, UC Berkeley Charles Eesley, Stanford University George Foster, Stanford University Masayo Fujimoto, Doshisha University Kathryn Ibata-Ahrens, DePaul University Martin Kenney, UC Davis Robert Kneller, Tokyo University Masahiro Kotosaka, Oxford University Kazuyuki Motohashi, Tokyo University Renee Rottner, New York University Ulrike Schaede, UC San Diego Kay Shimizu, Columbia University Janet Smith, Claremont-McKenna University Richard Smith, UC Riverside
The following are confirmed discussants:
Charla Griffy-Brown, Pepperdine University Richard Dasher, Stanford University Robert Eberhart, Stanford University Kathleen Eisenhart, Stanford University Nobuhiko Hibara, WASEDA Business School Glenn Hoetker, University of Arizona Takeo Hoshi, Stanford University Riitta Katila, Stanford University Christine Isakson, Stanford University Joachim Lyon, Stanford University Tammy Madsen, Santa Clara University William F. Miller, Stanford University Tom Roehl, Washington University Steve Vogel, UC Berkeley Dan Wang, Stanford University Jennifer Wooley, Santa Clara University
The following practitioner and financial supporter will give short talks:
Mike Alfant, CEO Fusion Systems, President ACCJ
STAJE applies the principles of entrepreneurship to the academic domain by creating opportunities for innovative, creative and multidisciplinary approaches to research on contemporary Japan. During this conference we will present high quality contributions on issues related to entrepreneurship, institutions, and Japan such as empirical studies, case studies, political and social institutional studies in Japan, and new research methodology including experimental design.
Without a Fight is a feature length documentary film that explores how soccer can facilitate social change in Kibera, one of Africa’s largest slums.
When: Thursday, April 11th at 6pm
Where: Branner Lounge, Stanford University
RSVP: Join the event on Facebook
Dinner Provided from DARBAR Indian Restaurant
· Introduction by Sarina Beges, CDDRL Program Manager
· Post-screening Q&A with CFK-Kenya Executive Director Hillary Omala and Producer Beth-Ann Kutchma
About the Film
Footage of violent clashes fueled by polarizing national presidential elections is intertwined with profiles of youth from different religious and ethnic backgrounds as they navigate daily life and prepare for the final championship soccer game of the season. The film provides a glimpse often a very positive one into an Africa few have seen. It attempts to break stereotypes associated with people who live in extreme poverty while depicting sports as a tool that could be used to prevent violence among at-risk youth. The film made its World Premiere at the 11 MM Festival in Berlin, Germany in March 2012 and its North American Premiere at the Full Frame Documentary Festival in Durham, NC in April 2012. The soccer league is run by the international development organization,Carolina for Kibera. Watch the Film’s Trailer.
North Korea announced on April 2 that it would restart its nuclear facilities, including its 5-megawatt-electric (5-MWe) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, north of the capital, which had been disabled and mothballed since an agreement in October 2007.
Pronouncements from Pyongyang during the past few weeks have been ominous, including threatening the United States and South Korea with pre-emptive nuclear attacks. On April 2, 2013, a spokesman for North Korea’s General Department of Atomic Energy told the Korean Central News Agency that at the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea: “A new strategic line was laid down on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed forces.”
The pronouncement continued: “The field of atomic energy is faced with heavy tasks for making a positive contribution to solving the acute shortage of electricity by developing the self-reliant nuclear power industry and for bolstering up the nuclear armed force both in quality and quantity until the world is denuclearized.”
We ask Stanford Professor Siegfried S. Hecker – former CISAC co-director and now a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute – to weigh in. Hecker has been invited seven times to North Korea and he made international headlines when he returned from his last trip in November 2010 and announced the isolated North Asia nation had built a modern uranium enrichment facility.
Q: How concerned should we be about North Korea’s announcement that it will restart all its nuclear facilities? Does this fundamentally change the threat imposed by Pyongyang?
Hecker: It does not immediately change the threat, but it really complicates the long-term picture. This announcement indicates that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is severely limited by a lack of fissile materials, plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel its bombs. Despite its recent threats, North Korea does not yet have much of a nuclear arsenal because it lacks fissile materials and has limited nuclear testing experience. In the long term, it’s important to keep it that way; otherwise North Korea will pose a much more serious threat. So, it is important that they don’t produce more fissile materials and don’t conduct more nuclear tests. The Kim Jong Un regime has already threatened to conduct more tests and with this announcement they are telling the world that they are going to make more bomb fuel. I should add that they also need more bomb fuel to conduct more nuclear tests.
Q: What do you make of the previous threats to launch an all-out nuclear war against the United States and South Korea? Does North Korea have the technical means to do so?
Hecker: I don’t believe North Korea has the capacity to attack the United States with nuclear weapons mounted on missiles, and won’t for many years. Its ability to target and strike South Korea is also very limited. And even if Pyongyang had the technical means, why would the regime want to launch a nuclear attack when it fully knows that any use of nuclear weapons would result in a devastating military response and would spell the end of the regime? Nevertheless, this is an uneasy situation with a potential for miscalculations from a young and untested leader.
Hecker spoke about North Korea with Christiane Amanpour on CNN, April 2, 2013.
Q: The Kim Jong Un regime has reiterated and apparently put into law that North Korea will not give up its nuclear arsenal. Does the current announcement really make things that much worse?
Hecker: I have previously stated that North Korea has the bomb, but not yet much of an arsenal. It has been clear for some time that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons, so what we should have focused on is to make sure things don’t get worse. I have stated it as the three No’s: no more bombs, no better bombs and no export. We don’t know much about North Korea’s nuclear exports, but that potential is a serious concern. Pyongyang took a step toward better bombs with its successful Feb. 12 nuclear test, although it still has little test experience. The current announcement demonstrates that they will now redouble efforts to get more bombs by increasing their capacity to make plutonium and HEU. It won’t happen quickly because these are time-consuming efforts – but it bodes ill for the future.
Q: Let’s look at the technical issues of the latest announcement. What do you think Pyongyang means by “readjusting and restarting all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon?
Hecker: The restarting is easy to decipher: They plan to take the 5-MWe gas-graphite plutonium production reactor out of mothballs and bring the plutonium reprocessing facility back into operation. The “readjusting” comment is less clear. It may mean that they will reconfigure the uranium enrichment facility they showed to John Lewis, Bob Carlin and me in 2010 from making low enriched uranium (LEU at 3 to 5 percent for reactor fuel) to making highly enriched uranium (HEU at 90 percent for bomb fuel).
Q: What did you learn about the 5-MWe reactor during your November 2010 visit to Yongbyon? Will they really be able to restart it?
Hecker: Lewis, Carlin and I were shown the beginning of the construction of the small experimental light-water reactor. The containment structure was just going up. I pointed to the 5-MWe reactor right next door and asked the chief engineer of the reactor, "What about the 5-MWe gas-graphite reactor?" He replied: “We have it in standby mode.” I told him that people in the West claim it is beyond hope to restart. He chuckled and said, "Yes, I know, that's what they also said in 2003, and they were wrong then as well." The reactor had been mothballed since 1994 as part of the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans restarted it in 2003 without much of a problem and ran two more campaigns to make plutonium.
Q: Is there any indication that they actually have an HEU bomb?
Hecker: We really don’t know. To the best of our knowledge, the first two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 used plutonium for the bomb fuel. We do not know what was used in the most recent test on Feb. 12. It could have been either HEU or plutonium. It would not surprise me if they have been pursuing both paths to the bomb; that’s what the United States did during the Manhattan Project.
Q: Will we know when they restart the reactor?
Hecker: Yes, using satellite imagery we should be able to see the steam plume from the cooling tower as soon as they rebuild and restart it.
Q: Didn’t North Korea also have a 50-MWe reactor under construction? What happened to that?
Hecker: As part of the Agreed Framework in 1994, North Korea agreed to freeze the operation of the 5-MWe reactor and the construction of its bigger cousins, a 50-MWe reactor in Yongbyon and a 200-MWe reactor in Taecheon. We saw the 50-MWe reactor in 2004 and were told that they were evaluating what it would take to get it restarted. During later visits we were told and saw for ourselves that it was not salvageable. We were told the same was true for the Taecheon reactor. The North Koreans had been willing to trade these two gas-graphite reactors for the KEDO light-water reactors that the United States, South Korea and Japan had agreed to build at Sinpo. However, the deal fell apart when the Agreed Framework was terminated in 2003.
Q: What would it take to restart the 5-MWe reactor? And how much plutonium could it make?
Hecker: The reactor has been in standby since July 2007. In June 2008, as a good-will gesture to Washington (and a reputed fee of $2.5 million from the U.S., according to North Korean officials), Pyongyang blew up the cooling tower. In addition, based on our previous visits, we concluded that they also needed to do additional work to prepare the fresh 8,000 fuel rods required to restart the reactor. If they restart the reactor, which I estimate will take them at least six months, they can produce about 6 kilograms of plutonium (roughly one bomb’s worth) per year. What they may do is to run the reactor for two to four years, withdraw the spent fuel, let it cool for six months to a year, and then reprocess the fuel to extract the plutonium. In other words, from the time they restart the reactor, it would take roughly three to four years before they could harvest another 12 kilograms of plutonium. The bottom line is that this is a slow process.
Q: How difficult would it be for North Korea to adjust its centrifuge facility to make HEU? And, if they did, how much HEU can they make?
Hecker: Not very difficult. It just requires reconfiguration of the various centrifuge cascades and adjusting operational procedures. That could be done very rapidly. They most likely had everything prepared in case they ever wanted to make this move. If they reconfigure, then based on our estimates, they could make roughly 40 kilograms of HEU annually in that facility – enough for one or two HEU bombs a year.
Q: How big is North Korea’s plutonium stockpile?
Hecker: After our 2010 visit, I estimated that they had 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium, roughly enough for four to eight bombs. If the 2013 nuclear test used plutonium, then they may have 5 or 6 kilograms less now. Because they have so little plutonium, I believed that they might have turned to uranium enrichment to develop the HEU path to the bomb as an alternative.
Q: Could you explain what you see as North Korea's capabilities in regard to putting nuclear warheads on short-, medium-, and long-range missiles?
North Korea has conducted only three nuclear tests. The 2006 test was partially successful; the 2009 and 2013 tests likely were fully successful. With so few tests, the North Korean ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads to fit on its missiles is severely limited. After the first two tests, I did not believe North Korea had sufficient test experience to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit on any of its missiles. I believed the nuclear devices tested were likely primitive -- on the order of the Nagasaki device, which weighed roughly 5,000 kilograms. Official North Korea news outlets implied they were more advanced, and some Western analysts agreed. I stated that they needed additional nuclear tests to miniaturize.
Q: After the test in February, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully tested a smaller and lighter nuclear device. North Korean news media also specifically stated that this was unlike the first two, confirming that the earlier tests involved primitive devices. The Kim Jong Un regime followed the claim of having smaller and lighter warheads with threats of launching nuclear-tipped missiles against the United States and South Korea.
My colleague, CISAC Affiliate Nick Hansen, and I do not believe that the North Koreans have the capability to miniaturize a warhead to fit on a long-range missile that can reach the United States because the weight and size limits are prohibitive for them. They have insufficient nuclear test experience. Although last December they were able to launch a satellite into space, it is much more difficult to develop a warhead, fit it into a reentry body, and have it survive the enormous mechanical and thermal stresses of reentry on its way to a target. In April 2012, Pyongyang paraded a road-mobile long-range missile we call the KN-08. It may have been designed to reach as far as Alaska and the US West Coast, but to our knowledge it has never been test fired. There is some evidence that the first-stage engine may have been tested last year and early this year at the Sohae (Tongchang) launch site on North Korea's West Coast. North Korea would need a lot more missile tests as well as more nuclear tests to present a serious long-range threat.
In his blog posting SORT vs. New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty, Steven Pifer continues with his previous posting Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate. He points to the ratification experience between George W. Bush's 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and Burak Obama's 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as the basis for the Obama administration fear that the Republican majority Senate would not consider a treaty for further nuclear reductions on its merits.
President Barack Obama desires to further reduce nuclear arsenals below the levels set in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and Republicans and former officials of the George W. Bush administration assert that this can only be done through a new treaty. Steven Pifer, director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative, in his blog posting Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate, points out that nuclear reduction efforts have not always been accomplished through treaties requiring ratification by the senate. History shows that past presidents, including Republicans, have used alternative methods that did not require a 2/3 majority vote by the Senate.
China’s “rise” has been achieved through participation in the international system led by the United States, but many predict that Beijing will attempt to replace the US-led global order with one shaped by its own vision and priorities. The 2013 Oksenberg Lecture will examine China’s desire and ability to remake the global order by focusing on what it would like to retain and what it would like to change. Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow Thomas Fingar will give the keynote address, and Professors Thomas Christensen (Princeton) and Jia Qingguo (Peking University) will provide commentary and their own views on the subject.
The Oksenberg Lecture, held annually, honors the legacy of Professor Michel Oksenberg (1938-2001). A senior fellow at Shorenstein APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor Oksenberg served as a key member of the National Security Council when the United States normalized relations with China, and consistently urged that the United States engage with Asia in a more considered manner. In tribute, the Oksenberg Lecture recognizes distinguished individuals who have helped to advance understanding between the United States and the nations of the Asia-Pacific.
SPEAKERS
Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–1994), and chief of the China Division (1986–1989). Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history, 1968), and Stanford University (MA, 1969 and PhD, 1977 both in political science).
Thomas Christensen is William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. From 2006-2008 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security. Before arriving at Princeton in 2003, he taught at Cornell University and MIT. He received his B.A. from Haverford College, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania, and Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
Jia Qingguo is Professor and Associate Dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1988. He has taught in University of Vermont, Cornell University, University of California at San Diego, University of Sydney in Australia as well as Peking University. He was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution between 1985 and 1986, a visiting professor at the University of Vienna in 1997 and a CNAPS fellow at the Brookings Institution between 2001 and 2002. He is a member of Standing Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League.
Dr. Connell will give an overview of radiological terrorism, focused on high activity radiation sources in the US and the risk they pose for malevolent use. He has been involved in developing countermeasures to radiological terrorism and will discuss some of the current efforts by the US to reduce this risk. The main thrust of his talk will be about how the risks can be managed.
Dr. Connell is a Senior Scientist with the Systems Analysis Group at Sandia National Laboratories. He is a technical advisor on unconventional nuclear warfare, and radiological/nuclear terrorism to DOE, DHS, and the DOD. He has served as a subject matter expert on a number of Defense Science Board Studies dealing with unconventional nuclear warfare and radiological terrorism. In 2004, Dr. Connell worked with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to help identify and locate high risk radiation sources in Iraq and also served in Baghdad as a member of the Iraq Survey Group, Nuclear Team. He has published several reports on the risk of radiological terrorism and the vulnerability of cesium chloride irradiators. He was a committee member on the 2008 National Academy of Sciences Committee on Radiation Source Use and Replacement. Prior to working at Sandia National Laboratories, Dr. Connell was a Naval Officer and taught nuclear propulsion theory at the Naval Nuclear Power School in Orlando Florida. He has a B.S. with High Honor in Mechanical Engineering from Michigan Technological University and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of New Mexico.
CISAC Conference Room
Leonard Connell
Assistant Senior Scientist, National Security Studies Department
Speaker
Sandia National Laboratories
From the 1950s through the 1970s, the success of antibiotics and vaccines in controlling or eradicating infectious diseases (ID) worldwide resulted in decreased emphasis on development of ID therapeutics. The emergence in the past three decades of HIV, SARS, West Nile, avian flu, swine flu, Ebola, and the potential for bioterrorist attacks has reversed this trend and renewed interest in treatment and prophylaxis of ID. Unfortunately, because many diseases are prevalent primarily in developing nations (e.g., malaria, TB, Chagas), potential sales of bioterrorist pathogens are limited mainly to orders for government stockpiles (e.g., anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin), and the cost of anti-infective clinical trials is high, traditional large pharmaceutical companies have cut back R&D resources in this arena. To combat this investment shortfall, a new paradigm has emerged where public-private partnerships between the NIH, World Health Organization, private foundations, academia, and non-profits, are beginning to function like pharmaceutical companies to advance the development of promising ID drugs, even when there is little opportunity for profit. This talk will discuss the growing need for ID therapeutics, present some new models for discovering and developing them, and provide examples of public-private partnerships that have advanced therapeutics for specific infectious diseases.
About the speaker: Dr. Jon C. Mirsalis is Managing Director of the Biosciences Division and Executive Director of Preclinical Development at SRI International in Menlo Park, CA. Dr. Mirsalis is an internationally recognized expert in the development of drugs for infectious diseases. He manages two large programs for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for the development of promising therapeutics for the prevention and treatment of a broad range of infectious diseases including TB, malaria, influenza, polio, anthrax, plague, and Ebola. He has personally been involved in the development of over 50 therapeutics that have entered clinical trials and several have already reached the market. Before joining SRI in 1981, Dr. Mirsalis was a postdoctoral fellow at the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology, where he developed the in vivo-in vitro hepatocyte DNA repair assay, which is now widely used as a screen for potential carcinogens by government and industry. He is the author of over 140 publications and abstracts. Dr. Mirsalis received his B.S. degree in zoology/molecular biology from Kent State University, his M.S. degree in genetics from North Carolina State University, and holds Ph.D. degrees in toxicology and genetics from North Carolina State University. Dr. Mirsalis has an adjunct faculty appointment with the University of California-Santa Cruz, where he lectures regularly on genetic toxicology and carcinogenesis. He has recently served on the Board of Scientific Councilors for the National Toxicology Program, the Advisory Board for the Critical Path Institute, and is a past member of the FDA’s Over-the-Country Product Review Committee. Dr. Mirsalis has been certified by the American Board of Toxicology since 1983.
CISAC Conference Room
Jon Mirsalis
Managing Director, Biosciences Division
Speaker
SRI International
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
0
jinjen@stanford.edu
Visiting Scholar
Jessie Jin-Jen Leu a government official from the Republic of China (Taiwan), was a visiting scholar at the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) in 2012-13.
Ms. Leu is a senior economic officer who worked in various positions at the Ministry of Economic Affairs of R.O.C. She is experienced on the import management and multilateral trade related to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Currently she is working as an associate researcher to the National Security Advisor for economic affairs.
Ms. Leu graduated from Taiwan’s Tam-Kang University with a Bachelor's degree of International Trade in 1989. She continued her Master’s degree at University of Wyoming, United States in 1995. Ms. Leu also participated in the WTO negotiation and leadership Program at the Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in 2003.
