Missiles are pivotal to North Korea's military strategy says Shorenstein APARC's Daniel Sneider
North Korea's response to the United Nations resolution demanding that it suspend its ballistic missile program and resume a moratorium on launches was typically belligerent. But like the multiple launch of seven missiles earlier this month, the North Korean vow to continue to fire off its missiles should not be dismissed as mere political theater.
The missile tests were neither a gesture of defiance nor a desperate bid for negotiations. Nor can they be dismissed as the impulsive act of an irrational leader. It was, as Pyongyang itself so succinctly put it, a "military exercise."
The launches are only the latest evidence of a decadeslong effort by Pyongyang to redress the military balance in its favor. For North Korea, missiles are an attempt to compensate for weakness. The communist state has a large but technologically backward army, lacking the air power to compete with the United States and its South Korean ally. Rockets give it the firepower to back an assault on the South and to hold U.S. forces in Japan, the rear base for Korea, at bay.
The late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung set this goal as far back as 1965 when he established an academy to develop missiles and other modern weaponry.
"If war breaks out, the U.S. and Japan will also be involved," he said. "In order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan."
I encountered one crucial tentacle of Kim's program some 14 years ago, in late October of 1992.
A group of 64 Russian rocket scientists, accompanied by their wives and children, were stopped just as they were about to board a flight to North Korea. The scientists were employees of a super-secret facility in the Urals, the V.P. Makeyev Design Bureau, responsible for the development of the Soviet Union's submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
As the bureau chief for the Christian Science Monitor, I pieced the story together later from Russian press accounts and interviews with the scientists and others. A middleman with apparent official backing had offered the bureau, starving for orders and left adrift by the sudden end of the Cold War, work in North Korea.
Scientists who were making the equivalent of $15 a month jumped at offers of up to $4,000 a month to help a former Soviet ally. In the spring, a group of 10 scientists had gone for an initial foray. The Koreans, one of the scientists told me, initially never directly asked about nuclear warheads or missile designs. They claimed only to be interested in rocket science.
The Russians came home that fall and signed up dozens of their comrades as recruits. But the project was not officially sanctioned, and the KGB held them outside of Moscow for two months while the broker tried to re-negotiate their departure. Russian officials later described the North Koreans' aim, without mentioning them by name, as an attempt to build "combat missile complexes that could carry nuclear weapons."
North Korea began with copies of Soviet short-range Scud missiles and moved on to medium-range "Nodong" missiles, but they lacked the range and accuracy to meet Kim's target. A decade after the airport incident, in 2003, credible reports emerged that the North Koreans were deploying a new, far more accurate missile based on the Soviet SS-N-6, a submarine-launched rocket developed by Makeyev in the 1960s. The Nodong-2, as some labeled it, could reach all U.S. bases in Japan and possibly even to Guam.
In the 1990s, the North Koreans developed a long-range missile, potentially reaching U.S. territory, to lend credence to claims they could deter a pre-emptive strike on their nuclear or missile facilities. Some experts believe the Nodong-2 also functions as the second stage of this missile. American intelligence officials believe an otherwise inexplicable leap in missile technology was thanks to the help of Russian scientists.
Still the self-imposed missile test moratorium that Pyongyang agreed to in 1999 made it difficult to move ahead. Late last year, according to a recent Wall Street Journal story, the North Koreans delivered a dozen Nodong-2 missiles to Iran, a close collaborator on missiles since the 1980s. Unconfirmed reports from Germany say Iran tested the missile in January.
The Nodong-2 may have been tested this month, one of the six short- and medium-range missiles set off in a wave or as a stage of the long-range missile. Data from the launch is not yet conclusive, according to U.S. and South Korean officials. Despite the failure of the long-range attempt, it may be more significant that Pyongyang carried out the first successful launch of a Nodong since 1993 and a nighttime barrage of Scuds and Nodongs.
The display of diplomatic unity at the United Nations may give Pyongyang pause. But the relentless nature of North Korea's pursuit of its ballistic missile strength suggests that this is not a bargaining chip that will be readily traded away.
Russian students practice diplomacy in CISAC arms control exercise
One day perhaps Marina Agaltsova will join the diplomatic corps at a foreign embassy, or help write policy positions for the Russian government. Coit Blacker hopes that the lessons from her Stanford-sponsored distance-learning course will stick.
Agaltsova was among a group of Russian students brought to the provincial city of Yaroslavl in late May for an academic conference that capped this year's five distance-learning courses offered at nine universities across Russia by the Initiative on Distance Learning at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Through videotaped lectures, web readings and online chat sessions with senior research scholar Kathryn Stoner-Weiss and 14 other Stanford instructors, students in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law explored democratic ideals and practices, studying examples in Latin America, Asia and the former Soviet Union. "The course taught me that there is a black side to the reforms" that followed perestroika in Russia, Agaltsova says. "I learned more about Russian history [in the course] than I had learned in school."
That's the idea, says FSI director Blacker, who wants to re-establish the teaching of critical analysis, lost under decades of Communist rule, in Russian universities. "The social sciences were disemboweled," he says. He wants to develop future generations of diplomats and policy makers whose worldview is shaped "by how they think, not what they're told to think."
This year, to cap off the courses, 40 students came to Yaroslavl to participate in a mock United Nations Security Council session addressing Iran's nuclear program. They traveled from the farthest reaches of the Russian hinterlands, like Amur State University in Blagoveschensk, 4,800 miles from Moscow.
The arms control simulation is a teaching tool developed for the Stanford undergraduate class International Security in a Changing World, taught by Blacker and Scott Sagan, a political science professor and director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation within FSI. Sagan has exported the simulation to several universities in the United States where his former graduate students now teach--UC-Berkeley, Dartmouth, Columbia, Duke--but this was the first one he has conducted overseas.
This year's scenario was the International Atomic Energy Agency's referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council for failure to fully disclose its nuclear activities. During the simulation, students submitted proposals to their heads of state, played by Blacker, Sagan and Russian faculty members. By the end of the two-day session, delegates had overcome seemingly intractable differences during four intensive sessions led by Stanford third-year law student Matthew Rojansky, acting as U.N. undersecretary-general for legal affairs. The council's resolution gave Iran three months to comply with the IAEA's requests and provided for Iran to obtain nuclear fuel from Russia, with the production and waste disposal to occur on Russian soil under IAEA controls.
After the session closed, students set aside their delegate roles to reflect on what they had learned. Narina Tadevosian, a student from Yakutsk State in far eastern Siberia, said she was surprised at "how strict Russia was" in taking a leading role in the session.
"If only it were so in real life," she added.
High Tech Regions 2.0: Sustainability and Reinvention
On November 13-14, 2006, the Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) of Stanford University and the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) together with the School of Technology Management, National Tsing Hua University, will co-sponsor an invitation-only workshop at Stanford University.
Deadlines and Proposal Submission Guidelines
- Paper proposals are due by July 31; notification of acceptance will be by Aug. 18; papers are due Oct. 31
- Papers will be considered for inclusion in the proceedings, which will be published in English by SPRIE.
- Paper proposals should be 1-2 pages long (single-spaced) and in English; include with your proposal citations of your recent and related publications.
- Submit your proposal in .pdf format; send via electronic mail with the subject "November workshop proposal" to sprie-stanford@stanford.edu. Be sure your proposal arrives in time for the July 31 deadline or it will likely not be considered!
- Academic presenters of papers will receive a sum that serves both as an honorarium and as support for travel expenses from the home institution to Stanford. Those whose travel across the Pacific or Atlantic will receive $2,000; those who travel from within the contiguous United States will receive $1,800, and those from the Bay Area will receive $1000; lodging and food will be covered by the organizers. Note that papers with multiple authors only receive one honorarium.
Leading high tech regions face the challenge of sustaining their competitive position amidst shifts in the global knowledge economy. Their ability to create/re-create their edge depends in large measure on the ability to foster innovation and entrepreneurship--to respond to challenges and opportunities presented by competition and collaboration with rising high tech regions as well as to innovate in technologies, services, processes, strategies and business models. The workshop will concentrate on three topics:
Indicators and Analysis of Regional Innovation and Entrepreneurship
- What are the core strengths and weaknesses of major high tech regions now facing the challenge of sustainability? How are they evolving? Which indicators best reveal regional attributes and trends and how can we improve the collection of such data?
- What key factors are determining the development of these regions and how is each region's performance in innovation and/or entrepreneurship?
- What indicators point to the next stage of development for these regions?
- How are regions responding to pressing challenges and opportunities? How are regional leaders reinventing strategies, exploring new practices, and developing new models?
- How effective have government policies (national and local) been in fostering productive high tech regions? What are similarities and differences in these policies across regions/countries?
- High tech regions are connected through people, technology and capital, linkages that have become both more important and more complex.
- How do multinationals, hybrid firms and local firms use linkages of people, technology and capital to enhance their competitive advantage? What new business models have emerged recently?
- What forces nurture or inhibit these global high tech linkages? What kinds of processes and networks are at play and what is their impact on the vitality and sustainability of regions?
Stauffer Auditorium
Hoover Institution
Stanford University
U.S. has few threats or enticements to prevent a North Korean missile test, says Daniel Sneider
WASHINGTON - Despite its threat of severe consequences, the Bush administration has little leverage to use on North Korea to keep it from testing a long-range missile and few ways to punish the nuclear-armed nation if it proceeds.
The United States has no diplomatic or economic ties with North Korea, the rudimentary U.S. missile-defense system is untested in real-world conditions and Pyongyang is regarded as having a right to test missiles, making any American attack to forestall a launch an act of war with potentially explosive consequences.
"The United States could try to shoot down the rocket, but good luck,'' said Wonhyuk Lim of the Brookings Institution, a policy-research organization in Washington.
The dearth of options illustrates the limits of the administration's pre-emption strategy and its need to rely on the cooperation of others -- especially given the strains on the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan -- to contain threats.
Washington hopes that the world's only Stalinist regime will heed demands by the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China to uphold a self-imposed 1999 moratorium on missile tests and rejoin talks on curbing its nuclear program in return for security guarantees and economic and political benefits.
At the same time, the administration is reviewing its options should the Kim Jong Il regime test-fire what U.S. officials describe as a multi-stage Taepodong-2 missile, thought to be capable of reaching Alaska.
"The launch of a missile would be a provocation,'' Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman said Thursday during a House Armed Services Committee hearing. "If such a launch took place, we would seek to impose some cost on North Korea.''
Rodman declined to say what Washington would do. Experts said that even the imposition of sanctions by the United States would be largely symbolic.
They think that North Korea would not have readied the missile for flight unless it had decided it could live with the consequences.
"It probably means they are not worried about the American reaction,'' said Daniel C. Sneider of Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. "There is nothing that the United States can do to them.''
The United States has no diplomatic relations or financial assistance it can threaten to cut, and it suspended contributions to international food aid for North Korea last year.
The administration has moved against Pyongyang by trying to halt its missile sales to other countries, its alleged international narcotics trafficking, and its alleged counterfeiting of U.S. currency, cigarettes and over-the-counter drugs.
Under American pressure, banking regulators in February froze North Korean accounts at the Banco Delta Asia, a Macao bank that the U.S. Treasury Department accused of laundering North Korea's ill-gotten gains.
Other banks, anxious to avoid American scrutiny, reportedly have curtailed business with North Korea.
David L. Asher, a former Treasury Department official who oversaw the crackdown on North Korea's alleged illicit dealings, said the United States could respond to a test with an intensified campaign against Pyongyang's alleged international criminal activities that would hurt the ruling elite.
"Do not underestimate the impact of the financial pressure we could put on them,'' said Asher, a scholar with the Institute for Defense Analyses, a policy-research organization.
Washington is counting on Japan, which also is threatened by Pyongyang's nuclear arms and missile programs, to react to a launch by closing ports to North Korean ships and shutting off remittances by ethnic Koreans to relatives in North Korea. But those measures are expected to have limited impact.
A North Korean missile test in 1998 prompted Japan to boost missile-defense cooperation with the United States, and experts said a new launch probably would prompt Washington and Tokyo to forge even closer military ties.
The only nations that could tighten the screws significantly are China and South Korea, North Korea's main foreign trading partners and aid donors.
But while Seoul and Beijing would be outraged, because a missile test would effectively kill hopes of restarting talks on containing North Korea's nuclear arms program, they are unlikely to take any step that could rock Pyongyang.
Both are anxious to avoid destabilizing their neighbor of 26 million people. China doesn't want to be overwhelmed by North Korean refugees, and South Korea would be unable to bear the economic and social costs of sudden reunification.
They also fear that Kim's government could lash out with its million-member army against the South, igniting a conflict that would drag in the United States and devastate the Asian-Pacific economy.
"China and South Korea fear instability more than they fear a nuclear North Korea,'' said Marcus Noland, an expert at the Economic Policy Institute.
Moreover, Beijing probably would be unwilling to jeopardize the budding commercial ties it has been pursuing with North Korea.
"China opposes sanctions on North Korea because it believes they would lead to instability, would not dislodge the regime but would damage the nascent process of market reforms and harm the most vulnerable,'' said a February report by the International Crisis Group, a conflict-prevention organization.
South Korea has been pursuing a policy of economic engagement and political exchanges with North Korea.
The United States has been consulting with members of the U.N. Security Council on a response to a North Korean test. But North Korea has the right under international law to test-fire missiles, making it tough for the United States to win more than words of chastisement of North Korea from the council.
Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040 book released
The anticipated title from Cambridge University Press has been released in hard-cover and is available for purchase. Edited by PESD director, David Victor, Rice professor Amy Jaffe, and PESD fellow Mark Hayes, the book sheds light on the political challenges which may accompany a shift to a natural gas-fed world.
Energy is on the front burner and will stay there, so this book has special value. Read it and learn about the topic of today and tomorrow and tomorrow.
- George P. Shultz, United States Secretary of State, 1982-1989
The coming phase of energy industry development is bringing with it the rapid globalisation of the gas business. Long term take-or-pay contracts, which align supply and demand and which formed the foundation of all successful projects in the past, are coming under pressure from liberalisation. But security of supply still depends on security of demand: this timely and authoritative study demonstrates that, if gas is to
fulfil its enormous promise as an energy source, new ways must be found to establish the confidence of both sides that secure supply will be matched by reliable demand
- Frank Chapman, CEO, BG Group plc
This is a very valuable addition to the global literature on energy issues and energy policy ... Natural Gas and Geopolitics goes deep into the global gas policy issues that affect critical US energy policy, not only looking backward but helping understand what may happen as the global natural gas market develops.
- Bill Richardson, Governor of New Mexico, United States Secretary of Energy, 1998 2001
Storytelling of Indigenous Peoples in the United States
How one school district found religion
Americans have never been in greater need of understanding religious differences and cultivating respect for religious freedom. The events of 9/11 transformed America's relationship with Muslims at home and abroad, a surge in immigration from Asia and Africa has increased the nation's religious diversity, and cultural conflicts between secularists and religious conservatives occur like clockwork.
So you might think the last thing school districts would want is to bring religion into the classroom. Better to play it safe, and avoid lawsuits and angry parents by limiting any mention of faith to the private sphere. But school officials in Modesto, in Northern California, decided not to play it safe. In 2000, the religiously diverse community took a risk and, in an almost unheard-of undertaking for a public school district, offered a required course on world religions and religious liberty for ninth-graders.
As college professors and social scientists studying religious freedom in the USA, we wanted to know more. Could greater discussion of religious differences actually deepen cultural divides? From October 2003 to January '05, we surveyed more than 400 Modesto students and conducted in-depth interviews with students, teachers, administrators and community leaders. We granted anonymity to students so they could speak freely, but we recorded the interviews. No prior study on American teens' views on religious liberty has scientifically surveyed such a large number of students.
To our surprise, students' respect for rights and liberties increased measurably after taking the course. Perhaps more important, the community has embraced the course as a vehicle for fostering understanding, not indoctrination.
All-American city
Modesto, population 190,000, resembles many medium-size U.S. cities. Over the past 40 years, it has made room for an array of immigrants, including Buddhists, Sikhs and Muslims. Evangelical "megachurches" have sprung up alongside mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic denominations and a flourishing Jewish community. Overt incidents of religious prejudice have been rare, but the cultural divide bred mutual suspicion.
In 1997, some religious groups in Modesto battled the school over a policy of tolerance for gay and lesbian students. Out of the dispute came a meeting of the minds: A 115-member committee of community members and educators was formed to examine how to provide safe schools for all students. That meant putting an end to bullying, whether based on sexual orientation, race or ethnicity--even religion. The world religions course was one of several initiatives designed to further the "safe schools" mission.
The experiment succeeded. Our surveys indicate it increased students' respect for religious liberty as well as for basic First Amendment rights. One Russian Orthodox boy, for instance, found that the course brought him closer to his neighbors. "We have a Hindu family living across the street who pray(s) to a statue," he said. "I thought it was just plain dumb. But I notice now they had a pretty good reason."
Bringing religious beliefs out into the open increased students' respect for religious liberty for two reasons. First, students not only emerged from the course far more knowledgeable about world religions, they also were able to apply the knowledge practically. One student told us that the course gave him a greater appreciation for the religious diversity in his school. "I walk up to one of my friends I've known for years. I had no idea he was a Sikh. When I see the bracelet (worn for religious reasons), I say, 'Oh, you're a Sikh.' "
Second, students learned that major faiths shared common moral values. When we asked one student why she enjoyed studying other religions, she said: "All my life I've been a Christian, and that's really the only religion I know about. So when I take this class I see there are other religions out there, and they kind of believe in the same thing I do."
Even so, students did not become relativists or converts. They were no more likely to disbelieve the truth of their own religious traditions after taking the course.
A broad spectrum of Modesto's residents has embraced the course. Students can opt out, but only a handful have. The school board, which stands divided on other hot-button cultural issues, voted unanimously to adopt the course. Religious leaders of all faiths lent their support because they realized that something had to be done to bring peace to the schools--and that pushing religious identity undercover would create more problems than it solved.
Lessons beyond Modesto
Recent disputes over the teaching of evolution in Kansas and Dover, Pa., and over a Bible studies course in Odessa, Texas, have made national headlines. These stories leave the impression that all attempts to teach about religion in public schools--even courses far more balanced than these disputed courses--are bound to cause controversy. How did Modesto avoid this fate, and what lessons does Modesto provide for other communities?
- Extensive training gave teachers the knowledge and enthusiasm to handle a sensitive subject.
- An interfaith religious council reviewed the course before its implementation and paved the way for its acceptance. The council members applauded particularly the district's decision to have the course focus on objectively describing religions rather than evaluating their merits.
- The focus on description prevented the perception that the course was biased or an attempt to indoctrinate students into a particular faith.
- Most crucial was the school district's decision to introduce the course as part of an effort to counteract the hostility against students who were seen as different.
Limiting deeply held beliefs to the private sphere breeds suspicion and tension. True religious liberty prevails not only when people feel comfortable expressing their beliefs, but also when they learn to discuss religious differences with civility and respect.
Emile Lester is an assistant professor at The College of William and Mary. Patrick S. Roberts is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
Wait out North Korean missile test: op-ed
North Korea is poised to flight test a ballistic missile that may have intercontinental range -- an action the Bush administration declares would be provocative. Others have called for sanctions if the flight test occurs, the use of U.S. ballistic-missile defenses to intercept the missile in flight or a pre-emptive attack against the missile-launch site. But is this missile test a red line that, if crossed, seriously threatens U.S. security and, hence, warrants strong action? The simple answer is "No."
In thinking about this test, one must not lose sight of two paramount goals: rolling back North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the eventual peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. Ballistic missiles constitute a serious threat to the U.S. homeland only when armed with nuclear warheads and they are only one delivery means for such weapons. In this sense, ballistic missiles are of secondary concern. By most estimates, North Korea has sufficient nuclear material for a few nuclear explosive devices, but whether they can design a nuclear weapon that satisfies the size, weight and delivery constraints associated with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles is far from obvious.
If North Korea tests a three-stage version of the Taepodong-2 missile, it will likely attempt to put a satellite into orbit, just as it did in 1998 when it failed to place a satellite into orbit with the smaller Taepodong-1 missile. North Korea has a sovereign right to launch satellites, or to test ballistic missiles for that matter. International protocol requires launch notification and restrictions on air and marine traffic for reasons of range safety -- steps North Korea failed to take in 1998 -- but no international agreement bars this test. True, North Korea agreed to a unilateral moratorium on ballistic missile flight tests in 1999, pending further talks with the United States regarding North Korea's missile program, but the Bush administration refused to join these talks. North Korea leader Kim Jong Il reaffirmed this flight test moratorium in the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration signed with Japan, but this document is not a legally binding commitment.
If successful, this flight test would demonstrate that North Korea can produce rockets large enough to carry payloads intercontinental distances. However, this does not translate into an immediate threat because North Korea has not demonstrated that it can build a nuclear warhead that is small enough to fit on top of a Taepodong-2 missile and that can survive re-entry into the atmosphere after flying intercontinental distances.
Given vastly superior U.S. conventional and nuclear forces, deterrence should dissuade North Korea from ever using such missiles, except for saber rattling, or worse selling nuclear weapons or nuclear material abroad (this is a serious red line). Kim Jong Il may be a ruthless totalitarian leader, with little regard for the welfare of his people, but he is not suicidal.
More important, these missiles would be highly vulnerable to pre-emptive attack in the midst of a crisis, which is when pre-emption makes sense, because these missiles are large and easy to detect, they are not mobile, and they take many hours, if not days, to erect in a vertical position and fuel -- precisely the activity that generated this concern.
On the other hand, U.S. sanctions against North Korea in the wake of a test flight could backfire. They would likely cause rifts with other friendly parties to the Six Party talks aimed at eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons, especially China. U.S. national missile defenses may not be within range, depending on the flight trajectory, to intercept this flight test. If this unproven U.S. missile defense were to fail and North Korea's flight test succeed, the Bush administration would be embarrassed, and Kim Jong Il triumphant. And, pre-emptive attack against the test facility would be a unilateral act of war at a time when U.S. unilateralism has hurt more than helped U.S. vital interests. South Korea would adamantly oppose such adventurism because Seoul is vulnerable to retribution, being within artillery range of the Demilitarized Zone.
So, what should the United States do on the eve of this flight test? Nothing, beyond expressing its dismay that North Korea appears to favor conflict over cooperation.
A Taepodong-2 flight test allows the United States to learn more about this missile than North Korea, given the concentration of technical intelligence assets in the area, which would help resolve the question of whether this missile, in fact, constitutes a serious threat to the U.S. homeland. In addition, such a test would isolate North Korea further and reinvigorate the Six Party Talks by encouraging South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States to overcome their differences and create a united front to persuade North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapon program, which is the real threat.
Stepping back, U.S. leaders should see that North Korea is a mouse and the United States the elephant. Contrary to popular mythology, elephants are not, and should not be, afraid of mice.
If necessary, strike and destroy North Korean missile: op-ed
North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.
A year later North Korea agreed to a moratorium on further launches, which it upheld -- until now. But there is a critical difference between now and 1998. Today North Korea openly boasts of its nuclear deterrent, has obtained six to eight bombs' worth of plutonium since 2003 and is plunging ahead to make more in its Yongbyon reactor. The six-party talks aimed at containing North Korea's weapons of mass destruction have collapsed.
Should the United States allow a country openly hostile to it and armed with nuclear weapons to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to U.S. soil? We believe not. The Bush administration has unwisely ballyhooed the doctrine of "preemption," which all previous presidents have sustained as an option rather than a dogma. It has applied the doctrine to Iraq, where the intelligence pointed to a threat from weapons of mass destruction that was much smaller than the risk North Korea poses. (The actual threat from Saddam Hussein was, we now know, even smaller than believed at the time of the invasion.) But intervening before mortal threats to U.S. security can develop is surely a prudent policy.
Therefore, if North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched. This could be accomplished, for example, by a cruise missile launched from a submarine carrying a high-explosive warhead. The blast would be similar to the one that killed terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. But the effect on the Taepodong would be devastating. The multi-story, thin-skinned missile filled with high-energy fuel is itself explosive -- the U.S. airstrike would puncture the missile and probably cause it to explode. The carefully engineered test bed for North Korea's nascent nuclear missile force would be destroyed, and its attempt to retrogress to Cold War threats thwarted. There would be no damage to North Korea outside the immediate vicinity of the missile gantry.
The U.S. military has announced that it has placed some of the new missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California on alert. In theory, the antiballistic missile system might succeed in smashing into the Taepodong payload as it hurtled through space after the missile booster burned out. But waiting until North Korea's ICBM is launched to interdict it is risky. First, by the time the payload was intercepted, North Korean engineers would already have obtained much of the precious flight test data they are seeking, which they could use to make a whole arsenal of missiles, hiding and protecting them from more U.S. strikes in the maze of tunnels they have dug throughout their mountainous country. Second, the U.S. defensive interceptor could reach the target only if it was flying on a test trajectory that took it into the range of the U.S. defense. Third, the U.S. system is unproven against North Korean missiles and has had an uneven record in its flight tests. A failed attempt at interception could undermine whatever deterrent value our missile defense may have.
We should not conceal our determination to strike the Taepodong if North Korea refuses to drain the fuel out and take it back to the warehouse. When they learn of it, our South Korean allies will surely not support this ultimatum -- indeed they will vigorously oppose it. The United States should accordingly make clear to the North that the South will play no role in the attack, which can be carried out entirely with U.S. forces and without use of South Korean territory. South Korea has worked hard to counter North Korea's 50-year menacing of its own country, through both military defense and negotiations, and the United States has stood with the South throughout. South Koreans should understand that U.S. territory is now also being threatened, and we must respond. Japan is likely to welcome the action but will also not lend open support or assistance. China and Russia will be shocked that North Korea's recklessness and the failure of the six-party talks have brought things to such a pass, but they will not defend North Korea.
In addition to warning our allies and partners of our determination to take out the Taepodong before it can be launched, we should warn the North Koreans. There is nothing they could do with such warning to defend the bulky, vulnerable missile on its launch pad, but they could evacuate personnel who might otherwise be harmed. The United States should emphasize that the strike, if mounted, would not be an attack on the entire country, or even its military, but only on the missile that North Korea pledged not to launch -- one designed to carry nuclear weapons. We should sharply warn North Korea against further escalation.
North Korea could respond to U.S. resolve by taking the drastic step of threatening all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. But it is unlikely to act on that threat. Why attack South Korea, which has been working to improve North-South relations (sometimes at odds with the United States) and which was openly opposing the U.S. action? An invasion of South Korea would bring about the certain end of Kim Jong Il's regime within a few bloody weeks of war, as surely he knows. Though war is unlikely, it would be prudent for the United States to enhance deterrence by introducing U.S. air and naval forces into the region at the same time it made its threat to strike the Taepodong. If North Korea opted for such a suicidal course, these extra forces would make its defeat swifter and less costly in lives -- American, South Korean and North Korean.
This is a hard measure for President Bush to take. It undoubtedly carries risk. But the risk of continuing inaction in the face of North Korea's race to threaten this country would be greater. Creative diplomacy might have avoided the need to choose between these two unattractive alternatives. Indeed, in earlier years the two of us were directly involved in negotiations with North Korea, coupled with military planning, to prevent just such an outcome. We believe diplomacy might have precluded the current situation. But diplomacy has failed, and we cannot sit by and let this deadly threat mature. A successful Taepodong launch, unopposed by the United States, its intended victim, would only embolden North Korea even further. The result would be more nuclear warheads atop more and more missiles.
Ashton B. Carter was assistant secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton and William J. Perry was secretary of defense. The writers, who conducted the North Korea policy review while in government, are now professors at Harvard and Stanford, respectively.