Thirty years ago this week, I watched the news from Beijing and started shredding my bedding. It was the night before my college graduation, I had been studying Chinese politics, and news had broken that college students just like us had been gunned down in Tiananmen Square after weeks of peaceful and exhilarating democracy protests—carried on international TV. In the iconic square where Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People’s Republic decades before, bespectacled students from China’s best universities had camped out, putting up posters with slogans of freedom in Chinese and English. A “goddess of democracy” figure modeled after the Statue of Liberty embodied their hopes—and ours—for political liberation in China.

On my campus back then were just a handful of students majoring in East Asian studies. Learning of the brutal crackdown in Beijing, we somehow found one another, gathered our friends, and stayed up making hundreds of white armbands for classmates to wear at commencement the next day. Grappling with the cold realities of the “real world” we were about to enter, we didn’t know what else to do. So we tore sheets and cried for what might have been.

The June 4, 1989, massacre was a horrifying spectacle that the Chinese government has sought to erase from national memory ever since. But, 30 years later, contemplating what might have been is more important than ever. In hindsight, Tiananmen Square serves as a continuing reminder about just how much China has defied, and continues to defy, the odds and predictions of experts. The fact is that generations of American policy makers, political scientists, and economists have gotten China wrong more often than they’ve gotten China right. In domestic politics, economic development, and foreign policy, China has charted a surprising path that flies in the face of professional prognostications, general theories about anything, and the experience of other nations.

Read the rest at The Atlantic

Karl Eikenberry, director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, spoke with "Bloomberg Markets: Asia" about the ongoing trade disputes between the U.S. and China. Video of his interview—conducted on the sidelines of the Morgan Stanley China Summit in Beijing—is posted below.

People today can generally expect to live longer and, in some parts of the world, healthier lives. The substantial increases in life expectancy underlying these global demographic shifts represent a human triumph over disease, hunger, and deprivation, but also pose difficult challenges across multiple sectors. Population aging will have dramatic effects on labor supply, patterns of work and retirement, family and social structures, healthcare services, savings, and, of course, pension systems and other social support programs used by older adults. Individuals, communities, and nations around the world must adapt quickly to the demographic reality facing us and design new approaches to financing the many needs that come with longer lives.

This imperative is the focus of a newly published special issue of The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, entitled Financing Longevity: The Economics of Pensions, Health and Long-term Care. The special issue collects articles originally written for and discussed at a conference that was dedicated to the same topic and held at Stanford in April 2017 to mark the tenth anniversary of APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program (AHPP). The conference convened top experts in health economics and policy to examine empirical and theoretical research on a range of problems pertinent to the economics of aging from the perspective of sustainable financing for long lives. The economics of the demographic transition is one of the research areas that Karen Eggleston, APARC’s deputy director and AHPP director, studies. She co-edited the special issue with Anita Mukherjee, a Stanford graduate now assistant professor in the Department of Risk and Insurance at the Wisconsin School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

The Financing Longevity conference was organized by The Next World Program, a Consortium composed of partners from Harvard University, Fudan University, Stanford University, and the World Demographic and Aging Forum, and was cosponsored by AHPP, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and the Stanford Center on the Demography and Economics of Aging.

The contributions that originated from the conference and are collected in the Journal’s special issue cover comparative research on more than 30 European countries and 17 Latin American countries, as well as studies on Australia, the United States, India, China, and Japan. They analyze a variety of questions pertinent to financing longevity, including how pension structures may exacerbate existing social inequalities; how formal and informal insurance interact in securing long-term care needs; the ways in which the elderly cope with caregiving and cognitive decline; and what new approaches might help extend old-age financial security to those working outside the formal sector, which is a major concern in low-income countries.

Another challenge of utmost importance is the global pension crisis, caused due to committed payments that far exceed the saved resources. It is a problem that Eggleston and Mukherjee highlight in their introduction to the special issue. By 2050, they note, the pension gap facing the world’s eight largest pension systems is expected to reach nearly US $400 trillion. The problem cannot be ignored, as “the financial security of people leading longer lives is in serious jeopardy.” Indeed four of the eight research papers in the special issue shed light on pensions and inequality in income support for older adults. The other four research papers focus on health and its interaction with labor force participation, savings, and long-term care.

The issue also features two special contributions. The first is an interview with Olivia S. Mitchell, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and worldwide expert on pensions and ageing. Mitchell explains the areas offering the most promise and excitement in her field; discusses ways to encourage delayed retirement and spur more saving; and suggests several priority areas for future research. The latter include applying behavioral insights to questions about retirement planning, improving financial literacy, and advancing innovations to help people imagine themselves at older ages and save more for their future selves.

The second unique contribution is a perspective on the challenges of financing longevity in Japan, based on the keynote address delivered at the 2017 Stanford conference by Mr. Hirotaka Unami, then senior Director for policy planning and research of the Minister’s secretariat of the Japan Ministry of Finance and currently deputy director general with the Ministry’s Budget Bureau.

In Japan, decades of improving life expectancy and falling birth rates have produced a rapidly aging and now shrinking population. Data released by Japan’s Statistics Bureau ahead of Children's Day on May 5, 2019 reveal that Japan’s child population (those younger than 15) ranks lowest among countries with a total population exceeding 40 million. In his piece, Unami focuses on the difficult tradeoffs Japan faces in responding to the increase in oldest-old population (people aged 75 and over) and the overall population decline. Japan aspires to do so through policies that are designed to restore financial sustainability for the country’s social security system, including the medical care and long-term care insurance systems.

Unami argues that Japan must simultaneously pursue a combination of increased tax revenues, reduced benefit growth, and accelerated economic growth. He notes that these three-pronged efforts require action in five areas: review Japan’s pension policies; reduce the scope of insurance coverage in low-risk areas; increase the effectiveness of health service providers; increase a beneficiary’s burden according to their means; and enhance policies for preventive health care for the elderly.

The aging of our world’s population is a defining issue of our time and there is pressing need for research to inform policies intended to improve the financial well-being of present and future generations. The articles collected in the Financing Longevity special issue and the ongoing work by APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program point to multiple areas ripe for such future research.

View the complete special issue >>

Learn more about Dr. Karen Eggleston’s work in the area of innovation for healthy aging >>

Does the current trade-talk stalemate between the U.S. and China portend a larger confrontation? Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow David Lampton says yes, and shared with VOA Asia reasons for why the two countries find themselves so much at odds. Listen below (first 8 minutes):

Tomorrow marks the 150th anniversary of the completion of the First Transcontinental Railroad. The tracks of the Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads met at Promontory, Utah, on May 10, 1869. In a ceremony, Central Pacific Railroad President Leland Stanford drove the last spike, now usually referred to as the “Golden Spike,” at Promontory Summit. What has largely been left out of the narrative of the First Transcontinental Railroad is the estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese laborers who worked on the Central Pacific Railroad. They were paid less than the white workers and as many as a thousand lost their lives, and they eventually made up 90 percent of the workforce that laid the 690 miles of track between Sacramento, California, and Promontory. In a recent Stanford News article, Olive H. Palmer Professor in Humanities Gordon Chang, one of the lead scholars of Stanford’s Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project, noted that “Without the Chinese migrants, the Transcontinental Railroad would not have been possible. If it weren’t for their work, Leland Stanford could have been at best a footnote in history, and Stanford University may not even exist.”

Provost Persis Drell with SPICE Director Gary Mukai and SPICE Instructional Designer Jonas Edman

At the event, SPICE Curriculum Consultant Gregory Francis and I gave an overview of the curricular component of the Project, which helps to make the Project’s findings and materials accessible to teachers and students. The four free lesson plans that SPICE developed bring all of the Project’s “bells and whistles” to high school students and help them understand this often-overlooked part of U.S. history.

The Chinese Railroad Workers Project lessons touch upon many key issues in the high school U.S. history standards, including the building of the Transcontinental Railroad, immigration to the United States, challenges faced by immigrants like the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the growth of the American West. SPICE worked closely with Chang, Fishkin, and Dr. Roland Hsu, Director of Research at the Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project, to plan and write the free lesson plans, which are available for download from the SPICE website. Each lesson incorporates the Project’s scholarship and primary sources.

Lesson 1 focuses on the use of primary sources to understand and interpret the past. Students review resources and artifacts on the Project website, discuss whether each is a primary or secondary source, and postulate what questions the resource could help them answer. Students then read and discuss excerpts from Maxine Hong Kingston’s classic book China Men.

One of the political cartoons (Harper’s Weekly, April 1, 1882) that students examine in the lesson “Challenges to Chinese Immigration and Assimilation”

Lesson 2 focuses on racism and discrimination broadly and in the specific context of discrimination directed toward early Chinese immigrants in the United States. Students learn the history of Chinese Americans and attitudes toward them during various periods of immigration. They analyze U.S. political cartoons on Chinese immigrants from the 1870s and 1880s and read four short documents from different periods of time regarding issues of immigration, discrimination, and assimilation of Chinese Americans.

Lesson 3 uses photos to show students the physical and natural challenges to building the Transcontinental Railroad and asks them what they can infer from these photos about life building the railroad. Students then work in small groups to read oral histories of descendants of the Chinese railroad workers. They then write and perform a mock script for an interview between the Chinese railroad worker they read about and a group of reporters.

The final lesson explores the historical and cultural background of San Francisco’s Chinatown and its significance to the Chinese community in the United States over time. Students compare descriptions of Chinatown written by Chinese residents with those from non-Chinese visitors, view historical photos of Chinatown, and watch a lecture by Chang on the interdependence of Chinatown and the Chinese railroad workers. Finally, students encapsulate the legacy of the Chinese railroad workers by designing a memorial in their honor.

“We are now entering not just a post-American but post-Western era.  In many ways the contours of the emerging world order are unclear.  But one aspect of them is certain: China will play a larger and the U.S. a lesser role than before in global and regional governance.” -   Ambassador Freeman

On May 3, the China Program’s colloquia series “A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations” closed with a seminar by Ambassador Chas W. Freeman. Ambassador Freeman discussed how President Trump’s trade war has impacted Sino-American relations on multiple levels, and how—for better or ill—Washington appears poised to dismantle China’s interdependence with the American economy, limit its role in global governance, counter its investments, and block its technological advances.

Audio from the event, as well as copy of the ambassador’s prepared remarks, is now available:

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. is a senior fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. He is the former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (1993–1994), ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1989–1992), principal deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs (1986–1989), and chargé d'affaires at Bangkok (1984–1986) and Beijing (1981–1984). He served as vice chair of the Atlantic Council (1996-2008); co-chair of the United States China Policy Foundation (1996–2009); and president of the Middle East Policy Council (1997–2009). He was the principal American interpreter during President Nixon's path-breaking 1972 visit to Beijing, the editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica article on diplomacy, and the author of America’s Continuing Misadventures in the Middle East; Interesting Times: China, America, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige; America’s Misadventures in the Middle East; The Diplomat’s Dictionary; and Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy. A compendium of his speeches is available at chasfreeman.net. 

By 1978, after the “epic impoverishment” borne of Mao’s non-market, ideologically-driven economy, China was almost like “a hot air balloon [that had been held] ten feet underwater” and suddenly let go, described Daniel Rosen, founding partner of the Rhodium Group, before an audience at a recent colloquium organized by Shorenstein APARC’s China Program.

Rosen—who leads the Rhodium Group’s work in China, India, and Asia—drew on his 26 years of professional experience analyzing China’s economy, commercial sector, and external interactions, to share his insights on the implications of China’s recent divergence from liberal market norms even as the U.S. and China are trying to reach an agreement that could end a protracted trade war.

With its explosive rise, increasing U.S.-China economic tensions, argued Rosen, were inevitable. By reverting to non-market principles under Xi Jinping, however, China’s divergence from advanced economic norms has triggered a hostile reaction from the United States.  He acknowledged that China has “the sovereign right to choose the system it thinks best for itself,” including reverting to non-market principles.  But, he noted, “as an old adage goes, paraphrased, China’s freedom to swing its fists stops where other noses begin.”

China, with its thirteen trillion-dollar economy is now the world’s second largest economy.  China’s economic footprint, too—as trader, foreign investor, and lender, among others—is enormous around the world.  Thus, Rosen pointed out, now when “China sneezes, the rest of the world can catch a cold or pneumonia.”  By disavowing the primacy of market principles, furthermore, China’s decisions will now have spillover consequences for not only the way the rest of the global economy functions but also for economic prospects of the United States.

Rosen highlighted, in particular, three aspects of China’s divergence from market norms:  its financial markets, competitive regimes; and IP protection rules.  China’s capital markets give preferential treatment to its domestic state firms and discriminates against not only foreign firms but also its private firms.  He also stressed China’s uneven competition policies—as most dramatically epitomized in its “Made in 2025” policy—that establish asymmetric market access for foreign firms in China versus Chinese firms abroad; China’s state and sub-state financial subsidies set up to advantage domestic firms; and China’s domestic control of intellectual property in large swathes of critical industries.  China’s “Made in 2025” policy thereby, for example, distorts the innovation ecosystem of the world and the United States.  As Rosen asserted, “We depend for our vitality on structural conditions that non-market policy choices by a systemically important national could disrupt.”

In Rosen’s assessment, President Xi Jinping had begun his tenure with a far-reaching set of economic reforms called the “60 Decisions” of the Third Plenum Resolution in 2013.  But these market-centered initiatives, many of which Xi’s administration did push initially, led to “mini” (and “many”) crises, he stated.  These reforms, therefore, have stalled.  “The shadow over U.S.-China economic engagement comes not because China refused to reform in the Xi Jinping years,” Rosen asserted, “but because lately it has stumbled in attempting to do so.”

NEW YORK, NY - MAY 6: Traders and financial professionals work at the opening bell on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), May 6, 2019 in New York City. The Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped over 360 points at the open on Monday morning after U.S. President Donald Trump said that the U.S. will raise tariffs on goods imported from China. China also threatened to skip upcoming trade talks following tariff threats from President Trump.

According to Rosen, hardening U.S. approach to Chinese trade policy and the current discussion of possible “disengagement” with China are the result of U.S. recognition that China had changed course away from convergence with the liberal international economic order.  It, in fact, stems from the U.S.’s valid need to protect its economic welfare and the welfare of other market economies from the deleterious effects of China’s illiberal policies.  In the same way, he claimed, that the U.S. is not as deeply engaged with Italy as it is with Germany, and that we are not as deeply engaged with Germany as we are with Great Britain, it is not “heresy” to say that nations that do not share the same basic economic framework cannot be as engaged together—or as interoperable—as nations that do.  

But, Rosen predicted, China’s own turn away from market principles is bound to fail.  Liberal market reforms delivered double-digit growth for China since Deng Xiaoping’s Opening and Reform.  And “[u]nless everything we think we know about the relative efficiency and dynamism of free markets over politically controlled economies is wrong, the present Chinese policy turn will be, in the end, a dead-end,” Rosen remarked.  According to his prediction, therefore, we will either see a weakened China that poses less of an economic and national security threat to the U.S. or a China that eventually returns to market norms (i.e., “a reversion back to what will work.”).

In the meantime, therefore, he suggested that the American response must be “provisional,” “partial,” and “peaceful.”  American policy must be adaptable and readily reversible such that our ability to reengage to the maximum with China is carefully protected.  Secondly, it must be “partial” rather than absolute.  And, lastly, it must be “peaceful.”  When Beijing’s non-market policies fail, as it will, Rosen averred, and China re-orients itself towards economic convergence with advanced economy norms once more, we must ensure a “foundation of good will” between the U.S. and China to which China can return.

Rosen also cautioned against the U.S. abandoning its own source of national strength—i.e., its openness.  Arguing that economic protectionism has too often been confused with national security, Rosen argued that primary threats to U.S. national security now stem more from new causes like climate change, pandemics, migration pressures and access to weapons of mass destruction.  “Economic protection will do little to nothing to address those risks,” Rosen pointed out.

Rosen spoke at Shorenstein APARC as part of the China Program’s Colloquia Series “A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations.”  The series continues on May 3 with Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr.’s seminar “On Hostile Coexistence with China.”

On Thursday, the third Asia-Pacific Geo-Economic Strategy Forum (APGEO) saw discussion on issues of international strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific with a particular focus on the U.S.-Japan relationship. Speakers included experts on defense and foreign affairs, including former U.S. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and former Japanese Ministers of Defense.

Organized by the Hoover Institution, Nikkei Inc. and the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), the talks occurred within the context of the United State’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) and Japan’s Medium Term Defense Program, both recently updated to outline the U.S. and Japan’s respective regional commitments.

The forum’s speakers focused on the rise of China as a common theme underscoring the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Particularly, the speakers shared a general consensus that China’s attempts to increase its economic and political influence and its initiatives to drive progress on technological frontiers such as 5G networks and artificial intelligence pose a threat to the current international order...

Read the full article in The Stanford Daily

The Stanford University Scholars Program for Japanese High School Students or “Stanford e-Japan” is an online course sponsored by the Yanai Tadashi Foundation and the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), Stanford University. This online course teaches Japanese high school students about U.S. society and underscores the importance of U.S.–Japan relations. Through Stanford e-Japan, ambassadors, top scholars, and experts throughout the United States provide web-based lectures and engage Japanese high school students in live discussion sessions called “virtual classes.” Stanford e-Japan is now in its 5th year and 8th session overall.

On March 15, 2019, 29 high school students across Japan were notified of their acceptance to the Spring 2019 Stanford e-Japan Program. The online course kicks off today and runs until August 23, and will include students representing Aichi, Chiba, Fukuoka, Gunma, Hiroshima, Hokkaido, Hyogo, Kanagawa, Nagano, Niigata, Okinawa, Osaka, Saitama, Shizuoka, Tokyo, and Toyama. In addition to a diverse geographical representation within Japan, the students themselves bring a diverse set of experiences to the program, many having lived overseas in places such as Canada, China, the Philippines, and the United States.

The selected Stanford e-Japan high school students will listen to lectures by renowned experts in the field including Professors Emeritus Daniel Okimoto and Peter Duus, and Professors Katherine Gin Lum, Phillip Lipscy, and Kenji Kushida (Stanford University) on topics such as “Baseball Diplomacy,” “The Atomic Bombings of Japan,” “The Attack on Pearl Harbor,” “Religion in the U.S.,” “U.S.–Japan Relations,” and “Silicon Valley and Entrepreneurship.” Live virtual classes include guest speakers such as Ms. Suzanne Basalla (Toyota Research Institute), Ms. Maiko Cagno (U.S. Consulate, Fukuoka), and Mr. Andrew Ogawa (Quest Venture Partners).

Many Stanford e-Japan students in the current cohort (as well as past ones) have mentioned their desire to study in the United States. The Stanford e-Japan Program equips many students with the motivation and confidence to do so, in addition to many of the skills they will need to study at U.S. universities and colleges. In addition to weekly lectures, assignments, discussion board posts, and virtual classes, the program participants will complete a final research paper on a topic concerning U.S. society or the U.S.–Japan relationship.

“Through this course, we’ve raised Japanese students’ interest in U.S. society and U.S.–Japan relations, which is fantastic,” commented Brown. “I’ve encouraged them to seriously consider undergraduate studies in the United States and to look into opportunities like the Yanai Tadashi Foundation Scholarships.”

Stanford e-Japan is one of several online courses for high school students offered by SPICE, including the Reischauer Scholars Program, the China Scholars Program, and the Sejong Korean Scholars Program. For more information about Stanford e-Japan, please visit stanfordejapan.org.

To be notified when the next Stanford e-Japan application period opens, join our email list or follow us on Facebook and Twitter.

Related articles:

• Yanai Tadashi Foundation and SPICE/Stanford University
• Winners announced for the Fall 2018 Stanford e-Japan Award
• Spring 2019 Stanford e-Japan online course now accepting applications

Applications opened yesterday for the China Scholars Program, an intensive, college-level online course on contemporary China for U.S. high school students. The China Scholars Program is offered by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), Stanford University, and is open to rising 10th, 11th, and 12th graders. The Fall 2019 online course will run from late August through December. Applications are due June 15, 2019.

Stanford University China Scholars Program for high school students
Fall 2019 session (late August through December)
Application period: April 15 to June 15, 2019
 

Accepted applicants will engage in a rigorous academic exploration of key issues in China, spanning politics, economics, social issues, culture, and the arts, with an emphasis on the relationship between the United States and China. In real-time conversations with leading scholars, experts, and diplomats from Stanford University and other institutions, participants will be exposed to the cutting edge of U.S.–China relations and scholarship. Students who complete the online course will be equipped with a rare degree of expertise about China and international relations that may have a significant impact on their choice of study and future career.

As in previous sessions of the China Scholars Program, the Fall 2019 cohort will comprise high school students from across the United States. Participants in the current cohort represent states across the nation, including New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Missouri, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Arizona, California, and Hawaii. The immense diversity of student backgrounds and experiences within each online course allows for an especially rich exchange of ideas and perspectives among the young scholars—a crucial and invaluable component of the learning experience.

“It’s been one of the most fascinating, valuable, and formative classes I have ever taken,” says Rebecca Qiu, a recent alum of the program. “Every week, you discuss pressing topics—from technology censorship to the urban-rural divide—with your motivated peers. During virtual classes, you have the opportunity to ask questions and speak with some of the most influential experts and researchers on modern China—I cannot emphasize how valuable this is. [The China Scholars Program] provides you with a huge breadth and depth of knowledge on China and U.S.–China relations that you cannot find in any typical high school class.”

More information on the China Scholars Program is available at http://chinascholars.org. Interested high school students can apply now at https://spicestanford.smapply.io/prog/china_scholars_program/. The deadline to apply is June 15, 2019.

To be notified when the next China Scholars Program application period opens, join our email list or follow us on Facebook and Twitter.

The China Scholars Program is one of several online courses for high school students offered by SPICE, Stanford University, including the Reischauer Scholars Program (on Japan), the Sejong Scholars Program (on Korea), and the Stanford e-Japan Program (on U.S. society, offered to high school students in Japan).

Related article:

• The China Scholars Program: Continuing a 45-year tradition of bridging Stanford and schools