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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Benjamin Valentino Associate Professor of Government Speaker Dartmouth College

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Stanford University
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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Scott D. Sagan Co-Director, CISAC; Professor of Political Science, Stanford University Speaker
Anne Harrington de Santana Postdoctoral Fellow, CISAC Commentator
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Rod Ewing Visiting Professor at CISAC; Edward H. Kraus Distinguished University Professor in the Department of Geological Sciences at the University of Michigan Speaker
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The fourth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, held at Stanford University on June 18, 2010, convened former senior South Korean and American West Coast-based policymakers, scholars, and regional and functional experts to discuss North Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and regional dynamics in Northeast Asia. Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center organized the Forum in association with its Korean partner, The Sejong Institute, of Seongnam, Korea. The Forum operates as a closed workshop under Chatham House Rule of confidentiality, allowing participants to engage in frank and in-depth exchanges on important and sensitive current issues. Meeting in the aftermath of the March 26 sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, Forum participants focused on developments in North Korea, how the U.S.-ROK alliance should respond to North Korean challenges, and the role of China vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia region.

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Shorenstein APARC
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AgingAsia

In the past fifty years, two factors have led to global population aging: a decline in fertility to levels close to—or even below—replacement and a decline in mortality that has increased world average life expectancy by nearly 67 percent. As the population skews toward fewer young people and more elderly who live longer postretirement lives, demographic changes—labor force participation, savings, economic growth, living arrangements, marriage markets, and social policy—are transforming society in fundamental, irreversible ways.

Nowhere are these effects of aging and demographic change more acute—nor their long-term effects more potentially significant—than in the Asia-Pacific region. How will these developments impact the economies and social protection systems of Japan, South Korea, China, and, by extension, the United States?

To assess this question, Aging Asia showcases cutting-edge, policy-relevant research. The first section focuses on demographic trends and their economic implications; the second section approaches select topics from a global comparative perspective, including social insurance financing, medical costs, and long-term care.

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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 The Economic and Social Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in China, Japan, and South Korea

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Karen Eggleston
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Shorenstein APARC
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This paper provides an understanding of the current copyright laws regarding software licensing in the United States and Europe. The concept of copyright under both the U.S. and EU legal regimes is to convey on the copyright owners the exclusive right to distribute their copyrighted software. In case of sales transactions, that right is expressly limited to statutory copyright law.

Sections 109 and 117 of the U.S. Copyright Act are the respective core provisions to apply to software transactions. It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a work obtained at an authorized sale to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy. In addition, the owner of a copy of a computer program may, inter alia, create another copy of that program provided that the copy is made either as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or for archival or back-up purposes. Under U.S. case law the crucial question is whether a licensee of software can be deemed as an "owner" of a copy of the software and as such trigger the first sale immunities. The paper shows the different approaches taken by different courts on the so-called "sale versus license debate".

Article 4(c) of the Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs ("EC Software Directive") contains the European version of the first sale doctrine, the Community exhaustion doctrine. The first sale of a copy of a computer program by the copyright owners or with their consent shall exhaust the distribution right of that copy within the European Communities (EC) or European Economic Area (EEA). Contrary to the sale versus license debate in U.S. case law, European courts—with no greater argument—deemed software licensees subject to exhaustion. The courts have been more concerned to apply the doctrine of exhaustion in a way as to further the implementation of the fundamental freedom of free movement of goods and services in the EC.

On the basis of a transatlantic copyright analysis the paper will discuss, in a second step, the existence of a digital first sale doctrine (as called in the United States) or digital Community exhaustion doctrine (as known under EC law). The paper debates whether the first sale/exhaustion privilege is to apply also in the event of online-transmissions of software, i.e., when no tangible data carrier embodying the target software changes hands. In today’s world, copies of copyrighted works, including software, are bought with increasing frequency by electronically downloading them through networks, mostly the Internet, with no tangible copy of the target software provided. However, digital transmissions of copyrighted works over the Internet fit neither comfortably within the narrow concepts of first sale nor exhaustion. In discussing whether online distribution of software shall render sections 109 and 117 of the U.S. Copyright Act or Article 4(c) of the EC Software Directive applicable, the paper concludes that in the absence of persuasive case law in either jurisdiction on this matter, U.S. governmental authorities tend to protect software copyright owners, whereas the existence of a digital Community exhaustion doctrine may be based on the ground of free movement of information.

This research was published as TTLF Working Paper No. 6 at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/ttlf/#ttlf_working_papers.

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Transatlantic Technology Law Forum
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Petra Heindl
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Reaching everything from medicine to the food industry, biotechnology’s impact on society has become a major economic factor and is ever-increasing. In addition to its impressive potential benefits, biotechnology carries serious risks, especially regarding security and ethics. The European Patent Convention includes statutory restrictions regarding morality and public policy, while today’s U.S. laws in contrast, try to avoid morality restrictions in patenting biotechnology and U.S. agencies generally grant patents without regard to moral concerns. Not long ago, the U.S. Patent Act included a morality doctrine which had a restrictive effect on biotechnology.

The new U.S. approach applies to micro-organisms, plants, and animals where moral concerns were not considered at all before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. It is not clear, if the moral questions re-emerged referring to the Newman/Rifkin patent application, claiming an animal-human chimera, since the application was finally rejected on the grounds that human beings do not constitute statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This line of argumentation was a break from the developed case law concerning living matter. The attempt to keep ethical concerns out of the U.S. patent laws stands on very shaky grounds.

Another problem arises from the fact that both patent systems, in Europe and the U.S., are relying on the term “human” as a borderline for patentability but none of them define the term “human” which leads to ambiguities. An interesting approach came up, defining a human being not by its biological criteria but rather by its intellectual capabilities. However, this approach is still in its infancy.

The project is co-sponsored by the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum (TTLF, a joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School of Law) and by Stanford University’s Forum on Contemporary Europe at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

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Transatlantic Technology Law Forum
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Christine Reiter
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How do military allies come to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions? Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.

With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley discussed his research and future plans.


What is one of the most interesting and timely case studies that you examined?

Japan and China have had a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of disagreements between China and Japan.

Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in anti-Japanese protests.

My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one country see between their national identity and the national identity of the other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Based on your dissertation, what steps would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?

A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive headlines.

My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the other.

For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister. Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.

Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a more stable, trusting relationship.

What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you take to teaching?

The course will be about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the environment here at Shorenstein APARC.

Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well. 

Do you hope to work in academia or government, or serve in both fields?

I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations. Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of research. 

Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.

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Leif-Eric Easley, 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at Shorenstein APARC.
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