Failing to renew the New START arms control treaty with Russia “is not a wise direction of travel,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former Deputy Secretary General of NATO who ranked as one of President Barack Obama’s top nuclear security experts. 

She knows better than most. Gottemoeller was the chief US negotiator at the Moscow and Geneva talks where details of the treaty were hammered out between 2009 and 2010. Officially ratified a year later, New START limited both the United States and Russia to seven hundred delivery vehicles and just over double that count in total warheads, and was reinforced with a stringent verification process to closely monitor each country’s compliance. 

Read the rest at National Interest

In 2015, SPICE launched Stanford e-Japan, an online course for high school students in Japan. Two key objectives of the course were to introduce the students to U.S.–Japan relations and to also encourage the students to consider studying in the United States. Since then, many Stanford e-Japan alumni have spent time studying at U.S. colleges as exchange students for a year and on summer programs, and several as four-year undergraduates.

One of the challenges for international students to enroll in college in the United States is the cost of tuition. To encourage more Japanese students to consider applying to U.S. universities as full-time undergraduates, Mr. Tadashi Yanai—through the Yanai Tadashi Foundation—has offered competitive four-year scholarships to Japanese high school students who enter top colleges in the United States. Several Stanford e-Japan alumni have received the prestigious and very generous scholarships.

This year, four Stanford e-Japan alumni are recipients of the Yanai Tadashi Scholarships. The Yanai Scholars are scheduled to begin their undergraduate studies in the United States from this fall. They are:

• Yuki Hayashita (Shiba High School, Tokyo): Brown University
• Ryotaro Homma (Kaisei Academy, Tokyo): Yale University
• Hugo Ichioka (Zushi Kaisei High School, Kamakura City, Kanagawa Prefecture): Williams College
• Riki Shimizu (Nada High School, Takatsuki, Osaka Prefecture): Duke University
   

Riki Shimizu, who was a student in the fall 2018 Stanford e-Japan course, noted, “Stanford e-Japan was one of the most instructive programs in high school. Back then I did not have enough English ability to fully express my thoughts, but I think it somewhat improved through the courses to the level that I could consider U.S. colleges as an option. Without attending e-Japan, I wouldn’t be able to go to Duke…” Shimizu’s Stanford e-Japan Instructor Waka Brown commented, “I am touched that Riki credits my course for providing him with the inspiration to apply to universities in the United States.” She continued, “The fact that Riki will be going to Duke University, Yuki to Brown University, and Ryotaro to Yale University is exceedingly rewarding to me as one of their former teachers.”

Stanford e-Japan is also generously supported by the Yanai Tadashi Foundation. Stanford e-Japan Instructor Meiko Kotani, who taught the fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan course, is hopeful that more Japanese students will consider applying to U.S. colleges in the future. Upon hearing that her student, Hugo Ichioka, was accepted into Williams College, she stated, “The excitement that was conveyed from his email, which alerted me to the news that he had become a Yanai Scholar, made me reflect upon the importance of working with young students and encouraging them to think ‘outside of the box’ and to apply to universities outside of Japan… during one of my online classes, I had my students meet with high school students in the United States who were enrolled in SPICE’s Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) and this seemed to have prompted many to consider studying in the United States.”

This type of meaningful exchange between Japanese students and American students has become significant in the college life of Yanai Scholar Daisuke Masuda, a rising junior at Stanford University. When asked what advice he would give to the new Yanai Scholars, Masuda commented, “Interacting with people with diverse backgrounds has always been an integral part of my college life in the United States. The more you know about their culture, the better you can appreciate why they do what they do. I would encourage you to get to know your peers from around the world and learn various approaches to learning, careers, and life in general.”

SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and an online course to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program).

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Starting something new from scratch is always challenging. Though it requires huge amounts of effort and contains the possibility of not working out, I believe that it is absolutely worth exploring a new challenge because it has the power of creating chances of making people happier. This is the most important thing I learned from the people who took the initiative to establish the wonderful program, Stanford e-Japan.

Though it was the inaugural year of the program when I joined in 2015, I was truly impressed not only with the high quality of the academic content, but also with the rich opportunities of communication with prestigious leaders from various fields. Moreover, the program generously offered the top three students the chance to visit Stanford University for a ceremony.

It was exhilarating to be in the program due to the endless surprises and new learnings that I encountered throughout the course. 

Since then, I have resolved to initiate new challenges myself in order to contribute to younger students just as Stanford e-Japan Instructor Waka Brown did for me. After I returned to Keio University from a one-year university exchange program at the University of California, San Diego, I established a student-led organization with several members at Keio from diverse backgrounds. Our student-led organization aims to cultivate young global citizens of Japan by allowing students attending Japanese high schools to have meaningful interactions with international students from Japanese universities like Keio.

In addition to encouraging the high school students to explore new challenges, I also wanted to share how interesting it is to learn about different cultures, including the histories of foreign countries and the benefits of interacting with people who have different backgrounds. We focus on designing an environment so that high school students can actively discuss and exchange ideas with international students in person while also building their English presentation skills. Through our program, we believe every high school student has the opportunity to learn something new like communication skills with individuals of different backgrounds, the ability to reach a mutual understanding with people of differing opinions, and leadership skills to lead discussions in a diverse community.

During our programs at several high schools, I have been able to hear many voices from the high school students, international students, and even high school teachers that suggest that they have fortunately had meaningful and fruitful experiences during our programs. Despite some initial struggles, I now strongly believe that even small programs like ours can make a difference in our society. I will never forget the precious lessons learned from Stanford e-Japan, and perhaps the most important lesson is for me to continue to explore new challenges and to encourage young students to do so as well.

President Donald Trump’s chief arms control envoy last week acknowledged the possibility that the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) could be extended, but he added, “only under select circumstances.”  He then put down conditions that, if adhered to, will ensure the Trump administration does not extend the treaty.

New START and Extension

New START limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers and no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.  It expires by its terms on February 5, 2021 but can be extended for up to five years.  The Trump administration has adamantly refused to do that.

From the perspective of U.S. national security interests, extending New START is a no-brainer.  As confirmed by the State Department’s annual report, Russia is complying with the treaty’s limits.  Extension would keep Russian strategic forces constrained until 2026.  It would also ensure the continued flow of information about those forces produced by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections and other verification measures.

And extension would not force a single change in U.S. plans to modernize its strategic forces, as those plans were designed to fit within New START’s limits.

Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, have raised New START extension since the first days of the Trump administration.  In 2017, Trump administration officials deferred on the issue, saying they would consider extension after (1) completion of a nuclear posture review and (2) seeing whether Russia met the treaty’s limits, which took full effect in February 2018.

Russia fully met the limits in February 2018.  At about the same time, the administration issued its nuclear posture review.  Yet, more than two years later, New START extension remains an open question.

On June 24, Amb. Marshall Billingslea, the president arms control envoy, briefed the press on his meeting with his Russian counterpart two days before in Vienna.  Asked about extending New START, Amb. Billingslea—never a fan of the treaty or, it seems, any arms control treaty—left the option open.  However, he described three conditions that will block extension.

China

Amb. Billingslea’s first condition focused on China, which he claimed had “an obligation to negotiate with [the United States] and Russia.”  Beijing certainly does not see it that way—saying no, no and again no—citing the huge disparity between the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and those of the United States and Russia.  China has less than one-tenth the number of nuclear warheads of each of the two nuclear superpowers.

To be sure, including China in the nuclear arms control process is desirable.  But Beijing will not join a negotiation aimed at a trilateral agreement.  What would such an agreement look like?  Neither Washington nor Moscow would agree to reduce to China’s level (about 300 nuclear warheads).  Nothing suggests either would agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to match their levels (about 4,000 each).  Beijing presumably would not be interested in unequal limits.

This perhaps explains why, well more than one year after it began calling for China’s inclusion, the Trump administration appears to have no proposal or outline or even principles for a trilateral agreement.

For its part, Moscow would welcome China limiting its nuclear arms.  The Russians, however, choose not press the question, raising instead Britain and France.  Amb. Billingslea pooh-poohed the notion, but France has as many nuclear weapons as China, and Britain has two-thirds the Chinese number.  The logic for bringing in one but not the other two is unclear.  The question raises yet another hinderance to including China.

A more nuanced approach might prove more successful.  It would entail a new U.S.-Russian agreement providing for reductions beyond those mandated by New START.  Washington and Moscow could then ask the Chinese (and British and French) to provide transparency on their nuclear weapons numbers and agree not to increase their total weapons or exceed a specified number.  Much like his president, however, the arms control envoy does not appear to be into nuance.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Amb. Billingslea’s second condition dealt with including in a new negotiation nuclear arms not constrained by New START, especially Russia’s large number of non-strategic nuclear weapons.  Again, this is laudable goal, but getting there will require much time and unpalatable decisions that the Trump administration will not want to face.

Russian officials have regularly tied their readiness to discuss non-strategic nuclear arms to issues of concern to them, particularly missile defense.  The Trump administration,  however, has made clear that it has zero interest in negotiating missile defense.

Even if Moscow severed that linkage, negotiating limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons would take time.  New START limits deployed strategic warheads by virtue of their association with deployed strategic missiles and bombers.  The only warheads directly counted are those on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

By contrast, most if not all non-strategic warheads are not mounted on their delivery systems.  Monitoring any agreed limits would require new procedures, including for conducting on-site inspections within storage facilities.  This does not pose an insoluble challenge, but it represents new territory for both Washington and Moscow.  Working out limits, counting rules and verification measures will prove neither quick nor easy.

Verification

Amb. Billingslea earlier suggested some dissatisfaction with New START’s verification measures, though he did not articulate any particular flaw, and, as noted, the State Department’s annual compliance report says Russia is meeting the treaty’s terms.  Last week, he made verification measures for his desired U.S.-Russia-China agreement the third condition for New START extension. 

Verification measures are critical.  Treaty parties have to have confidence that all sides are observing the agreement’s limits or, at a minimum, that any militarily significant violation would be detected in time to take countervailing measures.  Working out agreement on those measures will prove a long process, even in just a bilateral negotiation, especially if it addresses issues such as stored nuclear weapons.  That is not just because of Russian reluctance to accept intrusive verification measures such as on-site inspection; the U.S. military also wants verification measures that do not greatly impact its normal operations.

Russian officials have reiterated their readiness to extend New START now.  Amb. Billingslea’s conditions will thwart extension for the foreseeable future.  That’s unfortunate.  By not extending New START, the Trump administration forgoes a simple action that would strengthen U.S. national security and make Americans safer.