A year has passed since the Egyptian uprising, one of the defining moments of the democratic wave that surged across the Arab world. Since Jan. 25, 2011, three long-standing Arab dictatorships have toppled and citizen movements continue to challenge entrenched autocratic regimes. Reflecting on this pivotal moment, five scholars at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law talk about how these events changed the course of democracy – if at all – and what they mean for the region as a whole.

What are the prospects for democracy in the Arab world today?

Larry Diamond: The near-term prospects for democracy are mixed and uncertain – but far better than they were a year ago. Within the space of a single year, Tunisia has become an electoral democracy – the first in the Arab world since Lebanon fell apart in the mid-1970s. This is an astonishing achievement, and Tunisia’s prospects to build democracy are quite good. Egypt has a chance to turn the corner politically, but it depends on whether the Muslim Brotherhood will evolve in a truly democratic and tolerant direction, and whether the military will step back from power. Libya must still disarm its militias and build democratic institutions and a viable state. Syria and Yemen remain much more deeply troubled, with a risk of civil war.

In examining the arc of history, was the Arab Spring inevitable? Should we have been surprised by what happened?

Francis Fukuyama: Economic growth and technological change foster the rise of a middle class that fosters demands for political participation. This is the social basis for democratic revolutions around the world. Some people argued that cultural factors – Islam, Arab passivity –would prevent this from unfolding in the Middle East, but this has clearly been proven wrong. These structural shifts do not imply inevitability, since it is human agents who must translate social demands into political action. This is why the general phenomenon of a revolt may have been predictable, but the timing absolutely uncertain.

Have living conditions improved in the Arab world, or are they worse for the average citizen?

Lina Khatib: The Arab Spring has brought immense change in the lives of Arab citizens. Political taboos have been broken, and the wall of fear that used to govern their everyday lives has crashed down. The Arab world still has some way to go before it can be called democratic in the full sense. While the economy in particular has taken a hit in the current period of transition and uncertainty – making conditions worse for many in the short term – the average Arab citizen today can actually look forward to seeing freedom of expression, human rights, and political and economic reform. These are no longer unrealizable dreams.

What are some of the lessons U.S. policymakers have learned from the Arab Spring?

Jeremy M. Weinstein: A number of fundamental ideas that underpinned 30 years of U.S. policy in the Middle East were upended by the events of 2011. The idea that Arabs do not care about democracy, are politically apathetic, and are too frightened to resist oppressive regimes has been disproved. The notion of authoritarian stability is now questioned, and it is no longer taken for granted that “the autocrats we know” are the safest bet to secure U.S. interests. And the fear of Islamists is slowly receding among policymakers as they confront the electoral success of Islamist parties and begin to directly engage a new cadre of leaders.

How did Arab monarchies weather the storm and avoid the experiences of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia?

Ahmed Benchemsi: Except in Bahrain, where security forces opened fire on unarmed crowds, Arab monarchies generally managed to outflank their respective protesters in a peaceful way. They did so either by implementing illusory reforms while in fact playing for time (in Morocco and Jordan) or by buying off the opposition with huge social spending (in the Gulf). As this last tactic may remain effective for some time, non-oil monarchies’ victories are more likely to prove short-lived. New rounds of popular anger could be spawned sooner rather than later by, if anything, growing economic difficulties. These will be harder to quell by subterfuges.

Looking forward, are you hopeful that democracy will prosper in the Arab world?

Diamond: Yes, I am quite hopeful that democracy will develop in the Arab world, but I think there will be wide variation among Arab countries in the near term, and much will depend on whether there emerges an instance of clear democratic success that inspires other countries. This is why I think we should bet heavily now on Tunisia, while also intensively engaging Egypt, the largest Arab country.

Fukuyama: In the long run yes, in the short run, no – a safe answer.

Khatib: Even if democracy takes decades to materialize, the Arab world has finally taken the first steps in what – as history has taught us – is always a long and difficult journey, and that’s an important milestone.

Weinstein: All of us know that the road to democracy is uncertain and filled with obstacles. But I take comfort in the fact that no one could have predicted a 2011 in which Ben Ali, Mubarak, Gadhafi, and Saleh would leave the stage. Something profound has changed in the region, and I am confident that – having lost their fear – citizens will make their voices heard as the struggle for democracy continues.

Benchemsi: For democracy to have a real chance in the Arab World, liberals must build grassroots organizations – ones that would be large and strong enough to challenge both autocratic regimes and Islamist groups. When this is done, I will have reason for optimism.

Danny O'Brien led the Nov. 10  Liberation Technology seminar on the topic, “Reports from the Bleeding Edge: What Journalism in Syria, China and Iran tell us about Silicon Valley's Future”. O'Brien is the Internet Advocacy Coordinator at Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which was founded in New York in 1981 with the aim of defending individual journalists worldwide.

O'Brien argued in the seminar that after focusing on mainstream journalists for more than a decade, CPJ started its Internet program based on the realization that a considerable number of people who are jailed for their journalistic work worldwide are online journalists. CPJ’s Internet program is aimed at protecting them through their involvement in their individual cases, research and lobbying. Through these efforts CPJ hopes to create an online ecosystem that is generally safe for most users, and for journalists who use the online medium.

This wide-ranging talk took us through different kinds of threats that journalists face in the online space including attacks against their websites, lack of legal protections, and physical dangers that journalists face based on the available information about themselves and their sources. O'Brien argued that while there are tools being developed to protect activists that could potentially be used by journalists, such tools are rarely used since journalists do not think of the threats to their work until they actually get into trouble. CPJ is committed to making the online environment safe for all journalists, rather than just providing training to journalists on precautionary measures.

He discussed some of the issues that CPJ has been advocating among large internet corporations and governments, and the strategy of enabling journalists themselves to meet with such agencies to make a persuasive case.

The killing of Muammar Qadaffi marks an end to one of the most dramatic chapters of the Arab Spring. But what follows after the death of a dictator who has held power for 42 years? Lina Khatib, the head of the Arab Reform and Democracy program at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, discusses Qaddafi’s death and its significance for Libya and its neighbors.

What’s next for Libya?

Libya faces a complicated journey ahead. Qaddafi never developed state institutions in Libya, so the National Transitional Council faces the challenge of building a state system almost from scratch. This makes democratic transition in Libya much more difficult than that in Egypt and Tunisia. Another challenge is potential internal power struggles over leadership of the country, which may be fueled by existing tribal rivalries.

Is this the end of an era of Arab autocrats in the Middle East and North Africa? 

Qaddafi's death signals the end of an era for Libya, and a sobering reminder to Arab autocrats who are refusing to listen to their people of their potential fate. However, I wish Qaddafi were captured alive and given a fair trial. That would have sent a stronger message to other Arab autocrats--unfortunately, for some, Qaddafi's death has already transformed him into a celebrated martyr.

Is Qaddafi’s death a larger victory for the Arab Spring?

It is only a matter of time before leaders like Assad of Syria and Saleh of Yemen are forced to step down, whether violently or not. Qaddafi's death, however, will not necessarily make those leaders more likely to cede power.

It is possible that, following a now-established pattern of thinking of themselves in exceptional terms, they might think that, unlike Qaddafi, they can "outsmart" their oppositions and the international community.

I think we need to think about what this death means for the people in places like Syria and Yemen. It may take time, but Arab protesters in Yemen and Syria will prevail, and Qaddafi's death is an empowering factor to them. The death of Qaddafi is not going to be the biggest catalyst for autocrats to leave power; the steadfastness of the people on the street is the deciding factor.