The War on Terror Revisited
Co-Sponsored with the Humanities Center
Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair. His most recent book is Thomas Jefferson: Author of America. His most recent collection of essays is titled Love, Poverty, and War. Mr. Hitchens, longtime contributor to The Nation, wrote a wide-ranging, biweekly column for the magazine from 1982 to 2002. With trademark savage wit, he flattens hypocrisy inside the Beltway and around the world, laying bare the "permanent government" of entrenched powers and interests. Mr. Hitchens has been Washington editor of Harper's and book critic for Newsday, and regularly contributes to such publications as Granta, The London Review of Books, Vogue, New Left Review, Dissent and the Times Literary Supplement.
Born in 1949 in Portsmouth, England, Mr. Hitchens received a degree in philosophy, politics and economics from Balliol College, Oxford, in 1970.
Event Synopsis:
Mr. Hitchens recounts the early history of American war, including its first foreign engagement in North Africa against the Ottoman Empire after it had enslaved Europeans and Americans in the region. He then reflects on the turnaround in European and American attitudes toward Islam since 1967, when US President Lyndon Johnson began to make concessions to Israel regarding its presence in Gaza in order to gain support for the Vietnam war. Johnson's predecessors as well as European leaders, in contrast, had pressured Israel to leave Gaza and had threatened economic consequences against Israel and England.
Mr. Hitchens relates recent conversations with several prominent figures - Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Dutch newspaper editor Flemming Rose, and Somali-Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali - as illustrations of the new approach to the Muslim world by America and Europe. He describes a "civil war" within Islam between fundamentalists working to impose Sharia and "export" the conflict to the West, and moderate Muslims. Hitchens also recounts how he discouraged Tony Blair from pursuing measures to allow separate schools for Muslims in Britain, and argued against extending the anti-blasphemy law to cover Islam, instead calling for it to be revoked entirely.
Mr. Hitchens concludes his talk with the observation that the fight against Islamic extremism and terrorism will be a key battle for both the US and Europe in years to come and will transcend cultural or strategic differences between the two regions.
During a discussion session, the audience raised such questions as: Does Mr. Hitchens see the French ban on girls' head scarves as a positive measure? Where are there differences between the war in Iraq and the war against militant Islam? What are the implications for Europe if Turkey joins the EU? Is there a common European view toward terrorism, Islamism, and jihadism?
Braun Hall
Bldg 320, Room 105
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
CISAC fellow: U.S. civil rights movement shows way to Middle East peace
Imagine a land where bombs explode almost daily and children are killed by terrorists without conscience. On one side we find a people who suffered through the horror of slave-labor death camps; on the other side a people who suffered through a terrible war -- which they began when what they felt was their property was seized from them -- a terrible defeat and (for them) a terrible occupation. Now imagine those same peoples 15 years later, living side by side, peacefully.
This sounds like a pipe dream: The Middle East could never be this way, we think. But we do not need to imagine this land.
We are living in it.
One century after America's Civil War, the descendants of slaves daily faced the twin terrors of homicide and arson. Yet only 15 years after the rise of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the back of segregation and neo-Confederate violence had been broken.
Can Palestinians likewise mount a successful, nonviolent movement toward peaceful co-existence with their former adversaries? In short, can history repeat itself?
How expensive would it be for us if it did not? America spends an estimated $3 billion a year in support of Israel. This support is justified because Israel is a democracy and our main ally in the region. Yet we also spend $2 billion supporting Israel's nondemocratic neighbor, Egypt. Billions more have been spent maintaining bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and now Iraq. We justify these expenditures by surrendering to the serpentine excuses of realpolitik: We need the support of key figures and families in the region, we say, and so we have to work with them. Just as we once said of the Dixiecrats and other segregationist politicians in the American South.
We can transform this paradigm, as we did then, and at little cost to ourselves. We can utilize the experience of the civil rights movement -- which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice knows all too well (her childhood friend was killed by an improvised explosive device in segregated Birmingham) -- to assist Palestinians in their stride toward peace. What we need is a Muslim Martin Luther King.
Many believe that leaders are born, not made, but programs to cultivate leadership and promote good will among men have been used successfully for generations. Oxford's Rhodes Scholarship is one such example. Its idea is to bring the best and brightest from the British Commonwealth (and beyond) to build strong ties among English-speaking peoples, and stronger ties to England. Founder Cecil Rhodes, pirate though he was, wished for there to be "an understanding between the three great powers" -- America, Britain and Germany -- that "will render war impossible."
What we recommend is a sister program for the Middle East. One could hold a competition for the 30 best young orators in the Palestinian diaspora. (King first gained prominence at age 26, and the Rhodes Scholarship is only for men and women under that age.) Send them to an American institution such as Stanford University, where they could study for the doctorate under Professor Clayborne Carson, director of the Martin Luther King Jr. Papers Project and historian of the civil rights movement and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Then, after they have spent several years studying the African American experience with special courses and lecturers, focusing especially on the efficacy of nonviolent direct action, send them back to their native lands.
This is no program of indoctrination. Indeed, it would be detrimental if American spy organizations were to infiltrate or interfere with the King scholars in any way: the scholars would lose all credibility at home. Just as King spoke out against Southern injustice (and American injustice in Vietnam), the King scholars must be free to criticize America and, it is to be expected, the occupation. They would not be able to lead the Arab street otherwise.
By bringing young leaders from the region, we would avoid disasters like the U.S. Army's flirtation with mathematician Ahmed Chalabi, a man who had no real roots in Iraq, but whom America still wished to enthrone as a new shah. The Chalabi experiment blew up in America's face like a roadside bomb.
The King scholarship program might cost only $2 million per year -- an endowment of perhaps $20 million could put it on its feet indefinitely. And, coupled with the application of "soft power," the export of American culture -- notably, hip-hop music, which serves both as a mechanism for promoting intercultural understanding and as a nonviolent channel for youthful aggression -- one could reasonably expect to see the flower of peace bloom in the desert of despair.
Two specific aspects of the civil rights movement would be most effective in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: first, the proper utilization of legal instruments as a way to wage a nonviolent campaign; second, the utilization of mosques to mobilize a nonviolent grassroots struggle. Mosques in the West Bank and Gaza can be used to promote peace over violence and terrorism, and the African American experience can teach Palestinians how to do this.
In "The Trial" by Franz Kafka, at one point two men stand outside a gate. One seeks to enter; the other seeks to prevent him from entering. Both men wait there for their entire lives. Though one is guard and the other the one guarded, both men are prisoners.
In game theory, the branch of mathematics made famous by "A Beautiful Mind," there is a paradox called the Prisoners' Dilemma. Each of two prisoners may believe it is in his best interests to harm the other, but one can mathematically prove that both men would be better off if they cooperated. A King scholars program might help us resolve the prisoners' dilemma that is the Middle East.
This is a utopian dream, perhaps. But another man dreamed, once, and we all know what became of that man's dream.
We are living it.
Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance
Part I of this article looks at the American institution of legal controls on the executive branch and their subsequent erosion post-9/11. It explores three changes incorporated in the USA PATRIOT Act: alterations to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; the introduction of Delayed Notice Search Warrants; and the expansion of National Security Letters. Outside of this legislation, the weakening of the Attorney General guidelines
increased the FBI's ability to collect information. The article highlights the Department of Defense's ("DOD") movement into the domestic surveillance realm. It discusses a number of operations both inside and outside the DOD, such as TALON, Echelon, Carnivore, Magic Lantern, TIPS, and the use of watch lists. Part I concludes with a discussion of the data mining efforts underway. The article argues that Total Information Awareness, ADVISE, and other projects catapult surveillance into another realm. Moreover, while any one program, such as the NSA initiative, may be considered on narrow grounds, the sheer breadth of current powers raises important concerns.
Part II notes that, until recently, no laws governed police and intelligence service information-gathering authorities in the UK. Extraordinary stop and search powers for terrorist-related offences, and warrants for police interference with property provided exceptions. But physical searches of property conducted by the intelligence services, the interception of communications by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the use of covert surveillance or "electronic bugs," and the running of covert human intelligence sources operated under the legislative and judicial radars. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the European Court began to raise objections to the lack of safeguards and statutory framework. But each time the Court handed down a significant finding against the United Kingdom, the state responded not just by, at least on the surface, meeting the demands of the European Convention of Human Rights, but, it appears, by expanding executive surveillance authorities. Moreover, the warrant system introduced retained control within the executive branch. Not subject to judicial review, the standard applied is reasonable suspicion--considerably less robust than probable cause. Like the United States, Britain draws on new technologies; the country leads the world in its use of public surveillance systems.
Having laid out legal developments on both sides of the Atlantic, Part III moves to policy concerns: it begins by briefly exploring the substantive, political, legal, social, and economic risks posed by such measures. It then considers six approaches that would help to mitigate the risks. First is the possibility of creating a property right in personal information. The second centers on the regulation of access, transfer, use, and retention of data. Such efforts would satisfy demands for accountability and transparency in both the public and private sector. A third possibility centers on scaling back the existing powers of the state. Fourth, both countries may contemplate placing limits on what constitutes national security. Fifth, alternative safeguards and oversight structures deserve attention - such as reporting requirements, random audits, the creation of ombudspersons, the insertion of the judiciary, and (in the UK) allowing intercepted communications to be used as evidence. Sixth, preventing countries from introducing ever greater powers of surveillance under the claim that they are only temporary in nature would force legislatures to consider the long-term impact of provisions beyond the immediate terrorist threat.
Defining and Founding Civil Liberty
In order to facilitate a subsequent operationalization of civil liberty, the paper attempts to define and ground civil liberty on the basis of liberal political philosophy/theory as this tradition provides fruitful conceptual distinctions and specifications and offers some interesting motivations for taking civil liberties into deeper consideration. Different clusters of perspectives are found in the literature and one these is identified as key to understand the character of civil liberty and the relationship between civil liberty and democracy. Thereafter, to specify was is plausibly meant by civil liberties, I introduce three historically significant forms of rights codifications, that is, agreements about rights put down in peace treatises on the background of religious wars between Catholics and Protestants; national declarations and constitutional provisions connected to the revolutions in the seventeenth century England and the late eighteenth century USA and France; and international conventions on human rights. As one cannot settle the question of the plausibility of civil liberties just by reference to their legal recognition, I turn to some of the justifications offered by liberal philosophers that are briefly confronted with some general critiques.
The paper concludes that there are good reasons to respect civil liberties and to narrow the focus to (modern, negative) liberal freedom understood as absence of state interference in certain personal exertion rights. On this background, five rights are selected to constitute the core of a civil liberty measure: freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of movement and residence; freedom of recourse to independent courts.
Workshop on Comparative Health Policy: Asia and the Global Governance of Epidemics
The seminar will examine critically the current state of the art in global health crisis management with particular reference to HIV/AIDS, SARS, and Avian Influenza. Speakers include internationally recognized experts from various disciplines including public health and the social sciences.
Philippines Conference Room
Stella Quah
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Stella Quah, (PhD, University of Singapore; M.Sc [sociology], Florida State University) is professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore. She was a Fulbright Hays scholar from 1969 to 1971. Since 1986 she has spent academic sabbaticals as research associate and visiting scholar at the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California Berkeley; the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Department of Sociology at Harvard University; the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University; the Stanford Program in International Legal Studies, Stanford University; and the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University.
Professor Quah was elected vice president for research of the International Sociological Association (ISA); chairperson of the ISA Research Council for the session 1994-98; and served as associate editor of International Sociology (1998-2004).
Among her professional activities, Professor Quah serves on two institutional review boards; is member of the Society for Comparative Research; member of the International Advisory Board of the British Journal of Sociology; member of the Editorial Advisory Board of Health Sociology Review, the journal of the health section of the Australian Sociological Association; member of the editorial board of Marriage & Family Review; member of the International Advisory Board of Asian Population Studies; editor of the Sociology in Asia Series; and editor of the Health Systems Section, Encyclopedia of Public Health (Elsevier Inc).
Professor Quah's main areas of research are medical sociology, social policy, and family sociology. The complete list of her publications is at http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/socquahs.
Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany
Co-Sponsored with the Department of History and the Taube Center for Jewish Studies
Richard Evans is a Professor of Modern History at the University of Cambridge, with a particular research interest in the social and cultural history of Germany since the mid-nineteenth century. He has worked on movements of emancipation and liberation, on social inequality in the urban environment, and on the social history of death and disease. Most recently, Professor Evans has worked on crime and punishment, especially the death penalty in German history since the seventeenth century, where he has used archival evidence to bring a social and anthropological approach to bear on major theories of punishment and society. Additionally, Professor Evans holds an interest in historiography and the history of the discipline of history. He has been Editor of the Journal of Contemporary History since 1998 and is a Fellow of the British Academy, the Royal Society of Literature and the Royal Historical Society, and an Honorary Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Birkbeck College, London. His most recent publications include Telling Lies About Hitler: History, the Holocaust and the David Irving Trial (London, 2002), and The Coming of the Third Reich (London, 2003).
Lane History Corner, Room 205
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Douglas Fuller on complacency toward China's challenge to U.S. science and technology lead
A recent report from Duke University that critiques the supposed gap between the number of American science and engineering (S&E) graduates and those of merging economies -- especially China's -- has led to false reassurance that the U.S. lead in science and technology is not under threat from China. It would be a grave mistake to drop our concerns about China's competitive challenge.
First, the Duke report simply claimed that China's true number of science and engineering bachelor degrees was 351,000, rather than the widely reported 600,000. Coupling this with an upward adjustment for American graduates still left China producing 214,000 more such degrees than the United States.
Moreover, undergraduates are only part of the concern. China's production of those with doctorates has increased rapidly. By 2003, China's homegrown science and engineering doctorates numbered almost half of the U.S. total.
Chinese were also earning large numbers of doctorates abroad. In 2001, the number of Chinese S&E doctorates earned in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States equaled 72 percent of the total of S&E doctorates earned by American citizens and permanent residents.
Since 1975, China has increased its global share of S&E doctorates from zero (courtesy of the Cultural Revolution) to 11 percent, not counting doctorates earned overseas. During the same three decades, the U.S. global share has fallen from half to roughly 22 percent.
More worrisome than the aggregate numbers is American universities' reliance on foreigners who earn doctorates. In engineering, foreigners account for over half of America's doctorates, and in computer science just under half.
If foreign-born holders of doctorates continued to stay in the United States, we wouldn't have to worry. Unfortunately, there are many signs that it is becoming much harder to retain them.
One need only look at the flow from Taiwan, one of the former main sources of American S&E doctoral degrees, to see what could happen. Up until 1994, Taiwanese earned more science and engineering doctorates in the United States than members of any other foreign nationality. By 2000, their numbers had plummeted because economic and educational opportunities at home were more appealing.
The Taiwanese didn't just stop coming to America. They also began to leave. As Taiwan's tech sector boomed in the 1990s, huge numbers of Taiwanese technologists (estimates range as high as 100,000) left America for home and took their technical skills with them.
Our two current biggest foreign sources of technologists, China and India, appear to be following Taiwan's path. China has begun to lure back large numbers of technologists. China's central and local governments offer free office space and other benefits to attract technologists home. These inducements are working. A 2005 survey of the Chinese American Semiconductor Professionals Association's members showed that the vast majority regard China as the most likely future work destination, and they rated Shanghai higher than even Silicon Valley on career potential. India's recruitment efforts have also started to bear fruit.
The challenge is not simply keeping up the numbers of technologists in America. China by many measures has improved its technological capabilities. On the Georgia Institute of Technology's Index of Technological Capability, China has more than doubled its index score over the past decade. China now ranks fourth behind the United States, Japan and Germany.
This rapid ascent is not surprising given China's increasing investments. China's research and development spending as a percentage of gross domestic product has tripled to 1.3 percent in the last decade, even while its GDP has ballooned. Few emerging economies spend even 1 percent of their GDP on research.
U.S. patents invented in China are also on the rise. Information-technology patents from corporations' Chinese technologists have risen from 134 in 1997-2001 to 482 during 2002-04. As a first step to meet this challenge, we should increase federal spending on basic and exploratory research. Our R&D spending has been flat at 2.6 percent of GDP for four decades, but the share of federal spending has declined from two-thirds to one-quarter.
Given that corporations now de-emphasize basic scientific research, the federal government should further support the basic research that could maintain our lead at the cutting edge of technology.
Increased federal funding would also address the issue of the falling share of investment in certain disciplines. With spending flat, the rising share commanded by biomedicine has meant a falling share spent on engineering and physics.
Federal support may also play a direct role in increasing interest in pursuing a science education. Since the 1950s, the number of undergraduate S&E majors in America has risen and fallen in line with federal research funding, as Professor Henry Rowen of Stanford University has pointed out.
Before meeting China's challenge, we first must recognize it. Complacency in reaction to "good'' news that China is producing fewer S&E graduates than commonly thought is not the answer.
Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War
This article critiques the Eurocentric character of debates over combat motivation and battlefield conduct. It compares two approaches to these topics, the societal and the organizational, with the experience of the Indian army and other British imperial forces in the second world war. Different ways of thinking about nationalism, culture and military service are assessed against the distinctive character of colonial forces. Rather than seeing culture as derived only from ethnic heritage, as in the societal approach, the article develops a cultural analysis of the regular military institution and the ways in which it transforms people from diverse backgrounds into soldiers. This argument attends both to what soldiers share and to hybrid fusions of local and military culture.
International Differences in Patient and Physician Perceptions of "High Quality" Healthcare: A Model from Pediatric Cardiology
Although the quality of health care would logically seem to be a universal concept, this study hypothesized that physicians and their patients could differ in their perceptions of high-quality care and that those beliefs might vary by country. Such a mismatch in beliefs may be especially important as clinical practice guidelines developed in the United States are globalized.
A survey of 20 statements describing various components of health care delivery and quality was sent to pediatric cardiologists in 33 countries, who ranked the statements in order of priority for ideal health care. Each participating physician administered the questionnaire to the parents of children with congenital heart disease; 554 questionnaires were received and analyzed. A subanalysis of 9 countries with the largest number of responses was done (Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Doctors and parents rated the same 4 statements among the top 5: the doctor is skillful and knowledgeable; the doctor explains health problems, tests, and treatments in a way the patient can understand; a basic level of healthcare is available to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay; and treatment causes the patient to feel physically well.
Overall, parents' responses differed more among countries than those of physicians; the magnitude of the difference between parents and physicians varied by country. This discrepancy highlights a potential mismatch between patients' and physicians' views about the desired components of health care delivery, in particular the application of American quality standards for health care to systems in other countries.