On April 17, 2025, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), alongside The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution, hosted a seminar entitled “The Russo-Ukraine War: Peace for Our Time?” featuring Syracuse University Professor of Political Science Brian Taylor. The seminar examined the state of the war, the prospects for peace, and the political dynamics shaping both Ukrainian resistance and Russian aggression. Taylor emphasized that, despite mounting casualties and economic costs, peace remains unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the ideological rigidity and strategic goals of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Putin’s own speeches, notably from February 2022 and June 2024, underscore his belief that Ukraine lacks legitimate statehood and is a ‘Western puppet.’ He accuses Kyiv of fostering “neanderthal nationalism” and allowing NATO to develop Ukraine as a military outpost. These views culminated in his June 2024 and April 2025 peace proposals, which demand complete Ukrainian military withdrawal from occupied regions, recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” These demands remain wholly unacceptable to Ukraine, where President Zelensky has repeatedly asserted that ceding territory violates the constitution and would betray over a million Ukrainian citizens still living in unoccupied portions of the contested areas.

The seminar highlighted three core issues blocking peace: territorial integrity, security guarantees, and domestic political sovereignty. Ukraine insists on reclaiming all occupied land and seeks NATO membership or bilateral security commitments from Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia demands not only territorial concessions but also structural constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities and internal laws. The Kremlin's calls for “denazification” include repealing post-2014 legislation on language and historical memory — proposals Ukraine sees as direct infringements on its sovereignty.

Territorially, the stakes are high. Ukraine holds parts of Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia, and is unwilling to legitimize Russian claims. International law supports Ukraine’s position: the UN Charter, Budapest Memorandum, and several treaties confirm Russia’s previous recognition of Ukrainian borders. The war, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described, is the largest attempted annexation in Europe since World War II — a recolonization effort with severe implications for the international order.

On the battlefield, the war shows no signs of abating. Russian casualties exceeded 400,000 in 2024 alone, yet recruitment incentives and resource reserves remain robust. Some analysts argue that Putin is ideologically committed and politically insulated, making him indifferent to the war’s costs. Ceasefire discussions, while briefly floated in early 2025, have faltered amid escalating demands.

Taylor also explored the U.S. political context. President Donald Trump’s shifting rhetoric — from claiming he could end the war in 24 hours to hedging that he would “like to get it settled” — reflects uncertainty about future American policy. According to Russian sources, Putin believes he can manipulate Trump to secure favorable terms.

Ultimately, Taylor concluded that both sides see more advantage in fighting than in negotiating. The war is deeply rooted in Putin’s imperial ambition and ideological confrontation, not just geopolitics. Without dramatic shifts in leadership or battlefield fortunes, peace will remain elusive.

A full recording of Professor Taylor's seminar can be viewed below:

In an era of increased transnational repression against dissidents, opposition groups need to become more effective in galvanizing support and avoiding suppression. These organizations are simultaneously losing critical institutional donors, as governments are becoming less inclined to donate to pro-democratic movements. This makes it more important than ever for such organizations to find out how to stimulate collective action among diasporic communities and uncover new outlets for donations. 

Therefore, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva and her collaborator, Emil Kamalov (EUI), decided to start the OutRush project to survey Russians who have fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By understanding the conditions that drive Russian emigrants to donate to activist organizations, Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research, presented in a recent CDDRL seminar, could prove vital to more effectively mobilizing diaspora communities.

The Russian government has expanded its criminalization of oppositional organizations since the 2022 invasion, increasingly labeling groups as “undesirable.” This designation is for organizations that are allegedly a threat to Russian security, making any collaboration with them illegal. For example, Russian citizen Alexey Malyarevsky was recently sentenced to prison for donating to Alexey Navalny’s “undesirable” Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK). With 70% of Russian emigrants being afraid of repression since the invasion, Sergeeva predicted that this designation would discourage emigrants from donating.

To test their hypothesis, Sergeeva and Kamalov surveyed respondents annually through OutRush about their willingness to donate to theoretical organizations that fit various criteria. They utilized nonmonetary incentives, such as promising to send reports to respondents, which lowered the cost of the study.

Contrary to expectations, there was a positive correlation between the criminalization of an organization and the diaspora’s willingness to donate. The “undesirable” designation did not deter support as intended. Instead, it served as a marker that the organization was effective in its opposition, incentivizing donations. This effect was especially prominent among those residing in countries outside of Russia’s sphere of influence. At the same time, it diminished in host countries friendly to Russia, reflecting the continued fear of transnational repression. Furthermore, donor anonymity and organizational transparency further incentivized support. 

The very means through which authoritarian regimes attempt to suppress dissent — the criminalization of opposition groups — can actually be used to galvanize diasporic support. Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research serves as evidence that activist organizations have the opportunity to mobilize emigrants discontented with the regimes they fled, despite oppression. 

Nearly every day for the last three years, Russian missiles, drones, and artillery fire have struck Ukraine, killing thousands of people and damaging power plants, schools, hospitals, and homes in what has become the largest conflict in Europe since World War II.

“You live in constant fear for your loved ones,” said Oleksandra Matviichuk, founder of the Center for Civil Liberties and a participant in a February 24 virtual panel discussion with Ukrainian leaders in Kyiv on the war’s impact on daily life, the global democratic order, and Ukraine’s path ahead. The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law hosted the event on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

“It's very difficult to be in a large-scale war for three years. You live in total uncertainty,” Matviichuk said.
 

At a CDDRL weekly seminar, American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examined how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions. The talk was part of the REDS seminar series, organized in partnership with The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution. While some expected that heightened military threats would drive greater European Union (EU) unity and integration, Darden argued that the war is instead reinforcing national institutions and re-nationalizing Europe.

First, the war has shifted power dynamics within the EU, strengthening newer member states, particularly those from post-enlargement waves in Eastern Europe. Unlike older Western European members, these states do not share the post-WWII commitment to anti-nationalism that has underpinned European integration. Countries such as Poland and Hungary have adopted nationalist policies that challenge the EU’s foundational ideals, treating European regulations as discretionary rather than binding. This shift has weakened the EU’s ability to act as a unified political entity.

Second, while the war has spurred European military rearmament, this has occurred along national rather than EU-wide lines. Defense spending has surged across the continent, yet procurement remains fragmented, with countries prioritizing domestic industries and bilateral agreements over collective EU initiatives. Military aid to Ukraine, rather than being coordinated by European institutions, has largely been managed through U.S.-led bilateral mechanisms. This reflects the EU’s limited role in security policy. Historically, existential threats have led to fiscal centralization—the concentration of taxation and spending powers at a higher level of government to fund collective defense. However, the EU is restricted by its treaties from directly allocating budgeted funds for military expenditures, limiting its ability to centralize security coordination or build stronger institutional frameworks in response to the war.

Third, the war has heightened national identity politics across Europe, further undermining European integration. Instead of fostering a shared European identity, the conflict has reinforced national distinctions. In Ukraine, the war has fueled policies emphasizing language, media control, and historical narratives rooted in nationalism. Within the EU, it has led to unilateral trade restrictions, violations of Schengen rules, and disputes over migration policies. These trends have strengthened sovereignty-based decision-making at the national level rather than pushing Europe toward deeper federalism.

Darden situated these findings within broader theories of state-building. Drawing from bellicist theories, he explained that war has historically driven state-building by centralizing fiscal capacity and consolidating power. However, unlike past cases where war led to greater political integration, the EU remains structurally constrained by its reliance on voluntary market-based cooperation rather than centralized security imperatives. Kelemen and McNamara (2022) argue that the EU’s fragmented institutional development results from the absence of war-induced fiscal consolidation. Even with the return of war to Europe, integration has not accelerated; instead, security responses have remained decentralized, with national governments taking the lead.

Darden concluded that the war is reinforcing the dominance of the nation-state rather than strengthening the EU as a collective entity. Despite increased military spending, European defense remains disjointed, and the war’s institutional impact is shaped by national identities, security alternatives, and EU governance constraints. Far from unifying Europe, the war may ultimately weaken the post-WWII European project.