A
panel of Carnegie Russia experts presented analysis of the current
state of Russia's political and economic development and the likelihood
of continuity or change in Dmitry Medvedev's first term as president of
Russia. The panel included scholars-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow
Center Nikolay Petrov and Maria Lipman and Carnegie senior associate
Michael A. McFaul. Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies, served as
moderator.
Petrov emphasized structural conditions delimiting the options
available to the Russian leadership over the ability of any particular
personality to radically change course. He noted that Medvedev, as
Vladimir Putin's protégé, was unlikely to introduce major modifications
to Putin's established trajectory and that he could not do so even if
such was his desire.
He described his conception of the Kremlin-designed political system
in Russia today, making reference to what he called the "mechanical
configuration of power": the creation of elements that cannot operate
indepedently and a highly hierarchical administration that is
inherently inefficient and divorced from the realities of society.
Although poorly governed autocracies can last for a long time, if there
is a crisis and Russia still lacks the democratic instruments to deal
with it there could be a serious authoritarian retrenchment.
-Michael McFaul
At the same time, he argued that change is inevitable -- not because
of Medvedev's intentions, but because of evolving facts on the ground,
such as the demographic situation and the need to transition from
recovery-based economic growth to modernization and expansion. Petrov
said that one of the major features of the Russian regime -- controlled
elections -- is becoming a source of major weakness as Russia faces a
number of serious political, social, and economic challenges. Although
these elections nominally legitimize the authorities, they do not
provide any feedback from the population nor do they offer any
opportunity for genuine political competition of the kind that could
introduce diversity and accountability. He compared the Russian
leadership to a dinosaur, with a small head far removed from the body
politic.
Lipman focused on the evolution of the media from the relative
pluralism of Boris Yeltsin's presidency to the tight control of Putin's
system. She contrasted the interview Putin had as he was coming into
the presidency in 2000 with the interview that his successor has
recently had. While the journalists interviewing Putin were inquisitive
and at times confrontational, Medvedev enjoyed a far more passive and
respectful tone from the journalists who interviewed him. This, she
said, was a sign of the success of Putin's project for the media.
She noted that the state and Gazprom were the two largest players in
the national media market and that loyalty to the state is a
requirement for sucess in any business sector, including media. The
state's control of broadcast media is particularly important, as
television is the overwhelmingly primary source of information for the
Russian public. Meanwhile, on a regional level, journalists are
routinely punished for attempting to uncover local malfeasance or
corruption.
Although the Russian leadership has consolidated a majority of the
media under its control, Lipman said, media with independent editorial
content still exists. She speculated that there were a number of
functions that having a tiny minority of independent media could serve:
existing for the sake of external consumption, a valve to let off some
steam, and potentially an in-house bulletin board for the use of elites
to signal dissatisfaction or to inform the leadership of conflicts.
McFaul began his remarks by noting he would not use the term
"democracy" to refer to the political system in place in Russia today.
He said that political science as a discipline is struggling to
properly code and understand systems such as Russia's and other
countries whose regimes are "between" dictatorship and democracy. He
illustrated this lack of clarity by referring to the lack of
correspondence between various freedom coding scores when it comes to
regimes that do not fall into either extreme of the political
freedom spectrum.
With regard to Russia, McFaul noted the crucial significance of the
fact that there was an election and that a new leader was appointed. In
that way, he said, Russia is not like Uzbekistan. He elaborated on what
he sees as three possible reasons that the Russian leadership decided
to construct the system that exists today: (1) Putin has decided that
this system is necessary for the modernization project he wishes to
undertake; (2) in order to allow for theft by the elites, for which
McFaul noted a controlled national media was crucial; and (3) to manage
the transition. Now that Putin's plan for the transition has been
fulfilled, it is an open question whether the regime can become a
system for governance.
Having delineated the "why," McFaul put forward what he sees as the
chief characteristics of the Russian regime: a lack of any defining
ideology; little connection to citizenry -- the fact that this is not
an autocracy of mobilization; no charismatic leader; the fact that the
regime is not a military junta, and that a strategy of massive
repression is not a viable alternative; the existence of foreign
enemies, which is important for autocracies to survive; and
the dependence of the regime's legitimacy upon performance,
particularly in the economic sphere. McFaul believes Putin knows that
this system is not sustainable over the long term, but that
paradoxically he nonetheless emphasizes continuity. He expressed
cautious hope that Medvedev's liberal-sounding speech in Krasnoyarsk --
which contained criticism of the current state of affairs in Russia and
lacked a real precedent in recent Russian political history -- could
signal a change in policy in the Kremlin.
He noted that he would not predict the future course of Russia's
political development and reiterated his point about the failings of
political science: although scholars can understand the structural
conditions that make potential social and political crises in such
regimes possible, the political science community does not do well at
predicting when they will occur. McFaul sounded a note of warning on
this point, saying that although poorly governed autocracies can last
for a long time, if there is a crisis and Russia still lacks the
democratic instruments to deal with it there could be a
serious authoritarian retrenchment.
In response to questions, Petrov and Lipman made clear that they did
not believe Medvedev's liberal rhetoric should be treated seriously.
McFaul noted that such changes, if they were to take place, would
likely occur at the margins and said that the situation is more
optimistic than if hawk Sergei Ivanov had been chosen as president.
