Rising leaders from a diverse group of nations in transition, including China, Russia, Ukraine, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nigeria arrived on campus on July 25 for a three-week seminar as Draper Hills Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development. Initiated by FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) six years ago, the program has created a network of some 139 leaders from 62 transitioning countries.  This year's exceptional class of  23 fellows includes a deputy minister of Ukraine, current and former members of parliament (including a deputy speaker), leading attorneys and rule of law experts, civic activists, journalists, international development practitioners, and founders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). (One fellow needed to withdraw because he was named to the Cabinet of the new Philippine president, Noynoy Aquino).

Draper Hills Summer Fellows are innovative, courageous, and committed leaders, who strive to improve governance, enhance civic participation, and invigorate development under very challenging circumstances"
- Larry Diamond"Draper Hills Summer Fellows are innovative, courageous, and committed leaders, who strive to improve governance, enhance civic participation, and invigorate development under very challenging circumstances," says CDDRL Director Larry Diamond. "This year's fellows are an inspiring group. They have come here to learn from us, but even more so from one another. And we will learn much from them, about the progress they are making and the obstacles they confront as they work to build democracy, improve government accountability, strengthen the rule of law, energize civil society, and enhance the institutional environment for broadly shared economic growth."

The three-week seminar is taught by an interdisciplinary team of leading Stanford faculty. In addition to Diamond, faculty include FSI Senior Fellow and CDDRL Deputy Director Kathryn Stoner; Stanford President Emeritus Gerhard Casper; FSI Deputy Director and political science Professor Stephen D. Krasner; Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow Francis Fukuyama; professor of political science, philosophy, and law Joshua Cohen; professor of pediatrics and Stanford Health Policy core faculty Paul H. Wise; visiting associate professor Beth van Schaack; FSI Senior Fellow Helen Stacy; Walter P. Falcon, deputy director, Program on Food Security and the Environment; Erik Jensen, co-director of the Stanford Law School's Rule of Law Program; Avner Greif, professor of economics; Rick Aubry, lecturer in management, Stanford Graduate School of Business; and Nicholas Hope, director, Stanford Center on International Development.

Other leading experts who will engage the fellows include President of the National Endowment for Democracy Carl Gershman, United States Court of Appeals Judge Pamela Rymer, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict founding chair Peter Ackerman, Omidyar Network partner Matt Halprin, Conservation International's Olivier Langrand, executives of leading Silicon Valley companies, such as Google and Facebook, and media and nonprofit organizations in the Bay Area.  Michael McFaul, a Stanford political science professor and former CDDRL director, who now serves on the National Security Council as President Obama's chief advisor on Russia, will come to campus to teach a session on U.S. foreign policy in the Obama administration.

The demanding, but compelling curriculum will devote the first week of the seminar to defining the fundamentals of democracy, good governance, economic development, and the rule of law.  In the second week, faculty will turn to democratic and economic transitions and the feedback mechanisms between democracy, development, and a predictable rule of law. This week will include offerings on liberation technology, social entrepreneurship, and issues raised by development and the environment.  The third week will turn to the critical - and often controversial - role of international assistance to foster and support democracy, judicial reform, and economic development, including the proper role of foreign aid.

Our program helps to create a broader community of global activists and practitioners, intent on sharing experiences to bring positive change to some of the world's most troubled countries and regions"
- Kathryn Stoner-Weiss The fellows themselves also lead discussions, focused on the concrete challenges they face in their ongoing work in political and economic development. "Fellows come to realize that they are often engaged in solving similar problems - such as endemic corruption in different country contexts," says Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. "Our program helps to create a broader community of global activists and practitioners, intent on sharing experiences to bring positive change to some of the world's most troubled countries and regions."

The program has received generous gifts from donors William Draper III and Ingrid Hills.  Bill Draper made his gift in honor of his father, Maj. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., a chief advisor to Gen. George Marshall and chief diplomatic administrator of the Marshall Plan in Germany, who confronted challenges comparable to those faced by Draper Hills Summer Fellows in building democracy, a market economy, and a rule of law, often in post-conflict conditions. Ingrid von Mangoldt Hills, made her gift in honor of her husband, Reuben Hills, president and chairman of Hills Bros. Coffee and a leading philanthropist. The Hills project they ran for 12 years improved the lives of inner city children and Ingrid saw in the Summer Fellows Program a promising opportunity to improve the lives of so many people in developing countries.

Thanking the program's benefactors, Larry Diamond says, "The benefit to CDDRL faculty and researchers is incalculable, and we are deeply grateful for the vision and generosity of Bill Draper and Ingrid Hills." As he and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss state, "The Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program allows us to interact with a highly, talented group of emerging leaders in political and economic development from diverse countries and regions. They benefit from exposure to the faculty's cutting edge work, while we benefit from a cycle of feedback on whether these ideas work in the field."  Like CDDRL, which bridges academic theory and policy, the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, they note, "is an ideal marriage between democratic and development theory and practice."

For additional details on the program or to request permission to attend a session, please contact program coordinator Audrey McGowan, audrey.mcgowan@stanford.edu.

The Southeast Asia Forum experienced an embarrassment of riches in 2009-2010.  In no previous academic year had the Forum enjoyed the intellectual company of so many first-rate scholars working on Southeast Asia at Stanford.  They were six in all—Marshall Clark (Australia), James Hoesterey (US), Juliet Pietsch (Australia), Thitinan Pongsudhirak (Thailand), Sudarno Sumarto (Indonesia), and Christian von Luebke (Germany)—three for the full academic year and three for two months apiece.  All six visitors shared their findings and thoughts on Southeast Asia in talks hosted by SEAF.  Not least among the pleasures of having them at Stanford was a Spring 2010 seminar in which they read each other’s work in progress and shared ideas as to how it might be improved.  These conversations gave specific, heuristic, and collegial meaning to the abstract notion of “a community of scholars.”

Here are brief updates on all six as of the end of June 2010:  

Marshall Clark

A lecturer in Indonesian studies at Deakin University in Australia, Dr. Clark came to Stanford on sabbatical to spend two months at Stanford in Spring 2010 writing up and sharing his research findings with US-based colleagues.  Publications associated with his stay at APARC include two books, Maskulinitas:  Culture, Gender and Politics in Indonesia (Monash University Press, 2010) and Indonesia-Malaysia Relations:  Media Politics and Regionalism (co-authored with Juliet Pietsch and forthcoming in 2011), and two articles, “The Ramayana in Southeast Asia: Fostering Regionalism or the State?” in Ramayana in Focus, and (with Dr. Pietsch) “Generational Change:  Regional Security and Australian Engagement with Asia,” The Pacific Review  During his time with SEAF he presented papers at venues including the Association for Asian Studies convention in Philadelphia in March 2010.  In April at the University of California-Berkeley at the Islam Today Film Festival he moderated a discussion of the ins and outs of making movies in Indonesia and Malaysia. (2010).

He returns to his position on the faculty of Deakin University.

James Hoesterey

Dr. Hoesterey was awarded the Walter H. Shorenstein Fellowship to spend the academic year at APARC working on several projects, including revising his University of Wisconsin-Madison doctoral dissertation into a book.  Based on anthropological research in Indonesia on media-savvy Muslim preachers, Sufi Gurus and Celebrity Scandal:  Islamic Piety on the Public Stage should be under review in 2010 for possible publication in 2011.  Also in the pipeline are an essay, “Shaming the State: Pop Preachers and the Politics of Pornography in Indonesia,” to appear in a volume he is co-editing with political scientist Michael Buehler, and chapters in Muslim Cosmopolitanisms and Digital Subjectivities:  Anthropology in the Age of Mass Media.  During his fellowship he spoke to audiences at several US universities.  In March 2010 he was elected incoming chair of the Indonesian and East-Timor Studies Committee of the Association for Asian Studies.

In Fall 2010 the BBC-Discovery Channel series “Human Planet” will feature Dr. Hoesterey’s work as a cultural consultant with documentary-film makers in West Papua.  He will spend AY 2010-11 in Illinois as the Andrew W. Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in Islamic Studies at Lake Forest College.  

Juliet Pietsch

Dr. Pietsch is a senior lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the Australian National University.  During her two-month sabbatical at Stanford in Spring 2010 she worked on two books:  Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Media, Politics and Regionalism (with Dr. Clark) and (with two other co-authors) Dimensions of Australian Society (3rd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  In April, jointly with Dr. Clark, she spoke at the Berkeley APEC Study Center on “Indonesia-Malaysia Relations and Southeast Asian Regional Identity.”

Dr. Pietsch returns to her faculty position at the Australian National University.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Dr. Pongsudhirak is an associate professor in the Department of International Relations in the Faculty of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University, whose Institute of Security and International Studies he also heads.  He was selected to spend a month at Stanford in Spring 2010 as an FSI-Humanities Center international scholar, and was supported for a second month by FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.  During his time on campus he focused on the turbulent politics of Thailand—in an article drafted for the Journal of Democracy, in a number of shorter pieces, in lectures at various venues, and in interviews with media around the world.  (For a filmed interview on 4 June 2010, see http://absolutelybangkok.com/thitinan-on-continuity-change/.)

Dr. Pongsudhirak will briefly rejoin some of his Stanford colleagues at a conference on Asian regionalism to be hosted by APARC in Kyoto in September 2010.  Meanwhile he continues his scholarship and teaching at Chulalongkorn.

Sudarno Sumarto

An Indonesian economist specializing on poverty reduction, Dr. Sumarto spent AY 2009-2010 at APARC as an Asia Foundation fellow writing up research, lecturing on and off campus, and advising Indonesian officials on anti-poverty policy.  Notable among the publications resulting from his residence at Stanford is a book, Poverty and Social Protection in Indonesia (Singapore / Jakarta:  ISEAS / Smeru Institute, May 2010), which he co-edited and most of whose chapters he co-wrote.  Noteworthy, too, is a co-authored essay, “Targeting Social Protection Programs:  The Experience of Indonesia,” in Deficits and Trajectories: Rethinking Social Protection as Development Policy in the Asia Region (forthcoming, 2010).  Indonesia-related subjects of writing in progress include lessons from the cash transfer program, how such transfers have affected political participation, and the impacts of violent conflict on economic growth.  During his stay at Stanford, Dr. Sumarto was chosen to co-convene the September 2010 Indonesia Update conference in Canberra on “Employment, Living Standards, and Poverty in Contemporary Indonesia” and to co-edit the resulting book. 

Dr. Sumarto returns to Jakarta to become a senior research fellow at the Smeru Institute, which he co-founded and directed, and to continue his work on poverty alleviation in Indonesia.

Christian von Luebke

Former Shorenstein fellow Dr. von Luebke completed the first year of a two-year German Research Foundation fellowship at Stanford writing a book on democracy and governance in Southeast Asia.  Before the end of 2010, Gauging Governance:  The Mesopolitics of Democratic Change in Indonesia should be in the pipeline toward publication.  Other relevant work includes “Politics of Reform:  Political Scandals, Elite Resistance, and Presidential Leadership in Indonesia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs (2010), and a co-authored piece on current economics and politics in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (2010).  Pending revision and resubmission is an article on the political economy of investment climates in Indonesia.  In the course of the year he spoke on his research before audiences in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia, and co-organized a panel on Southeast Asian politics to be held at the annual conference of Oxford Analytica in the UK in September 2010.

Dr. von Luebke’s plans for AY 2010-11 at Stanford include research and writing on Indonesia and the Philippines and teaching a course on Southeast Asian politics

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a live debate May 25 between Scott Sagan and Keith Payne, CEO and president of the National Institute for Public Policy. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization in Washington, D.C.

Scott Sagan's Introductory Statement

I have been asked to address the question: "What should be U.S. declaratory strategic deterrence policy?"

I continue to believe, as I wrote in my 2009 Survival article, that,

"The United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward a No-First Use declaratory policy by stating that the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces and to be able to respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options if necessary in the event that deterrence fails."

I believe that slow but steady movement toward a No-First Use (NFU) doctrine is in the U.S. interest because I think U.S. declaratory policy should have three characteristics.

U.S. declaratory policy should:

a) address the full range of nuclear threats to U.S. national security objectives (not just basic deterrence);

b) be accurate and consistent, reflecting actual military doctrine rather than being mere rhetoric; and

c) U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what U.S. leaders really might want do in the event of a deterrence failure.

In my brief opening remarks, I will explain these three points and outline the logic and evidence that leads me to the conclusion that the benefits of an NFU declaratory policy outweigh its costs.

Point #1: Deterrence is one, but only one critical U.S. national security objective and prudent decisions about declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons should take into account its likely effects on deterrence of adversaries, bit also the reassurance of allies, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, the risks of nuclear terrorism, the impact of our declaratory policy on nuclear doctrines of other states; and the prospects for long-term nuclear disarmament. In this sense, the CSIS question (like previous Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) before this latest one) is too narrow in scope and could therefore lead to an excessively narrow, indeed a wrong-headed, answer. Historically, many actions and statements made in the name of deterrence - think of Richard Nixon's Madman Nuclear Alert over Vietnam or George W. Bush's suggestion that "All Options are on the Table" included nuclear preventive strikes on Iran -- might add just a smidgen of deterrence, but can be highly counterproductive with respect to other U.S. nuclear security goals. This is true of the NPR in general: just as war is too important to be left to the generals, nuclear declaratory policy is too important to be left solely to the Pentagon.

Opponents of this broader conception of nuclear posture claim that there is no evidence that U.S. nuclear posture influences others or perceptions that we are honoring our NPT Article VI commitments help with non-proliferation goals. That view is wrong. Let me give just two examples:

1. Evidence to support the point about U.S. disarmament steps helping encourage others to act is seen with Indonesia's decision to ratify CTBT earlier this month:

When Indonesia announced its decision it said it had taken note of the "serious effort" on the part of the current United States Administration in promote disarmament. "We do feel that at this time, what is needed is positive encouragement rather than pressure of a different type that we've been trying to impart in the past," he said, voicing hope that the U.S. will follow suit from his country's actions. "We are also cognizant of some positive aspects of the United States' Nuclear Posture Review."

2. For evidence on the doctrinal influence or mimicry point let me cite India. In January 2003, the BJP government in New Delhi, influenced by the U.S. NPR, adopted a revised, more offensive nuclear doctrine including the explicit threat of Indian nuclear first-use in response to biological or chemical weapons use. "India must consider withdrawing from this [NFU] commitment as the other nuclear weapons-states have not accepted this policy." Although it is too early to know the final result, the Indian government today appears to be reversing course: A group of very senior former officials has stated that, "It is time to review the objectionable parts" of India's nuclear posture and the Foreign Minister has called for universal declarations of NFU.

Point #2: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Declaratory Policy should be consistent with actual U.S. Nuclear Doctrine. That is, U.S. government officials should not misrepresent what its "real" nuclear policy is when it makes public statements about intent and plans. This may seem like an obvious point to some... but history suggests that this principle is not always followed--from Robert McNamara's mid-1960s declaratory statements about Assured Destruction (which often downplayed the heavy Counter-Force emphasis of U.S. doctrine at the time) to the Bush Administration's February 2002 statement in which in the same speech it "reaffirmed" the 1995 Negative Security Assurances not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the NPT unless they attack the U.S. or our allies with a NWS and, in the same speech, also stated that, "If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response. This followed the leaking of the classified portion of the 2001 NPR which reportedly placed Iran, Libya, and Syria on target lists, creating a flurry of negative international press reports.

In an era in which leaks should be considered highly likely, if not inevitable and, at a time in which we want more transparency around the world, the U.S. Government should err on the side of transparency. With multiple audiences present, calculated ambiguity may sometimes be necessary and even helpful; clear contradictions and calculated hypocrisy are not.

Here, I must give the current Administration some credit, for it judged that there was a small set of specific threats that could not currently be met by U.S. and allied conventional forces. It said so clearly in the Nuclear Posture Review and also clearly committed itself to deal with the challenge:

"The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons." (p. ix)

Critics say that this will weaken extended deterrence as key allies will feel abandoned. Evidence so far is to the contrary:

  Japan: Foreign Minister Okada said, in October 2009, "We cannot deny the fact that we are moving in the direction of No-First Use of nuclear weapons. We would like to discuss the issue with Washington." The Japanese 2010 Rev Con statement said, "Japan appreciates and welcomes the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States." "We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. In this connection, we call on the Nuclear Weapon States to take, as soon as possible, such measures as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that comply with the NPT." Japanese 2010 NPT Review Conference statement

  This is also the case in NATO: The German, Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian governments have all called for removal of the tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. NATO meetings will address this soon. We should not just assume that the credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance to allies is threatened by NFU declarations or removal of tactical weapons. Instead, we should listen to what our allies are saying and work with them.

Point #3: U.S. declaratory policy should reflect what the U.S. might really want to do if deterrence fails. Doctrine and declaratory policy should be made with an acute awareness that deterrence might fail and not succumb to the common wishful thinking biases that assumes perfect prospects of success. This leads me to appreciate the wise advice that Brent Scowcroft gave to President George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf War to avoid "spoken or unspoken threats to use them (Nuclear Weapons) on the grounds that it is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention of carrying out."

When an official threatens actions that we have no intention of carrying out it can add a thin sliver of deterrence strength but at the grave cost, if the action occurs anyway, of either cheapening the currency of deterrence or risking the creation of a commitment trap that leads the state to execute an option that it otherwise would deem ill-advised. Here, I think of General Chilton's recent remarks about using nuclear threats to deter cyber attacks, as an example.

Here, I should note that in order to enhance non-proliferation and move slowly in the direction of a nuclear-free world the current NPR adds new NSAs and threatens conventional attacks only against NNWS in compliance with the NPT: "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations" (p.viii) and promises that its conventional responses would be "devastating" and that, "any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders , would be held fully accountable."

Dr. Payne, in his 2009 article, was critical of the whole goal of nuclear disarmament, despite the U.S. Article VI commitment to work in good faith toward that objective. He has written that, "The continuing threat posed by chemical and biological weapons is a fatal flaw in the logic of the nuclear-disarmament narrative, one that is all but ignored by its proponents.

"In fact, even if all enemies and potential enemies of the United States miraculously gave up their nuclear weapons, the United States would still need to maintain a nuclear deterrent arsenal. Why? Because some enemies reportedly retain other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as chemical and biological weapons, that could inflict enormous civilian casualties...If we also take nuclear deterrence off the table, we may, as Gen. Paul Fouilland, commander of the French Strategic Air Forces, has observed, 'Give a green light' to chemical and biological threats," Dr. Payne states.

I fail to see how a promise of "devastating" conventional responses and a promise that, "Any individuals responsible for the attack, would be held fully accountable" is giving any kind of green light to an adversary contemplating a chem/bio attack.

Furthermore, the only historical evidence that Dr. Payne cites to demonstrate his belief that, "Nuclear weapons threats have unique deterrent qualities" is the alleged success in deterring Iraqi use of Chem/Bio during the 1991 Gulf War:

The preponderance of evidence suggests that this is not right: Saddam did not use his WMD in 1991 because we threatened to march on Baghdad and overthrow his regime if he did that and "promised" to do that if he refrained from using his WMD.

First, look at the Bush, 25 January, 1991, letter to Saddam:

"Should war come it will be a far greater tragedy for you and your country. Let me state too that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort." Two of the three things that Bush warned about happened...hardly good evidence that vague threats or calculated ambiguity worked as a deterrent.

Second, look at James Baker's memoirs in which he claimed that he "purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation," but also warned Aziz that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, "Our objective won't just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime." Advocates of maintaining calculated ambiguity too often cite the first statement but fail to cite the second Baker statement.

Third, look at what Saddam said under interrogation: "How would Iraq have been described if it had used nuclear weapons? A: "We would have been called stupid." In the May 2004 interrogation: "The WMD was for the defense of Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq demonstrated this with the use of WMD during the Iraq and Iran War, as Iran had threatened the sovereignty of Iraq. Yet, Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened."

In conclusion: I think you will discover today that reasonable people can certainly disagree about how to value and prioritize these different nuclear-related objectives and reasonable people can (and do) disagree about how best to pursue them. But reasonable people should not ignore the full range of U.S. objectives and narrowly conflate deterrence with security, should continue to search for evidence that supports or weakens their assumptions, and should engage in rigorous dialogues like this to help propel the debate forward.

The 20th century world of philosophy did not, as a rule, create superstars.

Hannah Arendt was an exception – almost from the time she coined the phrase that has become a cliché, "banality of evil," to describe the 1961 trial of Nazi Adolf Eichmann in a series of articles for The New Yorker. She acquired a cult status that her mentors, philosophers Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, could hardly imagine.

Thirty-five years after her death, the German-Jewish political theorist, author of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition and Life of the Mind, among other works, is an international industry, with new letters, commentaries and biographies published every year. But perhaps her message has been obscured by celebrity.

A scholarly conference at Stanford attempted to redress the imbalance in its own way with a recent two-day workshop, "Hannah Arendt and the Humanities: On the Relevance of Her Work Beyond the Realm of Politics," sponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Scholars from around the world discussed the life and thought of one of the most seminal and influential political philosophers of the last century.

A friend remembers

In a surprise appearance, Stanford University President Emeritus Gerhard Casper spoke of his friendship with Arendt, from their meeting in 1961 until her death in 1975.

"Why Arendt? Why Arendt now?" asked Professor Amir Eshel, director of the Forum on Contemporary Europe. He said that in the humanities, her "insights about the link between the past and the future" can "address the predicaments of our time, specifically such manmade disasters as genocide and mass expulsion."

Arendt fled Germany when Hitler rose to power in 1933, immigrating in 1941 to the United States, where she taught at a number of universities. Her works, particularly The Origins of Totalitarianism, a study of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, spurred a wide-ranging debate on the nature and history of totalitarianism. Her books analyzed freedom, power, evil, political action – and, always, thought.

Stanford professor Robert Harrison, chair of the Department of French and Italian, made the conference's most spirited address in a talk on "passionate thinking." He considered Arendt's notion of friendship and thought as rooted in solitude and the ability to commune with oneself – that "plurality begins with the individual."

The "overwhelming question" in the humanities, he said, is "How do we negotiate the necessity of solitude as a precondition for thought?"

"What do we do to foster the regeneration of thinking? Nothing. At least not institutionally," he said. "Not only in the university, but in society at large, everything conspires to invade the solitude of thought. It has as much to do with technology as it does with ideology. There is a not a place we go where we are not connected to the collective.

"Every place of silence is invaded by noise. Everywhere we see the ravages of this on our thinking. The ability for sustained, coherent, consistent thought is becoming rare" in the "thoughtlessness of the age."

Harrison decried the public fascination with Arendt's youthful affair with Heidegger, a Nazi sympathizer; the publication of Arendt's personal letters; and her biographers' invasive use of private material – although at least one biographer, Thomas Wild of Berlin, author of Hannah Arendt, attended the workshop.

Casper said that he had to be "cajoled into coming" as Arendt was "a very private person."

"She would not have approved of videos, being taped at all times and put out on the web," he said, indicating the camera that was filming the event.

He noted that "she liked to gossip – very much so." However, he said, "What she would have been appalled by is the industry. Cottage industry? This is hardly a cottage industry anymore."

Guarded her solitude

Casper reinforced the notion of Arendt as a guardian of her own solitude: attending conferences infrequently and "always thinking … always fiercely independent," protecting her "private time, time for study, time in her apartment on Riverside Drive."

"She was forceful, opinionated, never had any doubts about her views," he said. "In certain circumstances she was willing to listen carefully and be convinced she was wrong. Those were rare."

Casper said he considered her best book to be Eichmann in Jerusalem, a book that concluded, famously, with a direct address to Eichmann:

Just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations – as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world – we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.

"She was incredibly good when she observed, when she told what she saw," Casper  said. "She was incredibly suggestive and artistic – she was not definitive, not scientific," he said. "That's why she's not popular among philosophers, nor among political scientists. She was putting forward a kind of truth, not definitive, about the human condition. That was her great strength."

Arendt is more than another talking head; Eshel said that she forms a formidable counterpoint German philosopher Walter Benjamin's view of the past "as one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage at the feet of the angel of history."

Arendt instead "wants us to acknowledge our ability to set off, to begin, to insert ourselves with word and deed into the world. Arendt seemed to have sensed that if we do not do so there may be indeed no future for us to share."