In September, Crystal Chang and Jeremy M. Menchik will join the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as its Shorenstein Fellows for the 2011–2012 academic year. 

Crystal Chang, a PhD candidate with the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is currently completing her dissertation on China's growing independent automotive industry. Her research examines Chinese automakers alongside historical case studies from Japan and Korea. During her time at Shorenstein APARC, she will expand her dissertation to include a comparative study of India's contemporary automotive industry, which, like China's, has experienced domestic and international success. She will also continue research that she is currently conducting about China's private energy sector, with a focus on the solar power industry. Chang holds an MPIA degree in international management from the University of California, San Diego, and a BA in international relations from Stanford University.

Jeremy Menchik, a PhD candidate with the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW-Madison), is finishing his dissertation, which poses the question: what is the basis for religious tolerance in Indonesia, and why does it sometimes break down? He addresses this question through a study of Indonesian civil society and of three of the country's largest and oldest Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and Persatuan Islam. Menchik has conducted extensive field research in Indonesia during the course of his graduate studies. At Shorenstein APARC, he will prepare his dissertation for publication and develop related projects on Islamic law, political tolerance, and political symbolism in Indonesian elections. Menchik holds an MA in political science from UW-Madison and a BA, also in political science, from the University of Michigan.

Established in 2002 through the generosity of Walter H. Shorenstein, the Shorenstein Fellowship in Contemporary Asia is an exciting opportunity for junior scholars to spend a year at Shorenstein APARC, engaging with other scholars and experiencing the world-class resources—ranging from libraries to events—that Stanford University has to offer. Shorenstein APARC looks forward to welcoming Chang and Menchik to the center in the coming academic year.

President Obama's vision of a "world free of nuclear weapons" -- first enunciated in Prague in April 2009 -- has been derided by his critics as a utopian fantasy that will have no influence on the nuclear strategies of other nations.

But in a special issue of The Nonproliferation Review, entitled Arms, Disarmament, and Influence: International Responses to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, 13 prominent researchers from around the world examined foreign governments' policy responses to Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the landmark document published a year and a day after his Prague speech.

They found that many nations, though not all, had been "strongly influenced by Washington's post-Prague policy and nuclear posture developments," which reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy, and assured non-nuclear nations that the U.S. would never use nuclear arms against them provided they remained in compliance with their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Indeed, the 11 case studies presented "demonstrate that U.S. pronouncements and actions influenced bureaucratic infighting and domestic debates inside a number of important foreign governments, and that some of these governments have adjusted their own policies and actions accordingly."

Read the full report here.

See a presentation about the report here, or listen to a different one here.

Read CISAC co-director Scott Sagan's essay on "Obama's Disarming Influence" in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  

Read Thomas Fingar's essay on "How China Views U.S. Policy" in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 

Highlights:

* Russia adopted a nuclear doctrine that was considerably more moderated than it would have been had the United States not pushed ahead with its own policy changes. In the run up to the April 2010 publication of the NPR, Washington "reset" relations with Russia, ended the deployment of missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic, and resumed the disarmament negotiations that ultimately led to the ratification of the New START treaty. As a result of this process, and continuous consultation with Russia about the NPR, Moscow narrowed the role of nuclear weapons in its policy and the range of circumstances in which it would consider using them. (page 39)

* "The most important short-term success of Obama's nuclear weapons policy," along with the "Prague Spirit," has been to halt the erosion of the NPT. "Obama's policies helped extract a minimum positive result from the 2010 NPT Review Conference, a favorable outcome compared to the chaos that his predecessor's representatives had created at the 2005 conference." The Obama policy was welcomed as a positive development, which allowed "key players, such as Egypt and Brazil, to strive for compromise, and others, such as Russia and China, not to block it." (page 219)

* The U.S. effort to encourage other governments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their policy was successful in the United Kingdom, which adopted a nuclear posture that was very similar to that to the U.S. (page 238)

* Due in large part to the Obama policy, some of the non-nuclear weapons states in NATO began to push for the removal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. At the November 2010 NATO summit, members agreed to a new Strategic Concept that called for negotiations with Russia and a linkage between the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe to comparable reductions in western Russia. (page 238)

* Obama's new nuclear doctrine was a driving force behind a May 2010 agreement among 189 nations at the Nonproliferation Review Conference to a set of disarmament objectives and steps to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime. (page 238)

* The Obama disarmament initiatives encouraged Indonesia's decision to begin the process of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (page 238)

* China continues to view Washington's nuclear doctrine with suspicion. Although Beijing viewed the 2010 NPR favorably compared to its 2001 predecessor, it still found serious cause for concern. This is partly the result of timing: the NPR came out amid a period of rising tension between U.S. and China. It also reflected a tendency among Chinese leaders to view virtually all U.S. doctrine and actions as part of a concerted effort to constrain its rise. In this view, the NPR would foster comparisons between nuclear decreases in Russia and the U.S., and increases in China, and be used as leverage to force Beijing to engage in an expensive conventional arms race. In keeping with this China-centric view, Chinese officials were also concerned about the U.S. military's continued development of missile defense capabilities. (page 243)

* Many non-nuclear weapons states--such as Egypt, Brazil, and South Africa--emphasize their opposition to any constraints being placed on their right to enjoy the benefits of civilian nuclear energy. Some of their opposition is "due to post-colonial sensitivity about any apparent inequality in the terms of international agreements that divide the world into 'haves' and 'have-nots.'" Others are engaged in bargaining, waiting to see what nuclear-weapons states will do regarding disarmament before offering to accept more constraints on nuclear technology development. Some governments also appear to be engaged in "hedging behavior--protecting their ability to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium" to be closer to acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, should they choose to do so. This may be disappointing for Washington policymakers, but it should not be surprising. After all, the U.S. employs a similar "hedging strategy" in its management of its own nuclear stockpile. As a result, it is imperative to begin discussions of how to reduce the danger of both kinds of nuclear hedging behavior. (page 255)

* The Obama administration must continue "to ensure there is consistency and discipline in the messages" emanating from the military and the government bureaucracy. Some foreign governments viewed the NPR's guarantees as mere rhetoric. "Such a skeptical view is encouraged whenever a senior US military officer makes statements that reflect a lack of understanding or lack of discipline regarding nuclear use policy." Even after the NPR was released, a top U.S. general insisted that the United States had not altered its "calculated ambiguity" policy. (page 258)

The special issue of the Nonproliferation Review was coordinated by Scott D. Sagan, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and Jane Vaynman, a PhD candidate at the Department of Government at Harvard University, and a National Security Studies Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. The journal is published by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and it is edited by Stephen Schwartz.

Authors:

Irma Argüello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, a private nonprofit initiative that focuses on improving global security and reducing risks stemming from WMD proliferation.

Ralph A. Cossa is President of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. He is senior editor of the Forum's quarterly electronic journal, Comparative Connections. 

Ambassador Nabil Fahmy is the founding Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. He is also the Chair of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies' Middle East Project.

Thomas Fingar is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow and Senior Scholar in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Brad Glosserman is Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. Mr. Glosserman is co-editor of Comparative Connections, the Pacific Forum's quarterly electronic journal, and writes, along with Ralph Cossa, the regional review.

S. Paul Kapur is associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a faculty affiliate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Mustafa Kibaroglu is an Assistant Professor at Bilkent University.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank specializing in national and international security problems. 

Harald Müller is executive director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and Professor at International Relations at Goethe University Frankfurt.

Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, Switzerland, where he manages the research project Russian Nuclear Forces.

Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute. He also serves as the co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Science's Global Nuclear Future Initiative.

Scott Snyder is Director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation, Senior Associate at Pacific Forum CSIS, and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Jane Vaynman is a PhD candidate at the Department of Government at Harvard University and a National Security Studies Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

^{The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), is an interdisciplinary university-based research and training center addressing some of the world's most difficult security problems with policy-relevant solutions. The Center is committed to scholarly research and to giving independent advice to governments and international organizations.}

Q. While the ROK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will come into force on July 1, the ROK-U.S. FTA is still awaiting approval from the U.S. Congress. Could you tell us about the prospects for Congressional approval of the deal?

"It was such a significant issue that even President Barack Obama mentioned the trade deal during his State of the Union address in January, and he also called on Congress to ratify it ‘as soon as possible.' Therefore, you will likely see in the coming weeks the submission of the legislation to Congress, and I expect that it will pass through both the House and the Senate after a robust discussion of it. I think that with the Administration and many stakeholders in the United States from business to workers to individual states and communities saying how important this is for the American economy and for Korea-U.S. relations, I'm very optimistic about the ratification process."

Q. The Six-Party Talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue have been at a stalemate for more than two years. Some officials, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, argue that the United States should have bilateral dialogue with the North to smooth the way for the resumption of the [Six-Party] Talks. What do you think we need now to resume the stalled Six-Party Talks?

"U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth already mentioned this issue in details at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the North Korean issue yesterday (March 1). We all agree that it is very important to improve inter-Korean relations, and we also understand that when we verify that the North truly wants to see a tangible improvement in its relations with the ROK, we should be ready to accept bilateral and multilateral dialogue."

Q. Regarding Mr. Bosworth's mention about food aid to the North, some observers speculate that there will be some change in the stalled U.S.-North Korea relations.

"(Shaking her head) The U.S. approach on the provision of humanitarian assistance including food assistance internationally has always been a principled one based upon an assessment of the need and the ability to monitor in an appropriate way to ensure the assistance gets to those who are most needy. We are applying those same principles to any consideration of humanitarian assistance to North Korea, and therefore, he [Amb. Bosworth] did not indicate any particular change."

Q. The "Jasmine Revolution" is sweeping the Middle East. Considering the lack of social networking services and a different type of regime in North Korea, it may be difficult to draw a direct comparison [between the Middle East and North Korea,] but do you think that the pro-democracy movements in the Middle East could affect North Korea?

"To be honest with you, I do not know. It is difficult to speculate on it because North Korea is certainly one of the most isolated places in the world when it comes to the availability of news about the outside world."

Q. While the ROK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will come into force on July 1, the ROK-U.S. FTA is still awaiting approval from the U.S. Congress. Could you tell us about the prospects for Congressional approval of the deal?

"It was such a significant issue that even President Barack Obama mentioned the trade deal during his State of the Union address in January, and he also called on Congress to ratify it ‘as soon as possible.' Therefore, you will likely see in the coming weeks the submission of the legislation to Congress, and I expect that it will pass through both the House and the Senate after a robust discussion of it. I think that with the Administration and many stakeholders in the United States from business to workers to individual states and communities saying how important this is for the American economy and for Korea-U.S. relations, I'm very optimistic about the ratification process."

Q. Recently, the issue of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the ROK in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula stirred up some controversy. Some observers also point out that it is possible for the United States to assist the ROK with tactical nuclear weapons as part of its extended deterrence. If the ROK wants, is there a possibility that the United States will redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons to USFK?

"Our position is very clear on this, and we reaffirmed it at a Senate hearing yesterday (March 1). We want to see the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. That means no nuclear weapons in North Korea. There are no nuclear weapons right now in South Korea. In terms of the ROK, it's our assessment that the reintroduction of these weapons is neither desirable nor needed."

Q. President Obama, in his speeches, praised the ROK especially for its education. In the ROK, however, many people point out that the education problem is very serious. What is your take on this?

"So many Koreans talked about it. Those who are currently living in the ROK or those who have been watching the ROK's education system may know that education is such an important issue for Koreans. Personally, I am also well aware of (Koreans') education fervor as well as the stress incurred by children and families due to excessive [education-related] competition.

President Obama seems to think that every education system has some problems, and he appears to want to introduce Korea's education fervor and parents' active interest in education to the United States. In my opinion, President Obama believes that in this aspect, the ROK is a good model.

However, as everybody knows it, there is no such thing as a perfect education system. Therefore, while the United States learns education fervor from the ROK's education system, the ROK could learn a wider variety of teaching methods from the United States."

Q. Would you raise your child in a Korean-style education system?

"Since my son has already grown up, I can only give you a hypothetical answer. The biggest challenge would be language, but I can say 'Yes.' This is because I know that the ROK also has many good schools and teachers. However, when it comes to sending my child to ‘hagwon,' a private institute, I would need to discuss with Korean parents, teachers and friends."

Q.  Could you tell us about U.S.-ROK relations and public sentiments in both countries now and at the time of your assignment to the ROK? When you arrived in the ROK, U.S. beef imports were a "big issue."

"The ROK and the United States have a very friendly alliance, and they are deepening and expanding it day by day. In addition, I think that I am lucky that I have served in the ROK at a time when I can contribute to creating the best and strongest relationship in the world.

When I arrived in the ROK in September, 2008, I received a truly warm welcome from the ROK—although it is a Korean tradition. When I went out on the streets, many people, who had concerns or expectations about ROK-U.S. relations, recognized and approached me and said that they wanted to see an improvement in ROK-U.S. relations. This is a message showing that the ROK-U.S. relations are very important, and we are actually working together to maintain a good relationship. 

Even President Obama said that (the bilateral relationship) ‘has never been better than it is today.' (A fluent Korean speaker, Stephens repeated the same phrase in Korean.)"

Q. Unlike other U.S. Ambassadors to the ROK, you travel across the ROK to reach out to Koreans, even gaining the nickname "Star Ambassador." Is there any special reason?

"Thank you very much for appreciating my efforts. Whenever I am assigned to a certain nation, I think that I must understand the nation and its people because that is what a diplomat and an Ambassador is supposed to do. To me, Korea this may have been a little easier than it was for my predecessors. This is because I lived in the ROK before, I speak Korean, and I feel comfortable with Korean culture.

I visited the ROK in 1975 for the first time, and I wanted to know how much the ROK and Koreans' thought have changed ever since, and I watched actual changes with interest.   

Q.  This might be a little premature, but you are going to leave office in six months. Do you have any future plans? Are you going to continue to work to strengthen ROK-U.S. relations?

"(Laughter) This is my third time to live in the ROK. It is a great honor to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK. In my third year in office, I still have many things to do, including the ROK-U.S. FTA, but after leaving office, I hope to continue to make contributions to this great (U.S.-Korea) relationship for the rest of my life. In fact, I do not know what to do after leaving office, but I will always carry a huge interest in and commitment to this relationship."

Q. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Peace Corps. You actually worked as a Peace Corps volunteer in the ROK. What does the Peace Corps mean for you? How did your service in the ROK affect you today?

"Thank you for asking that question. The Peace Corps is still engaging in various activities around the world, and I think that it is the best program ever from the United States Government. I can say that this program has inspired the United States and people around the world throughout many generations.

It is true that while serving in the ROK as a Peace Corps member, I underwent a series of difficulties which I had never experienced before. It was not easy for a young woman to adapt to living and working in a nation which she hardly knew.

At that time, I needed to completely assimilate into a Korean organization. I serve in many countries as a diplomat, but it is about working at a U.S. Embassy, a U.S. institution.  Therefore, it is difficult to compare it with Peace Corps activities. I think that at that time, I had experience which was totally new mentally, physically, and emotionally. However, any Peace Corps member has such experience.

[Through such experience,] I witnessed the strength and various talents of Koreans in person, and that has had an enormous impact on my life.  

Translation by Yonhap News. Republished with permission.