Beijing tries to read mixed U.S. signals in Korea diplomacy By John W. Lewis

For the past year China has led the quest for a negotiated solution to the Korean nuclear crisis. It facilitated and hosted three-way talks with the United States and North Korea a year ago this week and two sessions of the six-party talks (adding South Korea, Japan and Russia) in August and February. Its officials crisscrossed the globe to explore potential areas of common interest and compromise and this week hosted North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to explore options for the beleaguered Korean Peninsula. Yet, in each of the formal talks, the Chinese have been discouraged by the minimal results. They are now questioning U.S. intentions toward Korea and, in the longer term, toward China.

Beijing considers the unchecked expansion of North Korea's nuclear weapons to be a real possibility, and its reasoning starts with the record of U.S. policies toward nuclear proliferation. That record, the Chinese argue, is mixed and often contradictory. As a result, China worries that Washington might continue to tolerate the program so long as Pyongyang did not cross key red lines, such as the transfer of nuclear materials to terrorists.

Whatever Beijing's past position on nuclear matters, many senior Chinese now regard nuclear weapons on their border to be a direct threat to their national security and suspect Washington of downplaying that danger. For them, it is no great leap to the conclusion that the unfettered growth of the Korean program might embolden others in Asia, including Taiwan, to acquire nuclear weapons despite verbal opposition from Washington. Beijing's leaders can easily imagine how that nightmarish turn of events would undermine the nation's drive toward modernization and end strategic cooperation with the United States.

Despite the fact that all parties at the six-party meeting in February endorsed the dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program, the Chinese fear that the talks may be dead in the water. Following that meeting, they began to debate other ways to resolve the crisis. They had already reorganized the leadership team responsible for North Korean affairs, and that team had begun acting to prevent the worst case, including offering further inducements to Kim Jong Il this week. Whereas last fall the talk of deepening U.S.-China cooperation on Korea pervaded the news, now, especially after Vice President Dick Cheney's uncompromising stand on Korea and Taiwan last week, the reverse is occurring.

What China can do in these circumstances is quite limited. Its influence on North Korea is largely determined by what the United States does or doesn't do. By refusing to negotiate on a staged process leading to the eventual dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, Washington has tacitly allowed the North's program to proceed. It has rejected proposals for a temporary freeze, technical talks and any interim steps short of the unconditional and complete ending of the program. The result is virtual paralysis.

Beijing has been able to work with North Korea only when it could find areas of potential compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. It cannot or will not act

alone to exert pressure because this would jeopardize its influence on the North. Contrary to a widely circulated story, Beijing did not cut off energy shipments to North Korea for three days in 2003. Beijing would not take such a counterproductive action when its main influence with the North lies in the kind of quiet diplomacy being practiced this week with Kim Jong Il.

Many in Beijing are beginning to question whether there might be a more promising approach with Pyongyang. Should the Chinese, South Koreans and Russians conclude that making progress toward the common goal of the North's complete nuclear disarmament is out of reach, for example, they reluctantly might translate their joint offer of aid in February into a quid pro quo for a partial agreement, such as a limited freeze, that would allow the situation to stabilize. China could worry that such an independent action could endanger the common front with Washington. At the same time, it could calculate that the United States would be sufficiently pleased with any solution that halted the North Korean nuclear program.

None of these developments may come to pass, of course, but who could have imagined a year ago that Washington would have permitted the situation to deteriorate to the present point?

For the past year China has led the quest for a negotiated solution to the Korean nuclear crisis. It facilitated and hosted three-way talks with the United States and North Korea a year ago this week and two sessions of the six-party talks (adding South Korea, Japan and Russia) in August and February. Its officials crisscrossed the globe to explore potential areas of common interest and compromise and this week hosted North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to explore options for the beleaguered Korean Peninsula. Yet, in each of the formal talks, the Chinese have been discouraged by the minimal results. They are now questioning U.S. intentions toward Korea and, in the longer term, toward China.

Beijing considers the unchecked expansion of North Korea's nuclear weapons to be a real possibility, and its reasoning starts with the record of U.S. policies toward nuclear proliferation. That record, the Chinese argue, is mixed and often contradictory. As a result, China worries that Washington might continue to tolerate the program so long as Pyongyang did not cross key red lines, such as the transfer of nuclear materials to terrorists.

Whatever Beijing's past position on nuclear matters, many senior Chinese now regard nuclear weapons on their border to be a direct threat to their national security and suspect Washington of downplaying that danger. For them, it is no great leap to the conclusion that the unfettered growth of the Korean program might embolden others in Asia, including Taiwan, to acquire nuclear weapons despite verbal opposition from Washington. Beijing's leaders can easily imagine how that nightmarish turn of events would undermine the nation's drive toward modernization and end strategic cooperation with the United States.

Despite the fact that all parties at the six-party meeting in February endorsed the dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program, the Chinese fear that the talks may be dead in the water. Following that meeting, they began to debate other ways to resolve the crisis. They had already reorganized the leadership team responsible for North Korean affairs, and that team had begun acting to prevent the worst case, including offering further inducements to Kim Jong Il this week. Whereas last fall the talk of deepening U.S.-China cooperation on Korea pervaded the news, now, especially after Vice President Dick Cheney's uncompromising stand on Korea and Taiwan last week, the reverse is occurring.

What China can do in these circumstances is quite limited. Its influence on North Korea is largely determined by what the United States does or doesn't do. By refusing to negotiate on a staged process leading to the eventual dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, Washington has tacitly allowed the North's program to proceed. It has rejected proposals for a temporary freeze, technical talks and any interim steps short of the unconditional and complete ending of the program. The result is virtual paralysis.

Beijing has been able to work with North Korea only when it could find areas of potential compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. It cannot or will not act alone to exert pressure because this would jeopardize its influence on the North. Contrary to a widely circulated story, Beijing did not cut off energy shipments to North Korea for three days in 2003. Beijing would not take such a counterproductive action when its main influence with the North lies in the kind of quiet diplomacy being practiced this week with Kim Jong Il.

Many in Beijing are beginning to question whether there might be a more promising approach with Pyongyang. Should the Chinese, South Koreans and Russians conclude that making progress toward the common goal of the North's complete nuclear disarmament is out of reach, for example, they reluctantly might translate their joint offer of aid in February into a quid pro quo for a partial agreement, such as a limited freeze, that would allow the situation to stabilize. China could worry that such an independent action could endanger the common front with Washington. At the same time, it could calculate that the United States would be sufficiently pleased with any solution that halted the North Korean nuclear program.

None of these developments may come to pass, of course, but who could have imagined a year ago that Washington would have permitted the situation to deteriorate to the present point?

Korea's leading companies, Pantech Co., Ltd., and Curitel Communications, Inc. (known as the Pantech Group) have awarded a $2 million gift to support the Korean Studies Program at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), within the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

The Pantech gift will create the Stanford Korea Forum, led by Professor Gi-Wook Shin, which will convene a conference every year on different aspects of the U.S.-Korea relationship. Three fellowships will also be established: one for mid-career professionals in public service, journalism, and business who will spend three to nine months at Stanford as Pantech Fellows; one for invited Korean scholars to come to Stanford during the summer; and a third for undergraduate and graduate students interested in Korean studies. In addition, the gift will help to sustain critical activities of the Korean Studies Program in APARC, such as public lectures, ongoing research, and policy briefs.

Under the leadership of Byeong Yeop Park, the Founder and Chairman, the Pantech Group had combined sales of 14 million sets worldwide, with a total gross revenue of U.S. $1.7 billion in 2003, placing them in the top three mobile handset manufacturers in Korea, and the eighth largest in the global market.

The Korean government has recognized Mr. Park's achievements with numerous awards. His strong investment in R&D and his recruitment of top technological talent have led to steady and sustainable profits for Pantech, and the company has a record of supporting broad social programs in local communities.

Regarding the company's commitment to Stanford, Mr. Park said, "I am extremely pleased to be part of this outstanding and unique program on Korean Studies. I recognize Stanford's contribution to promoting mutual understanding between Korea and the U.S. by bringing together prominent scholars, policymakers, and business leaders of both countries. I'm so proud that Pantech Group will be contributing to developing the next generation of leaders in building the relationship between Korea and the United States. I hope that our pledge will help attract to Stanford some of the brightest young minds of our two countries."

Professor Shin was delighted about the generous Pantech gift. Korean Studies have blossomed at Stanford over the past three years under Shin's leadership, and he notes that this new commitment will "facilitate American understanding of Korea and elevate Stanford's Korean studies program to the next level of excellence." Shin also underscored the importance of the timing of this gift, "as the United States is now entering a new era in its relations with both North and South Korea."

The Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is a unique Stanford University institution focused on the study of contemporary Asia. APARC's mission is to produce and publish Asia Pacific-focused interdisciplinary research; to educate students, scholars, and corporate and governmental affiliates about the importance of U.S.-Asian relations; to promote constructive interaction to understand and resolve the region's challenges; to influence U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific; and to guide Asian nations on key foreign relations, government, political economy, technology, and social issues. APARC is part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

The national debate over human embryonic stem cell research -- one that has pitted religious objections against the promise of major scientific and therapeutic advances -- has been reawakened by a dramatic advance that could have been made in the United States, but wasn't. That's because on Aug. 9, 2001, President Bush announced that only stem cell lines obtained before that date could be used in research supported by federal funds. This has virtually halted a vital area of medical science here because development of an equivalent level of private support will require many years. And that's why the new excitement comes from South Korea, not from this country. The stakes are high. Stem cells, which can be obtained from human embryos otherwise discarded at fertility clinics in the course of assisted reproduction, are capable of forming all of the tissues of the adult human body under the right circumstances. They are of enormous potential advantage in the treatment of Parkinson's disease, spinal cord injuries, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes. So what's wrong with the dozen or so old cell lines we have? The problem is that most of the approved lines are unavailable, or otherwise guarded by murky intellectual property claims. The way they were made and their limited genetic diversity limit their therapeutic utility. More important, new technology has taken us beyond their capacity. The recent experiments performed in South Korea have produced a robust line of stem cells, derived from blastocysts that were produced by activating eggs taken from female volunteers with nuclei taken from body cells of the donor. This process, called somatic cell nuclear transfer, is viewed by some as akin to cloning people, which no one in the scientific community favors. Instead, it provides a way to explore the early processes of human development and develop novel ways of understanding the basis for genetic predisposition to late-onset diseases. It is essential research, and it is needed here. Yet if the congressional opponents of stem cell research have their way, a bill already passed by the House and now being considered in the Senate would make such work a crime. In South Korea, cloning for reproductive purposes is against the law. But this work, plainly aimed at scientific and therapeutic purposes, was encouraged and supported by the government. If we decide to discourage or even criminalize such experiments here, they will be done elsewhere -- and the benefits will be reaped by others. One option in this country is to approach a solution at the state level. Some states have passed laws that make cloning people illegal but allow cloning stem cells -- an important distinction that Congress has so far been unwilling to make. And some states have developed the means for raising funds to support the kind of research that now cannot be done with federal funds. A forthcoming ballot initiative in California would appropriate $350 million each year to support stem cell research. It would create a California Stem Cell Research and Cures Fund, to be distributed by an Institute for Regenerative Medicine, overseen by an independent citizens committee selected from academic and research institutions. The funding plan rests on the authorization of a $3 billion general obligation bond issue. For the first five years, a positive tax revenue stream generated by the initial expenditures will make it possible not to burden the state's general fund while it recovers from its present economic stress. The California experiment is an interesting one. As Californians and scientists, we hope for its success. But we also hope that it will be a signal for other citizens -- that there are domestic alternatives to a national policy that threatens to drive an important and valuable research activity overseas. A California resolution would be nice for us, and for the California economy. But if we can't find a solution that permits stem cell research at the federal level, the result will be costly for our national health.

• DAVID BALTIMORE is president of the California Institute of Technology;
• PAUL BERG is a professor of biochemistry at Stanford University;
• DONALD KENNEDY, former Stanford president, is editor-in-chief of Science magazine; and
• IRV WEISSMAN is a professor of cancer biology at Stanford. They wrote this column for the Mercury News.