Preventing the unthinkable ongoing crisis with Tehran is not the first time Washington has faced a hostile government attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Nor is it likely to be the last. Yet the reasoning of U.S. officials now struggling to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions is clouded by a kind of historical amnesia, which leads to both creeping fatalism about the United States’ ability to keep Iran from getting the bomb and excessive optimism about the United States’ ability to contain Iran if it does become a nuclear power.

A U.S. official in the executive branch anonymously told the New York Times in March 2006, “The reality is that most of us think the Iranians are probably going to get a weapon, or the technology to make one, sooner or later.” Military planners and intelligence officers have reportedly been tasked with developing strategies to deter Tehran if negotiations fail.

Both proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism are wrong-headed, and they reinforce each other in a disturbing way. As nuclear proliferation comes to be seen as inevitable, wishful thinking can make its consequences seem less severe, and if faith in deterrence grows, incentives to combat proliferation diminish.

Deterrence optimism is based on mistaken nostalgia and a faulty analogy. Although deterrence did work with the Soviet Union and China, there were many close calls; maintaining nuclear peace during the Cold War was far more difficult and uncertain than U.S. officials and the American public seem to remember today. Furthermore, a nuclear Iran would look a lot less like the totalitarian Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and a lot more like Pakistan, Iran’s unstable neighbor—a far more frightening prospect.

Fatalism about nuclear proliferation is equally unwarranted. Although the United States did fail to prevent its major Cold War rivals from developing nuclear arsenals, many other countries—including Japan, West Germany, South Korea, and more recently Libya—curbed their own nuclear ambitions.

THE REASONS WHY

The way for Washington to move forward on Iran is to give Tehran good reason to relinquish its pursuit of nuclear weapons. That, in turn, requires understanding why Tehran wants them in the first place.

Iran’s nuclear energy program began in the 1960s under the shah, but even he wanted to create a breakout option to get the bomb quickly if necessary. One of his senior energy advisers recalled, “The shah told me that he does not want the bomb yet, but if anyone in the neighborhood has it, we must be ready to have it.” At first, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini objected to nuclear weapons on religious grounds, but the mullahs abandoned such restraint after Saddam Hussein ordered chemical attacks on Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq War.

The end of Saddam’s rule in 2003 significantly reduced the security threat to Tehran. But by then the United States had taken Iraq’s place. In his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush had denounced the governments of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil” with ties to international terrorism. After the fall of Baghdad, an unidentified senior U.S. official told a Los Angeles Times reporter that Tehran should “take a number,” hinting that it was next in line for regime change.

Increasingly, Bush administration spokespeople advocated “preemption” to counter proliferation. When asked, in April 2006, whether the Pentagon was considering a potential preventive nuclear strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, President Bush pointedly replied, “All options are on the table.”

AGREED FRAMEWORK IN FARSI

A source of inspiration for handling Iran is the 1994 Agreed Framework that the United States struck with North Korea. The Bush administration has severely criticized the deal, but it contained several elements that could prove useful in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

After the North Koreans were caught violating their NPT commitments in early 1993, they threatened to withdraw from the treaty. Declaring that “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb,” President Clinton threatened an air strike on the Yongbyon reactor site if the North Koreans took further steps to reprocess plutonium. In June 1994, as the Pentagon was reinforcing military units on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang froze its plutonium production, agreed to let IAEA inspectors monitor the reactor site, and entered into bilateral negotiations.

The talks produced the October 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to eventually dismantle its reactors, remain in the NPT, and implement full IAEA safeguards. In exchange, the United States promised to provide it with limited oil supplies, construct two peaceful light-water reactors for energy production, “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” and extend “formal assurances to [North Korea] against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.”

“The way for Washington to move forward on Iran is to give Tehran good reason to relinquish its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”By 2002, the Agreed Framework had broken down, not only because Pyongyang was suspected of cheating but also because it believed that the United States, by delaying construction of the light-water reactors and failing to start normalizing relations, had not honored its side of the bargain. When confronted with evidence of its secret uranium program, in November 2002, Pyongyang took advantage of the fact that the U.S. military was tied down in preparations for the invasion of Iraq and withdrew from the NPT, kicked out the inspectors, and started reprocessing plutonium.

President Bush famously promised, in his 2002 State of the Union address, that the United States “will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” Yet when North Korea kicked out the IAEA inspectors, Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed that the situation was “not a crisis.” Bush repeatedly declared that the United States had “no intention of invading North Korea.” The point was not lost on Tehran.

If Washington is to offer security assurances to Tehran, it should do so soon (making the assurances contingent on Tehran’s not developing nuclear weapons), rather than offering them too late, as it did with North Korea (and thus making them contingent on Tehran’s getting rid of any existing nuclear weapons). As with North Korea, any deal with Iran must be structured in a series of steps, each offering a package of economic benefits (light-water reactors, aircraft parts, or status at the World Trade Organization) in exchange for constraints placed on Iran’s future nuclear development.

Most important, however, would be a reduction in the security threat that the United States poses to Iran. Given the need for Washington to have a credible deterrent against, say, terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran, a blanket security guarantee would be ill advised. But more limited guarantees, such as a commitment not to use nuclear weapons, could be effective. They would reassure Tehran and pave the way toward the eventual normalization of U.S.–Iranian relations while signaling to other states that nuclear weapons are not the be all and end all of security.

Peaceful coexistence does not require friendly relations, but it does mean exercising mutual restraint. Relinquishing the threat of regime change by force is a necessary and acceptable price for the United States to pay to stop Tehran from getting the bomb.

A new era is under way for global high-technology innovation and entrepreneurship, marked by the rise of Greater China. During the past several decades, Taiwan, Singapore, and others have developed as centers in key information communications technology (ICT) industries. More recently, from Beijing to the Pearl River Delta, markets for new products are expanding, competencies in new technologies are growing, and a new generation of high-technology regions is emerging. All these signs point toward China as a rising powerhouse, accelerating the shift of locus for the global high-technology arena across the Pacific.

The contours of the nature and pace of this change are already evident in some ICT industries but have yet to be fully analyzed. The Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) (SPRIE) is leading a research program to advance the understanding of the dynamic systems of innovation and entrepreneurship that drive China’s ascendance in high technology and its implications for the global knowledge economy.

CHINA'S QUEST FOR INDEPENDENT INNOVATION

No longer satisfied with China’s role as the world’s factory, Chinese government leaders have declared that zizhu chuangxin (“homegrown” innovation) is the watchword for the future. They are sounding an urgent call to reduce dependence on foreign technology and build China into an “innovation-driven economy.” As President Hu Jintao said, “homegrown innovation” is the “core of national competitiveness”— the path to sustainable economic prosperity and global leadership.

Last May, SPRIE co-sponsored Greater China's Innovative Capacities: Progress and Challenges, a two-day, invitation-only workshop at Tsinghua University in Beijing that attracted scholars from Europe, the U.S., and Asia, as well as Chinese industry leaders and government policymakers. More than 70 participants tackled topics such as indicators of innovative capacity (patent data and journal citations, for example), reforms of Chinese research institutions to spur commercially useful innovation, and the changing roles for innovation of the state, multinational corporations (MNCs), and domestic firms.

A few numbers illustrate China’s progress over the past decade. Total R&D spending nearly tripled, reaching 1.3 percent of GDP in 2005, even while GDP doubled. China is now ranked third worldwide in overall R&D spending (after the U.S. and Japan), with targets to increase spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2010. Science and engineering PhDs more than doubled between 1996 and 2005. And China’s growth rate of U.S. patents granted has eclipsed Japan, Taiwan, or Korea, with an even steeper trajectory in Chinese-authored science and technical publications in international journals.

Yet, according to SPRIE Co-Director Henry S. Rowen, “the highest value-added work in China still is done largely in foreign-invested companies and increasingly in firms led by returnees who have been educated and worked abroad. Currently most R&D is focused on incremental improvements of existing products and services. Nevertheless, the key building blocks are in place for increasing technology contributions.” At MNC R&D centers like Nokia and Microsoft, top Chinese teams are beginning to contribute to worldwide product design and research. Through interviews at more than 75 firms in Beijing and Shanghai, SPRIE researchers have identified emerging competencies at some of the best domestic research labs and companies, ranging from multimedia chip design to communication equipment.

Huawei, the telecommunications networking giant with 2005 revenues of $5.9 billion, reports consistently spending more than 10 percent of sales on R&D. Boasting more than 10,000 researchers in China plus R&D centers in Bangalore, Silicon Valley, Dallas, Stockholm, and Moscow and 3,600 patent applications in 2005, the company epitomizes China’s growing pursuit of low-cost innovation, not just low-cost manufacturing and services.

However, obstacles to China’s drive for innovation are not trivial. Many Chinese institutions, though improving, still fail to provide an environment conducive for innovation, including a competitive and open system for R&D funding or effective intellectual property protection. As SPRIE associate director Marguerite Gong Hancock observes, “The current gold rush mentality for quick profits runs counter to breakthrough technology innovation that is typically the result of patient investments in research with long-term and uncertain payoffs. To date, some of the most innovative bright spots are not in disruptive technologies but in processes, services, and business models.”

One notable obstacle confronting Chinese high-tech firms is a leadership talent shortage, a problem that is the focus of another SPRIE research initiative.

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP IN GREATER CHINA

Since 1999, founders have led 24 Chinese firms to IPOs on NASDAQ. From this unprecedented number of startups to a rising class of billion-dollar giants going global, high-tech companies in China have a dramatically intensifying need for leadership.

To examine how China’s high-tech executives are facing this challenge, SPRIE partnered with Heidrick & Struggles, a leading executive search firm, to conduct more than 100 interviews with executives at both domestic and multinational high-tech firms operating in China.

Leaders face what Nick Yang (MS ’99), founder of wireless service provider KongZhong, described as “uncharted waters.” They must create a cadre of top leaders and managers in the face of an acute shortage of seasoned managers and globally capable executives. As John Deng, founder and CEO of Vimicro (a fabless semiconductor company with $396 million market cap), said, “I don’t lack other things, such as funding, infrastructure, or government relations. What I lack now is people.”

SPRIE Co-Director William F. Miller commented, “Interestingly, not one interviewee expressed an intention to adopt a management model that diverges significantly from the dominant global model,” a model defined by competencies well documented as key among U.S. and European executives. Based on the SPRIE-Heidrick study, some of these competencies currently are both more critical and more difficult to find in China: the ability to drive results, achieve customer orientation, provide visionary leadership, create organizational buy-in, model key values, and delegate and empower. The best leaders not only are seeking these competencies in senior executives but also cascading these attributes throughout their organizations.

The impact ripples throughout the talent pipeline, from recruiting to retaining to developing key people. High-tech leaders in China are deploying a wide range of new tactics. Miller noted, “To address pressing leadership shortages, executives are devoting an unusually large amount of their time and attention to talent and human resource issues.” As Mary Ma, CFO of computer giant Lenovo, stated, “I have become an HR manager. I spend 30 percent of my time on people and succession issues.” And the best companies are systematically using their best leaders to mentor and mold the next generation of professionals—the mid-level managers and team leaders, who are mobile, scarce, and frequently lack the full set of skills needed to drive results.

Emerging trends in leadership among China’s hightech executives may be a good harbinger, pointing to how and where this influential generation of China’s high-tech leaders are steering their firms—firms that have been charged with the task of leading China’s future economic growth.

The Stanford Program on International and Cross-cultural Education (SPICE) serves as a bridge between FSI’s research centers and elementary and secondary schools throughout the United States. Over the past year, SPICE curriculum writer Rylan Sekiguchi and Joon Seok Hong (MA, East Asian Studies, 2007) have been developing a curriculum unit for secondary schools called “U.S.–South Korean Relations” in consultation with Professor Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Korean Studies Program (KSP). The KSP was formally established in 2001 at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center with the appointment of Professor Shin as the founding director. “U.S.–South Korean Relations” is the result of SPICE’s first formal collaboration with the KSP.

For more than half a century, the United States and South Korea have been close and strong allies, a relationship nurtured under war and the pursuit of common interests. Despite this long and established alliance, U.S.–South Korean relations and Korean history are not adequately taught in American secondary schools. “U.S.–South Korean Relations” seeks to fill the gap by exposing students to the four core pillars of the alliance: democracy, economic prosperity, security, and sociocultural interaction. Each pillar supports the U.S.–South Korean relationship in a different and important way.

Lesson One examines South Korea’s maturing democracy, providing students an overview of South Korean democratization and engaging them on the concept of democracy. Students also study how the U.S.–South Korean relationship affected South Korea’s democratization and vice versa. Ultimately, students consider how common political and social values serve to strengthen relations between two countries and societies.

Lesson Two introduces students to the economic aspect of the U.S.–South Korean relationship and encourages them to recognize how economic interdependence between the two countries has served to draw them closer together. Students examine modern-day trade,such as the recently concluded U.S.–South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), and also learn about the historical role the United States played in helping South Korea industrialize after the Korean War.

Lesson Three outlines the security concerns that South Korea and the United States have shared since the Korean War and the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 to the recent nuclear weapons issue with North Korea. Students study the history of the U.S.–South Korean security alliance and evaluate why both Seoul and Washington have considered the alliance so important and beneficial.

Lesson Four complements the broad country-tocountry perspective of the first three lessons and encourages students to consider how the U.S.–South Korean relationship has influenced the individual lives of Koreans and Americans. Students contemplate how the cultural interactions between the two countries have influenced both societies and changed the lives of their people.

The U.S.–South Korean relationship is one of the most successful bilateral relationships in the world. SPICE hopes that the curriculum unit, “U.S.–South Korean Relations,” not only offers U.S. secondary students a broad overview of this relationship but also inspires students to enroll in college courses on Korea through programs such as the KSP.

The 70th anniversary of the 1937 Japanese attack on the Chinese capital of Nanjing, and the mass atrocities that followed, were marked in relatively low-key fashion in China. At a time when the Chinese government is anxious to improve its ties with Japan, it sent only junior officials to the commemoration ceremony unveiling a refurbished museum that attempts to document an event that has become emblematic, for the Chinese at least, of the war with Japan.

Despite the decision to downplay the anniversary, a wave of films, many of them backed by the Chinese government, had already been set in motion, begun at a time when Sino-Japanese tensions were high. Almost a dozen new movies on the “Nanjing Massacre,” including some supported by U.S. and European money, are in production. In Japan, a documentary supported by a group of conservative lawmakers and academics that claims there is no evidence of a Japanese massacre is also slated for release.

This is the latest indication of how Asia’s wartime past bedevils its present. From relations between governments to the interactions of ordinary citizens, disputes over past wrongs continue to occupy newspapers, cinema screens, and school textbooks. All nations in the region, rather than taking responsibility, have some sense of victimization and often blame others. Anti-Japanese sentiments seem undiminished in China and Korea, even among the younger generation with no experience of war or colonialism. The Japanese suffer from “apology fatigue,” questioning why they must continue to repent for events that took place six or seven decades ago.

The failure to address historical injustice and to reconcile differing views of the past has strained Sino-Japanese relations and friction between Japan and South Korea about Japan’s colonial past remains intense. Even South Korea and China are sparring over the history of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo . Taiwan as well is immersed in a re-examination of the historical past. The history question touches upon the most sensitive issues of national identity and now fuels the fires of nationalism in Northeast Asia.

There is widespread recognition of the need for reconciliation and the final resolution of historical injustices. But the existence of divided, even conflicting, historical memories is a fundamental obstacle to such reconciliation. All of the nations involved are bound by distinct, often contradictory perceptions of history and separated by different accounts of past events. These perceptions are deeply imbedded in public consciousness, transmitted by education, popular culture, and the mass media.

At the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, we have embarked on the “Divided Memories and Reconciliation” project that seeks to tackle the history issue from a comparative perspective. Rather than trying to forge a common historical account or to reach a consensus among scholars on specific events, we believe that a more fruitful approach lies in understanding how historical memory is formed in each country. Recognizing how each country engages in the selective creation of its own, divided memory can lead to mutual understanding. Ironically, the very realization that there is no absolute historical truth on which everyone can agree creates a path to reconciliation.

These divided memories are a foundation of national identity—and the formation of national myths that have a powerful role to this day. Whether it is Japanese atrocities in China or the decision to drop atomic weapons on Japan, no nation is immune from the charge that they have formed a less than complete view of the past. All share a reluctance to fully confront the complexity of that past and tend to blame others.

The United States is no less guilty of forming its own divided memory of these historical events—witness the response to the controversy surrounding the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution. And the United States had a key role to play in shaping the failure to confront these historical issues in a timely fashion, through its handling of the postwar justice issues for example and the troubling legacy of the problems left unresolved by the 1951 San Francisco Treaty.

Our research project compares the formation of these divided memories in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. The project has begun with a comparative examination of high school history textbooks in those five places, focusing on the period from the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1931 until the formal conclusion of the Pacific war with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This will be followed by a second comparative study of popular cinema dealing with historical subjects from roughly the same period. In parallel with these two comparative studies, Shorenstein APARC plans to design and carry out a comprehensive survey of the views of elite opinion-makers in all five countries on these historical issues. The project has garnered important support from donors in Asia and the United States, among them Korea’s Northeast Asia History Foundation, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and the U.S.-Japan Foundation.

The translations of the most widely circulated high school history textbooks— both national and world history textbooks—have been completed. In February 2008, Shorenstein APARC will convene an international conference of historians and other scholars to conduct a comparative analysis of the textbooks and to discuss, from personal experience, the process of textbook writing and revision. Stanford historians Peter Duus and Mark Peattie, the authors of numerous volumes on this historical period, will lead the comparative analysis. Textbook authors from all five countries will also offer their views.

Textbooks have been a subject of particular controversy in Asia since the 1950s, though focused almost entirely on the content of Japanese textbooks and complaints from China, Korea, and elsewhere that they offer a distorted account of wartime events. One approach to solving this problem has been to form joint committees to study history and to create jointly written textbooks. These efforts are ongoing but they have proved so far to be a very difficult path to reconciliation. A Japan-South Korea joint committee to create a shared history was launched in 2001 but has made little real headway. A similar Sino-Japanese joint committee of 20 prominent historians was formed in October 2006 but it also quickly bogged down in disagreements over what to include in a joint history.

These official efforts only reinforce the value of the “Divided Memories and Reconciliation” project. As an effort by scholars, without official involvement, and as the first attempt to treat this issue comparatively, with the inclusion of the United States, it breaks new ground. The February conference will produce not only a book but also will be reproduced in workshops in all the participating Asian countries, held in collaboration with scholarly institutions. Together with our partners, Shorenstein APARC hopes to generate a public dialogue, not only with scholars but also with the general public through media and other venues. The project is also intended to provide policymakers in Northeast Asia and the United States with data and analysis that will aid their own efforts at easing tensions over the history issue.

New Beginnings, a nonpartisan policy study group of former senior U.S. officials and other experts on Korea, will discuss the results of President Lee's visit and the prospects for forging a real partnership with South Korea at the World Affairs Council, San Francisco on June 3.

Panelists:

Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Philippines, and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow, Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University

Evans J.R. Revere, President of the Korea Society, and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affair

Gi-Wook Shin, Director of Shorenstein APARC and Professor of Sociology, Stanford University

Daniel C. Sneider, Associate Director for Research, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist

David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director

Bruce Pickering, Executive Director of the Asia Society Northern California (moderator)

This event is co-sponsored by the Asia Society of Northern California and World Affairs Council.

Ten 2008 POSCO NGO Fellows were selected by the Fellowship admission committee during the second POSCO NGO Fellowship Conference held on May 1 and 2 at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver.

George Washington University:

Ms. Gyung Lan Jung, Center for Peaceful Future of Korea

Mr. Hyun-Mo Choi, Korea Migrant Workers' Human Rights

Indiana University:

Mr. Seoung-Hwan Jeon, National Council of YMCAs of Korea

Mr. Jae-Seok Kim, Gwangju Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice

Columbia University:

Mr. Tae Ho Lee, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

Mr. Boyoun Joung, Korea Youth Corps

University of British Columbia:

Ms. Jeong Sook Park, Korean Women Link

Ms. Hee-Seon Jeong, Seocho Volunteer Center

Stanford University:

Ms. Hye-Jeong Kim, Korea Federation for Environmental Movement

Mr. Hyun Gon Jung, Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation