For the past year China has led the quest for a negotiated solution to the Korean nuclear crisis. It facilitated and hosted three-way talks with the United States and North Korea a year ago this week and two sessions of the six-party talks (adding South Korea, Japan and Russia) in August and February. Its officials crisscrossed the globe to explore potential areas of common interest and compromise and this week hosted North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to explore options for the beleaguered Korean Peninsula. Yet, in each of the formal talks, the Chinese have been discouraged by the minimal results. They are now questioning U.S. intentions toward Korea and, in the longer term, toward China.

Beijing considers the unchecked expansion of North Korea's nuclear weapons to be a real possibility, and its reasoning starts with the record of U.S. policies toward nuclear proliferation. That record, the Chinese argue, is mixed and often contradictory. As a result, China worries that Washington might continue to tolerate the program so long as Pyongyang did not cross key red lines, such as the transfer of nuclear materials to terrorists.

Whatever Beijing's past position on nuclear matters, many senior Chinese now regard nuclear weapons on their border to be a direct threat to their national security and suspect Washington of downplaying that danger. For them, it is no great leap to the conclusion that the unfettered growth of the Korean program might embolden others in Asia, including Taiwan, to acquire nuclear weapons despite verbal opposition from Washington. Beijing's leaders can easily imagine how that nightmarish turn of events would undermine the nation's drive toward modernization and end strategic cooperation with the United States.

Despite the fact that all parties at the six-party meeting in February endorsed the dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program, the Chinese fear that the talks may be dead in the water. Following that meeting, they began to debate other ways to resolve the crisis. They had already reorganized the leadership team responsible for North Korean affairs, and that team had begun acting to prevent the worst case, including offering further inducements to Kim Jong Il this week. Whereas last fall the talk of deepening U.S.-China cooperation on Korea pervaded the news, now, especially after Vice President Dick Cheney's uncompromising stand on Korea and Taiwan last week, the reverse is occurring.

What China can do in these circumstances is quite limited. Its influence on North Korea is largely determined by what the United States does or doesn't do. By refusing to negotiate on a staged process leading to the eventual dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, Washington has tacitly allowed the North's program to proceed. It has rejected proposals for a temporary freeze, technical talks and any interim steps short of the unconditional and complete ending of the program. The result is virtual paralysis.

Beijing has been able to work with North Korea only when it could find areas of potential compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. It cannot or will not act alone to exert pressure because this would jeopardize its influence on the North. Contrary to a widely circulated story, Beijing did not cut off energy shipments to North Korea for three days in 2003. Beijing would not take such a counterproductive action when its main influence with the North lies in the kind of quiet diplomacy being practiced this week with Kim Jong Il.

Many in Beijing are beginning to question whether there might be a more promising approach with Pyongyang. Should the Chinese, South Koreans and Russians conclude that making progress toward the common goal of the North's complete nuclear disarmament is out of reach, for example, they reluctantly might translate their joint offer of aid in February into a quid pro quo for a partial agreement, such as a limited freeze, that would allow the situation to stabilize. China could worry that such an independent action could endanger the common front with Washington. At the same time, it could calculate that the United States would be sufficiently pleased with any solution that halted the North Korean nuclear program.

None of these developments may come to pass, of course, but who could have imagined a year ago that Washington would have permitted the situation to deteriorate to the present point?

The Stanford Institute for International Studies, along with Newsweek, co-hosted a special forum, "Perspectives on National Security" on March 1, 2004 in Encina Hall.

The event participants included:

• Jane Harman, U.S. 36th District of California, Ranking Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
• Michael Hirsh, Newsweek Washington Bureau;
• Stephen D. Krasner, Deputy director of Stanford IIS and professor of political science;
• William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, senior fellow at Stanford IIS, and professor of management science and engineering;
• Michael Isikoff, Newsweek investigative correspondent, who served as moderator.

The panelists discussed issues pertaining to Iraq, North Korea, nuclear proliferation and the Bush administration.

John W. Lewis, director of the CISAC Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, led a private delegation of American experts and officials to North Korea and the country's nuclear weapons facility in Yongbyon. The visit took place January 6-10, 2004, and was the first visit by outsiders to that country's nuclear facilities since North Korea expelled international inspectors a year ago.

Accompanying Lewis were the former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory Sigfried Hecker, former State Department official Jack Pritchard, and two staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Jannuzi and Keith Luse.

Lewis and the others briefed U.S. government officials upon their return. Hecker, a nuclear weapons expert, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21 and 22 about their visit to the Nuclear Scientific Research Center in Yongbyon.

The visit generated intensive interest from the media.