Demographic change and long-term care in Japan, chronic non-communicable disease in China, national health insurance in South Korea, TB control in North Korea, pharmaceutical policy in the region and global safety in drug supply chains -- these are some of the topics explored in a new Stanford course: East Asian Studies 117 and 217,  "%course1%." Taught in fall 2008 by Karen Eggleston, Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, the course has enrolled students not only of East Asian studies but also other undergraduate majors as well as graduate students from the School of Education, School of Medicine, and Graduate School of Business.

 

The course discusses population health and healthcare systems in contemporary China, Japan, and Korea (north and south). Using primarily the lens of social science, especially health economics, participants analyze recent developments in East Asian health policy. In addition to seminar discussions, students engage in active exploration of selected topics outside the classroom, culminating in individual research papers and group projects that present findings in creative ways. For example, several students prepared an overview of health and healthcare in North Korea; three MBA students prepared a proposal for a healthcare venture in China ( 1.2MB); and others attended related colloquia, interviewed researchers, and prepared summaries for public posting, such as the article on gender imbalance in China.

In an interview with National Public Radio, Shorenstein APARC Associate Director Daniel C. Sneider discussed the advantages and disadvantages of seeking a grand bargain with North Korea to end its nuclear weapons ambitions.

South Korea's new president, Lee Myung-bak, has taken a hardline approach in dealing with North Korea, effectively signaling the end of former president Kim Dae Jung's once-vaunted "Sunshine Policy." Relations between the two nations have desintegrated in recent months. North Korea experts suggest, however, the the DPRK's growing belligerence toward the South actually follows a consistent pattern that may even help the United States in future negotiations.

North Korea's recent tactics -- including shutting down the successful Kaesong industrial zone -- put President Lee in a difficult position, assorcing to the New York Times. Abandoning his principled stance will be seen as surrender by Lee's supporters, while staying the course will all but guarantee that North Korea shuts down Kaesong, analysts say. That will feed South Korean fears of an unstable peninsula and provide Mr. Lee’s liberal critics with plentiful ammunition.

Perhaps the greatest current concern about North Korea’s recent moves, Korea experts say, is what they may signal about the internal dynamics of the regime. “The more intriguing issue is whether all these developments signal a growing role of the military,” said Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. “And the tour of Kaesong by the military was troubling in that regard.”

David Straub, the acting director of Korean Studies Program, argues that Obama administration will finally give diplomacy a chance to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem. He stresses that Senator Obama understands the difficulties of dealing with North Korea and will proceed carefully. If North Korea does not respond to this more nuanced American approach, he concludes, the international community is likely to be more supportive of U.S. efforts to constrain North Korean behavior.

Among conservatives in Korea and other American allied countries, there seems to be some anxiety about the election of a relatively unknown, young African-American liberal as the next American president. Typically, when a new U.S. president is elected, American diplomats seek to reassure allies by telling them that the incoming president will pursue fundamentally the same policies as the outgoing president. However, President Obama clearly will adopt a significantly different foreign policy than President Bush, including toward North Korea.

Obama’s soaring rhetoric has led to a widespread (and correct) impression of him as idealistic, but the long presidential campaign also revealed him to be a disciplined politician and a skillful manager. His foreign policy will be much closer to the prudent realpolitik of President Bush’s father than it will be to the “neo-con” approach of President Bush himself.
And while it is true that Obama does not have deep experience in foreign affairs, his youthful years spent in Indonesia and Hawaii, taken together with his successful navigation of American society as a young African-American man, have given him a genuine empathy for different peoples and cultures. He has the self-confidence and intelligence to listen with an open mind to others and then carefully to make his own decisions.

President Obama’s policy toward North Korea will defy stereotypes of the past. In some ways he will be “softer” on North Korea than President Bush; in other ways, he will be “tougher.”  Like President Bush and his predecessors, President Obama will take the position that he can never accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Obama will not engage in bluster such as “all options are on the table,” which most South Koreans reject and which only plays into the DPRK’s hands.

Instead, Obama will finally give diplomacy a fighting chance. Even during the past couple of years, President Bush remained very reluctant to engage fully in negotiations with North Korea. President Obama will order that a policy review be conducted expeditiously, and he will probably appoint a very senior special envoy to take charge of negotiations with North Korea. While maintaining the framework of the Six-Party Talks and consulting very closely with the Republic of Korea and Japan, he will also authorize meaningful bilateral negotiations with North Korea. If those negotiations bear real fruit, he may even visit Pyongyang himself if he is confident that he will be able to strike a deal completely ending North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

President Obama will probably offer North Korea a “more for more” deal. In other words, compared to President Bush he will propose a much more detailed and concrete series of steps to be taken by North Korea, the United States, and other members of the Six-Party Talks. The aim will be agreement on an early end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.

The North Koreans should not think that President Obama will be “easier” than President Bush. If, as may well be the case, the North Koreans reject President Obama’s approach or drag their feet in responding to it, he, unlike President Bush, will have the international credibility to work more effectively with other members of the Six-Party Talks and the international community to limit North Korea’s options.

Moreover, as a hardheaded domestic politician, President Obama will be careful to avoid situations in which the Republican opposition could credibly criticize him as being naïve about North Korea. Indeed, Obama’s team recognizes clearly that, having declared itself a nuclear weapons state and tested a nuclear device, North Korea may not be prepared to verifiably give up its nuclear weapons ambitions.

In formulating and conducting his policy toward North Korea, President Obama will have access to many trusted experts on North Korea, beginning with Vice President Biden and his staff. Obama is also advised by a number of experienced officials from the Clinton administration, from former Defense Secretary Bill Perry to former career diplomat Jeffrey Bader.

U.S. relations with the Republic of Korea are key to any successful American policy toward North Korea. Obama and his team fully appreciate the importance of U.S.-ROK relations and the security alliance. They will coordinate very closely with the Lee Myung-bak administration and never sacrifice the interests of the Republic of Korea, which is immeasurably more important to the United States than the DPRK is or ever will be.
 
President Obama will support the implementation of the agreements President Bush reached with the Republic of Korea on the realignment of U.S. Forces of Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control, as befits the ROK’s military and economic might.
 
Under President Obama, the United States will also aim to approve, with some adjustments, the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement, although it may take a year or so to do so as he perforce deals first with the global financial and economic crises and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  President Obama must be cognizant of the viewpoint of leading congressional Democrats and the constituencies they represent. It may be counterproductive if the ROK pushes too hard, too fast for U.S. approval of the FTA.
 
Obama’s inauguration will also open up new possibilities for U.S.-ROK coordination and cooperation on global issues. Unlike President Bush, whose early unilateralist mindset and specific policies caused dismay among international friends and foes alike, President Obama begins with a vast reservoir of sympathy and respect throughout the world. That will make it easier, and more useful, for the Republic of Korea to cooperate globally more with the United States.
 
In short, South Koreans should be reassured, not that President Obama’s foreign policy will be like that of President Bush, but that it will be different. Perhaps South Koreans will even begin to feel that their alliance with the United States is not just one that they feel they must have for their country’s long-term interests – but also one of which they can feel proud.