The world first became concerned about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1989 through satellite photos of a facility under construction near the town of Yongbyon. Since then, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea by the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries in the region to halt and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

A consistent strategy focused on dialogue and diplomacy is essential to get out of the current quagmire, urged Song Min-soon, a member of the Korean National Assembly and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at a Korean Studies Program public seminar on October 18. Although the United States and the ROK must lead efforts, China's active involvement is also crucial. Resolving the nuclear issue is necessary to help ensure the long-term peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire East Asia region.

Song explored reasons why previous negotiation attempts failed, especially the lack of a shared vision among the concerned countries for the future of the peninsula and region. He suggested that this rendered China less willing to play a stronger role in the negotiations. The imbalance of power among the negotiating countries is another significant factor. North Korea's only effective bargaining card is its nuclear weapons program, argued Song, while countries like the United States have the capability to offer or withhold important aid, such as energy and development assistance.

Song advocated a firm, direct approach, stating that the United States has not adopted a real strategy for effecting nuclear disarmament. Instead, it has opted for the "slogan" of "strategic patience." He cautioned against taking a hard line, such as the current ROK administration is pursuing. Song expressed the hope that the United States would focus more on developing a well-planned diplomatic strategy for resolving the nuclear issue and that the ROK would adopt a more conciliatory approach toward North Korea.

To move forward in the Six-Party Talks-negotiations among the United States, the ROK, North Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan-and effectively resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, Song made several recommendations. He pointed to the long-term benefit of building trust incrementally by fulfilling small, strategic commitments to North Korea. To balance the asymmetry of negotiating cards, Song suggested that the other countries proceed with fulfilling their commitments and allow North Korea more time to fulfill its own obligations. Bringing China fully on board by building a logical basis for its involvement is also a crucial element of the negotiations, he offered. Finally, Song asserted that the United States, the ROK, and China must develop a shared, solid vision for peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, taking into account different scenarios and the roles each country should play.

Song expressed confidence that the approach he outlined would not only eventually resolve the nuclear issue but would also open the way for stability and prosperity for everyone in East Asia, including North Korea.

The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.

What was learned last week about the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?

The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.

Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?

There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao, ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.

The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.

What is known about Kim Jong-un?

He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.

Who now heads North Korea? What is the power structure like?

The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a dominant place today.

A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.

Does a period of transition put the regime in danger? What took place before?

It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.

What legacy does he leave his son Kim Jong-un?

Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s. Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.

The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.

What is the situation at the diplomatic level?

North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.

Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.

The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that  it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.

In the wake of the global financial crisis, some have dubbed China and the United States the G2, signifying their centrality in global economics and politics. Even so, the relationship between China and the United States is rife with new tensions. Trade and currency challenges persist, complicated by domestic politics and differing approaches to security issues.

In its annual conference to honor the memory of eminent China scholar Michel Oksenberg, Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center gathered distinguished policymakers and analysts to examine colliding—and overlapping—interests in U.S.-China relations.

The conference was kicked off by Jeffrey Bader, special assistant to the president and senior director for East Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, who began by exploring the possibility of productive, stable relations amid values that appear to differ vastly. In support of this idea, Bader pointed to successive American presidents, going back to Richard Nixon, who found points of commonality with China. China poses a different challenge today, he argued, than even a decade ago, as its influence has grown alongside its commercial and economic presence. The Obama administration, Bader explained, has sought China's support on key issues and pursued partnership within the context of a broader Asian policy. He concluded by saying that China's rise is not intrinsically incompatible with American interest, but that does not preclude ongoing competition.

A panel chaired by Jean C. Oi, director of the Stanford China Program, next looked at competition and cooperation in the U.S.-China economic relationship. Despite the dangers of speculative bubbles and weakened export markets, the prospects for sustained economic growth in China remain very good, argued Nicholas Lardy, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Robert Kapp, former president of the U.S.-China Business Council, explored growing challenges facing American business in China, exemplified by recent clashes over Internet censorship. Despite the U.S.-China clash at the Copenhagen global climate conference, Stanford Law Professor Thomas Heller contended that behind the scenes global consensus on this issue has advanced.

Points of tension in the security relationship were the focus of a panel chaired by Amb. Michael H. Armacost, the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow. China-Taiwan tensions have improved, but Smith College's Steve Goldstein cautioned that Taiwan's policies could shift again, particularly if the promised economic benefits of improved ties do not materialize. China and the United States must likewise manage challenging allies in North Korea and Japan respectively, said Alan Romberg, director of the East Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Finally, the United States and China have both congruent and conflicting interests at stake in dealing with the situations in Iran and Pakistan, Stanford's Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at FSI, told the gathering.

"North Korea is a real country with real people getting on with their lives," said John Everard, former British ambassador to North Korea, to a full-house audience at a Korean Studies Program (KSP) lunchtime seminar on October 8, 2010. In his introduction of Everard, David Straub, KSP's associate director, noted the lack of reliable information about North Korea. Official government information is limited and everyday life is perhaps even less understood. Everard, who served in North Korea from 2006-2008, offered a firsthand perspective of ordinary people living inside North Korea, giving a very human dimension to a country often regarded only as a closed military state.

The darker side of life in North Korea is poverty, which is more acute now than in earlier decades. Everard stated that North Korea was ahead of South Korea economically until the 1970s and that the universal healthcare system put in place by Kim Il-sung was initially effective. The World Health Organization now provides most medical care in North Korea. Agriculture, once mechanized, has largely reverted to animal power and hunger, though not at famine level as it was in the 1990s, is still a major issue.

Leisure and social time also play a part of life in North Korea. People in Pyongyang frequent coffee shops and throughout the country neighbors gather for lively games of chess. Everard explained that daily activities like talking with family and friends are just as much a part of life in North Korea as they are in other parts of the world.

A bigger difference in North Korean society is the degree to which piety to the leading regime and service to the government is significantly integrated into life. Newly married couples, for example, will wear badges bearing images of Kim Il-sung pinned to their formal wedding clothes and lay flowers before a statue of the deceased leader. More than such customs though, Everard noted, North Korea's military service requirement has the biggest impact on people. Not only is the duration of eight to ten years significantly longer than the required one to two years of most countries, military life is also very strenuous.

Social attitudes in North Korea are changing, as are attitudes toward the outside world. Employees from North Korea now work for South Korean companies within the successful Kaesong Industrial Zone, which opened in 2004. Foreign goods, such as clothing, have also made their way into North Korea. People, suggested Everard, are beginning to modestly aspire to own more material possessions, like bicycles, and to learn more about the customs and cultures of other parts of the world.

Everard spoke about North Korea's relations with other countries. China has a natural interest in the stability of North Korea-its neighbor to the northeast-for its own welfare and it therefore supports it economically and politically. Despite a large Russian Federation embassy in Pyongyang, relations with Russia are not as strong as they were with the old Soviet Union, Everard said. Although the United States is officially regarded as an aggressor and an enemy, most people Everard met with did not express animosity toward Americans. "There is an openness toward warm relations with Americans if political relations improve," he said.

Everard described the curiosity expressed by North Koreans who asked him about life in the United States-about everything ranging from music to social conditions. Audience members-from the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and numerous other countries-asked him an equally broad range of questions, demonstrating that perhaps there is an equal amount of curiosity and willingness to connect both inside and outside of North Korea.

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John Everard is KSP's 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow. The David Straub, generously funded by the Pantech Group of Korea, are intended to cultivate a diverse international community of scholars and professionals committed to and capable of grappling with challenges posed by developments in Korea.

FSI's 2010 Fall Orientation welcomed faculty, staff, researchers, and friends of the institute to the new academic year and highlighted the institute's diverse research collaborations, educational programs, and policy engagement.  Presentations on display and in live video offered highlights of the current work of FSI centers and programs on many of the most challenging issues of the day. In his welcoming remarks, FSI Director Coit Blacker emphasized the interdisciplinary, cross-campus nature of FSI's work and thanked the FSI community for their many contributions to new knowledge and new approaches to many of the most pressing issues on today's global agenda.

This year's Orientation attracted the largest turnout to date. On continual display was a slide show capturing research of FSI centers and programs in the field and multi-disciplinary work here at the institute, along with highlights of FSI conferences, lectures, and policy endeavors compiled by FSI's Nora Sweeny.

Among the highlights were the following displays:

• A presentation by the Center for International Security and Cooperation on the center's research, writing, policy influence, and Track II Diplomacy
• A display of the many books published by the Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center showing the range of economic, political, and regional issues addressed by APARC scholars, and a photo slideshow of recent events and publications demonstrating the breadth of faculty work bridging the U.S. and Asia
• A presentation by The Europe Center, newly launched and housed jointly in FSI and the Division of International and Comparative Area Studies, featuring major research areas, visiting scholars, publications, and notable events
• A presentation by Stanford Health Policy capturing its multidisciplinary work in medicine, law, business, economics, engineering, and psychology
•  A presentation by the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies, a two-year interdisciplinary Master's program, which captured the IPS practicum, scholarly concentrations, internships, and careers
  
• A presentation by the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development featuring its work on environmental and policy research employing state of the art methodology to examine such issues as renewable energy, natural gas markets, national oil companies, low-income energy services, and climate change policy
• A presentation by the Program on Food Security and the Environment which addresses hunger, poverty, and environmental degradation. FSE showcased its current research on topics such as solar electrification, food and nutrition security, climate change and conflicts, and evolving U.S. energy policy, as well as its upcoming series on Food Policy, Food Security, and the Environment
• A presentation by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, which develops multi-disciplinary curriculum materials on international themes reflecting FSI scholarship. Recent educational projects include a three-part series examining U.S.-South Korean relations, Uncovering North Korea, and Inter-Korean Relations; and a collaboration with TeachAIDS, which works to address and overcome the social and cultural challenges related to HIV/AIDS prevention education through materials offered via the internet and CDs in several languages, http://teachaids.org
• A presentation featuring the Stanford Global Gateway, a comprehensive directory of Stanford in the world
• A presentation previewing the vision and mission of the Stanford Center at Peking University, opening Fall 2011

Other highlights included the presentations prepared by Stanford students who worked in the field this past summer. One group worked in China, developing a survey on nutrition and anemia and their effect on learning, with FSI's Scott Rozelle, Director of the Rural Education Action Program. A second group helped Dr. Paul Wise, professor of pediatrics and Stanford Health Policy core faculty member, evaluate prenatal care in the rural highlands of Guatemala.

 

In an op-ed in The Korea Times, Gi-Wook Shin discusses North Korea’s new leadership under Kim Jong-un. He suggests that this period of transition in North Korea might offer an opportunity for the U.S. and South Korea to attempt to stabilize their relationships with North Korea and make significant headway in the North Korean denuclearization process. He contends, also, that the stability of the new North Korean regime may act as a positive element in the promotion of peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole.