On May 20-21, 2006, the Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) of Stanford University and the China Institute for Science and Technology Policy (CISTP) of Tsinghua University will co-sponsor a workshop in Beijing, China, with the collaboration of Zhongguancun Science Park and the Industrial Technology Research Institute. The English version of the proceedings will be published by SPRIE.

Theme and Topics

The theme is the progress in and challenges to Greater China's innovative capacities. The workshop will include discussions of key drivers of innovative capacity: the inputs, processes, institutions, management strategies and outputs, including evidence of innovative capacities as demonstrated in new products, processes, services or business models.

The workshop will focus on information technology and telecommunications, focusing on development within and linkages among Mainland China and Taiwan, plus Singapore and Silicon Valley. Workshop sessions will include:

Statistical indicators

Corporate R&D: Multinational and domestic firms

University and research institute R&D

Science and technology human resources

Regional innovation

New technologies and business models

Papers invited include case studies of products and of firms, analysis of trends and cross-industry or cross-regional comparisons.

Workshop Format

Attendance at the two-day workshop will be by invitation only. More than twenty papers will be presented and discussed by a group of international scholars; panel participants will include senior industry leaders and government policy makers. The workshop format will facilitate discussions.

Tsinghua University, Beijing

Workshops
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About the series: The year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the end of Pacific War and Japan's unconditional surrender. Post-war Japan has embraced a new constitution that renounced war as a right of the nation and for the past six decades pursued economic growth under democratic government. Ironically, the years leading to this anniversary were filled with various disputes over territorial and historical issues with China and Korea and questions from neighboring countries whether Japanese society is shifting towards the right. Triggered by Prime Minister Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines "A" class war criminals, anti-Japan sentiment is widely spreading among its neighboring countries, accompanied by strong nationalism, and is posing a potential threat to the political stability of the region.

This colloquium series will focus on Japan's relationship with China and Korea and the historical controversies that are central to their deteriorating political relationship. The series speakers will address the following questions: What are the historical roots of these controversies? How did post-war Japanese foreign policy effect and was effected by Japan's handling of its militaristic past? What is the nature of domestic politics of these three countries that politicizes these historical issues and influences their responses to one another?

Each of the speakers in this series has been asked to address a specific aspect of Japan's relations. Professor Kimura will address the post-war political relationship between Japan and Korea.

Philippines Conference Room

Kan Kimura Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies Speaker Kobe University
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David G. Victor
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The world's energy system seems to have come unhinged. Oil is trading at record high prices because demand keeps rising even as supplies become unreliable. Oil exporters from Iran to Russia and Venezuela are using their petrocash to pursue agendas that undercut western security and interests. Supplies of natural gas also seem less secure than ever.

The world's energy system seems to have come unhinged. Oil is trading at record high prices because demand keeps rising even as supplies become unreliable. Oil exporters from Iran to Russia and Venezuela are using their petrocash to pursue agendas that undercut western security and interests. Supplies of natural gas also seem less secure than ever.

The root cause of these troubles is dysfunctional energy politics. The countries with the strongest incentives to cut their vulnerability to volatile energy markets - notably America - are unable to act because influential politicians view all serious policies as politically radioactive. Efforts to boost supply have little leverage because the most attractive geological riches are found mainly in countries where state-owned companies control the resources and outsiders have little clout. Thus, the current energy debates are generating a volcano of proposals that have no positive impact on tight markets.

Yet these structural barriers to serious policy remain hidden because the debate labours under the meaningless umbrella of "energy security". Proper policy on oil and gas must start with the distinct uses for these fuels - each requiring its own political strategy.

The effort on oil must focus on transportation. Vehicles and aircraft work best with liquid fuels that can store large quantities of energy in a compact space and flow easily through pipes to engines. Searching for a better substitute is worthwhile, but the effort faces an uphill battle. With today's technologies, no other energy liquid can reliably beat petroleum. Liquids can be made from coal, as South Africa and China are doing. But that approach is costly and has unattractive environmental implications. Brazil and the US have focused on ethanol, which they distill from sugar or grain from crops. However, those programmes, which account for less than 0.5 per cent of the world's energy liquids, have a negligible impact on the oil market. Yet, America is redoubling its ethanol effort because it is politically unbeatable to reward corn growers and grain handlers who are a formidable force in US politics. Indeed, requirements for ethanol in America have created a more rigid fuel supply system that actually raises the price of oil products, although ethanol's backers originally claimed they would cut energy costs. That same political force also blocks imports of cheaper Brazilian ethanol. In principle, a better approach is so-called "cellulosic ethanol", which promises lower costs as it converts whole plants into ethanol rather than just the grain. But like most messiahs, its attraction lies in the future. So far, nobody has made the system work at the scale of a commercial refinery.

The best way to temper oil demand today is by lifting efficiency. Even this economic winner is politically difficult to implement. The US, which consumes one-quarter of the world's oil, has not changed fuel efficiency standards for new cars in 16 years. Every big economy - even China's - has stricter fuel economy rules than America's. Political gridlock has stymied even modest proposals to allow trading of efficiency credits. A trading scheme is politically inconvenient as it could force US carmakers (which make generally inefficient cars) to buy valuable credits from foreign brands. No politican wants to multiply Detroit's problems.

Even better ideas - such as a stiffer petrol tax - stay stuck on opinion pages of newspapers and in academic journals. Despite what is increasingly termed today's "energy crisis", these ideas barely cross the lips of politicians who want to remain viable among the thicket of anti-tax conservatives and pro-Detroit lobbyists.

The approaches needed for natural gas are quite different. In western Europe, which has long depended on imported gas from Russia, Algeria and a few smaller suppliers, the vulnerabilities are particularly stark. In principle, though, gas dependencies are easier to manage than oil because gas has rivals for each of its major uses. In electric power generation, countries must preserve diversity - ensuring, for example, that advanced coal and nuclear technologies remain viable. While "diversity" is motherhood in energy policy, in reality it requires difficult choices. In continental Europe, for example, policy-­makers have not seriously confronted the conflict between the need for diversity while, at the same time, opening the power sector to morecompetition. Historically, companies in competitive power markets have invested heavily in gas because gas plants are smaller and require less capital than coal or nuclear plants.

Gas suppliers who dream of extending their powers forget that it is harder to corner gas markets when users have a choice. Algeria learnt that lesson in 1981 when it left a key pipeline empty in a pricing dispute with Italy - extracting a better price at the time but losing billions of dollars for the future by destroying its reputation as a reliable supplier.

That lesson should be sobering for Russia today. In December, Gazprom, Russia's giant state gas company, cut deliveries to Ukraine, which then siphoned supplies that flow on to Europe. The company rattled its pipes again last month - threatening retaliation if Europe dared try to wean itself from Russia's gas. While Gazprom's management must pander to Russian nationalism (where pipe-rattling is welcome), the company's long-term viability rests on its reliability as a supplier to lucrative west European markets. Similarly, the recent decision by Evo Morales, Bolivia's president, to nationalise his country's gas fields will give him a boost domestically and might generate some instant extra revenue, but it will also encourage his customers in Brazil and Argentina to look elsewhere for energy.

"Resource nationalism" is back in vogue. But for gas suppliers in particular, it usually ends badly - not least because the infrastructure is costly to build and buyers can afford to be choosy. Gas users can further subdue Russia's rattling by multiplying sources of supply. A robust market for liquefied natural gas will help.

The tendency for gridlock in energy politics means that policymakers must focus where tough decisions matter most, such as efficiency in the use of oil and diversity in the application of gas. Yet, prospects for serious policy are poor - not least because the US, which should be a leader, is the most hamstrung. Luckily, the markets are responding on their own - albeit slowly and patchily. Costly oil is encouraging conservation and new supplies; LNG is accelerating, and gas buyers are more wary of Russian gas than they were a decade ago when Russia was seen as a reliable supplier. If the political structure remains dysfunctional on matters of energy, then the best second is perhaps no policy at all.

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China's population management, with consideration of cultural values impacting the growing sex ratio imbalance in China. Professor Li, along with his collaborator, Professor Marcus Feldman of Stanford University, have been advising the PRC government on this matter for some years now.

Professor Li Shuzhuo is director of the Institute for Population and Development Studies at Xi'an Jiaotong University in China. His many publications include articles in Population Studies, Population Research and Policy Review, Journal of Biosocial Sciences, Social Biology, and the Journal of Comparative Family Studies. His most recent book is Uxorilocal Marriage in Contemporary Rural China (by S. Li, X. Jin, M.W. Feldman, N. Li, and C. Zhu; China Social Sciences Academy Press, in Chinese).

Since 1994, Dr. Li has been an associate and consultant with the Morrison Institute for Population and Resource Studies at Stanford University. Together with Professor Marcus Feldman and other members of Xi'an Jiaotong - Morrison cooperative projects, Dr. Li has been advising the PRC government on population related policy issues. Dr. Li earned his Ph.D. at Xi'an Jiaotong University in the People's Republic of China.

This seminar is part of the Taiwan/China Seminar Series hosted by Melissa Brown, Assistant Professor, Anthropological Sciences, Stanford University.

Philippines Conference Room

Li Shuzhuo Director, Population Research Institute Speaker Xi'an Jiaotong University, PRC
Seminars
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About the series: The year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the end of Pacific War and Japan's unconditional surrender. Post-war Japan has embraced a new constitution that renounced war as a right of the nation and for the past six decades pursued economic growth under democratic government. Ironically, the years leading to this anniversary were filled with various disputes over territorial and historical issues with China and Korea and questions from neighboring countries whether Japanese society is shifting towards the right. Triggered by Prime Minister Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines "A" class war criminals, anti-Japan sentiment is widely spreading among its neighboring countries, accompanied by strong nationalism, and is posing a potential threat to the political stability of the region.

This colloquium series will focus on Japan's relationship with China and Korea and the historical controversies that are central to their deteriorating political relationship. The series speakers will address the following questions: What are the historical roots of these controversies? How did post-war Japanese foreign policy effect and was effected by Japan's handling of its militaristic past? What is the nature of domestic politics of these three countries that politicizes these historical issues and influences their responses to one another?

Each of the speakers in this series has been asked to address a specific aspect of Japan's relations. Professor Iokibe will address Japan's Post-War foreign policy under the pressures of the domestic agenda.

Makoto Iokibe, Professor of History in the Department of Law at Kobe University, is a specialist in Japanese diplomatic history and U.S.-Japan relations. Dr. Iokibe has also taught at Hiroshima University and was a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University and an academic visitor at the London School of Economics. He was a member of the Prime Minister's Commission on "Japan's Goals in the 21st Century," which submitted its report in January 2000. He is the author of several award-winning books, including Japan and the Changing World Order; The Occupation Era: The Prime Ministers and Rebuilding of Postwar Japan, 1945-1952; and Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, 1945-1999. He received his BA, MA and PhD in Law from Kyoto University.

Philippines Conference Room

Makoto Iokibe Professor of History, Deparment of Law Speaker Kobe University, Japan
Seminars
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Is it really "a democratic transition" that is taking place in the aftermath of Suharto's overthrow? Is it something else? Something more? Can Pramoedya's analysis of movements in Indonesian history, in his novels and other writings, help us understand what is happening in and to the country now? And what is the answer to Pramoedya's question: How did the young generation succeed so impressively in ousting a military-backed dictator, yet fail to produce a national political leadership to replace him? In his analysis Max Lane will draw linkages between seemingly disparate events and trends: emerging "Pramism"; burgeoning demonstrations (aksi); the controversy over "rectifying history"; the new alliance of Sukarnoist parties; rapid decentralization; and the longer-term dynamics of Indonesian history.

Max Lane is affiliated with the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He has been writing about Indonesian politics and history since 1972. His highly regarded translations include novels by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, plays by W. S. Rendra, and writings by other Indonesians. Recently he finished translating Arok Dedes and The Chinese In Indonesia by Pramoedya and The Social Sciences and Power in Indonesia by Daniel Dhakidae and Vedi Hadiz. Presently he is completing a book of his own, Aksi, the Fall Of Suharto and the Next Indonesia, while preparing a PhD at the University of Wollongong on class consciousness in modern Indonesia and lecturing at the University of Sydney.

Co-sponsored with the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at UC-Berkeley

UC-Berkeley
IEAS Conference Room, 6th Floor
2223 Fulton Street
Berkeley, CA

Max Lane Translator of Pramoedya's four-novel Buru Quartet and founding editor of Inside Indonesia Speaker
Seminars
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About the series: The year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the end of Pacific War and Japan's unconditional surrender. Post-war Japan has embraced a new constitution that renounced war as a right of the nation and for the past six decades pursued economic growth under democratic government. Ironically, the years leading to this anniversary were filled with various disputes over territorial and historical issues with China and Korea and questions from neighboring countries whether Japanese society is shifting towards the right. Triggered by Prime Minister Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines "A" class war criminals, anti-Japan sentiment is widely spreading among its neighboring countries, accompanied by strong nationalism, and is posing a potential threat to the political stability of the region.

This colloquium series will focus on Japan's relationship with China and Korea and the historical controversies that are central to their deteriorating political relationship. The series speakers will address the following questions: What are the historical roots of these controversies? How did post-war Japanese foreign policy effect and was effected by Japan's handling of its militaristic past? What is the nature of domestic politics of these three countries that politicizes these historical issues and influences their responses to one another?

Each of the speakers in this series has been asked to address a specific aspect of Japan's relations. Professor Iriye will address how Japan's post war relationship with its neighboring countries was greatly influenced by the international politics of the time, especially the looming rivalry between Soviet Union and U.S.

Akira Iriye was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1934 and graduated from a Tokyo high school in 1953. He received a B.A. from Haverford College in 1957 and a Ph.D. in U.S. and East Asian History from Harvard in 1961. Prof. Iriye was an Instructor and Lecturer in history at Harvard following receipt of his Ph.D. He then taught at the University of California at Santa Cruz, the University of Rochester, and the University of Chicago before accepting an appointment as Professor of History at Harvard University in 1989, where he became Charles Warren Professor of American History in 1991. Professor Iriye has written widely on American diplomatic history and Japanese- American relations. Among those works are Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911(1972); Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (1981); Fifty Years of Japanese-American Relations (in Japanese, 1991); China and Japan in the Global Setting (1992); The Globalizing of America (1993); and Cultural Internationalism an World Order (1997).

Philippines Conference Room

Akira Iriye Charles Warren Research Professor of American History, Emeritus Speaker Harvard University
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Authors
David Kang
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Visting Professor David Kang comments in the Christian Science Monitor on the ongoing spat between Korea and Japan over disputed isles, just as the United States hopes to renew progress on the North Korean nuclear problem.

President Bush could hardly have picked a more critical time to host China's President Hu Jintao at the White House.

A flare-up in troubled waters between South Korea and Japan, faltering trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, and the failure to persuade North Korea to come close to terms on its nuclear-weapons program all make China a pivotal player -- while raising questions about US strength and influence in the region.

"The United States can play a more profound role in stabilizing the region," says Moon Jung In, international relations professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. "China may be happy to see what's happening."

While the United States tries to persuade China both to reduce its yawning trade surplus with the US and get North Korea to return to six-party talks, a potentially explosive quarrel between South Korea and Japan is frustrating Washington's efforts to join its two northeast Asian allies in common cause on the nuclear issue.

"High-ranking officials of the South Korean government have been talking about Korean-US cooperation rather than trilateral cooperation," says Kim Sung Han, director of North American studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, affiliated with South Korea's Foreign Ministry.

"Trilateral cooperation is vital to resolving the North Korean problem," he says.

The tendency in Korea is to blame Japan for somehow wishing to assert its own role in the region, reminding both Koreans and Chinese of the history of Japanese imperialism in Asia, culminating in the conquest of much of the Chinese mainland and 35 years of colonial rule over the Korean peninsula.

Who lays claim to islands?

Memories of that history have leaped into the headlines as a result of a stand-off midway between Korea and Japan in what Koreans call the East Sea and the much of the rest of the world knows as the Sea of Japan.

The focal point is a cluster of 34 islets, basically uninhabitable, that both Korea and Japan claim as part of their national territory.

Korea calls the cluster "Dokdo," or "Solitary Island," while Japan calls it "Takeshima," or "Bamboo Island," and Japan also wants to give Japanese names to undersea rock formations surrounding the islands, basically volcanic rock thrust up from the sea.

The issue, simmering for years, reached a boiling point this week when Japan said it was sending two survey vessels to chart the waters around the islands, held by a garrison of Korean troops seen on Korean television manning anti-aircraft weapons and machine-guns as if to stave off enemy invasion.

Eager to prove his fearlessness in the face of the Japanese, South Korea's President Roh Moo-Hyun has ordered 18 patrol boats to form a blockade against the survey vessels.

"Some people are claiming territorial rights to former colonies that were once acquired through war and aggression," he told Christian leaders at a breakfast Thursday. Not just "good will," he said, as if preparing for war, but "wisdom and courage" were needed in such a crisis.

Shinzo Abe, Japanese government spokes-man, says the vessels are going there in defiance of a pledge of "stern action" by Korea's foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon, against any "provocation" by Japan.

Mr. Kim, of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, accuses Mr. Abe, an outspoken conservative who aspires to succeed Junichiro Koizumi as Japan's prime minister, of playing to the right-wing in refusing to address Korean sensitivities.

"Shinzo Abe has his own agenda," says Kim. "The Japanese are trying to increase their own role in the area of security. This is sending conflicting messages."

The sense here is that the US could rein in Japan but is reluctant to do so while cooperating closely with Japan on North Korea.

"The United States has been rather silent on these issues," says Kim Tae Hwan, research professor at Yonsei University. "Koreans have been very uncomfortable with the Japanese posture of aligning with the United States. Japan seems to disregard expectations from Korea."

While playing into the hands of China, the standoff over the islands also comes at an opportune moment in terms of South Korea's policy of rapprochement with North Korea.

Ministerial talks between North and South

South Korea's unification minister, Lee Jong Seok, goes to Pyongyang Friday for the first ministerial-level talks between North and South Korea in five months. He and his North Korean opposite number will have no trouble agreeing on the need to fend off what North Korea has already denounced as a "shameless" attempt at expansion.

It's a "very clear win-win" for both North and South Korea, says David Kang, a professor at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. In the process, he says, the ruckus at sea "makes it look a lot as if Korea and China are cooperating more since they're both upset by Japan's moves."

Mr. Kang sees the standoff as "a distraction" that probably will not have "a fundamental effect on North-South Korean relations," but adds to the sense that six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons are not likely to go anywhere.

"The US doesn't expect to make any progress on six-party talks," says Kang. "Nobody has a face-saving way out."

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Daniel C. Sneider
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Despite chatter about "the Chinese threat" during Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent visit to Washington, neither China nor the United States seeks to confront the issues plaguing their complex relationship. Pantech fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel Sneider considers the muscular side of "China's peaceful rise."

The visit of China's President Hu Jintao to the United States this week is yet another opportunity for chatter about the "Chinese threat.'' In the lead-up to his arrival, we have heard rising voices from Congress and from the administration on everything from China's currency manipulation and piracy of intellectual property to its military buildup.

Do not be deceived. There is no real appetite in either Washington or Beijing for confrontation over any of these issues, much less a serious exploration of the challenge that China presents to American global leadership.

Neither government can afford an escalation of tensions. Economically, we are too intertwined. Strip away the packaging on the $200 billion trade deficit with China and you will find American companies running global assembly lines that begin in Ohio, pass through Malaysia, and end up in southern China.

Strategically, the United States is painfully dependent on China to try to cope with the greatest security challenge in northeast Asia: North Korea's nuclear program.

Beijing is wedded to its doctrine of "China's peaceful rise.'' First formulated three years ago, it aims to keep things calm with the United States and most of its neighbors, buying time to manage the tightrope act of continuing high growth while preserving domestic stability.

In any case, Washington is too bogged down in the Middle East to do more than bark now and then about China.

"At the strategic level, the United States is really focused like a laser on the Middle East,'' and the Chinese like it that way, said Asian security expert Kurt Campbell. "They appreciate the fact that with the U.S. attention focused elsewhere, it allows China to play a larger role in Asia as a whole,'' he told a gathering last week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Typically, while Washington is focused on Hu's visit, the Chinese defense minister is in the midst of an unprecedented Asian tour that will take him to North and South Korea and to Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. China's prime minister has just finished a swing through Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Cambodia.

In my own travels through Asia recently, from South Korea and Japan in the northeast down to Singapore, Vietnam and Hong Kong in Southeast Asia, I found a stunning growth in China's influence. The question of how to deal with China's rise is high on every agenda.

Everywhere people are looking over their shoulder, worried about China's burgeoning strength and presence. They are equally fearful that the United States is abandoning the field to China. But they also don't want to choose between these two powers.

That is even true in Japan, where the popular media and politicians are full of talk about the Chinese threat. But look a little closer and you will also find a growing counter-movement, particularly in elite policy circles, warning against becoming separated from the rest of Asia. The battle for succession to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who is stepping down in the fall, is now being shaped around this issue.

The China-Japan rivalry tends to reveal the more muscular side of China's "peaceful rise,'' one that Americans rarely glimpse. In Vietnam, senior foreign policy officials recounted what happened when the Japanese came courting to gain Vietnam's backing for a resolution to give them permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council, a key goal of Japan's foreign policy. Japan is Vietnam's largest aid donor and a major source of foreign investment.

China and Vietnam have a long and stormy history as neighbors, including wars that go back centuries and -- more recently -- a brief invasion in 1979 that ended in defeat for the Chinese. Relations these days are relatively good, however, fed by growing trade, heavily in China's favor.

Hu, in his role as leader of the Chinese Communist Party, sent a special envoy to talk to the leadership of the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party. Sometimes, a Vietnamese official told me, the Chinese can be very indirect. Not this time. The message was simple: "Don't do it!'' The ``or else'' was left unspoken.

The Vietnamese compromised, supporting Japan's membership but refusing to co-sponsor the resolution. China was not pleased, but apparently accepted it.

For the Vietnamese, a senior official explained, they must engage in a "lot of fine balancing.'' Vietnam "can't stop engaging China'' but wants to make sure China becomes a "predictable'' power.

In Washington, when the cloud of rhetoric clears, that formula pretty much sums up the reality of U.S.-China relations, too.

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