President Hennessy talks with Charlie Rose about Stanford's plans and priorities
Venture capital (VC) investment provides a unique mechanism for gauging the technological and entrepreneurial sophistication of a national economy. It is no surprise, then, that the two giants of Asia—China and India—have rapidly become important destinations for VC investment. The latest data available from Ernst & Young reveals an astonishing development: China received more VC investment than any nation except the United States. India, though lagging behind China, still received $862 million. To compare, over $30 billion in VC money was invested in the United States in 2007; $823 million was invested in Canada. Clearly, China and India are becoming nodes for the global VC practice. Many of the largest and most prestigious Silicon Valley VC firms have established significant presences in both nations.
China and India differ in many ways, but with respect to the development of VC they share important characteristics. Until late 2008, both nations had rapidly growing consumer economies. The Chinese and Indian governments and populations both agree that education—and particularly engineering—is critical to their future. Both China and India are leaders in sending their graduate students abroad, which has created a pool of well-trained nationals overseas who can advise their peers at home, or even return home themselves to set up new ventures. Many of these Chinese and Indian nationals have worked in U.S. sciences and engineering-based firms. Such professional experience, especially during the last two decades, has laid the basis for successful technology-based entrepreneurship, and the growth in VC that accompanies it.
When VC investing is viewed globally, U.S. dominance is unquestioned. In the United States, 30–35 percent of all VC-financed firms are located in the San Francisco Bay area. Another 10–12 percent are located in the Boston and New York areas, respectively. In India and China, VC investments are similarly concentrated, and generally occur in locations with the greatest concentrations of highly educated persons. As Table 1 indicates, the investment concentration is remarkable. Forty percent of all the VC-funded firms are located in Beijing, 26 percent are in Shanghai, and the Southern Chinese triangle of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong accounts for another 14 percent. VC investment in China is even more concentrated than in the United States.
Table 1 VC Investments in China and India by City, 2004–2007
(more than 5 investments per city)
Chinese City Number of Firms Percent Indian City Number of Firms Percent
Beijing 213 40 Bangalore 55 38
Shanghai 137 26 Mumbai 31 21
Shenzhen 36 7 Chennai 21 14
Hong Kong 19 4 New Delhi 16 11
Guangzhou 16 3 Hyderabad 11 8
Hangzhou 13 2 Pune 8 5
Nanjing 11 2 n/a
Suzhou 9 2 n/a
Wuhan 7 1 n/a
Others 66 13 Others 4 3
Unknown 1 0 Unknown 0 0
Total 528 100 Total 146 100
Binational 9 2 Binational 45 31
VC-backed startups in India, though more diffuse in terms of the top six, are more concentrated overall. Three city regions—Bangalore (38 percent), Mumbai (21 percent), and Chennai (14 percent)—attract the largest investment. However, when including Delhi (11 percent), Hyderabad (8 percent), and Pune (5 percent), these six cities account for an even greater percentage of overall VC investment. The most technology-oriented cities in both nations, Beijing and Bangalore, have received approximately 40 percent of all VC investment. The second largest recipients are Shanghai and Mumbai, which are also the financial capitals.
In China, an enormous economy growing at nearly 10 percent per year even as it emerges from a socialist past, there are significant opportunities in infrastructure development and in supplying the burgeoning underserved consumer market. In a recent Ernst & Young report, Fan Zhang, one of the founding managing partners of Sequoia Capital China, was quoted as saying that “one of the factors that attracted Sequoia Capital to China is the country’s booming consumer market that provides an opportunity to create companies to define certain sectors and fill the need for strong brands, not only in technology but also tech-related consumer services and more traditional industries.”
Zhang is correct—VC investing in China does not directly compete with U.S. firms seeking VC investment. Table 2 shows the fields that VC firms are targeting in China. The table is divided into two binary categories—whether the firm receiving the investment targets the domestic or the global market across a variety of industries, and whether a given firm is in a high technology or non-high technology sector. Chinese firms, even those in technology-based fields, overwhelmingly target the domestic market (87 percent). The Internet has given rise to the largest number of VC startups, nearly all of which are focused on the Sinophone market. Two other key areas—software (10 percent) and mobile phone applications (10 percent)—also cater almost exclusively to the Chinese market. This domestic focus suggests that it will be quite some time before VC-backed Chinese firms threaten counterpart firms in the United States. A possible exception may be semiconductor design, where there are some Chinese startups. Though few Chinese VC-financed firms are likely to be directly competitive with U.S. firms in global markets, many of these Chinese firms compete ferociously against U.S. multinationals trying to make their own inroads into the Chinese domestic market.
Table 2 VC Investments in China and India by Sector and Market, 2004–2007
India China
Sector Domestic* Global Domestic ** Global
Semiconductors 0 7 22 20
Internet 16 3 144 2
Software 2 14 55 4
Communications 1 4 23 9
Services 4 53 28 9
Mobile phone 7 5 51 1
Media 2 0 35 0
Healthcare 1 4 26 4
Retail 1 1 19 0
Miscellaneous 2 0 20 2
Components 0 0 2 1
Energy 0 0 6 8
Environment 0 0 5 1
Manufacturing 0 0 25 6
Total 34 91 461 67
* Domestic firms are identified as those that made no apparent attempt to serve overseas markets.
The profile of Indian firms differs from those in China. First, Indian firms are internationally oriented (73 percent); only 27 percent focus on the domestic market. With respect to sector concentration, VC investing in India favors the services sector (46 percent) and software (13 percent). This is not surprising, given India’s well-known comparative advantage in these arenas. Unlike most VC-backed companies in China, many Indian firms may well create competition for U.S. service firms, despite the less developed nature of the Indian economy as a whole.
China and India continue to attract significant VC investment, albeit in different sectors. Today, China is second only to the United States in terms of VC investing, and this is unlikely to change. In China, the preponderance of VC investment is geared to the rapidly growing internal market. The size and unique nature of this market offers entrepreneurs lucrative opportunities to provide “knock-off” U.S. Internet sites for the Chinese market. There are Chinese interpretations of Yahoo!, Google, eBay, Facebook, and Monster.com that service Chinese customers. These firms are self-limited by the language; as such, they do not threaten companies overseas. Moreover, these Chinese companies do not own unique or global class technology that could challenge larger multinational players. It is unclear whether this situation will change over time.
Indian firms differ from Chinese firms in their strong outward orientation. In percentage terms, more Indian than Chinese firms operate in hard-core technology fields. Thus, while China currently enjoys greater VC investment, it is possible that Indian firms may ultimately play a bigger role in the global economy.
Management Science and Engineering Professor Siegfried S. Hecker, an expert on nuclear weapons, recently returned from a visit to North Korea, where he frequently checks on the country's denuclearization process. Hecker has researched extensively in fields of plutonium science-he served as director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 through 1997, and remains an emeritus director to the Laboratory. Through a series of Track Two, non-governmental, non-official visits to North Korea, Hecker has worked closely with the previous and current administration's North Korean negotiations team. The Daily spoke with Hecker about his experiences in the country, and his insight into nuclear issues in North Korea and elsewhere.
The Stanford Daily (SD): This is your sixth visit to North Korea. You made one each year from 2004 to 2009. How is this trip different from the previous ones? Any change in North Korean society, diplomacy?
Siegfried Hecker (SH): We visited North Korea from Tuesday, Feb. 24 to Saturday, Feb. 28, and first of all it was quite a relief from Beijing in that the air was quite clear and that the weather was beautiful. In Beijing, it went day to day from being smoggy to being almost impossibly smoggy. So the first thing that we found when we got off at Pyongyang, was the relief of having reasonably clean air.
Even though it was in February and still quite cold, the greatest impression left is that Pyongyang and the people just looked more prosperous this time than I have seen them look in the past. There were more cars on the road; there were more tractors, especially when we got off into the countryside. The people were better dressed.
Particularly, one of the things I look for is color. Years ago, North Korea, like the Soviet Union, was all drab, gray and black. Now you see lots of colors; lots of down jackets, for example, on little children and women with bright colors from yellow to green to red. There was more construction in Pyongyang. We've seen many cranes working on the ground.
All the way around, while some people believed that North Korea and its economy is sinking, we've actually seen it rising and looking better than we've seen in the past. I would say this is the starkest observation of how it struck differently as the previous times.
[Diplomatically,] we've seen a change of attitude since October 2006, when they conducted a nuclear test. Even though, by technical standards, that nuclear test was of limited success, politically for them it was very successful. So the principal attitude change is one of greater confidence on their part. They now tell us, you must deal with us as a nuclear weapon state. We have demonstrated that we have nuclear weapons. We've tested a nuclear weapon, and so we expect to be treated as a state that has nuclear weapons. That confidence will most likely harden their negotiating position. Then, of course, they're also still trying to get a sense of what the new administration will do. They are entering the negotiations with a new administration from what they considered to be a position of strength.
SD: How is North Korea's disablement process of its nuclear facilities going?
SH: In July 2007, they stopped operations and began disabling the nuclear facilities. When I was there almost exactly one year ago, they showed me the nuclear facilities, allowed me to take photographs of the nuclear facilities to demonstrate that they are disabling those facilities that produce the bomb fuel-the plutonium. Disabling the facilities means making it more difficult to restart. They have finished most of the disablement actions, but still need to complete the unloading of the fuel from the nuclear reactor.
They made the decision last year to slow down the unloading because the other parties did not meet their obligations of providing heavy fuel oil or equivalent energy aid. At this point, Japan and South Korea have not finished their obligations, so the slow-down continues.
If the other parties complete their obligations, then I believe North Korea is prepared to complete the disablement. However, the next important step is to dismantle the facilities-that is, take them apart. The terms of that dismantlement have not yet been negotiated. Subsequently, they will need to give up their nuclear weapons. That seems a long way off now based on their comments.
SD: In one of your reports, you discussed the idea of a scientific fingerprint that could deter North Korea from exporting its plutonium. This is very interesting. Can the method have wider use?
SH: One of the concerns with North Korea would be the possibility of them selling or exporting plutonium or nuclear technologies. We know enough about the North Korean plutonium that we have what you call a scientific fingerprint. The makeup of plutonium is determined by the type of reactor and by how long it was in the reactor. We know that about the North Korean plutonium so we can identify North Korea's plutonium. This should be a deterrent for North Korea ever exporting its plutonium because we would know it came from North Korea.
We, of course, don't know whether or not North Korea would ever want to sell its plutonium, but just in case, the fingerprint represents a deterrent. This fingerprinting of plutonium is not as useful for plutonium from the rest of the world, because there are so many different types of reactors and we know less about their fuels and operating schedules.
SD: Do you think the example of North Korea contributes much to a solution of nuclear problems in other regions-for example, Iran?
SH: Right now, the second nuclear hot spot is Iran, and the difference between North Korea and Iran is that North Korea has declared its nuclear program now to be a weapon's program and has demonstrated that at least it can detonate a nuclear device, even though it wasn't fully successful. Iran, I believe, is developing an option for nuclear weapons but under the umbrella of doing it strictly for civilian purposes. They say, "We're not a nuclear weapon state and we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons," but they are continuing to put most of the capabilities in place should they decide to build weapons.
The dividing line between military and civilian is a very fine line, so North Korea and Iran are two very different problems. However, those countries certainly watch each other and look at the diplomatic responses during each other's negotiations.
SD: Are you advising anyone in the new administration?
SH: We work very closely with the U.S. government on this, although our visits are strictly track two visits, which means non-governmental, non-official visits. I don't go as an official, but rather as a Stanford University employee. In the past, we worked very closely with the previous North Korean negotiations team led by Ambassador Christopher Hill. We have now begun to work with the new team that is just being put in place.
SD: During your visits, you met with North Korean officials in education, public health, and explored possibilities of cooperation in these areas. How do you envision these future exchanges?
SH: We met with officials from the ministry of education and one of the economic universities to discuss potential cooperation in educational and technology exchange. In the past, we have also met with officials from the health ministry. So, in addition to working the nuclear issues, we're very interested in trying to engage the North Korean community in a broader set of activities than simply nuclear, and technology is one of those. They're very interested in material science, biotechnology, information technology, and so we explored the possibility of exchange visits and particularly having some Stanford professors go to North Korea and lecture on those topics.
SD: What classes do you currently teach at Stanford? How do you like being a professor at Stanford?
SH: I have a terrific time-that's one of the reasons why I'm at Stanford. The two classes that I teach are both Management Science and Engineering classes. They both focus on the intersection of technology and policy. One is a very large class, MSE 193/293, that Professor William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and I teach together. We cover everything from history of technology and warfare to modern times and what the current challenges are in the security arena. Both Prof. Perry and I try to teach that in the spirit of our own experiences in these areas. It's a very, very large class-over 200 students.
Then I teach a course by myself in spring that's exactly the opposite. It's a sophomore seminar, MSE93Q, and I have approximately 16 students. The title is "Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Terrorism," and in essence, it's everything nuclear. So I cover in that 10 weeks the whole nuclear problem. I try to get students to understand the basics of nuclear technology and how that interfaces with the policy issue of nuclear weapons, energy, proliferation and terrorism. We cover topics such as: If you develop nuclear energy, why do you have to be concerned about nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation? What is the connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? That's what we cover in 10 weeks' time, and I've enjoyed the interaction with students immensely.
SD: What do you aim to teach students in the classroom and outside?
SH: Particularly, I want students to understand the intersections of technology and policy. The nuclear field is a very good one to do that because you must understand the basics of nuclear technology to make good policy. And we also now have 60 years of very rich history of the interplay of those two in so many different countries and so many different ways. For example, in both of my classes the students have to write policy papers that show they have at least a basic understanding of the technology, even though they may be social science, political science, international relations majors, but I want them to understand the difference between plutonium and uranium, between fission and fusion, between weapons and energy. That's what I like to be able to contribute to the University.
What I like about the students is how truly interested and dedicated they are and how experienced so many of them are in the international arena. In addition, what's also fascinating is that we have students from all over the world. Whether it is a physics major from Palestine, or somebody who grew up in Iran, Pakistan, India or in China, Vietnam, Africa, they bring a totally different outlook on the world to the table, which then of course helps the rest of the students to understand that this world is much more than just about the United States of America, and Stanford is a great place to do it.
What makes some governments perform better than others? With rising levels of decentralization and local democracy, the focus of "good governance" is increasingly shifting from national to subnational levels. While much of the existing development literature remains preoccupied with formal institutional and society-centered explanations, there is growing evidence that local policy reforms are strongly affected by informal norms and elite-centered processes.
Post-Suharto Indonesia, a country with one of the most pronounced shifts to democratic decentralization anywhere in recent history, is a case in point. Drawing on empirical comparisons across ten districts (comprising 1000 business surveys and 150 interviews), Dr. von Luebke argues that societal pressures are often less significant in explaining policy differences than the quality of local government leadership. In the early transition to democracy, local firms, associations, and district councils continue to be constrained by collective action and political incentive problems. Local government leaders, on the other hand, have wielded historically strong formal and informal powers and stand, for better or worse, at the gateway to local policy reform. Motivated by direct elections and prospective donor funding, some district heads have become catalysts for better governance by introducing informal public-private dialogues, innovative monitoring instruments, and meritocratic promotion schemes. In response to current development debates, these findings highlight the importance of government leadership as an often underestimated policy determinant that can compensate for weak societal checks in periods of transition from authoritarian rule.
Christian von Luebke is completing a book manuscript titled “Heterodox Governance: The Political Economy of Local Policy Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” He has been awarded a 2009-2011 German Science Foundation Fellowship for a follow-up project incorporating cases from the rest of Southeast Asia and China. In 2001-2006 he worked in rural Indonesia as a technical advisor for the World Bank and the German Development Agency. He holds a Ph.D. in public policy from the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University.
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Christian von Luebke is a political economist with particular interest in democracy, governance, and development in Southeast Asia. He is currently working on a research project that gauges institutional and structural effects on political agency in post-Suharto Indonesia and the post-Marcos Philippines. During his German Research Foundation fellowship at Stanford he seeks to finalize a book manuscript on Indonesian governance and democracy and teach a course on contemporary Southeast Asian politics.
Before coming to Stanford, Dr. von Luebke was a research fellow at the Center of Global Political Economy at Waseda (Tokyo), the Institute for Developing Economies (Chiba), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jakarta). He received a JSPS postdoctoral scholarship from the Japan Science Council and a PhD scholarship from the Australian National University.
Between 2001 and 2006, he worked as technical advisor in various parts of rural Indonesia - for both GTZ and the World Bank. In 2007, he joined an international research team at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) analyzing the effects of public-private action on investment and growth.
Dr. von Luebke completed his Ph.D. in 2008 in Political Science at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, the Australian National University. He also holds a Masters in Economics and a B.A. in Business and Political Science from Muenster University.
His research on contemporary Indonesian politics, democratic governance, rural investment, and leadership has been published in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Contemporary Southeast Asian Affairs, Asian Economic Journal, and ISEAS. He regularly contributes political analyses on Southeast Asia to Oxford Analytica.
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The Asia Health Policy Program hosted meetings of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities World Institute (AWI, www.apru.org/awi) public health research project, February 24-25 at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Stanford University is a member of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities, and the Asia Health Policy Program coordinates with others on the steering committee for the AWI public health project. The project brings together scholars from leading Pacific Rim universities to focus on comparative study of chronic non-communicable disease – the number one cause of premature death worldwide – in selected Pacific Rim cities (Beijing, Danang, Hangzhou, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jakarta, Makassar, Nanjing, Sydney, Taipei, Vientiane and Wuhan).
Ambassador Michael H. Armacost, Acting Director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, welcomed the participants -- researchers and deans of schools of public health from China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. During the deliberations, the participants agreed to establish a program of research and development to prepare tools for use by health systems worldwide to implement best practice in chronic disease prevention and management through four areas of research: risk factor surveillance; assessment of costs and organization of services; change management to implement best practice; and monitoring and evaluation.
The previous meeting of the AWI public health project was held in November 2008 in Singapore. The next meeting will be held in June 2009 at Johns Hopkins University (an Invited Member of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities World Institute).
On February 23, prior to the public health project meetings, the Asia Health Policy Program also hosted the planning meetings for the AWI 2009 public health workshop, to be held at Johns Hopkins University June 24-26, 2009.
A group of writers and academics in China in recent years have come to be known as the "New Left." But the range of views encompassed under this rubric is broad and seemingly contradictory. Many are critical of the inequality that has come from the market reforms; some seem to look fondly back on the Maoist system and even the Cultural Revolution, while others hold very different views, preferring to call themselves "critical intellectuals," who see a "Chinese alternative" to a neoliberal market economy. This panel will explore the range of views within this group loosely termed the "New Left," to understand what exactly the "New Left" is. How are these "New Left" views different from the Old Left? What are the implications of these views for China's political and economic reforms? Discussing these issues are Wang Hui, a central figure in the "New Left" in China, and David Kelly, a leading Western scholar on the subject.
Wang Hui is professor of Chinese language and literature at Tsinghua University and guest professor at Nankai University. In May 2008, he was named one of the world's top 100 public intellectuals by Foreign Policy magazine. His essays, commentary, and teaching examine the paradoxes of social change in modern and contemporary China. He was editor-in-chief of Dushu, China's leading intellectual journal.
David Kelly is Professor of Chinese Politics at the China Research Centre, University of Technology Sydney. Professor Kelly's work ranges widely across Chinese politics: intellectual history, especially of Marxism and liberalism; political sociology, mainly of intellectuals, urban homeowners and migrant workers; and public policy, focusing on the dilemmas of governance under turbulent current conditions.
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Why do community-based education and social persuasion programs for promoting healthy lifestyle and preventing chronic disease sometimes fall short of our expectations? Why are population effects so difficult to engineer and why are they so ephemeral?
This research carried out at USC, the Claremont Graduate University, and collaborating institutions in China integrates across social, behavioral, and neurocognitive sciences to address those questions. We conclude tentatively that the answer to each of the questions may lie in individual and context variability relative to program response, and that in order to more fully address the question of prevention program response variability requires engagement and integration across several levels of science to consider the roles of social groupings, environmental selection and design, social influence processes, and brain biology.
What works in one social, cultural or organizational setting may not be so effective in another. What works for persons with certain genetic and experiential backgrounds may be totally ineffective for persons with different dispositional or personality characteristics. In a series of community/school based prevention trials carried out in markedly different southern California and central China settings, we have uncovered domains of consistent response, and other domains of substantial environment- and disposition-based response variability.
A social influences based smoking prevention program framed in collectivist values and objectives worked to prevent smoking in one cultural setting but not another. And an individualist framed social influences program worked in the setting where the collectivist program did not. But the characteristics of the particular settings, which defined program success or failure, were different from what conventional (e.g., cultural psychology) wisdom would have led us to expect. Furthermore, both within and across cultural settings, the same individual dispositional characteristics moderated or determined program effectiveness, again in ways not predicted by the common cultural and behavioral science wisdom.
In recent studies carried out both in China and the U.S. we have found affective decision deficits, with known neural underpinnings, to account for rapid progression to regular smoking and binge drinking. These deficits are akin to the dispositional characteristics found earlier to moderate prevention program effects. Subsequent brain imaging studies confirm the hypothesized regions of neural involvement. Together these findings hold promise for more effective – situation and phenotype specific – approaches to engendering and sustaining more optimal individual and population health behavior.
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