While Shanghai and Hong Kong are often viewed as the financial centers of China, Beijing, the capital, is in reality where all financial decisions are made-decisions that affect the country's banking system and overall financial structure, which has implications on a global level. Carl Walter, a managing director of JPMorgan China, spoke at a Stanford China Program seminar on November 1 about the frequent changes in China's banking system since 1949 and the cost of these reforms within and outside of China.

China's banking system is currently controlled by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which has competed at several points with the People's Bank of China (PBOC) for influence within the state bureacracy. During the Cultural Revolution period, MOF first moved to the fore of China's banking system, merging together the until-then separate PBOC and Bank of China (BOC) and eliminating all other banks. With China's "Open Door" economic reforms of 1978, the banks were again separated, with PBOC having oversight for three commercial banks and MOF for two, including BOC. In 1994, authority for all commercial banks, such as BOC and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), moved to PBOC and MOF took control of three newly established policy banks, such as China Development Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank. Premier Zhu Rongji drove these and all other banking reforms until 2003.

Major bank restructuring has taken place since 1998, the big four banks were re-capitalized, problem loans spun off into four "bad" banks and the international accounting system adopted in preparation for international share offering on both domestic and international markets. All four banks successfully raised capital internationally and domestically over the past five years. Two large sovereign wealth fund-like entities came into being-Huijin, controlled by PBOC, and China Investment Corporation (CIC), operated under MOF- that were used to hold the Chinese state ownership of these banks.  The year that it was established in 2007, CIC acquired Huijin and MOF thereby indirectly gained control of all of the banks under PBOC.

The greatly increased level of bank capital achieved through restructuring and recapitalization was eroded, however, due to the enormous growth of loans in 2009 so that China now is faced with raising virtually the same amount of capital again, stated Walter. Everyone is paying the price, including international and domestic equity investors, who are being diluted, and China's own government, which to avoid dilution, must buy new shares at high market prices. The values of these shares, moreover, may be inflated due to the techniques used earlier to remove bad loans from their balance sheets. This has left banks exposed to these now worthless portfolios. To that extent, international accounting firms and market regulators put their reputations on the line when they support capital raising by the banks internationally. In short, the politics and economics of China's bank reforms and the struggles to control the banks have been internationalized.

Walter suggested that China is trapped with a banking system that is suited to the country's political system, but not to its economy. His forthcoming book, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China's Extraordinary Rise, co-authored with Fraser J.T. Howie, examines this issue and the recent history of China's financial system in depth.

October 15, 2010 was the 100th anniversary of the birthday of Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and a key leader in establishing the field of East Asian studies. George R. Packard, president of the United States-Japan Foundation, worked with Reischauer in the 1960s and recently published a biography about him entitled Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan. Packard spoke at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center on October 28 to share his perspective on Reischauer's life and career.

Reischauer was born to missionary parents in Japan, where he spent the first part of his life. According to Packard, Reischauer had a lifelong appreciation for Japan that deepened with time, but he also recognized that the more time he spent living in and studying Japan, the more that there was for him still to learn. Reischauer attended Oberlin College as an undergraduate and Harvard University as a doctoral student. During World War II, he worked for the U.S. State Department translating intercepted messages.

The Pearl Harbor-era view of Japan in the United States was that of a "treacherous" country-one that still surfaces from time to time, according to Packard. Reischauer's life's work was to improve American education and understanding about Japan. While teaching at Harvard University, Reischauer, along with China studies pioneer John King Fairbank, helped to build the field of East Asian studies in the United States. Packard credits their efforts for changing the British imperial-era designation of the "Far East" to "East Asia." In addition to his works such as Japan, Past and Present and A History of East Asian Civilization, Reischauer was committed to writing about Japan in popular publications like Reader's Digest.

Reischauer served as U.S. Ambassador to Japan from 1961-1966. While there, he helped to diminish the "Occupation mentality" of Americans in Japan and planted the seeds for the eventual return of Okinawa, said Packard. During his time as ambassador, Reischauer suffered many professional and personal setbacks, including the death of President Kennedy, a supporter of his efforts; the escalation of the Vietnam War, for which he drew criticism although he was not a proponent of it; and being stabbed by a deranged student. According to Packard, after the stabbing incident Reischauer was deeply concerned about generating negative sentiment toward Japan, and thus intentionally kept quiet about it to the media. After returning to Harvard University in the late 1960s, Reischauer continued to draw criticism for the Vietnam War and in later decades was labeled as a "Japan apologist."

Despite his critics, the wisdom of Reischauer's work in academia and government rings true today, as evidenced by Japan's place as a global economic power and the successful and significant role that the U.S.-Japan relationship plays in the peace and economic stability of East Asia. 

In an interview with The Incheon Daily, Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC and KSP, stresses the significance of Incheon's designation as host city to the 2010 Asia Economic Community Forum. He suggests that Incheon, and in particular the Songdo Free Economic Zone, could become an important meeting ground for Asian nations, in part because it represents a geographical and political compromise, between China and Japan. For this reason, the time has come to seriously reflect upon the role that Songdo will play in Asian unification. According to Shin, Asia should do as Europe has done, following the example of the European Union, which, he maintains, has brought Europe together and strengthened the region. In this integrated Asia, he argues further, Incheon Songdo is perhaps the city best suited to serve as the regional hub.

Industrial-scale aquaculture production magnifies environmental degradation, according to the first global assessment of the effects of marine finfish aquaculture (e.g. salmon, cod, turbot and grouper) released today. This is true even when farming operations implement the best current marine fish farming practices.

University of Victoria marine ecologist Dr. John Volpe and his research team have developed the Global Aquaculture Performance Index (GAPI), an unprecedented system for objectively measuring the environmental performance of fish farming.

"Scale is critical," says Volpe. "Over time, the industry has made strides in reducing the environmental impact per ton of fish, but this does not give a complete picture. Large-scale farming of salmon, for example, even under the best current practices, creates large-scale problems."

The fish farming industry is an increasingly important source of seafood, especially as many wild fisheries are in decline. Yet farming of many marine fish species has been criticized as causing ecological damage. For instance, the researchers found that the relatively new marine finfish aquaculture sector in China and other Asian countries lags in environmental performance.

Adds Volpe: "The fastest growing sector is Asia, where we found a troubling combination of poor environmental performance and rapidly increasing production."

With support from the Lenfest Ocean Program, Volpe and his team developed GAPI, which uses 10 different criteria to assess and score environmental impacts. Incorporating information such as the application of antibiotics and discharge of water pollutants, GAPI allows researchers to gauge which farmed species and countries of production have the best or worst environmental performance.

The researchers examined the environmental impact of marine fish farming per ton of fish produced and the cumulative environmental impact for each country producing a major farmed species.

"GAPI provides a valuable tool for developing environmentally responsible fish farming. Governments can use GAPI to inform policies and regulations to minimize the environmental footprint of fish farming. Farmers can use it to improve production practices. And buyers can use it to compare and select better, more environmentally friendly seafood options," says Chris Mann, senior officer and director of the Pew Environment Group's Aquaculture Standards Project, which collaborated on the work.

For further information on GAPI, including a summary of the methodology and findings, visit www.lenfestocean.org.

The GAPI 2010 report released today is based on 2007 data, the most recent year for which data for all aquaculture indicators are available. GAPI analysis will be updated periodically as additional data becomes available. For additional information, updated research and analysis, please see the GAPI website at www.gapi.ca.

The Lenfest Ocean Program supports scientific research aimed at forging solutions to the challenges facing the global marine environment. The program was established in 2004 by the Lenfest Foundation and is managed by the Pew Environment Group.

The University of Victoria is a national and international leader in the study of the oceans, with expertise as far-ranging as ocean-climate interactions, ocean observation systems, physical and chemical oceanography, marine ecology, coastal resource management and ocean engineering

With a Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and anticipation building in Beijing for a change in leadership in 2012, domestic politics in both countries are playing a major role in the bilateral relationship. On the eve of his own milestone—his 80th birthday—John W. Lewis, one of the world’s foremost China scholars and the director of CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, discussed the direction of the U.S.-China relationship, the importance of dialogue between the two powers, and the potentially rocky road ahead. Excerpts:

CISAC: The conventional wisdom seems to be that relations between the two countries are not very good and getting worse. Can you provide some context?

Lewis: There have been many, many times when the relationship has been worse. The fundamentals in U.S.-China relations, in my view, have over time gradually gotten better. Both sides recognize that there is a complementarity in their relations in the Pacific. There is a kind of synergy that is very important, and when things get bad, as they are now certainly—or not good—both sides try to keep the genie in the bottle. Several things are important: even though the Chinese think we made the Taiwan problem worse with the sale of $6.4 billion worth of advanced weapons, the Cross-Strait relationship is actually pretty good. That ingredient in our relationship with China is not a serious problem. The issues that we have are not abnormal in big power relationships.

What is so sad at this point is that the militaries on both sides—the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army—they both want to have a serious engagement with each other. They want to have a security relationship with us, but we have these constant issues such as the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. It changes every day, but now they say they want to put the USS George Washington in the Yellow Sea, or what the Koreans call the West Sea. It's stupid militarily and it's provocative from the Chinese point of view, and you can't defend it other than that the South Koreans want it. And from the Chinese point of view, they cannot imagine why during the calm periods with North Korea, for example, we don’t try to take advantage of that, why we don’t try to make progress in the Six-Party talks. So they see this constant set of problems that project into China that do affect U.S.-China relations. Add into that the political rhetoric in this country, the loss of jobs to China, for instance. It's a big political deal in the United States now. With China, there are endless things we could do. But politically Obama will not do it because he’s going to take a hit domestically. The anger against China is so strong in Washington, and perhaps in the rest of the country, whether it’s because of human rights or questions related to their currency exchange rate. But again, the fundamentals are quite different. They are actually pretty sound.

CISAC: China is gearing up for a major transition of power. How will this affect the relationship?

L: Now that Xi Jinping has been made vice chairman of the Central Military Commission it’s pretty clear that the jockeying is already moving in the direction [that he will succeed President Hu Jintao]. Can something happen? The Chinese always worry, as any politician would, about the next round. So they’re not going to make any mistakes, and they’re not going to do anything that gets themselves off track. They cannot back down [on foreign policy]. No one can back down against the United States or anyone else, particularly now with the Japanese. They’re going to come right at the Japanese.

CISAC: So the transition makes things more difficult?

L: Absolutely, and it’s true in the United States. Obama's looking at the election and he's going to do everything he can to move to the right and look like he’s really tough on all the things the Republicans can hammer him on. That’s going to shape how the Chinese pick their leadership in 2012. Their selection will come at about the same time as ours in 2012—the campaigns will be simultaneous—and it’s too bad. If we become very nationalistic, it’s going to look very hostile to them. And we’re going to be wagged by the Japanese and South Korean dog, and this great power, the United States, is going to look helpless to them. China is offering opportunities to solve problems and we are not prepared to take them, and they're saying, ‘are you not willing to talk to us?’?