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In Southeast Asia, and particularly for for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), security has long trumped democracy as a priority. But the brutal dictatorship in Burma/Myanmar, political pluralism in Indonesia, and the global growth of democratic norms have led some Southeast Asians to question ASEAN’s habit of turning a blind eye to domestic abuses by member states. The concept of regional security, meanwhile, is being reoriented from military threats toward new dangers to health and the environment, and from state security toward human security.

Will promoting democracy cause local autocrats to hunker down, and split ASEAN into hostile camps? Will ignoring demands for democracy allow domestic pressures to rise to dangerous levels? Should Burma/Myanmar be expelled or engaged? How should ASEAN respond to nontraditional threats to security in which member states are themselves implicated? In Hard Choices, expert authors—including a foreword by Surin Pitsuwan, the current secretary-general of ASEAN—grapple with these and other key and controversial questions for Southeast Asia today—and tomorrow.

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Marcus Mietzner is currently Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University. Between 1998 and 2008, he lived, worked and researched in Indonesia. He has published extensively on Indonesian politics, among others in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Southeast Asian Research and Contemporary Southeast Asia. His most recent book is Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation, published by ISEAS in Singapore in December 2008.

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Marcus Mietzner Lecturer in Indonesian Studies and Faculty of Asian Studies Speaker Australian National University
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Yoshiki Kaneko is a professor at Dokkyo University in Saitama, Japan.  SEAF hosted him as a visiting scholar at Stanford for part of 2007 to continue or complete the research and writing of several Japanese-language manuscripts on Southeast Asia that are now in print or awaiting publication.  They include three chapters  in edited volumes: two forthcoming in 2009, "Ethnicity and Politics in Malaysia and Singapore," in Beyond Ethnic Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Keiso Shobo), and "The Collapse of Judicial Independence under the Mahathir Administration in Malaysia," in Rethinking Southeast Asia Politics (Keio University Press); and one published in 2007, "The Function of the Judiciary in the Democratization Process in Southeast Asia," in New Political and Economic Order in Southeast Asia: Changes and Challenges aft the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997 (Daito-Bunka University, 2007).

Kaneko Yoshiki is a professor at Dokkyo University in Saitama, Japan.  SEAF hosted him as a visiting scholar at Stanford for part of 2007 to continue or complete the research and writing of several Japanese-language manuscripts on Southeast Asia that are now in print or awaiting publication.  They include three chapters  in edited volumes: two forthcoming in 2009, "Ethnicity and Politics in Malaysia and Singapore," in Beyond Ethnic Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Keiso Shobo), and "The Collapse of Judicial Independence under the Mahathir Administration in Malaysia," in Rethinking Southeast Asia Politics (Keio University Press); and one published in 2007, "The Function of the Judiciary in the Democratization Process in Southeast Asia," in New Political and Economic Order in Southeast Asia: Changes and Challenges aft the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997 (Daito-Bunka University, 2007).

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Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation
in South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1979)

Paul Y. Chang, Singapore Management University

Research regarding the impact of repression on social movements
has yielded conflicting findings; some argue that repression
decreases the total quantity of protest events while others argue
that it motivates protest. To move beyond this impasse, various
scholars have suggested exploring how repression influences
the quality of social movements. This study assesses the
impact repression had on the formation of alliances between
different social groups participating in South Korea’s democracy
movement. Results from negative binomial regression analyses
show that repression facilitated the formation of alliances
between movement actors at a time when the overall number of
protest events decreased. This study contributes to the literature
on coercion and mobilization by pointing to the possibility of
movement development during low levels of a protest cycle.

Recent studies of social movements have identified repression as one important aspect of the larger political opportunity structure that significantly shapes movement trajectories (Davenport, Johnston and Mueller 2005; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Earl 2003, 2006; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; della Porta 1996). Empirical findings from past studies have revealed a "paradox" regarding the impact of repression on social movements (Brockett 2005, 1995). While some argue that repression reduces movement vitality (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier 2003) because of the added costs associated with repression (Tilly 1978), others argue that repression increases the rate of protest and collective action (White 1989; Khawaja 1993, 1994). In reviews of this literature researchers have puzzled over the fact that, "Both threats and opportunities can mobilize activism… For some challengers, increased political openness enhances the prospects for mobilization, while other movements seem to respond more to threat than opportunity." (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1645,1634; see also Earl 2006; Lichbach 1987).


Research and writing for this study was funded in part by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. For comments on previous drafts, I thank Gi-Wook Shin, Susan Olzak, Doug McAdam, David S. Meyer, John Meyer, Jeong-Woo Koo, Myung-Koo Kang, Ehito Kimura, Yong Suk Jang, members of Stanford University’s Workshop on Social Movements and Collective Action and anonymous reviewers for Social Forces.

Direct correspondence to Paul Y. Chang, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Level 4, Singapore 178903. E-mail: paulchang@smu.edu.sg.
© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces 87(2), December 2008


For full text of the article, please visit http://socialforces.unc.edu/epub/folder.2007-02-09.8541500563/copy_of_december08

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Paul Y. Chang
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Effective strategies for managing the dangers of global climate change are proving very difficult to design and implement. They require governments to undertake a portfolio of efforts that are politically challenging because they require large expenditures today for uncertain benefits that accrue far into the future. That portfolio includes tasks such as putting a price on carbon, fixing the tendency for firms to under-invest in the public good of new technologies and knowledge that will be needed for achieving cost-effective and deep cuts in emissions; and preparing for a changing climate through investments in adaptation and climate engineering. Many of those efforts require international coordination that has proven especially difficult to mobilize and sustain because international institutions are usually weak and thus unable to force collective action...."

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The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
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David G. Victor
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"How grievous are the wounds the rule of law has sustained over the past seven and one-half years?" FSI Director Coit D. Blacker asked at the beginning of FSI's fourth annual conference, Transitions 2009. This year's conference, coming on the heels of the U.S. presidential election, focused on opportunities for change offered by historic transitions at home and abroad. The Nov. 13 invitation-only event was attended by 370 Stanford scholars, outside experts, policymakers, diplomats, and leaders from business, medicine, and law, bringing together some of the sharpest minds in the country to formulate and discuss recommendations for U.S. President-elect Barack Obama and other world leaders.

The day-long conference was structured around a morning and an afternoon plenary, with a luncheon address by Oxford professor and Hoover Institution senior fellow Timothy Garton Ash. In his address, "Beyond the West? New Administrations in the U.S. and Europe Face the Challenge of a Multipolar World," Garton Ash urged concerted action on four projects of visionary realism: global economic order; development, democracy, and the rule of law; energy and the environment; and banishing nuclear weapons. Garton Ash also called for relaunching a strategic partnership among the United States and the 27-member European Union, not as a partnership against other nations, but as an alliance that would reach beyond the West to develop new and effective communities of shared purpose.

The morning plenary, "U.S. Transition 2009: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?" brought FSI Director Blacker together with Stanford President Emeritus and constitutional law scholar Gerhard Casper, Center on Health Policy/Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research Director Alan M. Garber and FSI senior fellow and former State Department policy planning director Stephen D. Krasner. Their varying but esteemed backgrounds allowed for a truly interdisciplinary discussion of the policy challenges, priorities, and prospects facing the new American president. "We have just lived through the most extraordinary claims to unbound power since the days of Richard Nixon," said Casper. "This rejection of the rule of law, just like the images of Abu Graib, will be present in the minds of many with whom we have to deal the world over."

The afternoon plenary, "Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat," featured Stephen J. Stedman, FSI senior fellow and director of the Ford Dorsey Program in International Studies; Bruce Jones, director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University; and Carlos Pascual, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. The three discussed their ambitious new project, Managing Global Insecurity Project (MGI) (MGI), which aims to provide recommendations and generate momentum for the next American president, the United Nations, and key international partners to launch a strategic effort to build the global partnerships and international institutions needed to meet 21st century trans-border challenges and threats. One key recommendation is to expand the current G-8 to a G-16 of established and rising powers by including China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and major Muslim nations such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Egypt.

Interactive breakout sessions in the morning and afternoon allowed participants to engage in debate with Stanford faculty and outside experts. Breakouts covered such diverse topics as combating HIV in low-resource countries, rethinking the war on terror, leveraging the EU to promote democracy and human rights, whether the U.S. should promote democracy, transitions in African society, working in a global economy, and overcoming barriers to nuclear disarmament.

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Fall 2007 SEAF visiting scholar Joseph Liow's study of Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia has been published by Oxford University Press. Liow is an associate professor in the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He worked on completing the manuscript at Stanford. SEAF director Don Emmerson blurbed the book as "broad in coverage yet rich in detail, cautionary without being alarmist, [and] a cogent antidote to wishful thinking about religion, society, and the state, not only in Malaysia but in the wider Muslim world as well."
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This conference, sponsored by the Asia Health Policy Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Global Aging Program of Stanford Center on Longevity, explored the impact of rapid aging on economic growth, labor markets, social insurance financing, long term care, and health care in China, Japan, and Korea.

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Michael H. Armacost Speaker
David Bloom Speaker Harvard University
Judith Banister Speaker The Conference Board
Naoki Ikegami Speaker Keio University
Soonman Kwon Speaker Seoul National University
Shripad Tuljapurkar Speaker Stanford University

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Marcus Feldman is the Burnet C. and Mildred Finley Wohlford Professor of Biological Sciences and director of the Morrison Institute for Population and Resource Studies at Stanford University. He uses applied mathematics and computer modeling to simulate and analyze the process of evolution. His specific areas of research include the evolution of complex genetic systems that can undergo both natural selection and recombination, and the evolution of learning as one interface between modern methods in artificial intelligence and models of biological processes, including communication. He also studies the evolution of modern humans using models for the dynamics of molecular polymorphisms, especially DNA variants. He helped develop the quantitative theory of cultural evolution, which he applies to issues in human behavior, and also the theory of niche construction, which has wide applications in ecology and evolutionary analysis. He also has a large research program on demographic issues related to the gender ratio in China.

Feldman is a trustee and member of the science steering committee of the Santa Fe Institute. He is managing editor of Theoretical Population Biology and associate editor of the journals Genetics; Human Genomics; Complexity; the Annals of Human Genetics; and the Annals of Human Biology. He is a former editor of The American Naturalist. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the California Academy of Science. His work received the "Paper of the Year 2003" award in all of biomedical science from The Lancet. He has written more than 335 scientific papers and four books on evolution, ecology, and mathematical biology. He received a BSc in mathematics and statistics from the University of Western Australia, an MSc in mathematics from Monash University (Australia), and a PhD in mathematical biology from Stanford. He has been a member of the Stanford faculty since 1971.

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Marcus W. Feldman Speaker Stanford University
Naohiro Ogawa Speaker Nihon University
Andrew Mason Speaker University of Hawaii
Shanlian Hu Speaker Fudan University
Edward Norton Speaker University of Michigan
Shuzhuo Li Speaker Xi'an Jiaotong University
Maria Porter Speaker University of Chicago
Meng Kin Lim Speaker National University of Singapore National University of Singapore
Kai Hong Phua Kai Hong Phua Speaker National University of Singapore National University of Singapore
John C. Campbell Speaker University of Michigan Emeritus
Byongho Tchoe Speaker Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
Young Kyung Do Speaker Asia Health Policy Program
Jian Wang Speaker Shandong University
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Abstract:  Scholars and policy-makers, when seeking to predict the future of nuclear proliferation, often refer to "nuclear capable states," or "latent nuclear weapons states," or "virtual nuclear powers."  There is consensus, however, about what such terms mean or how to measure a state's "nuclear latency," a condition that leads to widespread miscommunication and misunderstanding in the field.  This talk reviews alternative methods for measuring "nuclear latency" in the political science and technical literatures. It provides historical evidence of the wide range of time-lines for different states to move from one state of nuclear weapons development to more advanced states of development and identifies a set of political factors (including organizational competency, ambivalent political leadership, different arsenal size ambitions) that can influence the time-lags that states experience in their nuclear weapons programs. 

Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is on sabbatical in 2008-09. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons(Princeton University Press, 1993), and with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (W.W. Norton, 2002). He is the co-editor of Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James L. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000). Sagan was the recipient of Stanford University's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching and the 1998 Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching. As part of CISAC's mission of training the next generation of security specialists he and Stephen Stedman founded Stanford's Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies in 2000.

His recent articles include "How to Keep the Bomb From Iran," in Foreign Affairs (September-October 2006); "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969" co-written by Jeremi Suri and published in International Security in spring 2003; and "The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Will More Nuclear Security Forces Produce More Nuclear Security?" published in Risk Analysis in 2004. The first piece warns against "proliferation fatalism" and "deterrence optimism" to argue that the United States should work to prevent Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons by addressing the security concerns that are likely motivators for Iran's nuclear ambitions. The International Security piece looks into the events surrounding a secret nuclear alert ordered by President Nixon to determine how effective the alert was at achieving the president's goal of forcing negotiations for the end of the Vietnam War. It also questions many of the assumptions made about nuclear signaling and discusses the dangers of new nuclear powers using this technique. Sagan's article on redundancy in Risk Analysis won Columbia University's Institute for War and Peace Studies 2003 Best Paper in Political Violence prize. In this article, Sagan looks at how we should think about nuclear security and the emerging terrorist threat, specifically whether more nuclear facility security personnel increases our safety. His article, "Realism, Ethics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction" appears in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, edited by Sohail Hashmi and Steven Lee. In addition to these works, Sagan is also finishing a collection of essays for a book tentatively entitled Inside Nuclear South Asia.

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The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, where he previously served as the social science co-director. He is the Inaugural Harry Frank Guggenheim Fellow for Nuclear Ethics and Security at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs (2026-2027). Sagan also serves as co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, he was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus: Ethics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

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David Straub, the acting director of Korean Studies Program, argues that Obama administration will finally give diplomacy a chance to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem. He stresses that Senator Obama understands the difficulties of dealing with North Korea and will proceed carefully. If North Korea does not respond to this more nuanced American approach, he concludes, the international community is likely to be more supportive of U.S. efforts to constrain North Korean behavior.

Among conservatives in Korea and other American allied countries, there seems to be some anxiety about the election of a relatively unknown, young African-American liberal as the next American president. Typically, when a new U.S. president is elected, American diplomats seek to reassure allies by telling them that the incoming president will pursue fundamentally the same policies as the outgoing president. However, President Obama clearly will adopt a significantly different foreign policy than President Bush, including toward North Korea.

Obama’s soaring rhetoric has led to a widespread (and correct) impression of him as idealistic, but the long presidential campaign also revealed him to be a disciplined politician and a skillful manager. His foreign policy will be much closer to the prudent realpolitik of President Bush’s father than it will be to the “neo-con” approach of President Bush himself.
And while it is true that Obama does not have deep experience in foreign affairs, his youthful years spent in Indonesia and Hawaii, taken together with his successful navigation of American society as a young African-American man, have given him a genuine empathy for different peoples and cultures. He has the self-confidence and intelligence to listen with an open mind to others and then carefully to make his own decisions.

President Obama’s policy toward North Korea will defy stereotypes of the past. In some ways he will be “softer” on North Korea than President Bush; in other ways, he will be “tougher.”  Like President Bush and his predecessors, President Obama will take the position that he can never accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Obama will not engage in bluster such as “all options are on the table,” which most South Koreans reject and which only plays into the DPRK’s hands.

Instead, Obama will finally give diplomacy a fighting chance. Even during the past couple of years, President Bush remained very reluctant to engage fully in negotiations with North Korea. President Obama will order that a policy review be conducted expeditiously, and he will probably appoint a very senior special envoy to take charge of negotiations with North Korea. While maintaining the framework of the Six-Party Talks and consulting very closely with the Republic of Korea and Japan, he will also authorize meaningful bilateral negotiations with North Korea. If those negotiations bear real fruit, he may even visit Pyongyang himself if he is confident that he will be able to strike a deal completely ending North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

President Obama will probably offer North Korea a “more for more” deal. In other words, compared to President Bush he will propose a much more detailed and concrete series of steps to be taken by North Korea, the United States, and other members of the Six-Party Talks. The aim will be agreement on an early end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.

The North Koreans should not think that President Obama will be “easier” than President Bush. If, as may well be the case, the North Koreans reject President Obama’s approach or drag their feet in responding to it, he, unlike President Bush, will have the international credibility to work more effectively with other members of the Six-Party Talks and the international community to limit North Korea’s options.

Moreover, as a hardheaded domestic politician, President Obama will be careful to avoid situations in which the Republican opposition could credibly criticize him as being naïve about North Korea. Indeed, Obama’s team recognizes clearly that, having declared itself a nuclear weapons state and tested a nuclear device, North Korea may not be prepared to verifiably give up its nuclear weapons ambitions.

In formulating and conducting his policy toward North Korea, President Obama will have access to many trusted experts on North Korea, beginning with Vice President Biden and his staff. Obama is also advised by a number of experienced officials from the Clinton administration, from former Defense Secretary Bill Perry to former career diplomat Jeffrey Bader.

U.S. relations with the Republic of Korea are key to any successful American policy toward North Korea. Obama and his team fully appreciate the importance of U.S.-ROK relations and the security alliance. They will coordinate very closely with the Lee Myung-bak administration and never sacrifice the interests of the Republic of Korea, which is immeasurably more important to the United States than the DPRK is or ever will be.
 
President Obama will support the implementation of the agreements President Bush reached with the Republic of Korea on the realignment of U.S. Forces of Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control, as befits the ROK’s military and economic might.
 
Under President Obama, the United States will also aim to approve, with some adjustments, the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement, although it may take a year or so to do so as he perforce deals first with the global financial and economic crises and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  President Obama must be cognizant of the viewpoint of leading congressional Democrats and the constituencies they represent. It may be counterproductive if the ROK pushes too hard, too fast for U.S. approval of the FTA.
 
Obama’s inauguration will also open up new possibilities for U.S.-ROK coordination and cooperation on global issues. Unlike President Bush, whose early unilateralist mindset and specific policies caused dismay among international friends and foes alike, President Obama begins with a vast reservoir of sympathy and respect throughout the world. That will make it easier, and more useful, for the Republic of Korea to cooperate globally more with the United States.
 
In short, South Koreans should be reassured, not that President Obama’s foreign policy will be like that of President Bush, but that it will be different. Perhaps South Koreans will even begin to feel that their alliance with the United States is not just one that they feel they must have for their country’s long-term interests – but also one of which they can feel proud.

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