We write to invite you to an international conference on “Regional Carbon Policies” that PESD is hosting at Stanford University on Thursday, December 5^th. With efforts to expand international carbon markets beyond Europe’s trading scheme seemingly stalled, various countries and subnational jurisdictions have taken unilateral action on climate policy. Switzerland, the Canadian provinces of Québec and British Columbia, California, the member states of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern United States, and New Zealand have all moved forward on carbon markets or taxes. Asian countries including Japan, India, South Korea, and China are also in the process of implementing carbon policies.
 
Linking regional efforts to create a single larger carbon market has the potential to increase the impact and reduce the cost of climate mitigation. With this in mind, our conference brings together academics, government policymakers, and market participants to share the best available academic and practical knowledge about how to make regional carbon policies work. We specifically seek to: 1) identify common implementation challenges facing regional climate policies around the world, 2) formulate a “best practice” market design that can serve as a starting point for a country or region contemplating a GHG emissions allowance market, and 3) identify the policy pathways most likely to foster rapid and successful integration of regional carbon efforts. An additional goal of the meeting is to identify key market rules and integration protocols that can be tested as part of a new research project at Stanford that uses structured “games” to simulate cap and trade markets.

We hope you will join us for this unique event.

Click here for the conference agenda and to register
                                                                                       
Frank A. Wolak                                       Mark C. Thurber
Director, PESD                                          Associate Director, PESD
wolak@stanford.edu                              mthurber@stanford.edu

REAP co-director Scott Rozelle begins a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." Rozelle explains why continued high income inequality could spell trouble for China's future growth and stability.

REAP co-director Scott Rozelle begins a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." Rozelle explains why continued high income inequality could spell trouble for China's future growth and stability.

To read the column in Chinese, click here.

> To read Column 2: China's Inequality Starts During the First 1,000 Days, click here. 

> To read Column 3: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 1), click here. 

> To read Column 4: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 2), click here.  

> To read Column 5: How to Cure China's Largest Epidemic, click here.

> To read Column 6: A Tale of Two Travesties, click here. 

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Inequality 2030:

Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair

Column 1: Introduction and why we need to worry about inequality

Inequality is underrated

China’s growth slowed in 2012 and in the first half of 2013. And, the world is holding its collective breath. Can China’s once white-hot economy be re-ignited and continue to blaze ahead? Or has its economy finally begun its inevitable slow down, a braking that all countries that reach middle income levels of development experience.

While the financial pundits and economic crystal ball gazers are focused on growth rates and world economy spillovers, we are worrying about another indicator: China’s level of inequality. In fact, we believe that what happens to inequality in the future is probably more important in the long run than growth. Whether high or low, we believe the nation’s income distribution will be one of the most important determinants of the quality of life in China in the 2030s.

Why is inequality more important than growth? Of course, nominally both are important. China needs to maintain 6 to 8 percent over the next 10 years. China needs to continue to grow 4 to 6 percent until 2030. However, we believe that as China’s economy matures over the next two decades, growth will slow. The growth rates of healthy, developed economies are never more than 2 to 3 percent. This slowing is inevitable. It is a done deal. Inequality, on the other hand, could be high or low. And, if it is high: China could be in for a troubled adulthood. It could even be headed for stagnation. High inequality could even lead to collapse and the loss of all things good that have been built up over the past three decades.

Remedial learning about Inequality and the Middle Income Trap

So what allows some countries to successfully transition from middle to high income? Solid banking practices: important. Good corporate governance: a must. Competition policy: few would argue. In this part of the column we want to put forth an argument that an equitable income distribution is also a necessary ingredient for long-run, stable growth. The basis of this statement is an empirical regularity that characterizes nearly every case of successful development (during the shift from middle to high income) in the last half of the 20^th century.

Since 1945, we can divide the world into three groups of countries. The high income countries, like the US, the UK, Germany and France; the poor and chronically underdeveloped; and the new members of the OECD club. Somewhat surprisingly, over the past 70 years, there have been only 15 or so countries that have graduated from poor to middle to high income. The list includes two East Asian countries/regions (South Korea and Taiwan); four Mediterranean countries (Portugal; Spain; Greece and Israel); six Eastern European countries (Croatia; Slovenia; Slovak Republic; Hungary; Czech Republic and Estonia; and two other countries (Ireland and New Zealand).

Most salient for our column is that in the case of all of these successful countries an equitable income distribution is feature they all share. This is true goingback as early in their development paths as possible. Using a popular measure of inequality, the Gini ratio (where 0 is perfect equality and 100 is perfect inequality), it can be shown that the average Gini ratio of the new members of the OECD club is only 33, a level of the Gini that is relative low. The range of the Gini measures for these successfully graduating countries is from 26 to 39. Not one of the Gini ratios is more than 40. Such a pattern of income distributions suggests that, on average, those countries that were successful in moving from low to middle to higher income not only share a common growth path, successfully took them from middle to high income, all of the nations did so with fairy low levels of inequality.

Such low levels of inequality for the successfully developed countries can be seen to be in stark contrast to the countries in the world that grew, hit middle income status and then ultimately stagnated or collapsed. Argentina, Brazil, Iraq and Mexico are examples of countries that had rapid spurts of growth, joined the ranks of the world’s middle income countries, only to find their growth aspirations squashed. These countries all were striving to become high income, industrialized, developed countries. At some point during the past 70 years, however, each of these countries experienced either dire collapse or long and frustrating stagnation.

What is a characteristic that all of these failed-to-move-up-from-middle-income countries share? When comparing the Gini ratios of these wannabe-but-never-made-it nations with those that successfully graduated, there could not be a greater contrast. Whereas there were no successful developed countries with a Gini ratio over 40, there were no countries that experience growth and stagnation/collapse with Gini ratios under 40. The Gini ratios of Brazil and Mexico and Iraq were all around 50.

So where is China on this list? China’s level of inequality, according to one of the most complete and internationally comparable study done at Beijing Normal University by Professor Li Shi and his colleagues, is among the highest in the world. As of 2007, it was 50 (or 49.7 to be precise). Between 2003 and 2007 it rose more than any country in the world. Others say it is higher—see the work of Li Gan from Sichuan University. Hence, although China has attained middle income status in the past decade, it also is part of a group of countries that is trying to transition to high income status at levels of inequality which have not ever been associated with successful transition—at least not in the past 70 years.

What is the problem with high inequality?

So why is it that inequality is so inimical for a middle income country striving to reach high income? We believe the reason is twofold. The first has to do with the inevitability of growth slow down and expectations. When a country is growing fast (as countries can do when they are moving from poor to middle income—as China has been over the past three decades), even if there is a high level inequality, most people in society have expectations that they will be better off if they stick inside the system. In China during the past several decades, even for those at the lower end of the income distribution, their standard of living is higher now than 10 years ago. Relying on extrapolations from the past, most people believe that they will continue to become better off. At the very least they will tell you that they expect their children will be able to live a better life in the future.

High growth has made these rising expectations possible—even for the poor. There has been enough for all to “go around.” Hence, with positive expectations about being able to get better in the future, even facing long working hours, cruel living conditions and low wages, individuals have chosen to work “inside the system.” For most, working in the system mean that they get a job, save as much as possible and look forward to making even more and having more savings in the future.

This whole system, however, is predicated on growth trickling down to the poor. If growth slows, it is possible that the expectations may not be realized. We believe that it is these expectations that have produced the glue holding society together—despite the high levels of inequality.  The key question or the real fear is that when expectations are popped, individuals may decide to opt out of the system into the informal or even the gray/black economy.

The second problem with high income inequality is that it often is accompanied by high inequality in education, nutrition and health. So why is this a problem? In a high income, developed economy, by definition wages are high. Because wages are high, however, employers will demand that employees are equipped with the requisite skills—math, language, science, English, computer skills—to perform tasks that create earnings that help offset the high wages. If individuals do not have such skills, employers may take actions to layoff such employees or not hire them in the first place. Employers will look to replace labor with capital and/or move low-skilled jobs off shore. The problem with many countries that have grown fast from poor the middle income and are currently trying to push onto high income status is that there was a disconnect between what students learned in the previous decade or so and what job skills are needed. If a high enough proportion of the labor force is not equipped with the skills needed for a high wage economy, a share of the labor force might become unemployable. As before, if this polarization of the labor force occurs, the only choice of those that are unemployable by the formal labor force would be to move into the informal labor force and/or gray/black economy.

While all economies have such polarized segments of their economy, there are several problems facing middle income countries—especially those that had grown fast in recent years. Dealing with large shares of population in an informal economy requires lots of resources—for unemployment insurance, disability, retraining, health, etc. Since these countries have not yet graduated to high income status, by definition, their level of wealth might make it difficult to spend large sums of money to contain disruption out of the informal economy. If the disruption continues, it can lead to escalating violence and unrest, which will require even more resources to contain. Ironically, the very disruption that is being created by the slowing growth could very well lead to a further slowing of growth if fewer resources are spent on productive investments (instead of containment) and if the disruption itself diminishes interest in investment inside the country. In addition, many of those in the informal economy may exhibit particularly unsatisfied behavior (read anger and disaffection) since the may well feel their original expectations were undermined by the formal establishment. If the size of this part of the population is big enough, the country could find itself atop a powder keg.

In summary, then, the problem with inequality is complicated but real. Inequality in the face of slow growth can lead to unfulfilled expectations and diminished opportunities. Individuals can be polarized into two groups: those inside the system and those outside the system. If inequality is particularly great, the number of those outside the system could be large. Since middle income countries are not rich yet, resources may be insufficient to contain the anger and violence of those in the gray/black economies and/or support the needs of those in the informal economy (who are not contributing a lot to the overall economy). If the disruption is large enough, there could be negative feedback onto growth which could serve to further exacerbate the problem. An end point of stagnation or collapse is certainly plausible.

Our column’s real title: 10 ways to battle inequality; 10 ways to save China’s future

This column is going to be a series of ten articles about China’s inequality. It is a column about how managing that inequality may mean the difference between a bright and vibrant China in 2033 and a China teetering on the edge of collapse. Despite the potential doom, however, this is a column of hope because we believe inequality can be managed—given aggressive, enlightened and motivated decisions TODAY … or at least in the very near future.

However, this column is not about inequality today. We are not going to analyze the accuracy of the estimates of income inequality produced by the China National Bureau of Statistics. We are not going to vote for the higher estimate of Li Shi and his group from Beijing Normal University or the even higher one from Sichuan University’s Li Gan. We are simply going to live with the status quo, one that virtually everyone agrees with: China’s income distribution in 2013 is highly unequal.

Instead we are going to be writing about inequality tomorrow. However, one of the most basic axioms of poverty economics—especially given China’s high inequality today—means that we need to be engaged in this battle against high inequality tomorrow today. The axiom that we are talking about has been made famous both by Nobel Laureates who are spinning their advice for the global economy and by retiring economic planners-cum-policy makers as they write their memoirs. The iron rule of income distribution—lets call this Axiom 1, at some point in the future is:

Tomorrow’s income inequality = Today’s income inequality + Today’s human capital inequality.

This simple formula, above all, embodies on important lesson. Tomorrow’s income inequality is what we are interested in. The first installment of our column today has tried to motivate that this has to be low – or at least not too high – for China to enjoy long-run sustained growth and stable prosperity. We also know—by assumption or by common sense—that Today’s income inequality is high. Hence: to get to where we want to go—that is, low income inequality in the 2030s—we have one and only one degree of freedom. We need to put tremendous attention on reducing human capital inequality today.

If you are following our argument, and if you know anything about the gap between health and education in China today, this column would appear to be one of despair. In fact, this column will fuel that despair. Why? Because are going to show that the human capital gap in China today is ugly. Ugly as in wide. The gap is wide for education. The gap is wide for nutrition. The gap is wide for health. It is wide for babies, preschoolers, elementary school kids, those in middle and high school and for the college-bound. If China does not do anything—and, we mean act seriously—about this gap, and you believe in Axiom 1, it may be time for you to begin to plan for the worst in the coming years.

However, this column will also try to be a source of hope. We will discuss a large number of interventions that work. There are actions that can reduce the human capital gaps at all age levels—from infants to those in elite universities. They are proven. Many are cheap. Many are simple. Some need fundamental rethinking. But, when you add up the price tag of them all and you compare it to the possible costs in the future, we believe a War on Rural Education, Nutrition and Health Inequality is the Best Buy that the government can make.

Stay tuned, then, in the coming months—one column per month. We are going to write about inequality in baby health, nutrition and cognitive abilities between infants in the Qingling Mountains in Southern Shaanxi and China’s tiny princes and princesses in the cities in October. We are going to write about preschool inequality in November. December, January and February will examine the health, nutrition and education crises in poor rural elementary schools and in schools in China’s migrant communities. The rest of the months will talk about inequality in middle school, vocational high school, academic high school and college. There is not a lot of pretty about the gaps that exist in each of these age groups. However, as we stated above, we also will offer solutions—ones that we have evaluated; others that others have initiated. Many of them work. Others need more effort. We will try to inform you of the choices and the hope that can be created by trying. Seriously trying.

From August 18-22, the Japan Studies Program welcomed scholars of political science and economics to the Oksenberg conference room in Encina Hall for the first annual Stanford Summer Juku on the Japanese Political Economy.

The main goal of the program is to attract young researchers who will go on to become leaders in the study of Japanese politics and Japanese economy in the near future. The Summer Juku is distinctive by allowing ample time for informal discussions and interactions beyond the standard presentations and discussions. Juku is a word most commonly associated with the modern Japanese cram schools, but here it actually refers to the private schools at the end of the Edo period, which attracted young, motivated students and ended up producing numerous leaders of the Meiji Restoration.

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The first two days focused on political science, while the second two days were on economics.

In the first session, Yusaku Horiuchi from Dartmouth College presented a coauthored paper analyzing the role of the U.S.-Japan security alliance on Japan’s postwar economic growth. They employed a novel statistical method relatively new to political science called the synthetic control method to contend that the acceleration of Japan’s economic growth from 1958 coincided with the consolidation of the alliance. Discussants were Amy Catalinac (Australian National University) and William Grimes (Boston University).

In the second session, Shorenstein APARC fellow and political science faculty Phillip Lipscy presented part of his book project on the question of what explains cross-national variation in energy policy. He contended that electoral incentives best explained variation in energy efficiency policies. Using a new dataset of transportation trends in OECD countries and an in-depth examination of the impact of Japan’s 1994 electoral reform, he finds that energy efficiency-enhancing policies are more feasible in non-majoritarian systems, which allow the imposition of high, diffuse costs on the general public. Discussants were Gregory Noble (University of Tokyo) and Yusaku Horiuchi (Dartmouth College).

In the final session on the first day, Amy Catalinac presented her paper that poses the question of what led to the dramatic rise in conservative Japanese politicians’ attention to national security since 1997. She argued that electoral reform in 1994 led to new incentives for conservative politicians to focus on national security. Her analysis involved applying a statistical model called latent Dirichlet allocation to over 7000 election manifestoes over 8 House of Representatives elections. Discussants were Saori Katada (University of Southern California) and Christina Davis (Princeton University).

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Kenji Kushida, research associate at Shorenstein APARC, started off the second day by presenting the main argument of his book project on understanding why Silicon Valley companies have continually disrupted the global information and communications technology (ICT) industry. Analyzing the case of Japan’s ICT sector in comparative international context, he showed that national political settlements at initial stages of liberalization shaped industry structures, which in turn shaped global markets characterized by rapid commoditization. Discussants were Gregory Noble (University of Tokyo) and Ulrike Schaede (University of California, San Diego).

The second presenter was Kay Shimizu from Columbia University, who presented her book project analyzing distributive politics under conditions of fiscal austerity. Focused on the question of what happens to personalistic politics when resources run low, she argued that budget-constrained politicians work to find new resources locally and to secure votes by creating more personal linkages to voters. Her study is based on an analysis of Japan between 1991 and 2011, showing how subnational politicians sought to influence lending practices of private regional banks through publicly funded credit guarantees. Discussants were Steven Vogel (UC Berkeley) and Jonathan Rodden (Stanford University).

The third presenter, Saadia Pekkanen (University of Washington), presented the introduction of her edited volume explaining the construction of external institutions by Asian states. She explained how the project was motivated by the desire to better understand how and why Asian states might shape the contemporary world order, and what kinds of institutionalized rules and structures they might bring into play, along with the consequences for global patterns of governance. She presented a typology of external institutional designs based on formal/informal underlying organizational structures, and hard/soft underlying legal rules, based on a new database of over 6000 international institutions covering Asia’s economic, security, and transnational human security institutions. Discussants were William Grimes (Boston University) and Christina Davis (Princeton University).

Following the second day, a conference dinner was joined by both political science and economics segment participants.

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The third day began the economics-focused segment of the Summer Juku, beginning with Ulrike Schaede (UC San Diego) presenting a co-authored paper with Tatsuo Ushijima (Aoyama Gakuin University) analyzing the economic role and valuation effects of subsidiary M&A in Japan between 1996 and 2010. They conducted an event study, pairing and analyzing both sides to the deal, finding that abnormal returns to buyers and sellers both increase with deal size. They find that Japanese firms selling core business subsidiaries lead to negative returns, accentuated in larger deals. They interpret that this penalty was either an uncertainty discount or a signaling effect that the firm was in distress. Discussants were Robert Eberhart (Santa Clara University) and Ayako Yasuda (University of California, Davis).

The second presentation by Hitoshi Shigeoka examined the effects of school entry cut-off ages for children on the timing of births. Given the tradeoff for parents to time births just before and after cutoff dates, his analysis of births from 1974-2010 in Japan led to his finding that more than 1800 births per year were shifted roughly a week before the cut-off date to the week following the cut-off date. He went on to analyze the heterogeneity in responses among mothers along dimensions including work, baby gender, income and skill levels. Discussants were Karen Eggleston (Stanford FSI) and Toshiaki Iizuka (University of Tokyo).

In the third session, Thomas Cargill (University of Nevada) presented a paper co-authored with Jennifer Holt Dwyer (City University of New York) examining the concept of central bank independence and the case of Japan. Their core contention was that the postwar evolution of Bank of Japan policy reveals that de facto central bank independence was neither necessary nor sufficient for price stability. They argue that the causal association between central bank independence and price stability is a myth, with the broader implication that less time should be spent measuring central bank independence in correlation with inflation measures, with efforts instead focused on understanding the political and economic conditions under which central banks are most likely to contribute to price stability and how to design operating frameworks that facilitate this. Discussants were Helen Popper (Santa Clara University) and Ken Kuttner (Williams College)

The fourth day opened with Koichiro Ito (Boston College) presenting his paper co-authored with Takanori Ida (Kyoto University) and Makoto Tanaka (GRIPS) that investigates how consumer responds to marginal prices of dynamic electricity pricing. Their randomized field experiments yield various findings including consumers’ reduction of consumption facing hourly marginal price changes,  the effectiveness of dynamic pricing with certain parameters over conservation warnings, and differences across factors such as income levels and the level of electricity usage. Discussants were Aoki Masahiko (Stanford Shorenstein APARC) and Matthew Kahn (University of California, Los Angeles).

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The second presentation was by Satoshi Koibuchi (Chuo University) of a paper co-authored with Takatoshi Ito (RIETI), Kiyotaka Sato (Yokohama National University), and Junko Shimizu (Gakushuin University). The paper examined the choice of invoicing currency for Japanese export firms based on an extensive questionnaire. Key findings included variation of yen-invoicing according to arms-length versus intra-firm trade, size and trade type, and the extent of currency hedging that the firm engages in. Discussants were Katheryn Russ (University of California, Davis) and Mark Spiegel (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco).

The final presentation was by David Vera (California State University, Fresno) of a paper co-authored with Kazuki Onji (Australian National University) and Takeshi Osada (Bunri University of Hospitality), which examines how capital injections into Japanese banks triggered labor force rejuvenations at those banks. Using a difference-in-difference analysis of a panel of Japanese banks from 1990-2010, they find that for banks receiving public capital injections, the average age of employees got younger.  They also find that the number of employees of those banks was reduced on a stand-alone basis, but on a consolidated basis including subsidiaries, the number of employees was not reduced. Their findings suggest that lifetime employment survived, though in a limited form, among restructured banks. Discussants were Masami Imai (Wesleyan University) and Kelly Wang (Federal Reserve Board).

Each day, the sessions finished shortly after two o’clock, leaving ample time for informal discussion and networking. Summer Juku participants could be found around Encina Hall and other parts of campus working on collaborative projects, exchanging information, and discussing ideas for future collaboration. We look forward to future collaborations hatched at this event, and are committed to further developing this Stanford Summer Juku as an ongoing activity at the Shorenstein APARC Japan Studies Program.

2008的6月，超过1000万的考生参加了高考，以竞争570个进入大学的名额。尽管高考的初衷是给予每个学生平等的机会，但严重的不平等依然存在着。同等条件下，北京的考生相对于陕西的考生就有更多的上大学的机会，因为北京有更多大学和招生名额。同世界上其他地方一样，中国的大学也倾于照顾本地的生源。

For more than thirty years, Shorenstein APARC’s Corporate Affiliates Visiting Fellows Program has offered a unique opportunity for affiliate organizations to nominate personnel to spend an academic year at the Center. Since 1982 — one year before the Center even existed — visiting fellows in the program have been sharing ideas, forming connections, and broadening perspectives, from the early years when a handful of visiting fellows were hosted at Galvez House to recent groups of close to twenty visitors each year meeting in Encina Hall’s Okimoto conference room. As a recent visiting fellow observed, “Academically, professionally, and personally, the different perceptions I have now will change the way I approach and understand my future work.”

The present cohort of visiting fellows represents organizations in China, India, Japan, and Korea, and each fellow brings years of practical experience and an international perspective that informs and enriches the intellectual exchange at the Center and at Stanford University. A majority of the current affiliate organizations have participated continuously in the program for the past five years, or even longer.

The program — ideal for mid-career managers who wish to deepen their knowledge on topics relevant to their work — has fellows participating in a structured program, which includes creating an individual research project; auditing classes; attending exclusive seminars; and visiting local companies and institutions. In addition to broadening their views through interaction with world-class scholars, visiting fellows can network with managers from different countries and corporations.

With such an array of activities, every day in the life of a visiting fellow is different, and every year differs as well. The core research goal remains constant, but the changing composition of each group — more female fellows, varied professional backgrounds, and new countries joining the mix — keeps the program exciting and unique. One of the earliest visiting fellows from one of the longest-standing affiliate organizations put it best: “Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University and, more broadly, the Silicon Valley are culturally unique, and this program offers a great opportunity to understand some of the ins and outs and different mindsets that make the region so successful.”

The wide variety of participants has possessed an equally broad range of interests. Over the past three decades, visiting fellows have pursued research on topics ranging from “The Deregulation of Telecommunications Industries in Japan and the United States” to “Northeast Asian Interdependence;” from “Corporate Governance & Energy Management” to “Advanced Tools for Complete Characterization of Biopharmaceutical Products” to “Risk Management in Large Commercial Banks in China.”

Once visiting fellows return to their home institutions, the Corporate Affiliates Program stays connected with alumni, allowing it to maintain close partnerships with not only its affiliate organizations, but also with all of the people who have passed through the program. The alumni network has grown to more than 350, with many individuals holding prominent positions in both the corporate and governmental sectors, working in countries around the world including Russia, France, Indonesia, and Australia. Recent alumni events held in locations like Seoul and Tokyo have kept the program in close contact even with those visiting fellows who came through the Center during the early years.

The Corporate Affiliates Visiting Fellows Program thrives by bringing together a diverse international group, and through the shared experiences of research and study at Stanford University. It creates long-lasting bonds and a new community — one that enriches the university and finds within itself new, constructive perspectives. Ultimately, the hope is that these experiences will over time contribute to stronger U.S.-Asia relations.

» Large gallery: Highlights from Corporate Affiliates Program activities